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Abstract 
 
This investigation attempts to consider the identity of the contemporary 
Bergsonian philosophy of immanence by reflection on key conceptualisations 
from the work of Henri Bergson.  From the view that thinking Bergsonian is 
an attitude of philosophy that anticipates the metaphysics of a philosophy of 
process,  the demands of the emergence of thinking in art plays a role the 
directions of philosophical development.   It is by this concern that key 
Bergsonian concepts serve as grounding of philosophical reflections of the 
related themes of time, images, and movement, and the change of thinking, 
towards an encounter of the practice of philosophy through the process of 
painting. Under the rubric of contemporary process metaphysics in art, we 
will attempt to establish a conceptual framework from principle Bergsonian 
conceptualizations, to acknowledge the process of painting as a different 
methodology of philosophy.  This study of philosophy through painting then 
becomes a corresponding philosophy of the difference of thinking and the 
challenges to go beyond its identity.  Proceeding by Bergsonian 
conceptualisations, to frame the context for a philosophy of painting, the 
question of the identity of painting is situated according to the didactic 
philosophies of Wassily Kandinsky.  The comparisons and philosophical 
engagement between Bergsonian thinking and Kandinskian painting will be 
mediated by the counter interpretations of the philosophy of Michel Henry.  
The motivation to return to Bergsonian, exercised by a synthesis of Bergson’s 
concepts and Kandinsky’s theoretical practice, is situated according to an 
understanding of the identity of painting according to the terms of an ontology 
of images. In terms of a Bergsonian account of image, supported by a 
Kandinskian perspective, the focus will be towards the possibilities of 
philosophy and the metaphysics of becoming through the process of painting. 
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Introduction 
Introduction: 
An Ontology of Images & Painterly Subjectivity 
 
The aim of this work is to advance a Bergsonian theory of art by presenting a 
philosophy of painting in terms of an ontology of images, whereby thinking 
and perceiving are not definitive conditions but continuously changing 
realities immanent to a manifold world of becoming in which the expressions 
and experiences of change are encountered and actualised through the process 
of painting. In this way, we are arguing from the nature of the Bergsonian 
philosophy of philosophizing, as a relational experience of thinking in time, 
to extend the project of philosophy and the questions of our understanding in 
relation to painting and the prospects of its process. Painting is firstly an 
activity and process of creativity. It is the effort towards the creative 
composition of images from either the painter’s view in the activity or the 
reception of the painted image according to the viewer’s experience of image 
as sensuous encounter. It is this manner of regarding painting as a different 
mode of thinking, as thinking through the development and extension of 
perceptual faculties immediate to the becoming of perception, that we view 
the process of painting as itself philosophical. Because Bergsonian 
philosophy offers us the conception of the world as a vast and dynamic 
plurality of differing temporalities, so that everything is no less and no more 
than a duration of images in flux, we may then view painting as a philosophy 
because of its particular articulation of images and the proximation of the 
process to the ceaseless becoming and flux of perception. By the effort of its 
compositional qualities, forms of experience and expression encountered 
through the activity that defines the process of painting, means that the 
attention of painting so far as the result of the differences and generative 
expressions of painted images are respective of the process of perceptual 
images, continuous with experience, durational and immanent to the world.  
 
Much consideration has been given to the impact of Bergson’s philosophy in 
the work of modernist painting and literature and the distinction of his 
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influence in the early period of the twentieth century. For instance, in Mark 
Antliff’s study Inventing Bergson: Cultural Politics and the Parisian Avant-
Garde, (1993) 1we are given a thorough account of the force of Bergson’s 
thought within the avante-garde movements and diffusion of Bergsonism in 
the last century of art history. Antliff’s work serves as a definitive historical 
account, and is regarded as part of the more recent reintegration of Bergsonian 
philosophies in contemporary philosophy. When coupled with the renowned 
critical reappraisal of Bergsonian thinking in John Mullarkey’s, The New 
Bergson (1999)2,in which another of Antill’s studies in the essay, ‘The 
Rhythms of Duration: Bergson and the Art of Matisse’, the direction of 
scholarship on Bergsonian philosophy, has been moving towards the present 
application and continued activity. The establishment of Bergson’s 
philosophy and its legacy, as yet a reevaluation of a system of a process 
philosophy of time and the acceleration of theories of difference and changing 
modes of thinking from its inspiration, allow us to understand the justification 
for its continuance.  
 
However, it is here that we argue to move beyond an account of Bergson’s 
thinking and the work of the identification of Bergsonian theories in art 
history. While Antliff examines Bergson’s influence within the modernist 
avant-garde circles of art by a ‘Metaphysics of rhythmic duration’, and this in 
turn leads to Antliff’s argument to consider ‘the re-opening of aesthetic 
closure by Bergsonian aesthetics and its philosophical legacy’, we are more 
interested in how this legacy is to proceed.  In this respect, we are going 
beyond the survey and examinations of Bergson’s influence, as these surveys 
have served to reinforce the philosophical enterprise of Bergson’s original 
notion of the corporeal temporality of duration, which, by its very nature, 
incites philosophy’s self-appraisal in its ubiquitous realisation in the 
concreteness of reality.  Hence, we wish to consider the extension and time of 
                                                     
1 M. Antliff, Inventing Bergson: Cultural politics and the Parisian avant-garde (Princeton 
University Press Princeton, 1993). 
2 J. Mullarkey, The New Bergson (Manchester University Press, 1999). 
    
3  
 
 
Introduction 
a Bergsonian inspired sense of the process of thinking, in which the current 
activity of philosophy is enhanced by the attendance of such a thinking in 
terms of the immediacy and presence of philosophical genetic relations in 
painting.   By this we are inclined to consider that such a thinking contributes 
to a philosophy situated in the process of painting, and thereby, understood 
through the living experiences of the painter, the immediate encounters with 
the material and concrete forms of perception enacted in the rendering of the 
painted image, and the ongoing activity of the progress of painting in the 
discovery of new expression and visual forms through the articulation of the 
process.   
 
 This is not a radical departure from other systems of philosophy that 
have regarded the identity of philosophy in terms of an ontology of becoming 
and which occasions the being of perception or the activity of thinking 
analogously to the changing nature of painting.  Recently, Nicholas de 
Warren’s study, ‘Flesh Made Paint’3, begins with the question of ‘What is 
Painting?’ to then continue elaboration upon Merleau-Ponty’s system of 
thinking on painting and thought. In particular, De Warren’s study, as a 
contribution to the contemporary phenomenological approach to painting, 
upholds the principle insights of Merleau-Ponty’s definitive essay, Eye and 
Mind4, explaining that painting is a form of thinking and is necessarily 
evidence of the relationship between philosophy and art. We recognize that 
Merleau-Ponty’s research and its present continuation through the evaluation 
and study of his aesthetics in the current developments of phenomenology 
may not be fully appreciated without the recognition of the intellectual 
influence of Bergson’s philosophy. From Merleau-Ponty’s own admission in 
‘The Philosophy of Existence’, from the study, Text and Dialogues, and from 
his inaugural address for his election to the chair of philosophy at the College 
de France, ‘In Praise of Philosophy’, we see the importance of the influence 
                                                     
3 N. de Warren, 'Tamino’s Eyes, Pamina’s Gaze: Husserl’s phenomenology of image-
consciousness refashioned', Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences,  (Springer, 2010). 
4 M. Merleau-Ponty, 'Eye and mind (C. Dallery, Trans.)', The primacy of perception. 
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of Bergson’s philosophy, but more so, the capacity of Bergsonian thinking to 
affect the development of other currents of thinking within established 
traditions of thought.  This is most clearly articulated in Gary Gutting’s 
comprehensive work, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century5. 
Gutting’s sketches the major trends of French philosophy, dedicating an entire 
chapter to establish that Bergson’s influence, most notably on his 
commitment to a metaphysics of ‘individual agency and creativity’, remains 
not simply as a longstanding tradition, but as a diffusion of philosophical 
influence with its own retrospective activity concerning notions of differing 
modes of individuality and questions of the locus of originality, and thereby, 
spurring towards a progress and continuation of the possibilities of process 
thinking in current debate. 
 
For our purpose, we recognize the direction concluded by Gutting’s 
scholarship, and assume the ‘interludes’ of philosophy are the movements of 
philosophy in the contact with the arts. Most importantly, however, as with 
De Warren’s recent study6, the contemporary turn of philosophical 
examination of the arts in relation to philosophy highlights two important 
themes: art is now currently regarded as related to research and argument and 
tantamount to the claims of this present writing, namely, the specificity of the 
medium of painting as enacting subjective conditions of perception, and, the 
changing relationship between the process of painting and the process of 
thinking through visual forms and the living express.  The contemporaneous 
nature of the question of painting, such as in the case of De Warren’s study, 
is evidence of the need to continue the project of philosophies of painting, and 
to pursue the advancement of the broader project of philosophy through the 
process of painting. However, this is also a question of the process of 
philosophy, a question that is driven by the principle Bergsonian notion of 
                                                     
5 G. Gutting, French philosophy in the twentieth century (Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
6 N. de Warren, 'Tamino’s Eyes, Pamina’s Gaze: Husserl’s phenomenology of image-
consciousness refashioned', Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences,  (Springer, 2010). 
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philosophy as thinking difference by virtue of the becoming of all reality, to 
include the reality of thinking in the temporality of painting.  The effort to 
think Bergsonian, and to apply this understanding of thinking to different 
phenomena of thinking processes has been recently addressed in the works of 
John Mullarkey’s and Charlotte De Mille’s edited collection of essays, 
‘Bergson and the Art of Immanence: Painting, Photography, Film’7.  What 
has been ventured in this collection is an effort towards ‘recuperating 
Bergson’, and according to the authors’ own descriptions, this has been 
through the approaches of a variety of perspectives from the differing authors 
on the lineage of Bergsonian theory in art history.  The studies that address 
the relation of painting and philosophy, in particular, highlight the pervasive 
and diffuse nature of Bergson’s charge to turn away from the conventional 
systems of thinking, and this ‘turning‘ made evident in the response of artist 
movements in the modernist period. For example, and more specific to our 
concerns of this Bergsonian turn extended to philosophy in the practice of 
painting, in Eric Alliez’s study, ‘Mattise, Bergson, Oiticica, etc.’, he evaluates 
the impact of Bergsonian philosophy on the work of Henri Matisse and 
indicates the tracing of Bergsonian philosophical thinking in the Matissean 
development of art.  According to Alliez, the development of Matisse’s work 
was for Bergsonian philosophy, a projection of ‘it’s very first inscription’.  By 
this, we see that Alliez’s study argues for the insight of Matissean art as being 
more than a philosophy represented in painting, as a stylized Bergson-ism, 
but instead, the Matissean development was demonstrably the work of 
Bergsonian philosophy, as the work of the painter going beyond the 
convention of painterly practice through the enactment and constitutive nature 
of duration in painting.  This does not dissuade our argument, but rather, 
compels us to look further into the exchange of philosophy and painting.  
Paired with Alliez’s essay, and what we consider as compelling our argument 
forward, is the work of Brendan Prendeville’s study, concerning the relation 
                                                     
7 J. Mullarkey and C. de Mille, Bergson and the art of immanence: painting, photography, 
film (Edinburgh University Press, 2013). 
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of painting and phenomenology, ‘Painting the Invisible: Time, Matter, and 
the Image in Bergson and Michel Henry’.  Alliez’s study highlights the work 
of Matisse as a precedent of the turn of Bergsonian thinking in painting, and 
doubling as a turn from the conventionally views of the identity of painting 
distinct from the work of philosophy.  
 
However, and more specifically, Prendeville’s study invites us to consider the 
proximity of parallels between Bergson’s thought and the more recent 
addition to the tradition of phenomenology, through the ‘unorthodox 
phenomenologist’ Michel Henry.  What is particular to the content of our 
argument is that Prendeville’s study works in the area of the exchange and 
dialogue between Bergsonian thought and Henry’s philosophy.  However, 
Prendeville’s critical assessment of Henry’s reading and understanding of the 
writings and paintings of Wassily Kandinsky are more pronounced than any 
actual connections derived between Bergsonian philosophy and Kandinskian 
theory. It is our view that even though Prendeville’s study brings Kandinskian 
theory into the broader study of Bergsonian immanence philosophy and its 
application in the vocations of art history and theory, it is lacking because the 
relation between Bergson’s philosophy and Kandisnky’s theory is presented 
as no more than an approximation.  As both figures were contemporaries, 
there has not been an adequate survey or investigation, respective to the 
projects of Bergsonian philosophy and correlations of the radical change of 
painting in the twentieth century in terms of the development of abstraction 
through painting, according to the foundations of the conceptualization in the 
Kandinskian theories and practice of painting. In this regard, we see Alliez’s 
study as itself a tacit argument for the augmentation of contemporary 
Bergsonian scholarship with precedents of the Bergsonian turn of Mattisean 
painting, as the instantiation of original thought by the enactment of the 
exchange of thinking and expression of duration through painting. Likewise, 
we are interested in both the comparisons and the potential for the 
continuation of a philosophy through painting founded on the direct 
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connections between Bergsonian and Kandisnkian models. Because 
Kandinsky was regarded as a significant figure in the advancement of the 
abstract movement in painting, but more particularly, because he is a 
recognisable precedent of the practice of immanent art, by examples of his 
synthesizing the novelty of visual experiences in painting in cooperation with 
the theoretical and philosophical writings, his work will contribute to the 
conceptual analysis that is the contemporary exchange defining Bergsonian 
thinking.   
 
Many artists have been researched to further this exchange, particularly 
highlighted through the studies offered by Antliff and Alliez.  However, 
though we have seen the theorisation of Bergson effective through the 
analysis of art as a possibility of possible conditions of philosophical thinking, 
for example, of Matisse, the Cubists, The Italian Futurists, all of whom were 
contemporaneous with Kandinsky, the reception of Kandinsky in this regard 
is lacking.  This warrants the investigation of his theories as they may offer 
insight into the methodological accounts of philosophy in painting purview 
the contemporary Bergsonian philosophy of thinking immanence.  However, 
even though Kandinsky was contemporaries with Bergson, unlike other artists 
who responded to Bergson’s thinking, there is limited  mentions of  the 
connections or correlations of Kandinsky’s philosophy and practice of 
painting as intentionally relational or comparative to Bergsonian thinking.  
This is a strong signally for the concentration of our investigation.  This is 
accentuated when we regard Kenneth Lindsay’s renowned studies of 
Kandinksky, in which he explains, ‘Characteristic of Kandinsky’s writing is 
the technique of breaking up the given topic into opposites or alternatives, 
[…], the dominating relativity of the thought process contrasts strongly with 
conclusions, which are often positively stated’.8  Though Lindsay is 
explaining the Kandinsky’s theoretical writings as expressing a tension of 
difference, suggests a characterization that we association with Kandinskian 
                                                     
8 W. Kandinsky, Kandinsky, complete writings on art (Da Capo Press, 1994).p. 11-15 
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painting, that of the abstraction of the image from the experience, i.e. the force 
of change active in the expression of the process of painting.  In this sense, 
we see strong correlations from a Kandinskian quality of the departure from 
the signification of meaning or the signifying of emotion in the sense 
differential of painting, with the Bergsonian concern of philosophising 
differently, i.e. philosophy adjusting itself to the world of becoming.   
 However, despite the anticipation of the potential of abstraction of 
thinking through his cooperative working of painting and theory towards 
expressions of abstraction, his insights have been largely dismissed to the 
classification of ‘idioms of abstraction’ in art history.9 Contrary to this latter 
perspective we regard the ‘idiomatic’ of Kandinskian abstraction as the source 
of possibility to engage with the contemporary identity of painting.  Similar 
to the diffusion of Bergson’s thinking, which some have commented as 
contributing to its absorption and  the eventual flight of its return,  this passing 
over Kandinsky, and Kandinskian theory, despite its having profoundly 
affected the development of art theory, leaves a deficiency in the appraisals 
of painting as philosophy, which our research hopes to correct. 
 
In light of his theory of abstraction, Kandinskian theory anticipated the voice 
of contemporary  philosophy, in its challenge to go beyond its modes of 
thinking, and with this charge extended to philosophies of art, we can see the 
Kandinskian principles still resonates with the more specific claims in the 
discourse of philosophies of immanence.10  My objective in this regard, is not 
to follow Kandinskian theory in order to revive a primer for abstract painting 
practice to communicate a system of philosophy.  Instead, by process of the 
explication of Kandisnkian notions of expression through painting and the 
change of visual experience as an abstractive process, this presented 
interchangeably with Bergsonian thought and conceptualisations, both offer a 
                                                     
9 P. Crowther, The language of twentieth-century art: a conceptual history (Yale University 
Press New Haven, CT, 1997). 
10 J. Mullarkey and C. de Mille, Bergson and the art of immanence: painting, photography, 
film (Edinburgh University Press, 2013). 
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grounding for the contextualization of the limits and the problem of the 
identity of painting as a philosophy.  Though Bergson’s work challenged the 
nature of philosophy by directing its investigations according to how 
philosophy is to encounter a world of a plurality of images subject through 
change in time, he did not directly confront the nature of image application, 
composition, and development as it would be understood in the visual arts.  
Bergson did not publish any distinct work on aesthetics or a philosophy of art, 
and though the philosophies he offers on the subjects of time, memory, and 
the image are altogether relevant to the thinking of art, Bergson did not 
confront art directly.  
 
It is this deficiency that compels this research, and recognizing the parallels 
with Kandinsky’s thinking, we see the continuance of Bergsonian scholarship 
concerning the arts to be attainable.  Here we understand Kandinsky’s 
paintings to be an exemplar of a philosophy becoming realised in the process 
of painting, but more specifically, it is the Kandinsky’s theoretical writings 
which engaged with the enterprise of announcing the potential of abstraction 
as a visual philosophy.  Therefore, Kandinskian theory operates as much as a 
practical example of Bergsonian thinking, by evidence of the paradigmatic 
shift caused by his paintings in the history of painting, as well as their 
continuing legacy through their reception in modern collections,  but more so,  
by the accessibility of  the painter’s thinking and reflections proceeding with 
the origination of his work. It is then towards his writing that I rely, since 
accepting the creativity of Kandinskian outlook, as reinforcing the Bergsonian 
challenge to the creativity of thought.  We wish to explore the 
interchangeability of Bergson’s key concept that demand of philosophy and 
abstraction of its thinking from its own process, with |Kandinsky’s view of 
the expression of the forces intrinsic to the ‘inner sounds’ of the material 
world requiring  a view of the continuous creative overture in atmosphere of 
painting.  By shifting our focus from the imaged examples of abstraction in 
painting, to the tensions of his struggle with thinking philosophically through 
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his practice towards abstraction, it is a reliance of inquiry through his writings 
that we may understand the possibilities of philosophical expression 
mirroring its attendance to the devices of its process.  Because of this, we will 
consider Henry’s attendance to Kandinsky’s theory not only as functioning 
for the conveyance of another system of thinking, but by its return to an 
inspirational source, it offers a grounding for the reappraisal of both 
Kandinsky and Bergson, to return to the practice of thinking to benefit 
thinking’s challenge to understand its alterity.  So we aim for not only 
comparison, but a synthesis of Kandinskian theory towards the principle of 
Bergsonian views.   
 
 Our objective is firstly, to mediate  between Bergson and Kandinsky, in the 
reverse order of Prendeville’s study, so as to indicate that in the first order, 
the relation of Bergsonian philosophy and Kandinskian theory of painting is 
to be struck, where the bridging of the two is justified in part by the Henrian 
return to Bergsonian thinking.  Rather than simply returning to Kandinsky’s 
theories, we argue for the continuation of a Bergsonian immanence 
philosophy of painting with a view of painting in terms of the Kandinskian 
sense of the creative and transformative potential of painting sourced from 
the apprehension of  the creative content ‘revolving’ from the living 
experience of the ‘concrete reality’ towards its material expression. Though 
Prendeville’s work considers the themes of Bergson’s philosophy primarily 
in comparison to Henry’s conceptualisations, these conceptualisations are 
marginally indicated through the lens of Henry’s interpretations and loosely 
connected Kandisnky’s work. Inadvertently, the interpretive focus and critical 
assessment remains upon Henry’s phenomenology, and thus, Prendeville’s 
study elaborates upon consonance of Bergsonian philosophy with Henry’s 
apprehension of life.  This leads us to consider the reappraisal of Henrian 
philosophy, to contend that Henrian phenomenology is itself an example of 
the process of thinking, as the novelty of thinking that goes beyond the 
‘conventions’ of its tradition and contemporary philosophical basis.  
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However, though Prendeville’s study demonstrates the postmodern legacy of 
Bergsonian thinking, most notably through the post-phenomenological turn 
of Henry, what is lacking is the address of the correlation of the legacy of 
Bergsonian philosophy with the revolution of modernist painting by 
Bergson’s contemporary Kandinsky. Therefore, we propose a Bergsonian and 
Kandinskian synthesis, as a model for the continuation of philosophy as a 
creative process, oriented to the role of the practice of painting, such that the 
Kandinskian theory of painting offers the methodological parameters by 
which a philosophy of process may be investigated by the necessary 
abstraction of painting.   
 
This brings us to the second element of our argument, which is to regard the 
rendering of philosophy through the process of painting, such that the process 
of painting is the practice of philosophy immanent to its encounter and 
experience through time.  
 This situates our line of investigation closer to the terms of the ontologisation 
of the process of the painting, intrinsic to its immanent identity, and away 
from the subjectivisation of the object of painting. This will be a key position 
that frames the context for the investigation of the identity of painting and 
philosophy as also indicative of the philosophical movements of thinking 
immanence.  Regarded in this way, our questioning the identity of painting, 
aligns the philosophical interaction of painting and thinking to the current 
research and studies relating to Bergson’s philosophy of time and the history 
of art and visual culture. Here, the difference of our consideration is that it is 
given to the operation of the process of Bergsonian thinking upon itself, such 
that the thought of painting as a mode of philosophizing, anticipates the 
continuous questioning of the identity of painting as a system of thinking 
embedded in our living experiences of time.11 Our advancement is a response 
to what we formulate as a tripartite problem.  The first objective is the present 
                                                     
11 P. Crowther, The language of twentieth-century art: a conceptual history (Yale 
University Press New Haven, CT, 1997). 
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Bergsonian challenge to our philosophical assumptions of thinking and the 
descriptive and ontological methods of its outlook. This is prompted by the 
challenge of contemporary Bergsonian scholarship, particularly as Bergson’s 
thinking is identified as a process philosophy and thus, regarded as a 
metaphilosophy. We take this challenge to consider the orientation of 
philosophy through painting, and thereby, extend the challenge to the 
orientation of painting beyond the economy of its visual knowledge and 
conditions of established aesthetic theory of painterly creativity.  In this sense, 
we recognize the significance of Bergson’s philosophy in its regard of the 
multifarious possibilities of thinking through philosophical efforts.  The 
varieties of philosophies and the difference of our methods of philosophizing 
are as numerous and as frequent as the attitudes and perspectives of such 
efforts, as they are the collective assertions and projections of expressions 
from some original and simple insight into reality. Here we see the role of the 
painter as the philosopher, so that a Bergsonian philosophy is then already, a 
philosophical view of the ways and means of doing philosophy, and thereby, 
a philosophy towards methods of philosophizing.  It is precisely this thinking 
through philosophy as a philosophical anticipation of novelty through 
experience that we consider painting as itself a philosophical system.     
 
 Applied as an extension of Bergsonian philosophy to the metaphysical 
essence of painting in terms of the becoming of images, and as a genuine 
mode of thinking by approximation of experience to the materialization of 
images, we regard direct investigation into the differences of painting, as also 
the catalyst for Bergsonian philosophies immediate to the profusion of visual 
change and the understanding of life through the projections of painterly 
thinking. Our argument is a reaction to the present plurality of art theory, and 
in particular, an assertion of a Bergsonian conceptualisation of painting as a 
thinking from the continuity of expressions, as a philosophy of the ‘concrete’ 
that is attentive through duration of images and thus, the living experience of 
images becoming and revealing to us the movements and change of reality. 
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Arguing about the unlimited potential of philosophy to enlarge the scope of 
our perceptions and the unbounded nature of our intuitive thinking to progress 
a philosophy of change, Bergson specifically refers to  painting as an example, 
stating, 
 
What is the aim of art if not to show us, in nature and in the mind, outside of us and within 
us, things which did not explicitly strike our senses and consciousness?[...] But nowhere is 
the function of the artist shown as clearly in that art which gives the most importance place 
to imitation, I mean painting. The great painters are men who possess a certain vision of 
things which has or will become the vision of all men.12 
 
From this context, we argue for a Bergsonian philosophy of painting, as a 
philosophy that regards the present and plural dynamism of ‘the inner life of 
things’, via the events of expressive originality and moments of visual 
diversity in the processes of painting. From this sense of doing philosophy as 
a philosophy of painting, we regard the relation of the living experience and 
duration of the painter, and the image of the painter’s expression as joined 
directly and simultaneously, as a process of painting, whereby the indivisible 
flow of reality may be experienced and expressed through images.  
 
Our view is against the reduction of philosophical understanding and 
properties of philosophical speculation to a series of formal ideas, to symbols, 
and the beguiling qualities of linguistic inertness, and ultimately the stalemate 
of our philosophical outlooks according to established conceptual systems.  
Our view accepts that the practice of philosophy entails conceptual precision, 
explanatory analysis, and establishes modes of thought.  However, further to 
the point of the role of philosophy in terms of its relation to the duration and 
continuous becoming of reality, we understand philosophy to be self-
differentiating. By claiming that philosophy is most acute to its understanding 
when it is attuned to its empirical encounter with experience, thinking must 
                                                     
12 J. Mullarkey, The New Bergson (Manchester University Press, 1999). 
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mediate its identity from between the proximity to living experience and the 
distinction given by conscious reflection.  Bergson’s claim is clear in this 
regard.  His critique suggests that rather than rely on the localization of 
thinking compelled by the habits of thought according to pragmatic 
orientations to action, by an effort of intuitive and immediate reflection the 
reception of our philosophical understandings become more approximate and 
continuous with living experience.  In this regard, as reality is unfolding 
unceasingly, thinking that attends to the immediacy of the becoming of 
experience encounters the creative.  Extending this further to the identity of 
painting, the context of immediacy remains the same, so that the sense of the 
painted image as ‘meaning’, as reducible to an iconological analysis, or 
expounding a ‘truth of painting, is to also admit to a distancing of 
philosophical thinking. From the reality of its encounter.  According to this 
line of thinking, rather than relegating Bergsonian philosophy to a historical 
account of French Philosophy, consigning Bergson’s philosophy to a 
genealogical account of twentieth-century philosophies of process, we will 
maintain Bergsonian philosophy as the orientation of the activity of 
philosophy in terms of a philosophy of duration.13 By this,  we also regard 
painting analogically as a link between philosophy and art, as a method of 
philosophizing that entails differing modes of thinking, and thereby, diverges 
from habits of thinking which rely upon the crystallization of concepts and 
the analytical distortion of reality in terms of an ‘objective order’.  The 
challenge of Bergsonian thinking according to its principle of the duration of 
all things, is to continue thinking beyond its reflection.  With our investigation 
we are asking how this is not only equal with the creativity of painting, but 
how the project of Bergsonian philosophy integrated in the identity of 
painting.  
 
Mullarkey’s charge to consider Michel Henry, differently by thinking through 
                                                     
13 S. Guerlac, Thinking in time: an introduction to Henri Bergson (Cornell University Press, 
2006). 
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Henry’s philosophy contra the orientation of his immanent categories of 
‘manifestation’, ‘affectivity’, and the revealing of life through art, is a 
guidepost for our work.14  How is the relation of Henry’s philosophy to 
phenomenology, also an extension of a Bergsonian philosophy?  We address 
this question through analysis of |Henry’s study of Kandinsky, where the 
different outlook towards phenomenology gains traction.  Henry’s 
unorthodox phenomenology signals the differing directions of thought, and 
as reflected more specifically through the topic of painting, this brings 
Kandinsky into the broader dialogue of the difference of thinking.  For 
Bergson the difference of thinking is the impetus towards a metaphysics of 
thinking, for Henry the difference is the effort to think phenomenology by 
radicalizing the concept of life, and in a similar tone, for Kandinsky’s the 
difference of thinking is essential to the abstraction of painting.  Here, the 
three thinkers are brought full circle, and this is the staging for the work of 
our research, i.e. to exercise Bergsonian philosophy with a view towards the 
differences of processes of understanding through visual properties of the 
painted image.  Because we believe that the silence between Bergson’s 
original philosophy and its uptake with Kandinsky’s original thinking is 
evident by the lack of contemporary philosophical research, this is the 
potential for the turning of Bergsonian philosophy, specifically in the 
understanding of Bergson’s thinking in painting. In recent years the 
contemporary resurgence and return of Bergsonian philosophy, was most 
notably advanced by Deleuze’s Bergsonism.  But as the voice of Bergsonian 
thinking echoes in the potential to become many philosophies,  the encounter 
of Deleuzian-Bergsonian influences of research within a postmodern 
condition of continental philosophy has been surpassed by accounts of 
Bergsonian immanence, as new philosophies becoming from the immanence 
of multiple modes of thinking from the plural conditions of thinking in 
duration.   Such has been the case, with such reassertions of Bergson through 
                                                     
14 J. Mullarkey, Post-continental philosophy: An outline (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006).p. 
75 & 82 
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the anthological resurgence of his philosophy in Ansell-Pearson’s and 
Mullarkey’s, Henri Bergson: Key Writings, or Mullarkey’s edited 
compilation, The New Bergson, heralding the ‘new’ philosophies of Bergson 
by thinking Bergsonian through research and appraisal of his originary 
concepts.  Other titles have emerged lately now firming the establishment of 
the new advent of thinking via Bergson, but what has been lacking after the 
clear announcements of Bergson’s principle convictions in terms of the 
‘change’ of reality and its relation to our perception, or the movement of 
thinking in relation to the multiple durations of time, has been the exacting of 
philosophical extensions to other modes of its practice.   Throughout this 
investigation we will attempt to offer comprehensive descriptions and 
explanations where we find the work towards the continuation of a 
Bergsonian philosophy of painting.  
 
In order to engage in the present context of Bergsonian philosophy, we set out 
from the context of contemporary postmodernist debates, and in particular, 
we turn to the process of Bergsonian thought in regards to the increasing 
encounter with a diaspora of theories of the image, and in particular, from the 
effects of a prolonged engagement with deconstruction in relation to the 
identity of painting. The varieties of these theories and their total divergences 
from one another allows us to read Bergson not for a renewal of his concepts 
alone, nor to establish a rigorous discourse by which all theories are evaluated, 
but instead, for the thinking from Bergsonian philosophy into the question of 
the image. In this sense, this present work is a Bergsonian philosophy, situated 
from within post-continental philosophies.  To a greater extent, from the 
current views of meta-philosophical explorations of contemporary continental 
philosophies, this work aims to establish Bergsonian theory as a consistent 
challenge to our thinking through our experience of contemporary philosophy 
in its application and development with the medium of painting.15
  
 
                                                     
15 J. Mullarkey, The New Bergson (Manchester University Press, 1999). 
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 The work of Michel Henry is a recent direction in the development of the 
French poststructuralist, existentialist, and phenomenological traditions of 
thought.  More specifically, his work is classified and generally regarded as a 
continuation of the phenomenological projects of Husserl, to a greater extent, 
via a philosophical outlook of the transcendental reduction of ‘Being’ in terms 
of an auto-generative and auto-affective relation of life.  But also, and to a 
lesser extent, Henry’s philosophy continues from the Heidegerian sense of 
‘Being’, but in terms of the ‘manifestation of life’, by which life is ‘invisible’ 
and ‘Being’ as such, affects its own disclosure.  Henry’s philosophical 
projects aim to conceptualise life as an essence of its own becoming, that is, 
he considers life as the phenomena issuing from the force of its own invisible 
and originating affect. In is from this context that he applies his philosophy to 
the philosophical significance of the work and theories of Wassily 
Kandinsky’s understanding that the Kandinskian turn in the history of 
painting and its methodology towards abstraction confirms Henry’s own  
philosophical project of the essence of life as ‘Being’ affectively encountering 
its own becoming. Regardless of Henry’s philosophical system as a 
continuance and yet an alterity from within the phenomenological traditions, 
it is our belief that elements of the Henrian philosophical system suggests the 
implementation of a counter philosophy, that is, a philosophy of different 
philosophizing in current of philosophical thinking, and thus, a contemporary 
instance of Bergsonian thinking. Recent studies regarding the appropriation 
of Bergson’s philosophy and the incorporation of his thinking within 
phenomenology, and more specifically, studies highlighting the parallels of 
Bergson’s thought with Henry’s may compel further comparisons and excises 
of concepts of commonality.   
 
However, recognizing the complexity of Bergson’s philosophical influence in 
contemporary debate is beyond our interest here. Rather, we wish to affirm 
that Bergsonian thinking is the source of alterity for Henrian phenomenology 
from within the broader project of phenomenology.  And furthermore, by 
approximating Henrian philosophy to Bergsonian thinking, we are inclined to 
acknowledge the affinity of Kandinsky’s philosophical and methodological 
outlook in painting to Bergsonian philosophy.  In this sense we see the radical 
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nature of Bergsonian thinking, as a philosophy that upholds the multiplicity 
of thinking beyond a definitive philosophy, as exemplified in Henry’s 
thinking differently within the phenomenological project, coupled with 
Kandinskian theory of painting in terms of abstraction, exemplified in the 
radical turn of the identity of painting from the convention of the painted 
image in terms of formal configurations of representation.  Kandinsky’s 
work16 in the modernist period anticipated the crisis of modernism, by 
regarding abstraction as a property of  painting , painting as part of the 
spiritual evolution of our visual experiences beyond the reciprocity of the 
paradigms of form and matter, Kandinskian philosophy of painting 
understood the potential of a myriad of images reflecting the ever changing 
nature of experience.   
 
In light of this, as with Bergsonian thinking, we do not wish to retrace 
Kandinskian theory to its origins or redeem it from the notations of art theory 
and the history of the philosophy of painting.  Instead we wish to continue 
Bergsonian thinking in terms of the multiplicity of thought, by reading 
Kandinskian theory and regarding Kandinskian painting in terms of the 
abstraction of painting, painting as a source of the radical indeterminacy of 
perception. In this way, we will think Bergsonian regarding Kandinsky’s 
emphasis on the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ of the painted image in which painting is 
the occasion of the images of the material elements of painting and the images 
of the spiritual elements of the painter mutually reflecting each other upon the 
surface of consciousness, and we will think Kandinskian considering 
Bergson’s concept of images in terms of the durational nature of 
consciousness and the apprehension of change through lived experience.  
With Bergsonian thinking and Kandinskian painting, we are given a 
framework for a philosophy of painting, in which the thinking of painting may 
be regarded by the situation of painting, and the formulation of thinking may 
be recognised as the critical encounter of philosophy with the agency of 
perception in painting. 
 
Thus, we will argue for an extension of Bergsonian philosophy, through the 
                                                     
16 W. Kandinsky, Kandinsky, complete writings on art (Da Capo Press, 1994). 
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Kandinskian view of painting as philosophy, a visual thinking prompted by 
the abstraction of its own identity. We will argue for the extension of 
Bergsonian philosophy to the extent that the synthesis of the two processes of 
philosophy, firstly to a Bergsonian process of thought, a process which 
precedes a definitive conceptual grounding, and secondly to an understanding 
of painting as a becoming from the Kandinskian process of painting by ‘inner 
necessity’.  In one instance we are acknowledging the process of Bergsonian 
thinking contributing to the process view of philosophy in painting, and in the 
other instance, we are taking up the question of painting in terms of 
Kandinsky’s outlook of painting that is painting as the evolution of visual 
expression. Like the Bergsonian turn of philosophical thinking, that thinking 
is a continuous sounding of the durational qualities of reality, the Kandinskian 
turn of painting is the charge in painting to continuously reveal the organic 
and evolutionary nature of the perceptual world. 
 
 However, this is not a discursive account of all of Bergson’s original 
concepts, nor is this an attempt towards a comprehensive explanation of the 
original Bergsonian corpus. Instead, under the rubric of a contemporary 
Bergsonian philosophy of art, we will attempt to establish a conceptual 
framework from fundamental Bergsonian conceptualizations. This will allow 
for our own evaluations of those aspects of Bergson’s philosophy which may 
be regarded as each a philosophical system, but collectively, they offer a 
simple vision by which the continual appropriation and continuing 
philosophical discourses in the living and experientially based practices of 
painting may proceed. In this manner, though the fecundity of Bergsonian 
philosophical principles is presently evident, we wish to add to Bergsonian 
formulations by maintaining a process metaphysics in art practice that regards 
Kandinskian works and theory present the philosophical expressions of 
duration that establish the conditions that go beyond the origination of the 
intuitions and experiences.  Because of this, we regard a Bergsonian and 
Kandinskian synthesis of thinking through painting, as the potential for the 
continuity of painting as a process of philosophizing the living experiences of 
duration, as well as returning us to the trajectories of philosophies of change, 
understanding the boundless pursuits of the understanding of reality through 
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inexhaustible expressions, compelled by the encounter of painting and its 
manifestation with the provocation of philosophical intuition. 
 
We understand that much of the philosophical discourse surrounding 
questions concerning the relation of art and philosophy are being worked 
through in the traditions of phenomenology. Merleau-Pontian theories 
continue to make advancements in this regard. However, these theories have 
already radicalized the notion of perceptualisms from the Husserlian 
trajectories of thinking, in the sense that emphasis has been placed on the 
incarnate body in its motility to the material world, and thus, the ontology of 
the ‘chiasm’, in which the ‘intertwined’ self is regarded in terms of the 
kinesthetic interaction with its environment.17 We are now seeing that by 
these developments, by the extension of the considerations of philosophies of 
the phenomenology of art, the convictions to acknowledge a line of 
consideration of phenomenological perspectivalism are being blurred.  
Rather, this is most notably seen in terms of the unorthodox phenomenology 
espoused by Michel Henry. His theories are regarded as contributing to the 
notion of a post-phenomenology, in so far as Henry’s theories attempt to 
extend the phenomenological tradition, they have disrupted and perhaps 
departed from the variational framework.  In this respect, regardless of 
Henry’s apparent intention, his philosophy demonstrates the operation of 
philosophical thinking, a philosophy in duration, as was understood and 
advocated by Bergson.  Here we take support from Mullarkey’s study, ‘Post-
Continental Philosophy’ in our consideration of not only the affinity of 
Bergsonian philosophical conceptualisations within the advent of 
developments in contemporary continental philosophy, but more specifically, 
from the article, ‘Henry and the Effects of Actual Immanence’18, we recognise 
the proximity of Henrian turn of phenomenology with the nature of 
                                                     
17 D. Ihde, Postphenomenology: Essays in the postmodern context (Northwestern 
University Press, 1995). 
Though Ihde’s analysis considers the departure of Phenomenology from its Husserlian 
foundations, it is his assertion of a ‘nonfoundational phenomenology which suggests the 
radical departure of philosophical thinking from any sense of its center.  We see this as 
indicating the Bergsonian philosophy of philosophical thinking, as itself disruptive and by 
its own projections, continuously going beyond its present identity. 
18 J. Mullarkey, Post-continental philosophy: An outline (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006). 
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Bergsonian thinking.  From Henry’s theories of immanence, affectivity, and 
the emphasis of the duration of consciousness, we see Henrian thought as 
Bergsonian, to the extent that ‘Bergsonian‘ is applied to mean a continuity of 
philosophical thinking, changing as it approximates its investigations through 
its experiences in time.  
 
In Michael Kelly’s text, ‘Bergson and Phenomenology’, we see the scholarly 
deliberation for dialogue between Bergson’s thought and Phenomenology.  
However, though our interest of Henry’s connection to Bergsonian 
philosophy may be further supported by this text, it does not go far enough in 
the outlook of Bergsonian philosophy by its iteration of Bergson’s concepts 
and the reappraisal of perennial phenomenological views.  In particular, 
however, because of the challenge to go beyond any establishment of 
thinking, or any, we also understand the tension between the commitments to 
the projects of phenomenology and the Bergsonian studies of duration. 
However, it may be contested, but it cannot be denied that Bergsonian 
philosophy and its conceptualizations have affected many of the major figures 
in the phenomenological tradition. In this regard, in this project, aside from 
the dual workings of Bergsonian and Kandinskian theory, we will consider 
the views of Michel Henry, particularly from his interpretations of 
Kandinsky’s theories. However, this does not mean that we are adapting a 
Bergsonian view towards a phenomenology, but quite the opposite, we are 
bridging Bergson directly to Kandinsky, so that we may compare and contrast 
the theoretical positions more clearly.
  
 
 
In the following seven chapters of this study, we will offer an outline of 
concepts as a type of Bergsonian conceptual framework for a philosophy of 
art. We will follow from close readings of Bergson and those theories most 
relevant from our readings of Kandinsky, so as to establish links between the 
philosopher and the painter, and as a precedent for a continuing Bergsonian 
philosophical approach to art, to painting, and the possibilities of philosophy 
immanent to the process of art.  This Bergsonian-Kandinskian connection is 
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an alternative to contemporary Bergsonian scholarship, a scholarship which 
affirms a commitment to consider the difference of thinking, and to 
contemporary visual theories of painting, which has included the dialect of 
Kandinsky’s theory of abstraction.   What this connection offers is the insight 
of Bergson’s philosophy, with the charge of its claim to the nature of 
philosophizing regarding the nature of the world, but its lack of the specific 
appraisal of the role of the philosophy painting, taken up and supported by 
Kandinsky’s regard of painting as a vehicle of the expression of 
understanding, and as a nuanced manifestation of the living immediacy to 
time. We will argue that from this basis of an ontology of images, the material 
and physical forms of painterly expressions conditions the subjective 
experiences of the process, through which the inexhaustible differences of 
living expression occur. Moreover, this work attends to a philosophy of 
becoming, so that in regards to the process of painting, our focus will be on 
the dual anticipation of philosophy and art most immediate to the change of 
thinking and the difference of visual experience.  Though critical assessment 
and commentary on the nature of the projection of art history would be 
expected with any admission of the novelty of art and what it contributes to 
the work of philosophy, our argument does not entail theories of the 
receptivity of painting.  Our concern is with the most immediate identity of 
the process of philosophy through the process oriented view of philosophy 
immanent to painting. To that end, we are concerned with a philosophy that 
goes beyond philosophy.  We are concerned with the becoming of philosophy 
in the durational mattering of the images of painting, by which the reciprocity 
of painting towards philosophy, is also a continuous evaluation of visual 
experience, and challenges the extent of our sense of ‘immediacy’ in the 
processual flux of things.  Thinking is made creative in term of the proximity 
of thinking to the unfolding of images.  In this regard, our view is towards the 
continuity of thinking through painting, understood by the proximity of 
experience to the immediacy of the process.  This contrasts with the views 
that uphold the reflection of thought in painting, and the sense that painting is 
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an afterthought, at first a conceptual origin then realised through ‘works of 
art’.  This manner of thinking is pervasive with the innumerable contemporary 
theories of art, and furthered by sophisticated pronouncements of ‘critiques’ 
of art development historical and attending to originality of thinking and 
expression through the limitations of  retrospective interpretation. 
 
In, chapter one we will begin with Bergson’s conceptualization of reality in 
terms of images, with a view that the concept of image is fundamental to a 
metaphysical discourse made explicit through exchange and activity in the 
actualisation of painting.19
 We will maintain a close reading of Bergson’s 
‘Matter and Memory’, because it is the most explicit text towards the theory 
of an ontology of images, asserting that durational reality is a continuous 
‘presence of images’, an equality of images in process, i.e. an equality of 
multiple rhythms of images and differing states of change continuous with the 
movement of images in time.20 We are primarily interested in Bergson’s 
concept of image, because its conceptualisation entails the embodiment of 
perception and experience, matter and mind. It is from the resonance of the 
image, that we will consider Bergson’s ontology of duration as the context for 
the concept of image, in order to explore the practice of images and the 
process of images within painting. By this, we will argue that reality is a 
process of images, so as to claim that within this reality, the process of 
painting is a mode of activities from the contents of life with the effect of these 
activities towards forms of life in material events. This will call into question 
the general descriptions that formulate a theory of painting in terms of the 
interactions of the painter, as the vector of images and the subjective 
occurrences of painterly activities, and the painting medium, as an objective 
continuity of images. Instead we proceed from an evaluation of the 
ontological conditions of reality in terms of images, as an understanding of 
images in time, to reverse the order of painterly expression as the definitive 
                                                     
19 H. Bergson, Matter and memory (New York: Zone books, 1999). 
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source of subjectivity in the process of painting. Here we will rely on the 
Henrian analysis of affectivity in Kandinsky’s work, to turn from a view of 
subjectivity oriented by a situated center of sensation and perception to the 
painter.  Instead, taking lead from Henry’s view of the resonance of life from 
the material world, we will argue that the subjectivity in the process of 
painting is ‘painterly‘ by the designation of images in the process of change.  
This is to say that the total constellation of images enact and embody the 
condition of subjectivity, such that the instances of change are individuated 
occurrences, but fleeting with the implicit mattering of images in the 
actualisation of the painted image.  By this we wish to move away from the 
rhetoric of ‘intentionality’ in the art practice, and instead posit the notion that 
the medium specificity allows for the differentiation of images, as well as the 
distinction of the subject through the event of the creative and generational 
image. This follows from a re-assertion of Henrian theory into a Bergsonian 
ontology of images applied to a process view of painting.  However, by our 
uptake and application of Henry’s notion of affectivity, by which life’s 
affective relation is directed towards its own realisation, we re-orient this view 
of the ordering of life.  Instead, we see the diffusion of images in the process 
of painting, so that the actual, material, and visible are not subordinated to an 
internalisation of life’s discovery, but are the creation of new images through 
the force of becoming of all things, by which life’s activity is a participation 
of perceptual experience. 
 
We will move from the concept of image towards the conceptualization of a 
process of painting, by which we assume the time of painting. However, from 
this context of process, and in terms of Bergson’s concept of image, we will 
regard the activities of the painter and the painting medium as identities of 
painting through a process of images. From this perspective, we will be 
placing focus on the nature of painting as activity, by which the continuous 
events of the objects are the result of the uniting of the activities of images. 
From a Bergsonian notion of image, this would mean that in terms of the 
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events of painting, the images held in this relation embody processes of 
perception. We will attempt to establish a clear connection of Bergson’s 
concept of image to a Kandinskian theory of painting, so as to consider the 
conceptualization of images given to expression through time. In this respect, 
we argue that as Bergson’s concept of ‘image’, as principally, a conception 
that remains as a basis of inquiry in a contemporary process metaphysics, this 
may equally remain as a conceptual basis of a philosophy of painting. 
Bergson’s concept of image is the basis for an ontology of images, and a 
principle for theoretical and practical engagements with painting. 
 
In chapter two we will look to Bergson’s theory of intuition.  By considering 
the reality of paintings as experience, (i.e. in terms of the continuity of the 
activity of images and the events of images, as a process, the relation of its 
contents as differing states of sense and apprehension), we will argue that 
painting is a temporal system immanent to its process in time. In this manner, 
we are concerned with the becoming of images, expressed through intuitive 
thought, but intuiting as an active immediacy of expression through the 
creation of new images and images that are participation in the movement of 
the unique condition of images in the process of painting. This claim is to 
establish the continuity of Bergsonian philosophy in  art, but more so,  that 
the perceptions and intellectual attitudes in the process of painting become 
actual through the intuitive condition in painting, i.e. the dynamic experience 
of a direct vision from within medium specificity of the painting process. This 
is given added support by Kandinsky’s view of painting as a transformation 
of visual experience by mode of perceptual concentrations, that is ‘inner 
sounds’ emanating from things and the artifact of the painted image. Here, a 
Bergsonian philosophy of intuition coupled with a Kandinskian elucidation 
of approaches to painting to contribute to painterly thinking, is a matter of 
theoretical synthesis necessary to advance further a process philosophy of 
painting. We will rely on a close reading of Kandinsky’s renowned study, On 
the Spiritual in Art, and draw connections to Bergson’s theory of intuition to 
confront the question of the identity of contemporary painting and 
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philosophy, by positing the intuitive thinking in painting as also a re-
orientation of thought, and the necessary abstraction of philosophical 
experience from thinker and painter, to painting towards thinking. In addition, 
by considering intuition as a faculty for the translation of the activity of 
painting, this points towards the continuity of the process of painting. 
Therefore, we will consider intuition in terms of the interpenetration of 
immediate experience and conscious reflection, as temporal relations 
expressed into spatial terms. We will continue from the previous analysis of 
Bergson’s concept of ‘image’ to consider his theory of intuition. We will 
argue that intuition is an engagement with reality in terms of an attention of 
life and an immediacy of experience to perception. From this perspective, 
applied to the process of painting, this will mean that intuition is an inner form 
of experience originating from the painter’s direct relation with the painting 
medium. Moreover, this experience is then a compulsion for the painter’s 
activity and driving force for the diversity of painterly expressions. We will 
argue then, that the intuitive vision within the process of painting is not 
produced by the selective properties of the painter’s intellect, but rather occurs 
as a thinking from within the painting medium, as an ‘intellectual sympathy’, 
whereby the painter places himself in perceptual relation to perception and 
sensation given by the painting medium. 
 
In Chapter 3, we will consider the classification of the difference of 
movements of reality, so that we may consider the movements of painting as 
the force of becoming visual. Whether we consider movement in terms of the 
processes towards the origination of a painted image, such as the painter’s 
gestures and the bodily activity towards painterly expression, or the material 
placement and the counter effects of the medium’s resilience, such 
designations imply that within the process of painting there are multiple 
occurrences and relations of movements. In the context of the painted image’s 
temporalization, the processes leading to the image are no less of a continuity 
of movements, so that the art-object, as a material image in its entirety, is the 
culmination and event of the passage of movements. Nonetheless, the 
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movements of reality are relations, (i.e. connections in time) and as such, are 
not experienced in terms of their divisibility, but rather, by the experience of 
the total projection. In other words, the extent of these relations are dynamic, 
so that when we consider movement in terms of the specific artistic creation 
of painting, we associate our notion of movement to the processes of 
perception, processes of thinking, and the material processes. Our association 
of movement to these processes will concern the actualization of the painted 
image in terms of the force of painterly movements, i.e. the dilation of 
movement through the forms developing in the activity of painting. By 
maintaining that the nature of reality is considered in terms of a plurality of 
images in ceaseless movement and indefinite change, our understanding of 
the occurrence of painted imagery will in turn, follow from the conception of 
reality as an aggregate of images in process, and hence, an ontology of the 
multiplicities of movement. In this chapter we will have continued the theme 
of Bergson’s image ontology, but applying it to the ‘image’ in the states of 
becoming through the process of painting.  This chapter will argue in terms 
of the movement of painting, so that the ontology of image in the painting 
process is no longer restricted to the identity of painting as a static, imagined, 
and representational surfaces, but instead, by ‘movements of images’ painting 
encompasses the entire state of becoming in the ever-expanding flow of 
material and mental changes.  All things are durational, so that the movements 
of the painting process are the relation of movements of images embodied by 
the experience of the transitions of images with the becoming of the 
expression of these images in the event of their process. 
 
In Chapter 4, from the previous sense of movement ontology we will consider 
the condition of abstraction in the process of painting as being some form of 
a schematization.21
 
However, we will relate the concept of abstraction to the 
nature of thinking in terms of a schema, but we will argue that abstraction 
means a quality of invention continuous with the becoming of images.  We  
                                                     
21 J. Golding, 'Paths to the Absolute', Mondrian, Malevich, Kandinsky, Pollock, Newman, 
Rothko and Still, London. 
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will  consider  Bergson’s  concept  of  abstraction  to  mean  that  as perceiving 
occurs in things themselves, then the transitions of images from within the 
process of painting entail the dynamic selections and discernments of life 
from its experience in contact with matter. That is to say that, thought as an 
abstractive quality of living, is both a distillation of images and an extraction 
of images from the flow of reality. Furthermore, by considering abstraction in 
relation to the continuity of the flow of images, and in particular, with the 
process of painting, we will argue that the emergence of novel forms in 
painting, are the effects of physical processes. Therefore, abstract thinking is 
physical in its origins. Just as the concepts of the image, intuition, and 
movement have been maintained with a view towards Bergsonian philosophy 
of painting, these will allow us to consider the concept of abstraction as we 
elaborate further on the temporality of the process of painting and the 
ontology of images. 
 
In Chapter 5, we will consider a dual meaning of the concept of frame, as one 
that signifies the tension inherent with the other, that is, the literal device that 
marks out an other spatial plane, and as an epistemological state, so that the 
frame is type of attention of thought or a designation and boundary for the 
origin and operation of a concept. Because of this it will be necessary to 
question both of these distinctions of the frame, as being at once, a material 
object, and an epistemic condition. Together they are both suggestive of an 
aesthetic means.  Furthermore, it will be necessary to question the literal, 
physical, superimposition of material images from the visual field, but also, 
the architectonic characteristic of thinking that precedes painting, that is, the 
framing of the painter’s perception considered as a process of the delimiting 
and selecting of images. In this regard, we will consider the processual view 
of the activity of framing, by which the planar surface of the painting is 
transfixed from the materiality of the real, pronouncing the movement of 
consciousness to the contact of concrete perceptions. We will then consider 
the frame and framing as a directional characterization of the movement of 
consciousness, so that framing involves the tensions of activity, the differing 
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degrees of concentration of thinking, and the direction of conscious attention 
toward the planar surface. Our aim in this chapter is to connect Bergson’s 
ontology of images, with the process of painting, by which process of framing 
is already in the planar surface, and in turn, this conditions the subjectivity of 
the painter, by way of the embodiment of expressive and creative extensions 
as given by the process of its event. 
 
In Chapter 6, we will consider the nature of colour. We will consider colour 
first in terms of ‘intensity’ and in terms of qualitative sensations, and then, by 
following from Bergson’s conceptual negotiation of the difference of interior 
life and the purely qualitative states of consciousness, we will consider colour 
as material and creative rhythmic extensity. We will maintain that in the 
process of painting, colour is the embodiment of rhythmic extensity towards 
the quantitative dimension of the material surface. However, we will also 
consider the psychical intensity permeating the expressions through the 
painter’s conscious experience as given by the dimension of colour from the 
materiality of the process of painting. From this context, we will consider 
colour from the context of Bergson’s theory of duration of reality, so that 
colour is itself a qualitative change in time, and as it is given through 
perceptions, as an unfolding of states of consciousness as temporal 
multiplicities. This is to argue that colour as a ‘pure change’, the underlying 
basis for an ontological theory of painting, such that colour is at once 
qualitative intensities of material reality, and in the process of painting, by its 
own rhythmic potential, colour is then, an affective force of the becoming of 
discrete forms and quantitative magnitudes of its visual affect. We will 
consider Kandinsky’s theory of colour to further a Bergsonian view of colour 
beyond the description in terms of its duration and heterogeneous quality and 
emphasize its forceful presence in the change of painterly experience and the 
spiritual progression resonating from its affect. From Bergson to Kandinsky, 
we will argue for a conception of colour by which colour is regarded as 
affective force and an intermediary of activities of experience towards 
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expression. 
 
In Chapter 7 we will argue that the actualisation of the line in the process of 
painting is creative expression, as it is the occurrence of both the realization 
of images and indication of the prompt of images from the kinesthetic 
experience immanent to the process.  In this regard, this is at once the most 
stable translation of the experience of life and simultaneously, by its origin, it 
is a rupturing of conditions of deviations of experience, and thereby, modes 
of expression enacting the experiences that also portend the becoming of 
visual experiences in the process of painting.  The specific question that arises 
here is easily seen.  Because the identity of the line in painting has been 
considered in terms of its ‘function’, this conventional value of the line has 
limited our understanding of the possibility of the experience of linearity, 
beyond such notions as arrangement, foundation, outline, and contour.  In 
other words, we have reduced the originative expression of line to intellectual 
conceptualisations of structure, and lending to the ‘figurative’ in painting, so 
that representing becomes the definitive mode of thinking, i.e. thinking as 
spatial configuration of lines.  However, what are the alternatives of thinking 
through the line, and what can we make of  the identity of the line in the 
process of painting when we consider the line according to its ontological 
nature, and thereby, towards an account of a Bergsonian theory of linear 
thinking as creative and the difference of experience through time. We will 
argue that the line is an affectively present form of coalescence of contacts of 
the painter’s rhythm with the rhythms of the painting medium, and to extend 
this theory we will adopt the Kandinskian view of the line as the becoming of 
thinking through the necessary difference of thought according to the freedom 
and liberation immanent to the identity of the line. Here, it is the Kandinskian 
extension of Bergsonian philosophy that gives us an alternative philosophy of 
the line in practice-led research of painting as philosophy.  Furthermore, we 
will argue that the line is an occurrence of visible formulations from the 
contouring process in time. We will consider the line and the linear quality of 
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its movement, so that in both senses of the word, the force attributed to linear 
movement precedes its articulation, and the movement of lines, is both in the 
course of its marking, and yet, in the potential of that course for creative 
direction. In this latter sense, we will argue that lines are vital movements, 
both of mind and matter, as intentionally and consciously being rendered, but 
in the same instant, through their own discursive movements, lines are also 
self-actualizing means of non-intentional, unconscious, and continuously 
divergent activities. As with the line itself, the qualitative change of painting 
is one of processes of continual movement, differing degrees of tensions of 
consciousness, and the durational rhythms of visual expression. We will 
consider painting in itself as a material process, but a material towards forms 
of living. Therefore, we will attempt to argue that as the process of painting 
embodies both material and mental activities, in the same sense, the line in 
painting signifies the ‘living’ process most immediate to the activities in 
painting, and not merely mind intending towards and uniting with material, 
but moving from its own embodiment and continuously opening towards its 
endless creation. 
In the Conclusion, we consider what is at stake for the argument of a 
contemporary Bergsonian philosophy in the actualisation of painting.  
According to the momentum of contemporary Bergsonian scholarship, the 
definition of philosophy that regards its own process as it attempts to 
understand multiple movements of reality, by also appraising its own means 
of philosophizing beyond philosophy, this doubles a compounding problems 
in the identifications of the process of painting.  Therefore painting may serve 
as a philosophical effort in the investigation of duration and the world of 
images.  Towards the more recent contemporary evaluations and theoretical 
applications of Bergsonian thinking to process-oriented art, the practices and 
projects of technologically-based art have been the main focus.  By our 
account we have considered painting, not simply because of the more recent 
investigations of the identity of painting, but because the ‘tradition’ of 
painting has not been exhausted in terms of the potential of its ontological 
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status. From the context of a philosophy of becoming that regards the identity 
of painting in terms of process, the problem with the philosophy of painting 
is the medium by which we call into question its identity.    If we accept the 
Henrian influenced re-introduction of Kandinsky into the dialogue of 
Bergsonian philosophy of immanence, then what are we to ask about the 
knowledge of painting that is not referential to its object, the considers the 
process so as to consider the process?  This does not only challenge an 
immanence based theorization of painting  but calls into question the 
orientation of the questions.  In painting is the philosophy occurring in the 
location of the expression, or immediate to the experience   recognizable by 
the devices that enact the philosophical orientation towards the process? 
These questions frame the currents of questioning that aim towards the claim 
of philosophy becoming, connected to painting becoming, and then addressed 
as thinking becoming. As these questions are not driving to explicit answers 
but are poised to further their philosophical character, these chapters are not 
meant to be taken as a discursive, comprehensive, and ordered evaluation of 
a philosophy of painting or a metaphysics of art. Rather, these chapters are 
meant to highlight principle Bergsonian concepts and the comparative 
correspondences with Kandinskian theory, so as to be offered as workable 
thesis for the continuing philosophy in painting. From the interchange, 
crossovers, and even conjoining of any chapter, one to another, the 
philosopher and the painter, the thinker and the artist, may draw comparisons 
or establish dichotomies from principle Bergsonian conceptualisations to 
continue the metaphysics of painting, a view of the embodiment of thinking 
in process of visual experience and expression and increase the ever-
expanding development of philosophies of art.  The creative expression 
through the proliferation of images within the durational and evolving 
processes of painting, demonstrates that a process-oriented philosophy of 
painting must attend to the various forms of the development of visual 
experiences in painting, as these are constantly unfolding and convertible to 
the opening of thinking and philosophical reflection. 
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Chapter 1 – Image 
 
Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of ‘images.’ And by ‘image’ we mean a certain existence 
which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the 
realist calls a thing - an existence place halfway between the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation.’ 
This conception of matter is simply that of common sense.1 
 
Across the yellow sand walked a small, thin, red man. He kept slipping. He looked as if he 
were walking on ice.  But it was the yellow sand of the unbounded plain.2 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Our concern in this chapter is to establish Bergson’s concept of image as the 
basis for a philosophy of painting, a philosophy concerning the relation of the 
object of images and the form of images continuously actualised and 
elaborated in the creative process of painting.  We wish to proceed towards a 
philosophy of painting from the perspective of Bergson to simplify our 
terminology, and to advance our argument we consider painting as a creative 
process, to mean that painting is a mode of apprehending images in time, and 
the experience of images intuitively through the living encounter of the 
painter’s activity and the material object. This suggests a diffusion of visual 
experiences in relation to the potential of painting, such that the realisations 
of novel imagery occurs through the differing conditions of the process, and 
thereby, originating the difference of perceptual faculties through the multiple 
realities of living experience. By situating our claim this way, we are opposed 
to the view of the developments of painting in terms of the ‘progress of 
painting’, which mistakes that which has been communicated through the 
medium for the potential of the medium specificity towards continual visual 
experience.  This is often seen with accounts of painting, in which painting is 
considered in terms of the historical lineage of static objects, which is then 
applied in efforts of its current appraisal and classification. In this sense, we 
                                                     
1 H. Bergson, Matter and memory (New York: Zone books, 1999). 
2 W. Kandinsky, Kandinsky, complete writings on art (Da Capo Press, 1994). 
    
34  
 
 
Image 
are opposed to the supplanting of the identity of painting in terms of an ‘order’ 
of the understanding of painting, or a ‘paradigm’ of painting from a 
genealogical view of art, and thereby, the character of painting reduced to a 
systematic account of the succession of visual ideations. Rather, by situating 
the argument of the nature of philosophy and metaphysics of becoming 
enacted through the process of painting, we are already anticipating the 
multivalent philosophies of an ontology of images specific to the process of 
painting. Our understanding is in the activity of images, continuously 
individuating the identity of painting in the making. Therefore, we base our 
question of painting according to Bergson’s view of reality as a ceaseless 
becoming of an ever-present multiplicity of images. As Leonard Lawlor’s 
study of Bergson’s concept of image indicates, that for Bergson’s thinking, 
‘Art and Image are virtually identical’. As a marker for the direction of our 
line of thinking, we will therefore, proceed with our analysis of the concept 
of image, with view of towards in context in the identification of the process 
of painting. By this ‘foundation of image’, we will consider the process of 
painting in terms of a situation of images.  By regarding painting according 
to an engagement and activity within the world of images, this anticipates the 
differentiated philosophy of images from the movement of images enacting 
philosophical thinking.  In this sense, questioning the image first in relation 
to creative conditions of experience, is a projection of thinking that anticipates 
the ontological nature of painting, as it participates in the world of images, as 
a mode of sensuous experience and mutable thinking embodied in the 
modality of its own constellation of images. Where Bergson’s philosophy 
praises the emergence of creative thinking, and regards artistic perception as 
one such mode of philosophical discovery, we look to the very mattering of 
the image, its realization through concentrations of living attention. In this 
regard, from Bergson’s view of the world as a process of images, we will 
maintain our approach to the question of the activity of philosophy in 
painting, and how painting is philosophical through its specific attentions of 
life.  Painting and the enhancement of perceptions connected to a context of 
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images allows us to reflect from the atmosphere of creation itself as an 
engaging creative process.  
 
In Maria Fernandez’s study, ‘Historicizing Process and Responsiveness in 
Digital Art’3, we are offered an account of the more recent character of art’s 
development, specifically through the experimentation directed by a 
conceptualisation in tandem with art practice, ‘absorbed into new medium’.  
We are told that the understanding of art as process is most apparent in the 
digital and technological developments of art. However, we believe that the 
consideration of ‘process’, or even, the representation of ‘process’ is distinct 
from the realisation of process and the actual projections of the process of 
images . In this sense, we wish to enlarge the scope of philosophical grasp 
within the world, by an extension of a Bergsonian theory of image in order to 
advance the question of painting, firstly, as a means of philosophical activity 
concerning its own evolution, and thereby, the articulation of visual 
knowledge in contemporary image making.  However second to this, 
regarding the identity of painting as a philosophy of image in a post-
structuralist context, we will acknowledge the level of mistrust to concepts of 
the image, particularly related to painting as both painting and the process of 
images intrinsic to its creative enterprise require a spatialised framing 
structure to reference its identity.  We will visit this challenge in the later 
chapter on the ‘Frame’ through a reading of Derrida, to consider how painting 
must overcome its own spatial identity to address the very nature of the 
projection of images inherent to its process. To this end, a Bergsonian theory 
of image allows us to consider from among the diverse theories of 
contemporary painting, a conceptual basis of painting in terms of a process of 
images as activities and as the duration of images bound to the imaged 
content, but this is not only beset by the problems of identity it also contends 
with an array of issues from the postmodern context.  In particular, by 
                                                     
3 M. Fernández, ‘Life-like’: Historicizing Process and Responsiveness in Digital Art (na, 
2006). 
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proposing a philosophy of painting in terms of the thinking and painting as a 
mutual becoming, we believe this provokes philosophical and painterly 
projections, which scatters thought in the gestural and material embodiment 
in the images of painting.    A point to be taken from this, as this is evident in 
Kandinsky’s paintings, is that the description of philosophy as also the 
description of painting is secondary to the multiplicity of images immediate 
to the reciprocity of thinking through the process of painting.  As Crowther 
has argued, Kandinskian theory and practice of painting was concerned with 
its ‘immediate conditions of creation and reception’, indicating for us, in 
terms of the shared concern with the metaphysics of immediacy, the 
connection with a Bergsonian principle of philosophy.4  According to this 
analysis, our argument is also opposed to the limitations of phenomenology 
in the recognition of the modes of philosophical thinking, by which the 
traditions foists the meditation of consciousness, and the ontological appraisal 
of images in process in terms of the  occasion of conscious reception of the 
image.  Though the appeal and the question of consciousness in the role of 
the creative process is not being denied, rather, the reduction of the creative 
process of painting and the generative forms of images is a limitation of the 
processual qualities of images which preceded our articulation through 
reflective thinking.  In this sense, our opposition is against exclusive 
phenomenological evaluations of painting, not only because of the limitation 
of the scope of its investigation by its own conceptual constraints, but also 
because it is lacking in the engagement with the multiple dimensions of the 
temporal identity of painting. What is then asserted as the difference of 
thinking investigated and understood through the thinking of painting, is the 
recognition of the process of philosophy contingent upon the medium of 
painting and this very difference, as palpable in the emerging through the 
durational qualities of the forms of perceptual images.  
 
                                                     
4 P. Crowther, The language of twentieth-century art: a conceptual history (Yale University 
Press New Haven, CT, 1997). 
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However, we must first consider the dual nature of the image, the differences 
of mental and material images are immediate to the reification of the 
becoming of images inherent to the experiences of the painter and to our 
apprehension of reality as viewer.  The question of the ‘image’ that this raises, 
particular towards a Bergsonian basis of a philosophy of painting, anticipates 
many trajectories of philosophical conveyance from the conceptualising of 
the notion of ‘image’. It is towards Kandinsky’s opposition to the view of 
painting as solely a  representational construct that we turn our Bergsonian 
analysis of the painted image to expand further  our understanding of painting 
as the lived experience of images in time,  as a mode of expression of a 
discontinuity of images, and according to the Kandinskian view of painting 
as that of the free composition of images and the analogue of visual and 
aesthetic becoming that goes beyond the distinction of spirit and matter.     
 
To this extent we take a Bergsonian perspective, to articulate that the activity 
of the painter, the distinctions of painterly activities, and the affective 
condition of the painting medium towards the event of the painted image, are 
all occurrences within a process. Henceforth, from our use of the terms 
‘process of painting’, we assume the time of painting, and by this we mean 
that painting is the collective experiences of the painter, as the situated and 
lived agency of painting activity, in direct relation to the painting as an art-
object, and the reciprocity of these marks the event of the possibilities of 
painting becoming material form.5
   
From this context of process, and in terms 
of Bergson’s concept of image, we will regard the activities of the painter and 
the painting medium as identities of painting through a process of images.6
  
It 
is to Bergson’s ontology of duration that we will first consider the concept of 
                                                     
5 L. Lawlor, The challenge of Bergsonism (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2003). 
6 N. Wolterstorff, 'Works and worlds of art'. I take support from Wolterstorff’s view of the 
distinction of art works in terms of ‘occurrence-works or object-works’. In so far as this 
distinction complements a Bergsonian approach, by emphasizing the ontological status of 
art works by the activity or the taking-place of something, from his interpretation we 
recognize an implicit time of art. See also his theory of ‘occurrences of states of affairs’, 
which suggest the ‘event’ of art. p. 192 
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image.  By this, we will argue that reality is a process of images, so as to claim 
that within this reality, the process of painting is a mode of activities from the 
contents of life with the affective relations of these activities towards forms of 
life in material events.7
 
This will call into question the general descriptions 
that formulate a theory of painting in terms of the interactions of the painter, 
as subject, and painting, as an object. Instead, we will argue from the basis of 
Bergson’s concept of image, towards a notion of a process of painting, by 
which we regard painting in terms of the differing durations of images to 
account for the continuity of its vital experience in material expressions. To 
this end, in keeping with a Bergsonian outlook, we will attempt to connect 
Bergson’s concept of image, as it implies the durational nature of 
consciousness and the dynamics of perception, with Kandinsky’s theory of a 
non-representational painting, as it suggests a visionary becoming, a 
‘spiritual’ change, and a visual evolution of the elements and forms of 
painting. 
 
From Bergson’s concept of image, there is no distinct boundary between 
internal and external domains of reality, no separations of consciousness and 
things, but only a continuity of images immanent to time. From this 
immanence philosophy of processual nature of images, there is proximity of 
Bergson’s theory to Kandinsky’s thought. Where Kandinsky’s theories of 
painting aspired for painting to be of a pure abstraction, to mean that painting 
is emancipated from the function of  representation and considered as a means 
for the conveyance of perceptual faculties  understood as ‘objective’ and 
given to the appearance of the world. Although Kandinsky’s theory maintains 
that the elements of painting are towards the force of expression in external 
                                                     
7 H. Focillon, C. B. Hogan and G. Kubler, The life of forms in art (Zone Books New York, 
1989). Bergson’s influence in the work of Focillon’s is clear where he states, ‘And a work 
of art is (to hold for the moment an obvious contraction) both matter and mind, both form 
and content’. Focillon central thesis is the concept of ‘form’ in the arts, emphasizes the 
constitution of art in terms of life, and therefore, offers further theoretical support for a 
Bergsonian theory of painting. See also, . Herbert Read, The Forms of Things Unknown. 
(Horizon Press. New York, 1960). pp. 49-75. Read offers further comparative commentary 
on the concept of form that suggests a Bergsonist position. 
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objects issuing from inner sounds, he admits that the attempts towards 
expression of purely abstract forms require a grasping of the purely indefinite. 
Similar to Bergson’s view of the necessity of philosophical effort to break 
from the habits of thinking, and thereby, an active intuitive reflection   
attending to the most immediate encounter of living experiences, Kandinsky’s 
approach to painting emphasizes a concentration of upon the ‘tonal’ content 
of the material and objective, which is regarded in terms of the ‘immaterial’ 
emergence and the resonance of impulses within reality.8 Here we wish to 
bridge a Kandinskian theoretical outlook with a Bergsonian philosophy of 
painting, with the connection of the philosophical view of Michel Henry.  
  
In terms of Bergson’s ontology of image, and ontological outlook that regards 
the material world by the variation of images, from among a flow of 
differences of images, as a processual nature of images, this grants a 
philosophy of painting a grounding to consider the nature its imagistic 
duration and the difference of images from the contingency of the multiplicity 
of images in duration.  Here the most immediate point of connection with a 
Kandinskian theory of painting is the reconciling of the materiality of 
expressions and the dematerialization of the force of abstraction, the very 
force of change that encounters the sensuous image are from among a 
continuous reality.9
 
It is with a view of the parallels of Bergson’s concept and 
Kandinsky’s theory, that we aim to replace the question of the distinctions of 
inner psychological reality from external material in painting, by arguing 
towards a theory of painting in which the presence of the process is the totality 
of its activities and material events, and hence, an ontological grounding 
implicit in the temporality of images. We will argue towards this ontology by 
considering the interpenetration and mutual exchange of vital and material 
designations of images in process.10
 
This will entail elaboration on the notions 
of experience of philosophy reflected in the concrete embodiment of the 
                                                     
8 W. Grohmann and W. Kandinsky, 'Life and Work', New York.144-145 
9 W. Kandinsky, Concerning the spiritual in art (Courier Dover Publications, 2012). 
10 H. Bergson, Matter and memory (New York: Zone books, 1999). 
    
40  
 
 
Image 
painted image, the differentiation of expressions from the affect of intuition, 
and the creation of visual forms, so that in terms of images, painting is a 
creative process of images in time.11
 
  
 
This continues the Bergsonian view of thinking in terms of duration, by 
extending the horizon of thinking through the possibilities of artistic creation 
in the activity of painting.  Thus, Bergson’s concept of image is a key notion 
in the understanding of the process of painting as a continuous multiplicity of 
images, as a process of creation of qualitative differences through extended 
and material images.12
 
Supported by a Kandinskian view of the spiritual 
development of painting in relation to images and movement, we will argue 
that the process of painting is a progression of the images from its content and 
images towards its forms. From the Kandinskian outlook of the unfolding of 
painting by force of its own impulse, and by this elucidation, that the painting 
is a process of liberation from its own denotation, we can reconsider 
Bergson’s formulation of ‘reflective perception’. According to Bergson’s 
account of the image, perceptual awareness is by way of a ‘circuit’ of images 
in which the activity of perceiving and that which is being perceived, are held 
in a ‘mutual relation’.13  Implying that the flow of images in this circuit 
emanate from the object into the source of the sensory perception, this serves 
as a Bergsonian model from which we can further by adapting to the 
Kandinskian view. In other words, it is the view of the revelatory immediacy 
of images, as described in Bergson’s theory, that we extend to the images in 
the process of painting, regarding these as  issuing from the medium, such 
that the materiality is the basis of a perceptual self-presentation to the painter,  
through which philosophical investigation may focus  attention to the extent 
that the focusing and thinking, painting as perceiving,  proceed as an active 
engagement according to the difference of material and figural enactments 
from issuing from the rhythm of the process.  
  
 
 
                                                     
11 H. Bergson, Henri Bergson: key writings (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2002). 
12 J. Mullarkey, Bergson and philosophy (Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh, 1999). 
13 H. Bergson, Matter and memory (New York: Zone books, 1999). 
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An Ontology of Duration: Images Immanent to Reality 
 
Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of ‘images’. And by ‘image’ we mean a certain existence 
which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the 
realist calls a thing - an existence placed halfway between the ‘thing’ and the 
‘representation’.14 
 
Bergson’s concept of ‘image’ is a development from within his philosophy of 
process metaphysics.15
 
However, it is his theory of change which is 
fundamental to his philosophy, so that, from the context of a philosophy of 
process and change, Bergson’s theory conceives reality as a unity of 
multiplicities of images in duration. For Bergson, the material world is 
equivalent to a system of images, as immanent and continuous with reality. 
To argue from this towards a theory of painting as a process of images will 
require us to consider Bergson’s theory of pure perception and pure memory. 
 
We argue that the function of the living body in the image-world is towards 
action and affected by sensation.  Bergson suggests that the affection as the 
occurrence in the body from external stimulus, is the result of the surrounding 
‘images’ acting upon it. It is the reciprocal exchange, the influence of these 
affections as informed by sensations that not only enables the execution of the 
body’s movements but also effects the reactions. The movement of the 
physical stimulus, as an affective stimulus, is a movement from the external 
images to the internal image centre, which is then exchanged by a reaction as 
a movement from the internally situated images to the external and 
surrounding images. Bergson explains that this ‘movement’ is the relation of 
consciousness and sensation.  For him, consciousness is ‘present indeed’ in 
the sensation or feeling.16
   
However, consciousness is present in the 
movement of reality, as continuously assessing and initiating movement. 
                                                     
14 Ibid. 
15 J. Mullarkey, The New Bergson (Manchester University Press, 1999).p. 31 I take support 
from Mullarkey’s argument of the issue of ‘novelty’ in view of Bergson’s theory of duree. 
Specifically, I proceed with my argument from the principle that time is novel, as time is 
the affect of its continuity, and by the notion of immanent and internal temporalisation, by 
which the heterogeneous and differentiated reality of time is ‘full of structure’. 
16 H. Bergson, Matter and memory (New York: Zone books, 1999). p.2 
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Hence, the movement of images is also a movement of consciousness from 
the regime of actions and deliberate reactions, voluntary movements in 
response to the continuous movements of the reality. 
However, as with Bergson’s concept of image, we must also regard the 
images of painting in terms of a plurality of activities towards pictorial 
configuration, by which consciousness  is  made  more  vivid  through  a  
continuity  of  experience  in  time. 
Bergson argues in terms of reality as a process of images, in which we then 
understand the art-object of painting as itself an event of images.17
 
That is, in 
terms of the becoming-present of painterly forms and expressive images, the 
process of painting involves activities of images and the actualizations of 
these images in concrete and extended form. In other words, according to 
Bergson’s concept of image, reality is presented as a constellation of images 
in process, so that, in regards to the process of painting, the process of its 
images are modes of actualizations and realizations immanent to its activities 
and events.18
   
Here we argue that the process of painting, is processual, to 
mean that the very nature of the image is not stable, it is a fluid form, and the 
process of these images in the reality of painting is the transitional and 
progressive forms we recognize in the expressions and exchanges of visual 
                                                     
17 B. Sandywell, Dictionary of Visual Discourse: A Dialectical Lexicon of Terms (Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd., 2012). p. 277 Within Sandywell’s definition there is reference to the 
definition of ‘event’ according to John Dewey’s claim that ‘every existence is event-like’.  
I hold a similar view in the sense that the experiential condition of time is based on what is 
actualised in the present. 
18 J. Hornsby, Concise Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy (Psychology Press, 2000).p. 5 
see entry for ‘Action’. I see this entry as begging the question, because it combines the 
notion of action or ‘bodily movements’ with events.  By first proposing that Action theory 
is specific to metaphysics and philosophies of mind, I accept that Bergsonian theory 
contributes in a significant way. In this entry questions of the distinction between actions 
and events are said to be based on view of ‘purposiveness’, or even, ‘intentionality’.  From 
a Bergsonian context these would be considered the as thecontent of consciousness, and as 
consciousness flows in time, they are part of the real as they are actualized through time. In 
other words, I am not denying the entry’s description; I am considering the assumptions of 
the entry, i.e.  ‘having done with purpose’, ‘volitional notions’, and how they either may be 
taken as supportive for Bergson’s view of action or how they may counterbalance a 
Bergsonian view.  For the reader, I mean to frame an argument from a Bergsonian view of 
action, the regards actions of a painter, or painterly activities as those preceding the material 
event of the painted image. This would suggest that painted image accommodates the 
experience of the actions, and during its rendering, proceeds with the process of painting. 
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experiences.  By taking the activities of images in relation to their experience 
as differing durations according to differing activities and distinct occurrences 
of expression in time, we understand the experiences of the duration of matter. 
Hence, the process of painting is the progression of multiple modes of (re)-
presentation of images affecting the passage of activities towards the material 
embodiment of a condensing of durations, by which the expediency of our 
visualisations regard as a unified contraction of movements of expression. 
 
Painting, as involving the perceptual modes of experience, should no longer 
be regarded in terms of an object and subject orientation of mind, as this 
distinction becomes irrelevant in terms of the plurality of images in duration, 
and as we consider a view of the totality of reality as processual.19
 
This 
implies further, a concomitance of images, images of mind and of matter, 
differing in degree and not of kind, as a unity, and relational within the 
changing process of time.20
 In this regard, Bergson’s concept of image is the 
basis for an ontology of images, in which the continuous flow of reality is 
made up of images considered as contents of change and mutually, images as 
forms of process.21
 
The concept of image figures into a theory that considers 
reality as a continuity of duration and material extensity.22
 
Mullarkey explains 
that Bergson’s concept of image, suggests a pluralism of reality, by which 
matter is the lowest form of mind and mind is the highest state of matter.23
 
He 
indicates that for Bergson, the significance of ‘image’ is that it does not 
privilege mind over matter or vice versa, but rather, it is posited so as to ‘pre-
exist any bifurcation between inside and outside, subject and object’.24 
 
                                                     
19 J. Mullarkey, Bergson and philosophy (Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh, 1999). 
20 S. Guerlac, Thinking in time: an introduction to Henri Bergson (Cornell University Press, 
2006).p.106 
21 L. Lawlor, The challenge of Bergsonism (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2003). p. 117 I take 
support from Lawlor’s commentary, so that towards an application of Bergson’s theory to a 
theory of painting, I agree that Bergson is a ‘continuist’, (i.e. the continuity of Images in 
time), but that this means that the difference of images, as differences in  the evolution of 
life, are discontinuous.  However, because of life, these ‘forms of life’ are relational.   
22 H. Bergson, Henri Bergson: key writings (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2002). 
23 J. Mullarkey, Bergson and philosophy (Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh, 1999).p. 
165-185 
24 H. Bergson, Matter and memory (New York: Zone books, 1999). p. 181 
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Furthermore, Bergson explains that perceptions are ‘in the object’. Our 
perceptions are not states of our mind, but instead, they are part of the 
existence of the reality independent of our own. Because of this, he explains 
that it is by ‘common sense’, from the most literal meaning, that the object 
exists itself, and, in itself, it is ‘pictorial’. Therefore, by this notion of pictorial 
sense, perceiving is common to the field of perception, to mean that what we 
perceive is what is given by the images, so that our perceiving is in itself from 
the field of self-existing images.25
 In other words, the concept of ‘image’ is 
meant to suggest that the field of perception in reality, is given to differing 
points of view of mind, but given just as it is perceived, as images from among 
images. Here, Bergson’s strategy is not to examine reality by presuming the 
differences of mind from matter, but rather, by assuming their value in terms 
of images, he considers the connection of mind in matter. The relation of mind 
to matter is then, not so much to do with the difference of internal or external 
orientations of images, but rather, with the differences of images immanent to 
time. To this extent, Bergson’s theory conceives of time in terms of duration 
so that duration itself is not reducible to space, and therefore, the concern of 
the relations of mind and matter are based solely on a primacy of time. From 
the outset of Matter and Memory, Bergson’s thesis is presented in terms of a 
‘presence of images’, and thereby, begins by situating a notion of the self-
according to a temporal horizon, open to the occurrences of images. 
 
Here I am in the presence of images, in the vaguest sense of the word, images perceived when 
my senses are opened to them, unperceived when they are closed. All these images act and 
react upon one another in all their elementary parts according to constant laws which I call 
laws of nature [...].26 
 
 
From this formulation, the relation of the self and the world is in terms of 
perceiving, but perceiving as accounted by the activity from the whole of 
‘images’. Immediately, by this, the concept of the image indicates ‘presence’, 
                                                     
25 Ibid. p. 10 
26 Ibid. p. 17 
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but only a situated sense of self, a field of perception. Whether open or closed 
to the perception, the world is an activity of images. By perceiving, the body 
becomes situated to the activity of the real. Already, the world is given as a 
dynamic process of images, so that by the relation of perception to action, 
reality is more than ‘things’ or ‘appearances’, it is the perceptual and the 
sensorial experiences given by the movement of images, as qualities of 
movement among images. 
 
Moreover, Bergson argues that perception is the present condition as a 
plurality of differing activity, and the continuous interface from among all 
stimuli to responses. This suggests both a condition of the world, and, a 
specific mode of activity. To perceive as such, is to be from among ‘centres 
of action’ in a world of perception. In this way, Bergson’s notion of perception 
describes a notion of presence as well as reflection. On the one hand, 
perception is a dynamic complexity of indefinite images, continuous in the 
present, but on the other, perception as given to the perceiving and living 
centre of images, is reflected by response, reaction, and the overall 
interchange among the differing images. Mullarkey explain this in terms of 
the diminutive nature of perception, that is, as the whole of present reality 
perception is then given to the specific centres active in perceiving. In this 
way, he suggests that ‘each individual’s perceptual organs inevitably diminish 
the greater complexity in more various and so apparently subjective ways’.27 
In other words, in terms of painting, we can relate this to the painter, by which 
the painter is a canalization of primary qualities, that of activities of reality. 
Here, the conditions for subjectivity are situated in terms of the processes of 
perception, processes of perceiving from within a world of perception, and 
therefore, situated centres of perception that are themselves a type of 
condensing of duration.28 
 
In a similar sense, Kandinskian theory suggests that in the process of painting 
                                                     
27 J. Mullarkey, The New Bergson (Manchester University Press, 1999). 
28 H. Bergson, Matter and memory (New York: Zone books, 1999). p. 12-14 
    
46  
 
 
Image 
there occurs a localisation of activity, that is, from the inner self there emerges 
a force of 
origination of painterly forms.29 In this sense, for Kandinsky, the question of 
painting is not directed towards the specification of its nature, but rather, to 
the means and the modes of its continuity. Here we have a correlation with 
Bergsonian philosophy, in that a philosophy of becoming is concerned with 
the proximity of the orientations of the philosophical reflection, and the 
ascertaining of philosophical insight in the depths of durational rhythms of 
reality. In Point and Line to Plane, Explaining the problem of our 
understanding of the nature of art, and perhaps more importantly, the relation 
of the painter to the painting, Kandinsky questions the force that specifies the 
process of painting, the ‘content which only art can contain’.30 He suggests 
that this force is immanent to the process of painting, and through the process 
of painting, ‘can give clear expression through the means available to it.’31 
This suggests a type of mutual interaction, that between painter and painting 
medium, between perceiver and the system of perception in which the 
reciprocity of images, i.e. the interface of perceptions, is facilitated by the 
strictures of the material images towards the movement of the compositional 
process and the impulse of images experienced in the registration as physical 
and painted images.    
 
                                                     
29 Wassily Kandinsky, Point and Line to Plane, Dover Publications, London, 1979, pp. 17-
19.  The particualr point of correlation with Bergson’s thinking of the nature of perception 
in terms of the ‘reflecting’ that occurs in perceing, i.e. that when we percieve, this is a 
reflection back towards the possibility of courses of action, is elaborated by Kandinsky in 
terms of the work of painting which, ‘mirrors itself upon the surface...its image extends 
beyond...Here, too, exists the possibility of entering art’s message’.  
30 Will Grohman, Wassily Kandisnky: Life and Work, Thames and Hudson, London, 1959, 
p. 131. From Grohman’s description of Kandinsky’s realisation of the influence of the 
graphical elements of the painting upon the very process of the paintings process, we see 
this in the change of his paintings style particularly in the ‘Improvisation’ paintings 
between 1910-1914, after the publication of ‘On the Spiritual in Art’. What is significant 
about these paintings, are the force of the images which may not be appreciated in the 
contemporaneous viewing of these, but at the time of their exhibition they marked the sense 
of Kandinskian ‘abstraction’ defined as the outcome of struggling with elements of the 
painting, and ultimately, a reliance on the painting process to convey the ‘inner sounds’ of 
its expression. See also, p. 146  
31 W. Kandinsky, Concerning the spiritual in art (Courier Dover Publications, 2012). p. 29 
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In comparison, Alexander explains that by Bergson’s ‘doctrine of images’, 
we are given a universe that is ‘present’ to itself. In other words, by proposing 
that the real is a process of a plurality of images, Bergson relates everything 
to a dynamism of activities, so that the totality of the material world is the 
whole of images becoming present continuously.32
 
Furthermore, Bergson 
situates the body within this continuity, as an image like other images, but 
with the exception that it is able to exact different actions and reactions, and 
thereby, is regarded as a ‘zone of indeterminacy’ from among the 
transmissions of movement of images. Here, to be more exact towards an 
application of painting, this means that the painter’s body is a source of 
voluntary action, and by its activity, in terms of the choice of the body and 
the selection of images from the world of images around it, the body is a force 
of influence on the images around it, and through contact of the painting 
medium, is an effective impact within the field of perception. 
 
 
 
The Painter: Living Centre of Images 
 
My body is, then, in the aggregate of the material world, an image which acts like other 
images, receiving and giving back movement, with perhaps, this difference only, that my 
body appears to choose, within certain limits, the manner in which its shall restore what it 
receives.33 
 
According to Bergson, the differences from among perceptions is not that of 
distinctions from among the representations of the surrounding images, but 
rather, that the difference of perception is by an increase of the ‘horizon of 
choice’. In other words, for Bergson, the difference of perception and 
representation is more of a question of the possibility of actions and the 
activities that precede the degree of choice from among these actions.34
 
In this 
sense, from among a system of images given in perception, the variability of 
                                                     
32 I. W. Alexander, 'Bergson, philosopher of reflection'. pp. 30 
33 H. Bergson, Matter and memory (New York: Zone books, 1999). p. 19 
34 Ibid. p. 25 
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coordination and conduct of activities is conditioned by the body. The 
movement of the body is the situated occurrence of perception, which is to 
say, as perception is given to a ‘centre of images’, the body is affected by 
activities, and the body reflects perception by acting and reacting among the 
images and interacting within the field of perception. The degree of variability 
of perception, according to a body as a living centre of images, implies that 
perception, as a field of activity, is what is given to a painter’s consciousness. 
 
From this context then, we can say that the painter’s body is an activity of 
selection in terms of the need to act specific to the conditions of the activity. 
In this sense, the painter is embedded in the material world (i.e. image-world), 
and the change of the painter’s activity is relational within the world of 
activity.35
 
However, as a potential for changes of activity, the painter is an 
‘eventual influence’ from within a dynamic process of images. Bergson 
explains that the objects which surround the body ‘reflect its possible action 
upon them’. For us this means that the painter is within a ‘dynamic energy 
system’. This is to say that the painter’s body, as a living centre of images, is 
a relational condition of images from among a field of perception in the 
image-world.36
   
In this respect, there is not an isolation of images but rather, 
a constant change from the variation of activities issuing from among a 
relation of images. Here again, we relate the painter’s activities, as the 
activities actualized through the body as active ‘reflections’ of change. That 
is, the painter is source of action within a convergence of images, and hence, 
a reaction of activity towards the surrounding images relative to the body in 
the field of perception. 
 
Moore argues that Bergson’s theory implies a ‘preferred metaphor’, one 
                                                     
35 Ibid. p. 19 
36 S. Guerlac, Thinking in time: an introduction to Henri Bergson (Cornell University Press, 
2006). p. 109 . Guerlac’s suggests constant activity, change, vitality, as relational 
connections with the complex whole constant activity, change, vitality, as relational 
connections with the complex whole of reality.  I take this as an accurate 
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which emphasizes the pragmatic functions of perception.37 He explains that 
when the ‘body reflects its possible action’ this reflection is the ‘choice’ of 
the body, that is, the ‘selection of images’ from the image-world. In this 
regard, the possibility of the painter’s actions deemed as the ‘eventual 
influence’ of the painter’s body, are conditioned by the surrounding images. 
As a centre of actions, the painter is a ‘privileged’ image, in so far as the body 
is a ‘living’ centre, responding to the perceptions interposed from the process 
of painting. Those images that environ the painter are reflected from the centre 
or concentration of movements. From this, we argue that because the image-
world is continuous movement, and all ‘things’ are regarded as possible 
actions, then the painting medium must also be regarded as the active 
influence from within a processual occurrence of images. In this case, the 
painter’s activity is active reflection from among the movement of images 
issuing from the painting medium. Hence, the activities that occur from 
among a living centre of images and the painting medium, as itself part of the 
material images ranged round 
this centre, are all variable, as the process of painting is the continuous 
actualization from among a system of closely linked images. This suggest that 
the process of painting as such, is a proximity of movements issuing from the 
images specific to its material medium, and encountered by the reciprocity of 
painter, vectorising the perceptual possibilities according to the living centre 
among the vortical mass of image present to the painterly experience.  This 
view is similar to Henry’s philosophy of art, suggesting the painting is the 
instance of the ‘movement of the interior becoming life’, which suggests that 
the process of painting is a feeling through reflection, experience through 
expression, and the expanding of the painter’s perception solicited by the 
                                                     
37 F.C.T. Moore, Bergson: Thinking Backwards, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 
29.  This is an insightful description of Bergson’s theory of perception, which allows us 
to engage with painting in a philosophical manner, where the painter to painting, painter 
to canvas already models the environ of perception Bergson’s theory elaborates. 
Summary of Bergson’s theory of perception, form within the context of his philosophy 
of process. Guearlac’s view further supports the view of reality as an ‘image-world’, 
which I take as added support for a ‘Bergsonian’ ontology of images. 
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medium of painting and the images that compose its occurrence.38 In this 
sense, viewed from Bergson’s theory of perceptual relations of images, we 
are suggesting that the process of painting is a process dynamic exchange of 
movements, and the modifications and changes of images according to the 
activity of images from between the painter, as a living centre of images that 
is environed by extended images, and, the images selected according to the 
exchange of activity and reactions. This is to say that, as perception is 
actualized in the painter’s activities, the painter’s activity in the field of 
perception registers in terms of the movement of materiality.  According to 
our concern with the process of painting, this closely linked system of images 
is a complexity of the interchange of images,  such that,  the  living  centre  of  
images  encounters  the  affective  activity issuing from the continuity of 
images in the real, and in turn, must react to this activity of images. Hence, 
the living centre of images, as the sensuous and experiential occurrences of 
images, is active in such a way that the painting medium is already a 
determination according to the needs of activity that proceed with the 
painter’s body. 
 
My perception, in its pure state, isolated from memory, does not go on from my body to other 
bodies, it is, to begin with, in the aggregate of bodies, then gradually limits itself and adopts 
my body as a centre. And it is led to do so precisely by experience of the double faculty, 
which this body possesses, of performing actions and feeling affections;[...].39 
 
From the above passage, we apply Bergson’s explanation to the process of 
painting, to then mean that, as the painter’s activity is a coordination of the 
projection of activity with the continuous encounter of activity. And in the 
terms of ‘selection’, the activities are a filtering from all possible activities, 
so that the painter’s body retains the ‘double faculty’, i.e. that of feeling 
interwoven with acting. In this respect, the painter’s body is both an encounter 
                                                     
38 Michel Henry, La barbarie, Paris, PUF, 2001, p. 4. Here we bring Henry into our attempts 
to connect Kandinsky and Bergson, since Henry’s theory of life suggests life as being more 
than consciousness,  connects well to the Kandinskian outlook of the material and living 
form of painting, and then Henry’s theory of life as being the encounter of its own 
possibility with matter, which resounds with Bergsonian theory of perception.  
39 H. Bergson, Matter and memory (New York: Zone books, 1999).p. 61 
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within the field of images, but an active transmission of activities as an 
expression of the movements of images. However, by the sensorial basis of 
conscious experience, the painter’s body coincides with the influence of 
activities given by the painting medium. In other words, what we refer to as 
the painter’s perceptions, can be termed as such, because from an indefinite 
field of images, the painter’s activities issue from a living centre of activities 
relative to other activity and environed by conditions of activity from material 
images. And as the issuing of action is the actualization of affects from 
perceptions given by material objects, this means that the painter is a 
singularity of activities, that is, an operative image according to the 
actualizations of perceptions given from the total of reality. In this sense we 
are relying on Bergson’s view that perception is not simply original to the 
painter’s activity, but rather, the activities of the painter are modeled by the 
activities of the material world. In this way, the painting medium are 
themselves influential forces of images that exercise upon the painter and are 
already perceptions given to the perceptual experience and sensations of the 
painter. From the principle that perception is reality itself, Bergson’s theory 
supports our consideration of the painter. As a living centre of activities, and 
situated according to a relation to the painting medium, the painter’s 
interaction becomes a closely linked system of images and activities.40 
 
Here we look at Bergson’s hypothesis of a pure perception, by which he 
suggests a pre-reflective notion of perception - perception as ‘an immediate 
and instantaneous vision of matter’.41 Bergson argues that perception always 
includes memory, so by this hypothesis of pure perception, he is indicating 
that perception is not relative to a perceiver. Rather, perception is an 
impersonal system of images. ‘Without being perceived’ matter as the totality 
of perception, and the totality of what may be given to perceptual experience, 
                                                     
40 John Mullarkey, ‘Philosophy of mind’ in Bergson and Philosophy. (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 45 
41 MM p. 34 
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and therefore, a pure objectivity.42
 
Accordingly, from this objective reality of 
images we are then able to regard reality as more than what is articulated by 
the activity of a ‘privileged’ image, and instead, as a totality of images 
identical to the whole of matter.43
 
Bergson claims that the concept of image 
itself implies a philosophy of mind that regards a simultaneity of perception. 
This means that images are perceived as parts of the whole of images, but 
images are also continuous, as a condition of the totality of perception. 
 
In this regard a pure perception is a total instantaneous continuity of images 
without experience, so that it is only by the experience of becoming perceived, 
through the actions and movements of living bodies does the imprinting of 
experience from among perceptions occur. Here, perception becomes the 
basis of consciousness, as the images of perception are given to a convergence 
of movements towards the contact of experience. This suggests an intrinsic 
movement of activities within the total field of perception, which are then 
reflected without, and externalised in the continuous and ever present 
extensity of images. In this sense, perception is not an interior or subjective 
vision, but rather, perception is the whole of reality, from which objects of 
matter and the world as images have the potential to be perceived. From this 
theory, we consider the painter as the potential to effect change from among 
images, as his experience is necessarily, a convergence of perceptions. His 
modes of activity are the actualizations of experience. From these experiences 
then, conscious perception is the occurrence of memory, continuous with the 
interchange of activities and the movements from living centres of images 
within the duration and ever-present extended material world. Moore explains 
that for Bergson the philosophical difficulties with this understanding of 
perception, is that we immediately consider the process of perceiving to be 
equal with representation. 44However, we want to indicate by our reading that 
                                                     
42 MM p. 35 
43 K. Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual (Routledge, 2002). p. 13 
44 F.C.T. Moore, Bergson: Thinking Backwards, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 
pp. 33-34.  
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Bergson’s theory of pure perception disconnects representation from the 
properties of perception. By proposing a ‘pure perception’ he establishes a 
position in which perceiving is not considered immediately joined to 
particular kind of thought, or to a representation of consciousness.  Instead, 
Bergson breaks with any ‘representational’ definition of perception, 
establishing that our perceptual experiences are the encounters with the 
properties of an object as  related to our possible actions, so that it is the 
affection or sensation of the world that precedes any ‘idea’ of the world. 
 
 
Pure Perception: The Contact of Painting 
 
[...] we start from action, that is to say from our faculty of effecting changes in things, a 
faculty attested to by consciousness and toward which all the powers of the organized body 
are seen to converge. So we place ourselves at once in the midst of extended images, and in 
this material universe we perceive centres of indetermination, characteristic of life.45 
 
 
From the above passage, Bergson’s concept of image suggests that the image 
is a moving material continuity of images, but, also in terms of ‘the powers 
of organized body’, the image is regarded as ‘characteristics of life’.46 In this 
sense, because the field of perception is regarded as an ‘aggregate of images’, 
it is to the differences from among perception and sensation that we see the 
difference in kind of a pure material reality of perception, or the distinction 
of an unconscious perception from conscious perception occurring in the 
body. It is here that Bergson’s hypothesis of pure perception, allows us to 
understand perception as being an impersonal foundation of experience, by 
which an absolute exteriority is continuous and occurs as an ever present 
plane of matter.47
 
And as such, a pure perception would mean that perception 
is non-relational, atemporal, and as an instantaneous totality of images, by 
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46 K. Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual (Routledge, 2002).p. 144 
47 MM. pp. 65-66. I ask the reader to consider Bergson’s theoretical pure perception as an 
indication of an instantaneous present, and thereby a ‘complete perception’ as an absolute 
vision of images. 
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which the whole of all activities and ‘all the influences of all the points’ are a 
continuous material extensity. Moore explains that Bergson’s theory of 
image, suggests ‘a form of ‘ultra-externalism’, in which mind is founded 
wholly on matter. In consideration of the theory of pure perception we take 
this point, to understand that the purpose of Bergson’s theoretical invention 
is to indicate a field of perception without difference, without variance, and 
as continuity of images coinciding with matter itself.48 However, according 
to Bergson, such a ‘vision’ of the totality of extended  images,  would  mean  
to  be  embedded  in  the  real,  without  affect  and memory.49
   
In this way, 
pure perception is meant to abstract affect and memory from the consideration 
of perception in order to indicate that rather than this ideal perception, true 
perception is that which is full of memories and thereby, a continuity of 
experience. 
 
Bergson’s concept of image is meant to mediate between the domains of mind 
and matter. To this extent, Bergson argues that the material world is made up 
of objects, that he terms material images, which act and react upon one 
another by conditions of continuous movement. Again by the notion of pure 
perception what is meant is the becoming of action, or the appearing of 
actions, in so far as this continuity of images is also a totality of perception, 
‘prefigured in those images’. In other words, as Bergson argues that the 
actuality of our perceptions is situated according to activity of perceptions, 
this means that perception is ever enduring in the present. Perception is then 
the continuity of material extensity, continuously changing, but always 
present as a field of perception-images.  According to this view of an ever-
present and continuously changing materiality, Bergson explains the pure 
perception is not ‘that which acts no longer’, but rather, it is ‘that which is 
acting’.50 
                                                     
48 F.C.T. Moore, Bergson: Thinking Backwards, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 33-
34. 
49 MM p. 5 
50 Lawlor, Leonard, The Challenge of Bergsonism: Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics, 
(London and New York: Continuum, 2003). p. xiii 
    
55  
 
 
Image 
 
This indicates a significant turn for the identity of painting, as a pure 
perception is ever-present and continuous, this means that it the continuum of 
affect and sensation are continuous with movement and change.  Applied to 
our theory of painting, this is a radical departure from theories of painting 
based on the notion of representation. Here the Kandinskian theory of painting 
makes this a more specific application, where the artist visioned a sense of 
‘free composition’ in painting as an analogue of musical form, he was 
suggesting the content of the painting as ‘inner sound’, and therefore, the 
transformative qualities of painting originating from the sensuous and the 
emotional centre of experiences, which becomes the creative force of the 
painterly expressions.  This may be argued further by reinforcement of 
Henry’s view that suggests that painting is the specific incarnation of life 
which continues in the creation of forms by the very becoming of the inner 
life, regarded in terms of the change of the interiority of living experience.51 
The varieties of expressions in painting, and the difference of response to the 
experiences of painting are not only driven by ‘reflection’ of perception, as 
regarded in Bergsonian terms, but also the concretisation of the force of 
images and the impact to sensation by what is given in the experience and 
action of painting.  For a Bergsonian view extended by a Kandinskian outlook 
of the creative ‘sounds’ of painting, we must rely on Henry’s theory of the 
affect and sensation operative in perception, as a distinguishing dyad of life’s 
becoming, to convey the Bergsonian imperative of the common experience in 
perception to the practice of painting as philosophy.  In other words, the 
process of painting is the activity that is prompted by the experience granted 
by the constellation of images environing its process.      
 
From Bergson’s theory of pure perception alone, we are able to reconsider the 
question of painting, first in terms of the becoming of perception through a 
continuity of activity, and second, the experience of activity through the 
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actualisations of the painter’s movements. In this sense, we argue that it is by 
the perceptions given to the painter as a living centre of activity, the condition 
of the painter’s subjectivity occurs. It is the condition of experience occurring 
from within the ever-present field of perception, that perception given 
continuously is actualization through its encounter. By this we mean to say 
that as perception is the field of continuous change, from its change there is 
the condition of possibilities for the painter’s activity to actualize movements 
from among a field of indefinite movement. Furthermore, as perceptions 
occur as a continuous present, the potential of painting medium inheres within 
the materiality of the process of painting. In short, this means that prior to any 
notions of the painter’s intention, or the consideration of the painter’s activity 
in terms of the contemplation of an ideal and hence, a pre-given pictorial 
representation, we argue rather, that the painter’s activity consigned to the 
immediacy of experience towards the actualization of images environed by 
the painting medium, and as given by the material world. 
 
For it is possible to sum up our conclusions as to pure perception by saying that there is in 
matter something more than, but not something different from, that which is actually given. 
Undoubtedly, conscious perception does not compass the whole of matter, since it consists, 
in as far as it is conscious, in the separation, or the ‘discernment’, of that which, in matter, 
interests our various needs.52 
 
Bergson explains that in matter there is something more, ‘but not  something 
different from, that which is actually given’, to mean that though conscious 
perception is not able to grasp the whole of reality, it is a ‘discernment‘ from 
the totality of images. By this, he means to argue that matter is what is given 
in perception, and that memory is a ‘phenomenon of spirit as a dependent 
reality’. To take this a step further, Bergson means that conscious perception 
is itself the experience of difference from within a world of pure perception 
because it involves the manifold occurrences of the living encounters of 
movements and duration. 
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Within a world of absolute movement, and furthermore, this encounter is a 
conscious perception by the importing of the past into an ever continuous 
present. In other words, contact between consciousness and things imply an 
expansion of perception by a temporal synthesis. For Bergson, conscious 
perception is a type of temporal delay because of the circuitous movements 
of sensory information from the cerebra complex of the body, and therefore, 
a conservation of perceived images.53
  
 
What this suggests in terms of the painter and the particular activities that 
issue from 
the painter’s body, is that, because of the delay in the transmission of 
activities, and the relaying from stimulus back to the cerebral reactions in 
response to the affects received from other images, it is by virtue of the body’s 
sensorial system that the activities are retained and kept from being 
instantaneous with the material reality. In this sense, these activities are 
inhibited as they are processed through the bodily and cerebral complex of 
the centre of images. In this way, the body becomes a process of selection and 
choice and hence, the ‘indeterminations of acts’. Bergson suggests that it is 
because of the duration of activities, that we regard consciousness as a 
‘dawning of action’, as nascency of activity by the interpenetration of memory 
and perceptions.54
    In this regard, in terms of the painter’s activity and effects 
upon the change of the painted image the visual difference of images through 
the painting medium are firstly attributable to the temporal identity of 
perceptions in relation to the painter’s body. For instance, where Bergson 
argues that the occurrences of change in the field of perception is ‘through the 
medium of certain particular images’, in this regard, the painter’s activity, as 
conditions of consciousness in terms of the degree of selection from the 
image-world, is the intervention of activity towards material extensity. In 
other words, from a view of Bergson’s notion of pure perception, we regard 
                                                     
53 MM. p. 65 
54 MM. p. 67 
    
58  
 
 
Image 
the painter as the source of incipient movements within the process of 
painting, in which conscious perception is a situated centre of images that 
receives, inhibits, and transmits movements of images that correspond to the 
material world.55 
 
In review we see that Bergson’s argument based on a concept of image, thus 
far, has suggested that the body is a centre of action, and is active in terms of 
a situated encounter with what is given by perception presently. However, 
Bergson argues that memory as the past, does not act, and is therefore purely 
idea. By this, the past and the present are held as different, such that memory 
is considered independent. From Bergson’s concept of image, thus far, we 
have considered a broader conception, in which reality is a unity of mind and 
matter, and more specifically, that perception corresponds with matter, (i.e. 
pure perception) and that memory corresponds with consciousness, (i.e. 
l’espirit or mind). Applied toward a theory of painting, this means that 
although distinct, the painter is the occurrence of perception and memory 
intertwined in conscious perception. Furthermore, the physical body and mind 
interact in such a way that, the painter as a living centre of images, is a 
medium of selection, and reacts as a living image towards the material world. 
At this point our argument of Bergson’s concept of image as the basis for a 
theory of painting has developed according to the crucial distinction of 
Bergson’s notion of a pure perception from the role of memory. Accordingly, 
we assert then, that a model of a process of painting is based on this 
distinction.  The process of painting involves a contact of the material world 
with consciousness, which is to say that as perception is the material extensity 
of reality, the painter is the point of active reflection from what is given in 
things. And here we can make the connection with Kandinskian theory, 
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particularly in these terms of ‘reflection’. Kandinsky claims that the work of 
art is ‘reflected on the surface of one’s consciousness. However, he explains 
that ‘once the stimulus has gone, it vanishes from the surface without trace’.56  
That is to say, that similar to Bergson’s theory of perception, the materiality 
of the art-object is perception given to the painter’s consciousness, such that 
the painter’s conscious perception is an involvement within the perceptual 
activities of the painting medium, and an active reflection of images from a 
continuity of images. 
 
 
Forms of Memory: Painting as Recognition 
 
We now consider from Bergson’s development his theory of pure memory 
which is reasoned to be the direct opposite of pure perception. By his theory 
of pure perception Bergson offers a hypothetical notion of an atemporal and 
instantaneous totality of the images of the material plane. As its opposite he 
puts forward the notion of a pure memory which suggests a spontaneous 
occurrence of the total experience of all that is given in perceptions. However, 
according to Bergson a ‘pure’ memory as well as a ‘pure’ perception, are not 
possible, since there is a continuous interpenetration of memory and 
perceptions.  In terms of their interpenetration, Bergson explains that they are 
‘always exchanging something of their substance as by a process of 
endosmosis.57
 
For Bergson, real perception implies the duration of activities. 
Since conscious perception is a process of selection and choice in response to 
the nascency of movements and present activities in the material world of 
perception, this process involves the past through the prolonging of activities, 
activities being actualized as experiences, and hence, the becoming of 
memory. In this sense memory is a negotiation of experience from the 
duration of images in the present, and thereby, is a mediating condition 
between the planes of pure matter and pure memory. This is to say that though 
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perception is a continuous and present existence of activities, Bergson argues 
that it is different by degree, that is, the living and immediate encounter within 
this field of activity and ‘that which is acting’, is only different by the 
experiences of activity and ‘that which acts no longer’, then informing the 
conditions of active engagement. In other words, Bergson is arguing that the 
distinct of perception and memory is only by degree of time, stating: 
 
Restore, on the contrary, the true character of perception; recognize in pure perception a 
system of nascent acts which plunges roots deep into the real; and at once perception is seen 
to be radically distinct from recollection; the reality of things is no more constructed or 
reconstructed, but touched, penetrated, lived [...].58 
 
Here the ‘nascency’ of action is a clear indication of Bergson’s theory of pure 
perception.  By situating perception in terms of the activity as the reality of 
things 
 
Bergson then asks us to understand in terms of activity, the activity of 
experience. From this view of a context of action, Bergson explains that 
memory is considered as an element of consciousness, such that, conscious 
perception implies an activity within activity, as a condition of experienc-ing. 
That is, perceiving is a living activity, and by virtue of its continuity, 
conscious perception is also as a continuous actualization of activity, and 
implicitly, a continuity of experience from the activities which have been 
lived.  As we follow Bergson’s development further, we see that in a world 
of images, memory serves the living centre of images more than perception 
because it allows for consciousness to anticipate, and thereby, endows 
conscious perception with modes of activity from its reflection given by the 
experience of images from the material world. When applied to a context of 
painting, we may assert that memory situates the painter’s perception in the 
presence of the activities of painting. Taken a step further, we can argue that 
as perception is given through the materiality of the painting medium the 
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painter’s activity with this medium is a process of actualization and 
experiencing of specific activities, by which, the experiential qualities of these 
activities solicit perceptions further. 
 
This aside, we understand the distinction of perceptions and memory and 
regard the relation in terms of the duration of activities but are confronted 
with the issue of their connection and how the past survives in the present. 
One of Bergson’s approaches to this issue is to consider the relation of the 
body to the past in terms of memories occurring through movements. 
 
We must now add that, as pure perception gives us the whole or at least the essential part of 
matter (since the rest comes from memory and in super added to matter), it follows that 
memory must be, in principle, a power absolutely independent of matter. If then, spirit is a 
reality, it is here, in the phenomenon of memory that we may come into touch with it 
experimentally.59 
 
Because memories are internalized by the body, by the immediate 
actualization of activities from among the dynamism of an action to reaction 
complex from the confluence of the body in the image-world, it is by the 
repetition of occurrences of movements that ‘contrive a mechanism for 
themselves, grow into habit, and determine in us an attitude which 
automatically follows ours perception of things’.60 Bergson is indicating that 
it is by a condition of activities of bodily repetition that memories, themselves 
the experience of the actualization of activity, become habit, and thereby, as 
a movement imprinted in the body, these become spontaneous and recurrent 
to activities. Because the body, as a living centre of images, inhibits, relays, 
and transmits movement, to speak of memory in such a way is to indicate that 
the body is a point in which the past is continuous from among the activity in 
the present.  Furthermore, this suggests not only that the body is an occurrence 
for memory, but also, because the body transmits elements of the past, it is as 
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a ‘moving limit between the past and future’.61 The condition of memory 
emerges from a quality of experience so that movements are adapted and 
activities are selected so as to be best suited and most appropriate in terms of 
a ‘the general aim of life’. In this way, the past is a type of recording of 
experiences, imprinted in the body as motor- habit. However, Bergson 
suggests that by being as such, this type of memory is an Impoverishment of 
the original occurrences from which experiences emerged. By habit, the body 
operates more immediate to activities, as a type of automatism. Such body-
memory is then, an adaptation in which lived-experience becomes more 
pronounced in the immediate encounter of the body to the real than the body 
as anticipatory and, hence living as a difference of reactions and activity to 
the world. Though we would expect a level of motor-habit to develop with 
time, for the painter, this form of memory would affect the process of 
painting, to the extent that it would be discontinuous with creative life and 
nothing more than mechanical actions in immediate response to the medium. 
 
In contrast to this, Bergson suggests the other memory, that of image memory 
or, memory of imagination, which involves images and their occurrence as a 
return to the present and immediate perceiving as representations of 
perception. In this regard, as habit-memory implies a lack of effort for 
selection, with this notion of memory of imagination Bergson is indicating an 
effort of attention, that is, a register of memory continuously growing as a 
type of picturing of all past events to include the total details of one’s 
experiences from ‘their contour, their colour and their place in time’.62 This 
image-memory, unlike habit or body-memory, is not repeatable; it is specific 
to the events of things and place as occurrences in time. The difference then 
is that image-memory does not serve in the manner of necessities of life and 
as it is not towards the immediate demands of life within the continuity of 
action, it is not instantaneous with perception. However, unlike the automatic 
response of movement that body-memory instantiates, image-memory acts as 
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a store of experience by which there is a possibility of choice and a potential 
of adaption of reactions to the world. Unlike habit memory, which is 
automatic to the body and allows the body to be most immediate to the given 
activities of the world, image-memory has nothing to do with immediate 
actions, but rather, as it does not involve the present, it is entirely virtual. 
Bergson suggests that except in theory, these forms of memory are not 
completely separate, since in reality, image-memory which operates as mind, 
and motor-memory as an imperative condition of body, overlap as faculties 
of recognition and attention. This type of collaboration, regarded as a 
doubling of memory, suggests the previous distinctions of an ideal and real 
gradient of reality, i.e. pure memory and pure perception. In this instance, 
habit memory is more oriented towards the actual and instantaneous qualities 
of matter, whereas, image-memory implies a pure experience denuded of 
present activity. From this comparison we see that the image-memory is based 
on the notion of a pure memory, in that, though seemingly pure or ideal, it 
still operates in relation to perceptions through the body. 
 
This brings us to consider further, the interaction of motor-memory and 
image- memory. Bergson explains this interaction as, ‘the concrete act by 
which we grasp the past again in the present’, meaning by ‘recognition’ and 
by this process of the articulation of the past in the present. In this sense 
Bergson indicates that recognition implies actions and representations, such 
that it occurs automatically according to the physicality of the body in the 
present, but also, as organized, to the extent  that  it  is  a  ‘gradual  passage  
of recollections’,  and  becoming  part  of an informed response extends 
perception.63
 
However Bergson adds another form of recognition and 
suggests that by ‘attentive recognition’ specific images of memory, as 
‘pictures’ of events from the continuity of the occurrences of experiences, 
these insert themselves into the activities of perception. In this sense, he 
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explains in terms of attentive recognition that image-memories inserted into 
the present perception expand the perception as it is ‘strengthened and 
enriched by images’.64 In this regard, by considering these differences of 
recognition, Bergson is articulating a theory of memory in terms of the most 
immediate response of the body, and its pragmatic condition in a world of 
continuous activity, as well as the re-joining of memories in the present 
perception. The crucial turn from this distinction of an automatic recognition 
from attentive recognition is that the automatic recognition ‘removes us from 
the perceived object’, whereas, the attentive, brings us back to the object to 
underscore its contours’.65 In other words, by ‘recognition’, Bergson implies 
the immediate utility of memory to life in the sense that memory serves life’s 
interest as immediate and continuous with the world, but with the notion of 
attentive recognition, he is suggesting that memory is a constituting effect 
towards cognition.66 
 
This is to say memory in terms of attentive recognition means that memory 
constitutes an ‘understanding’ or a ‘knowing’ of the world. Bergson’s point 
of these distinctions is to suggest a reciprocal relation of memories to 
perceptions. The more memory is inserted in the present activity of 
perception, the deeper the experience of the perceptions, and hence the more 
elaborate image-memories. However, along this same line, memories can 
only occur through the experiences of perception to the extent that perceiving 
is the actualization of images, such that the activities of images is the contact 
and experiential grounding from which memory occurs. Applied to our theory 
of painting, what we may consider in terms of the ‘depth’ unique to the   
process of painting, is to mean a ‘depth’ from a menagerie of images limited 
to the process.  This means that the ‘percept-image’, as a pictorial or painterly 
form, is the event of an image occurring from an ever expanding painterly 
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experience  in contact  with  the  movements suggested by the painting 
medium, and therefore,  material images creative an active, ‘upon each other 
into a system.’67    Here we can compare an aspect of Kandinsky’s view that 
runs parallel to Bergson’s. By relating the ‘spiritual life’ to a notion of 
movement and in turn, regarding movement to the process of experience, 
Kandinsky’s notion of movement appears to closely resemble Bergson’s 
theory of memory, stating: 
 
The spiritual life, to which art belongs and of which she is one of the mightiest elements, is a 
complicated but definite and easily definable movement forwards and upwards. The 
movement is the movement of experience.68 
 
By this we see, from both Kandinsky and Bergson, the emphasis of the notion 
of spirit as a living process, itself developing in terms of experience and of 
movements. Grounding this to a Bergsonian view, we understand at this point 
that for Bergson the actualizations of activity are the continuity of experience 
and the consistent operation of memory. Mullarkey explains that Bergson’s 
theory suggests a type of build-up of images, (i.e. images upon image), as a 
process of abstraction and indicates the possibilities of images themselves as 
worlds, ‘to become a container for some ‘new’ content-meaning’.69 We will 
come to the question of this content next as we follow Bergson’s development 
further. However, we assert that at this point Bergson’s theory situates all 
things in terms of activity and by this, that the objective activity is the 
condition from which a subjective actualization and experiential interchange 
from among a world of images occur.   As we have seen so far, the material 
continuity of perception is an extrinsic course of activity, from which an inner 
unity of images from the convergent nature of living centres of activity 
becomes a contact of experience, and hence, reflective of images as 
‘understanding’. 
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However, we return to Bergson to consider further the nature of ‘attention’ so 
as to understand dynamic relation of perception, attention, and memory. 
Keeping this in mind, Bergson introduces us to consideration of attention in 
terms of consciousness. He suggests that by a condition of attention this 
renders perceptions in terms of ‘the turning back of the mind’.   This means 
that from the movement of memory away from present perception, 
consciousness is an effort from experience to think otherwise.70
 
In this sense, 
attentive recognition as attentive perception is the reflection of experience, 
which is to say that, as perception is already an awareness and immediate to 
a contouring of objects by the insertion of memory, conscious perception 
becomes an attention of memory. Bergson suggests that by attention, there is 
an effort to summon former experiences to bring back to the focus of the 
attentive perceiving and to reinsert in the activity of selecting and bringing 
together images from among images a recollection of memory-images. 
Bergson sees this as consciousness, such that 
 
Whenever we are trying to recover the recollection, to call up some period of our history, we 
become conscious of an act sui generis by which we detach ourselves from the present in 
order to replace ourselves, first, in the past in general, then, in a certain region of the past - a 
work of adjustment, something like the focusing of a camera.   But our recollection still 
remains virtual; we simply prepare ourselves to receive it by adopting the appropriate 
attitude.71 
 
In this regard, memory fortifies the very process of perceiving, and 
reciprocally, expands and grows experiences through the localizations of 
memories to perceptions. Hence, the experience of images is the becoming of 
image-memories. What is obvious here is the tension between the actual 
perceptions and the virtual and non-substantial memory. We are reminded by 
Bergson’s claim, 
 
Memory, inseparable in practice from perception, imports the past in to the present, contracts 
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into a single intuition many moments of duration [...].72 
 
Between memory and perception there is a dynamic interplay, such that 
between these is based the ontological aspect of images, as that of the 
occurrences of images in terms of duration. For this reason, both the virtual 
and actual are not to be regarded in terms of space or being somewhere, but 
rather, in terms of images in time, so that their duration is the condition of 
variability from among the immediacy of the actual perception and 
instantaneity of virtual experience.  
 
Bergson’s cone diagrams help to illustrate this theoretical formulation.73 What 
they show is a diagram of an inverted cone, in which the point of the apex 
touching a plane represents the body in relation to the theoretical pure 
perception ‘which indicate at all times my present’ as an unceasing contact 
with the material plane. From the apex as the point of immediate contact, 
towards the base, which represents the theoretical pure memory, Bergson is 
attempting to show the dynamic relationship of memory to perception. That 
is, by the doubling of the movements of perception to memory and from the 
view of memories reinserting themselves in the process of the actualization 
of activities, Bergson’s diagram is meant to model the circularity of these 
relations and the interchanges, and hence, ‘an indefinite multitude of possible 
states  of  memory’.74  Here Bergson diagrammatizes the terms of the 
movement  in the materialisation of memory-images among  the  differing  
levels of possibility, and thereby, indicates the differences in degrees of 
consciousness. This to say that, the occurrences of difference is from among 
the interaction of activities and experiences, such that there are distinctions in 
the present from the demands of the immediacy of living and to the encounter 
of reality as a conscious effort. This means that the demands for the attention 
of life become less immediate because of consciousness, so  that  through  
conscious  effort  life  engages  reality  from  reflections  of  its experience. In 
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turn, conscious perceptions affect the actualization of activities and the further 
development of experiences. Here we may draw connections between 
Bergson’s theory and Kandinsky’s, particularly concerning this notion of an 
oscillation between the situated immediacy of perceiving in the world of 
perception, to the increase of experiences from the affectivity of what is given 
by perception. 
[...] Our point of departure is the belief that the artist, apart from those impressions that he 
receives from the world of external appearances, continually accumulates experiences within 
his own inner world.75 
 
Here Kandinsky’s view presents the artist as that which wavers between the 
impressions of the external and experiences attributed to an internal domain. 
We read this from Bergson’s perspective, however, with the added notion that 
to live as immediate and only in the present, to attend only to the most 
immediate actions of life, is to be a ‘man of impulse’. Whereas, by effort of 
consciousness, reflecting on experiences ‘without any advantage for the 
present situation’, this makes one a ‘dreamer’. Here again, we may apply not 
only the development of Bergson’s theory thus far to a theory of painting, but 
consider the point illustrated by the diagram. We argue, that the painter is both 
a living body of ‘impulse’, but also, by mediation of the painting medium, 
considered as a threshold of the actualizations of activity.  In addition, by the 
origination of experience, the painter’s consciousness in the attention specific 
to the material medium is where the contingency of the plurality of images 
interact with bodily interests towards the eventual action on things, and by its 
encounter affords the occurrences of the actioning images specific to the 
painting process through perceptual reflection. In Kandinskian terms, the 
artist is only a wavering partition between the permeations of actions given 
by the medium and the reciprocal movements of experiences while engaging 
the medium during the process of image rendering. This paralleled with more 
specific notion of the dynamism between memory and perception, according 
to Bergson’s concept of image, we understand the process of painting to be 
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specific to the immediacy of activity, and to the actualization of experience 
from the materiality of the painting medium. The material objectivity of 
painting medium conditions the activity of the painter, and the continuous 
actualization of activity between painter and material medium generates 
subjective experiences. But in accord with the experience, reciprocally and 
therefore, necessarily, the selection of its activities informed by the virtuality 
of experiences means that the subjective condition of the painter originates 
from the reflection of memory-images and the projections into the realizations 
of images by modes of imagination. In this regard, the perceptions given in 
the materiality of painting, allows for conscious perception to be directed 
towards the painter’s activity in such a way, that the active reflection of 
images is also a selective activity and a projection of images back into the 
material continuity of images . Here again, Kandinsky suggests that the 
painter’s activity should assume activities that convey the experiences from 
affective qualities of perception, stating, 
 
We seek artistic forms that should express the reciprocal permeation of all these experiences 
forms that must be freed from everything incidental, in order powerfully to pronounce only 
that which is necessary - in short, artistic synthesis.76 
 
From this passage, we approach Kandinsky’s view from Bergson’s theoretical 
development to integrate the two in the sense that by ‘artistic synthesis’ we 
understand the process of painting to be a process of activity responding to 
what is given by perception and the experience of this effecting the becoming 
of experiences, the growing of memory. Moreover, by this we understand how 
the painter’s body directs memory-images back towards the activity of 
painting medium, how the experiences from painting medium are the 
actualization of conscious efforts of the painter, and therefore, how 
imagination is realized in the continuous present. In other words, we regard 
the materiality of the painting process to be the existential basis for experience 
of painting. But, in turn, we understand these experiences through the 
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becoming and presenting activities of painting medium, as the events 
occurring from the reflective nature of the experiences from what is given by 
perception. 
 
In this way, the occurrence of the painter’s activity is also the recurrence of 
the painter’s experience, and conditioned by the materiality of the body in 
relation to the painting medium, the painter’s consciousness is the directing 
of memory-images in relation to a the realization of movement and the further 
affectivity through material actualization.  
This implies further, in Bergsonian terms, the dynamic movement between 
memory and perception as relations in terms of activity. However, at this point 
in Bergson’s development thus far, we are specifically concerned with how 
memory is realized in the real and how the condition of imagination suggests 
memory-images ‘settle within matter’.77 Here again we can draw close 
comparisons of Bergson’s theory of the relation of memory and matter, to 
Kandinsky’s theory of painting. Where Bergson regards the activity of the 
body as derivative of a physical and material continuity of images, similarly, 
Kandinsky suggests that, that which evokes the painter’s abstraction is from 
the world, stating, 
 
The abstract painter derives his ‘stimulus’ not from some part or other of nature, but from 
nature as a whole, from its multiplicity of manifestations, which accumulate within him and 
lead to the work of art.78 
 
Here we are comparing Kandinsky’s claim of the painter’s activity being 
affected from the ‘whole’ of nature, from ‘its multiplicity of manifestations’, 
to Bergson’s theory of the whole of reality as a continuous activity of images, 
and these images affecting living centres of perception. More specifically, if 
we compare Kandinsky’s notion of the accumulation of these 
‘manifestations’, as also, a type of build-up of activities from experience in 
terms of the differing memories, we see how this accords with Bergson’s 
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sense of the actualization of activities as experiences and these experiences 
affective to conscious perception. In other words, similar to Kandinsky’s 
claim that nature ‘accumulates’ within the painter and directs his work, this 
parallels with Bergson’s theory of the body as an actualization of experience, 
and hence, as a continuous accumulation of memories. Moreover, Bergson’s 
theory explains that through the attentive recognition of conscious perception, 
memories reinsert themselves as representations of experience, being 
materialized through the body and made present in the continuing contacts of 
movement within the material continuity of reality. Similarly, Kandinsky 
claims that the whole of nature accumulates in the painter, and as the 
occurrence of the return of this nature to itself, the process of painting is an 
abstraction of nature, an immanence of transition determined by the 
reciprocity of nature’s reflection. We argue that what is most important in this 
similarity, is that as Bergson claims that attention of perception requires 
memory to complete it, and memory needs the process of actualization from 
what is given in the total activities of perceptions to become realized, both 
Kandinskian and Bergsonian theory are complementary in regards to nature’s 
reciprocity of becoming.  Accordingly, both Bergson and Kandinsky regard 
the interaction of  ‘images’ in the flux of reality as continuous, and because 
of the paradigm of continuity of images in time, they are transformative by 
the rhythm of their movement. 
 
However, thus far, we have considered Bergson’s notion the body, perception 
and the relation to memory, but now, we return to the most important question 
of Bergson’s thesis, which is that of the difference of perception and matter 
and how the soul and the body, respectively, are joined. He reminds us that as 
the body is always turned towards action, it must limit ‘the life of the spirit’.   
However, he explains that in terms of representation, the body is selective 
from the possibilities of differing courses of action, and thereby, an 
‘instrument of choice’.79 In this sense, the body involves a selective system 
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of memory, not simply storing recollections, but instead, bringing into 
perception memories to enhance the perceiving, whereby the body is able to 
‘choose’ from pictured-images, i.e. memory-images, to fit into the specific  
activity  and  the  contoured  field  of  attention  of  conscious  perception. 
Together then, both perception and memory, are regarded as a relation in 
terms of an interaction. Bergson affirms this relation by suggesting that in 
terms of ‘the orientation of our consciousness toward action’, this is the 
fundamental law of our psychical life’. However, at this point, though the 
body is oriented towards the plane of pure perception and by experience and 
memory of consciousness the body turns in the direction of pure memory, this 
double distinction only reaffirms the duality of perception and memory. 
Applied to our concern with the process of painting, we understand this to 
mean that a dynamic relation of memory and perception, that is, the mutual 
affects of mind and matter, coming to bear on the role of the painter and the 
interchange with painting medium. 
 
 
The Actual painter and The Possible painting: Delimiting and Fixing 
Images 
 
To this point, Bergson has considered the relation of matter and memory in 
terms of their interaction and the interchange of images from either domain. 
However, he returns to the problem of their ‘union’, considering that matter 
and memory are radically different in kind, this means that the answer is 
situated according to the encounters of one to the other. For Bergson the dual 
operations of body and mind are oriented according to the continuous 
interchanges between the planes of pure perception and the levels of a pure 
memory, as differing metaphysical entities of matter and soul, to the extent 
that, ‘within matter that pure perception places us, and it is really into spirit 
that we penetrate by means of memory’.80 In this regard, Bergson is 
reaffirming his position against the doctrines of materialism,  which would 
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attribute mind solely to the body and representations as emergent from matter 
and against idealism, which would maintain that mind generates the world 
and our understanding ‘constructs the contours of nature’.  Contrary to these, 
Bergson argues, that it is with the view of consciousness that we regard the 
body as images among a world of images, and that the comprehension of the 
world is by ‘a faculty of dissociating’. That is to say, conscious perception is 
the result of sensation in a world of activity, by which recognition of 
experience, (as experience is also the persistence of memory), is the impetus 
for choice, and the distinction and selection of activities from a continuity of 
indefinite activity. In this regard, it is this testimony of experience, by which 
consciousness opens to an ever-expanding field of perception, that Bergson 
bases his psychological analysis.  In this regard, it is Bergson’s ontology of 
memory which explores the complexity of experience, and the realisation of 
novel activity in the context of the general metaphysical problem of the 
separation of mind and matter. However, he suggests that this also allows us 
to consider reconciliation between the problems of the unextended and 
qualitative nature of mind, and the extended nature of matter related to in 
terms of quantitative distinctions. By this turn, Bergson is also referring to his 
previous works, in which we are introduced to his theory of duration, which 
argues for a dynamic temporality of becoming. In this sense, the theory of 
pure perception already assumes a view of reality as process and durational, 
such that perceived images are not something occurring in the body, but are 
located as a continuous occurrence in the external world. In this sense, images 
are not exclusive to an internal state or a privileged mind, but rather, images 
are occurring in the external world, as a continuity of material extensity in 
process. 
Furthermore, what we regard as the images of concrete perception, that is, 
what is given to conscious perception, according to Bergson, these are 
‘already a synthesis’ because of memory. However, Bergson argues that 
because an ‘infinity‘ of perceptions may be given by the material plane of 
reality, we should consider the diversity of sensorial experience in the body 
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the result of the actualizations of images becoming ‘contracted in our 
memory’, and therefore, considered as tension between states of pure 
extensity and pure intensity.81
 This suggestion orients Bergson’s theory of the 
relation between body and mind to a question of tensions between extended 
and unextended, that is, to the contingency of continuous adaptations from 
the mind to the body and vice versa. By considering degrees of tensions 
between body and mind, so as to consider the difference from among a type 
of continuous movement of oscillation between the polar opposites of pure 
memory and a pure perception, is ‘to seek experience at its source’.82 
 
In other words, for Bergson the relation of mind to matter, is based on the 
differentiation of experience in the duration of sensations and conscious 
perception in time, which means that differences of the experiential condition 
occur from direct and immediate contact with the real. Hence, by levels of 
immediacy, a thereby, degrees of the proximity of consciousness, the 
modalities of perception are affected within the duration of things. In terms 
of the process of painting, this implies that as the painter and the painting 
medium are regarded as a system of closely linked images of memory and 
perception, from between the interaction of bodily life and materiality, the 
difference of experiences as occurrences in time is then the difference of 
consciousness as occurrences in time. In Bergsonian terms, from this 
consideration of the relation of the mind to the body, applied to a theory 
painting, is to regard the process as a totality of the actualization of a painter’s 
movements, and the realization of experiences immediate to the condition of 
perceptions given by painting medium, as a continuity from the confluence of 
extended and unextended images, and hence, as living continuity of 
gradations of consciousness. 
 
However, this is to return to Bergson’s underlying principle that the relation 
of mind and matter are questions of time not space. Accordingly, the painter 
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and the painting medium are themselves of differing forms of images, images 
given to perception, images as experience and becoming memory, and 
ultimately, images continuous in 
the flow of time. In this sense, we are able to argue that there is the duration 
of the activities of the painter as a complexity of images in juxtaposition with 
the painting medium, as a movement of material images, and the duration of 
experiences of this activity as conscious perception continuously realized in 
the painting medium.  
 
The Passage of Painting 
 
In this regard we look to Bergson’s claim that the occurrences of fixed images, 
that is, the holding fast and hence, delimitation of images, are qualities of 
matter so that matter itself is regarded differing movements relative to the 
continuity of time.83
 With the first point, he asserts, that ‘Every movement, as 
passage from rest to rest, is absolutely indivisible’, and by this Bergson 
reaffirms his view that the division of reality, in terms of constituent parts to 
a whole, is an illusion.  He explains that to regard reality is to reduce reality 
to extension, and thereby, represent movement in terms of spatial positions. 
Moreover, in attempts to articulate the perception of real movement we 
assume that the progress of reality coincides with the seemingly immobile 
nature of things. In this way, movement is mapped in terms of spatial 
arrangements and thereby, seemingly held fast to the extent that reality is then 
regarded as a succession of immobile segments. Bergson explains that this 
makes time and movement as phenomena that coincide with a stable substrate, 
whereby, this very notion of stability is attributed to the subdividing of time 
and movement. In this way, the real continuity of the occurrences of images 
is then re-presented accordingly, and with view towards the utility of things, 
the images of reality are taken as delimited, succinct and discontinuous. 
Instead, Bergson maintains that in terms of ‘the living movement itself’ we 
are to regard reality as a duration of movements. By regarding all movement 
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as continuous passage, we are then able to recognize the demands of the body 
in the continuity of movement. In this respect, the function of mind is as an 
‘artificial reorganization of movement’. 
 
This leads us to Bergson‘s second point in which he asserts that movement is 
absolute. Regardless of the habits of thinking movement in terms of space, by 
which we reduce movement to a sense of distance relative to points of 
reference and hold views of variation and difference of movements by regards 
to positioning and immobilizations of activity, what remains is concrete 
movement as real movement. For Bergson, movement is then an ‘indisputable 
reality’.84     From this context, we may apply this to our concerns with 
painting, to argue that in terms of Bergson’s notion of real movement, the 
process of painting is at once, a contact of movement with movement, such 
that the present movement of images of the painting medium are immediate 
to change of qualities of movement from within the painter, i.e. sensorial 
perceptions and feelings. In addition, Bergson suggests that if we regard 
concrete perception in terms of external movement, such as that ‘between 
light and darkness, between colours, between shades’, these are also changes 
of qualities from among movements. To then understand real movement in 
the process of painting we must understand that the painter’s body is an 
individuality of movements from that of the external material substances of 
the painting medium. And from this, we see that the distinction of these 
movements is relative to the movement of the whole of the process, and that 
is to say that, the change of aspects of movement between painter and painting 
medium are relative to the qualities of change from among the whole of 
movements.  The Bergsonian discussion may be seen similarly in Henry’s 
philosophical themes emphasizing, the live-body, and the pathos of life, that 
is, the auto-affection of life from its living, or, in terms of the materiality that 
life encounters, the self-discovery of life from the reflection of its own activity 
and impressions.  Though Henry’s intention is to present a his own account 
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of phenomenology, we see correlations of Bergsonian thinking, and particular 
to the consideration of process thinking in painting,  the bodily movements of 
the painter as the expressions of the movements also encountering the 
experience and actualisations of these movements.  It is this patho-genetic 
sense that we see in Bergson’s account of the movement, in which Henry 
elaborates in terms of the ‘becoming of life’.85 For Bergson creativity is 
considered in terms of the novelty of movements, for Henry creativity is a 
necessary correlate of life’s experiential encounter.86 
 
Let us consider Bergson’s third point, as we see this to be more conducive to 
our application, particularly regarding the distinction of bodily movements 
and the painter’s application from the activity of the painting medium and the 
change of movement of painting substances. He argues that it is by an 
artificial view that we to consider the ‘division of matterinto independent 
bodies with absolutely determined outlines’. 
87
And by this he is indicating 
further that all of reality is a duration of movements, such that the moving 
continuity of perception is constantly changing and yet remains. Here the 
question becomes something other than the difference of real movement from 
our common sense’s mode of the immobilization of movement. Instead, 
Bergson argues that we consider change in terms of permanence by 
representing permanence with the sense of bodies and objects, and in turn, by 
regarding these as independent bodies, we consider their change in terms of 
‘homogenous movements in space’. What occurs is an articulation of reality 
in terms of the artificial carving out of bodies, which means that space is 
already and automatically assumed as the universal continuity from which all 
things can be measured and ascertained. 
 
                                                     
85 Michel Henry, See the invsible: On Kandinsky, trans. by Scott Davidson, Continuum 
Publishing, London, 2005, p. 11 
86 Ibid. p. 124, See also, Antonio Calcagno’s study, ‘Reclaiming the Possibility of an 
Interior Human Culture? Michel Henry and La Barbarie’, Journal of the British Society for 
the Phenomenology, Vol.  44, No. 3, October 2013, p. 252 
87 MM. p. 196 
    
78  
 
 
Image 
For Bergson, intuition is a means of immediate data of consciousness by 
which we are able to grasp the movement of reality as absolute, and thereby, 
view the things and bodies of the world as themselves qualities of movement 
relative to the world of movement. However, he admits that in terms of the 
biological imperatives in a world of movement, and the pragmatic nature of 
our conscious perception bent towards the necessity of living, it is life which 
turns toward the discontinuity of reality by carving out bodies and delimiting 
the relations among things. In other words, it is by demands of real movement 
that the necessity of life appears in the organization and establishments of 
‘specific relations between portions of sensible reality’, and hence, the 
piecemeal cuttings and contouring of reality as a process ‘we call living’. 
88
It 
is for life, that we see a connection from a biological basis to an epistemology. 
 
 
Painting as Living Encounter 
 
The necessity of life to construct, to organize, and in this sense, to establish, 
all this comes from the most immediate encountering with the world of 
activity. Hence, from the experiences of living the actualizations of activity 
become the basis from which further activity and further experiences are 
derived. To understand reality in this way means to ‘prolong the vital 
movement’, to continue with useful action, and deemed as such, to continue 
living according to experientially derived knowledge. However, Bergson 
maintains, that we will never understand matter according to bodies or things. 
Instead, he indicates that we are to consider the inner life of things, to go 
beyond the individuated identities of materiality this would mean to work 
with the experiences given by matter. Bergson argues that as the experiences 
given by matter also correspond with the articulations of life, it is through the 
representations of reality originating from experience that we may ‘reconnect 
with experience’.89 Here again, applied to painting, were we to agree that the 
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art object corresponds with the absolute movement of reality in which the 
experience of the painter and the perceptions given by the painting medium 
were relative movements, then process of painting is a process of living in 
which images of experience move in the directions of activity, and through 
the double effect of projecting actualizations as also conditions of 
representations, pursuant to the experience of life to the real. 
 
But to conceive of life in this way, is to assume a harmonious exchange of the 
heterogeneous and qualitative nature of reality with a homogenous view of 
reality in terms of the reduction of movements to movements of things. To 
this end, Bergson’s final point claim is that reality as real movement is ‘rather 
the transference of a state than of a thing’.90 Here, as a crucial turn, he 
attributes the whole of the plurality of qualities and indefinite diversity of 
reality as the contents of duration, and this pertains to matter itself. Here, 
particularly important towards our theory of painting, Bergson maintains an 
ontology of duration. Specific to the consideration of the processual nature of 
reality in terms of the durations of image, we are now able to argue an 
ontology of images in duration, by which we understand the process of 
painting in this context.  Hence, the process of painting is a differential 
process of movements of images in duration. 
 
However, what must be noted here is that Bergson identifies a duration of 
consciousness as a living duration and as a duration of ‘its own determined 
rhythm’. 91This is in contrast to the duration of all images. From this, Bergson 
argues that the duration of consciousness coincides with the duration of 
images as these are all of variable and qualitatively differences of durations. 
This implies that as there are pluralities of images and multiple movements 
and activity there are also many different rhythms of duration. 
 
In reality there is no one rhythm of duration; it is possible to imagine many different rhythms 
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which, slower or faster, measure the degree of tension or relaxation of different kinds of 
consciousness and thereby fix their respective places in the scale of being.92 
 
 
In terms of duration, matter as concrete extension is a graduated range of 
durational values, so that consciousness is also conceived as differing tensions 
from among the continuity of extended reality. Moreover, Bergson explains 
that these tensions are differing states of time, such that differing times 
correlate to differing contractions or expansions of consciousness. He 
suggests that to perceive then, ‘consists in condensing enormous periods of 
an infinitely diluted existence into a few more differentiated moments of an 
intenser life’. In other words, as perceiving also means to apprehend the world 
through a sense of immobilization from among continuous movement, 
conscious perception is then a continuous division of the real continuity of 
matter according to differing rhythms of activity. This also means that 
depending on the tensions of consciousness, what we ‘seize’ by perceiving 
‘outruns perception itself’, even though, as Bergson asserts, ‘the material 
universe is not essentially different or distinct from the representation which 
we have of it’. Applied to our view of the process of painting, this is taken to 
mean that from among the reciprocal movements between painter and 
painting medium, these movements do not exhaust the possibility of 
experiences of perception.  
From this double effect of our conscious perception, consciousness as 
characteristic of life is towards the rendering of distinct objects and things for 
the sense of expanding experience and developing knowledge. However, we 
must consider the process of painting in terms of Bergson’s argument that 
there are no such clear cut separations of thing and objects from the 
environment, but rather, ‘a passage by insensible gradations from the one to 
the other’.93 This is to say that all things are in a continuous unity to the extent 
that it is only by the living centre of images, reacting to the material world by 
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outlining other images towards the possible action upon them. However, this 
offers a clear framework from which to model a theory of the process of 
painting, to suggest the division of painter from the art object in terms of the 
mutual activity of the painter’s gestures and the applications of the painting 
medium. By this we argue, that in terms of the perpetual conditions of the 
painter’s actions, a continuity of experiences occur from the perceptions given 
by the painting medium. Therefore, the actualization of experiences through 
mutual engagement is a bivalent condition of movements relative to 
movements, by which the solidarity of the process occurs. 
 
 
The Memory of Painting 
 
Moreover, Bergson explains that our perceiving is instantaneous to the 
immediate actualization of activity effecting the division of matter and the 
contouring of objects, but also, it is memory which ‘solidifies into sensible 
qualities the continuous flow of things’.94 In other words, as our perception is 
immediate to the material extensity of reality, memory is the prolongation of 
the experiences of perception into the present. In contrast, he asserts that to 
react immediate to the activity of perception, this would mean that we have 
adopted the duration of material extensity, and hence, ever present and 
continuous with the present again. In this sense, Bergson argues that, such an 
operation consists only of ‘necessity’, by which the reaction to action dynamic 
would be of the same duration of matter, as always present always given, 
instantaneous and without choice. Whereas for actions to be free or 
‘indeterminate’, these require differing rhythms of duration and hence, 
changes of rhythms of duration ‘belong to beings able to fix, at long intervals, 
that becoming to which their own becoming clings’.95    For Bergson, the 
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independence of action and the sense of anticipation of actions come from the 
condensing of the durations of matter. Therefore, the degree of the contraction 
of the present by conscious perception, and thereby, the greater or lesser 
intensity of life, means that the differing tensions of consciousness allows for 
differing activity and the possibilities to enact change. 
 
Bergson’s theory argues against the Kantian view that we cannot know things 
in themselves but only through our representations. For Bergson, our ordering 
of things in terms of our representations emerges from mind.  In other words, 
Bergson does not deny the operations of mind but considers real duration as 
real time, and real extension as real material continuity, as both things in 
themselves. In this way, the durations of reality are immediate and ‘directly 
manifest to mind’, so that the difference of qualities of mind and matter are 
only distinctions from the relation of consciousness with matter. Bergson 
argues that by immediate experience, in which ‘everything is always being 
born anew’, there is no difference between movement and quality between 
the images of perception and the images perceived, ‘between quality and 
movement’.96 
 
This returns Bergson’s conceptualization of the images in terms of the relation 
of consciousness and matter, body and soul.  According to his view that 
perception is originally in things rather than mind, it is in ‘concrete 
perception’ in which memory intervenes, and persistence of the past allows 
for the prolongation of ‘a plurality of movements’. This indicates that 
perception is not relegated to a detached condition of mind. Instead, 
consciousness and matter, notions of body and soul, all ‘meet each other in 
perception’. In other words, consciousness is not different from matter, but 
only made distinct by space. However, space is itself an abstraction, imposed 
by the requirements of action, by which memory from the occurrences of 
experience is the prolongation of the past continuing in the present. This 
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means that from the duration of perception and the living experiences relative 
to our actions we find the relations of mind and matter. In the dynamism of 
activity, mind touches matter at the moments of the actualizations of activity. 
From this we understand mind as distinct from matter in terms of the 
difference of temporalities. This is to say that, as memory is the result of a 
temporal synthesis, that of ‘past and present with a view to the future’, by 
which memory is then the result of actualizations of activity, it is thereby, the 
contraction of moments of matter that is the activity by which experience is 
manifest.97
 
However, by this temporal synthesis, matter and mind are in 
contact in terms of ‘linking the successive moments of the duration of things’. 
Accordingly, there are two meanings from the notion of memory. With this 
point, we can draw another parallel; that from Bergson’s notions of the 
psychology of memory and the metaphysics of matter, with Kandinsky’s 
claim of the coinciding of life and the materiality of art. Kandinsky argues 
that the soul grows in the context of a continuous movement, suggesting: 
 
Like the body the soul grows by exercise.  Like the body, it grows by movement.  Movement 
is life; life is movement. It is in this that the meaning, the sense and the aim of art is 
manifested.  The whole of nature, the whole world acts ceaselessly on the soul.98 
 
Like Bergson, starting from the context of a pure perception as a continuity 
of movement, Kandinsky also suggests a similar orientation to the ‘meaning’ 
of life, situating the living encounter in terms of the affective nature of the 
world, such that the movement of the world is relative to the growth of the 
soul. In Bergson’s terms, we mean that in terms of ‘spirit in perception’, 
already as memory from experiences, declaring itself more and more, this 
means that like Kandinsky’s notion of the soul’s growth through art, the 
process of painting is part of ‘a progress, a true evolution’. 
 
However, from Bergson’s theory of the relation of body and mind, in terms 
of time, the temporal synthesis of matter implies two types of memory. On 
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the one hand, there is the lowest degree of mind, which is a pure perception, 
to mean matter as ‘mind without memory’. In this sense the most fundamental 
mode of contact and interchange from an indefinite flow of images as a 
continuity of material extensity, necessarily implies infinite degrees of contact 
and reflections from among images. With a higher tension of conscious 
perception through more concentrated forms of living images, the 
actualizations of perceptions as the experiences of contacts increases the 
capacity of memory. However, matter is different by degree or by its 
contractions or expansions as differing durations. Accordingly, memory is not 
something absolutely distinct from matter, but rather, memory is relative to 
the material conditions of reality by which it unites as a synthesis of past with 
the present, ‘with a view to the future’.99  In other words, memory emerges 
from the actualizations of perceptions, but in terms of a pure perception, that 
is, matter as ever present and yet continuously changing flow of image, matter 
is a continuity of the repetition of the totality of images. In contrast to this 
notion of ever unfolding series of images, ‘equivalent of the preceding 
moment’, for Bergson, images are living by their creative effect, that is, by a 
freedom of images to be possible, to become new movements by the 
experiences of living, to manifest new actions in the continuous pressing 
advancement towards the future. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In a world of images there is difference of actions, the differing movements 
in the image-world are contingent upon consciousness as a ‘variable relation’, 
and that of the interchange of sensation to affection, perception to 
consciousness. We have been interested in Bergson’s ontology of images as 
a basis for a philosophy of painting, specifically, by orienting the process of 
painting to its own temporality from among the temporal relations of images. 
Bergson’s argument would say that what perception is to space, action is to 
                                                     
99 MM. p. 220 
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time, and following Bergson’s theory we would have to say that as everything 
passes via the images, the physical reality and the psychic reality of the 
process of painting is a temporal system: the relations of processes of 
movement and change, activity and perception, towards rhythmical 
abstraction of visual forms.100
 
For Bergson, the ‘real time’ of duration means 
the flow and progression of reality. In reality what is immediately perceived 
is ‘multiplicity without divisibility and succession without separation’, so that 
in terms of painting, it is the being of the painter, which is the source of the 
evolving of images. As Bergson insists that the consciousness of living bodies 
is capable of spontaneous movements, from among the repetition of the 
‘material universe’, painting coincides with the intensification of life, that is, 
involving the restoring of a duration of images, and the contraction of a 
greater number of differing rhythms of time, within forms of matter as the 
expressive content issuing from experience.
87 
The experience of the painter 
is given by the medium of the painting, through which the perceptual 
becoming is then returned through expressions back to the mattered and 
painted image.  It is, therefore, our view that the process of painting is a 
continuity of painterly activity considered in terms of the degrees of attention 
of consciousness, and the continuum of painted images as the return of the 
experience of consciousness through multiple events unfolding as forms of 
the movements of matter in the mattered image. Accordingly, we argue that 
the process of painting is a duration of the durations of activities and the 
processes of painterly events.101 
 
According to our argument, we are presenting a Bergsonian theory of painting 
which is opposed to the phenomenological view of consciousness as a 
transcendent occurrence in connection with the world.  This 
phenomenological view, carries over into theories of art,  and more 
specifically, the practice of painting, to substantiate the ‘intentionality’ of 
                                                     
100 MM. p. 9 
101 MM. p. 63 
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perception, and thereby, granting a distinct existential condition, i.e. the 
‘being’ of painting attended by the ‘Being’ of consciousness. However, 
Henry’s thinking contributes to a turn in phenomenology in this regard.  
Though Henrian thought considers intentionality in the process of painting, 
and regards the identity of the painter as a living and individuated sources of 
life, the expressions and actions are not made possible by a subjectivism of 
intent, but by the manifestation of life to itself.102  This is strikingly similar to 
Bergson’s sense of perception issuing from the material world, and by the 
situated conditions of sensation, return to the material universe as differing 
compositions of movement. Here, the Henrian notion of the immanence of 
living to the processes of life, dissolves the classical subjectivism of 
phenomenology, and bridges with the Bergsonian view of the process of 
painting, in which the painter is a living centre of images, a vital medium 
within a constellation of images original to the activities and the events of the 
painting’s becoming.  
 
Furthermore, from the context of Bergson’s philosophy of time we have 
argued that the painter is creative, because of the temporal condition of 
consciousness. Lawlor and Mullarkey both argue that by Bergson’s concept 
of image, we understand the reality of images as activity and temporal. We 
take their collective point as added support to suggest that by the notion of 
painter and painting medium as activities, we already assume temporal 
relations intrinsic to the process of painting. And from a notion of the time of 
the process of painting, we understand the total process of these relations.103
 
                                                     
102 Antonio Calcagno, ‘Reclaiming the possible of an interior human culture? Michel Henry 
and La Barbarie’, in the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 44, No. 3, 
October 2013, p. 255.  Calcagno’s study shows seems to pass over the transition of Henry’s 
‘intentionality’ to a ‘non-intentional’ orientation of Life.  This is highly contentious for 
traditional views, particularly as Henry’s theory ‘immanent phenomenology’ in the post-
phenomenology era, resonates with Bergson’s original conceptualisation of living as 
immanent to duration.  
103 H. Bergson, 'Duration and Simultaneity, with Reference to Einstein’s Theory, 
trans', Leon Jacobson (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) 44. p. 49 ‘Duration 
therefore implies consciousness; and we place consciousness at the heart of things for the 
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In this way the activities of painting refer to the multiple modes of 
consciousness unfolding and multiplying from among an indefinite variation 
of projections, and the events of painting refer to the material image and may 
even be applied to the whole of material imagery as new fields of visual 
experience, embodying the unity of multiple activities and physical effects. 
The process of painting is a flowing process, in which occurs the unity of dual 
aspects of occurring as conditions of perception, or multiple modes of 
perceiving, and occurrences as translations of the creative impetus of these 
experiences, effective towards material forms and images as apprehensions. 
 
That is to say, painting is a process between the rhythm of the painter’s 
duration and that of the flow of the images of things, so that the process is the 
difference of consciousness as a difference of activity from among the 
‘neutralised’ and repetitive continuum of the totality of images.   By the 
experiences of the painter, painting is itself a continuity of images, but by the 
expressions, as themselves difference of the perceptual conditions of the 
material existence, the painting process is the enlarging of perception by the 
approximation of the experiences with the increase of the activity. For where 
the painter is also regarded as a ‘living centre of images’, the experience of 
this living centre is actualized through the projection of activity, that is, 
through the gestures and movement of the painter and the expressions of the 
painter through the painting medium are immanent to the change necessarily 
issuing from the process. In this sense, the activities and movements toward 
expressions, are also the culmination of the event of the creation of material 
images, which embody the enduring actualization of a materiality as the 
process of life’s attention and perceptual growth. In this regard, the 
eventuality of images from the field of perception is not exhausted by the 
continuous events of the art-objects. We have argued that Bergson’s concept 
of images supports a philosophy of painting, and equally indicating that a 
                                                     
very reason that we credit them with a time that endures.’ 
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living process immanent to time, the practice of painting is an instance of the 
practice of philosophy which assumes the germinal affect of an ‘image 
ontology’. As Bergson uses the term ‘image’, ‘because it suggests vision’, the 
‘image’ of duration implies two senses of the aesthetic qualities of the process 
of images and modes of the experiences of images. In this sense, the ‘image‘ 
is the most substantive description of the flux of perception as well as 
implying the constant rendering of reality, i.e. the continual movement of 
becoming perceptible.  Our purview from Bergson’s ontology of images, to 
continue thinking in painting, as the process of painting is a constitutive 
duration. In this way, from the concept of ‘image’, we are required to consider 
the metaphysics of painting as process, in terms of the encounter of the 
immediacy of our experience with the world and our evaluation of the world 
through the living expressions of images. 
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Chapter 2 - Method of Intuition 
 
A fish went deep and deeper into the water. It was silver. The water blue. I followed it with 
my eyes. The fish went deeper and deeper. But I could still see it. I could see it no more. I 
could still see it, even when I could not see it.1
 
 
By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within 
an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible.2 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In this chapter we will continue from the previous analysis of Bergson’s 
concept of ‘image’ to consider his theory of intuition. We will argue that 
intuition is an engagement with reality in terms of an attention of life and an 
immediacy of experience to perception. From this perspective, applied to the 
process of painting, this would mean that intuition is an inner form of 
experience originating from the painter’s direct relation with the painting 
medium. With painting, as with philosophy, there are innumerable ‘levels’ 
and differences of images in duration, so that it is the role of intuitive thinking, 
as an activity that is itself a mode of experience encountering multiple 
sensations, multiple durations, intuition compels both philosophical 
introspection and reciprocally, prompts the compositional qualities in 
painting. Bergson’s theory of intuition, suggests an interaction between the 
occasion of philosophical glimpses of the more profound and expanded 
perceptions of the world, and how this ‘sight’, becomes essential to the 
numerous possibilities of its application in philosophical and painterly 
expressions. Through the process of painting, this ‘depth of life’ explores the 
world according to consciousness being ‘launched into matter’, say Bergson 
in Creative Evolution.  And by this type of grasping from the encounter is 
                                                     
1 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘Something’, Sounds [Klänge], Munich, [1912] in Kandinsky: 
Complete Writings on Art, ed. by Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo, (New York: Da 
Capo Press, 1994),  p. 313. 
2 2Henri Bergson An Introduction to Metaphysics, Trans. T.E. Hulme. ed. by John 
Mullarkey and Michael Kolkman. (Palgrave Macmillan. New York. 2007), p. 5   
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mediated by the becoming of images enacted in the material images.  
Moreover, the intuitive experience becomes the compulsion for the painter’s 
activity and driving force for the diversity of painterly expressions. Caygill’s 
study begins with an elaboration of Bergson’s theory in terms of the 
expansion of perception.3 More specifically, we take support from his 
direction of thinking, to advance our consideration that painting is the process 
by which the material medium of painting enacts the intuitive condition of 
experience.  In this regard, the intuitive vision within the process of painting 
is not produced by the selective properties of the painter’s intellect, but rather 
occurs as a thinking from within the painting medium, as an ‘intellectual 
sympathy’, whereby the painter places himself in perceptual relation to 
perception and sensation impelled by the painting medium. In this sense, we 
will argue that the composition of painting is creative, in which the intuitive 
encounter of painting is a continuity of a diffusion of activities struck by the 
differing trajectories of material and psychical images in time. The painter’s 
activity endures with the activity of the painting medium, so as to coincide 
with the indefinite and continuous flow of reality, by which there occurs 
multiple co- ordinations of various modes of perceptions to experiences and 
expressions of feeling towards material form.  Here it is difficult to separate 
visual and plastic experiences  as  these  are  intrinsic  to  the  unified  modes  
of  experience  and apprehensions within the total process of painting.4
 
However, this is to say that the painter’s experience is a mutual occurrence to 
that of the painting medium, and hence, the painting medium is the perceptual 
means given to the painter. By considering comparisons between Bergson’s 
theory and Kandinsky’s theory, we will argue that by exploring the modes 
and methods of intuition, the painter’s expressions proceed from experiences 
of the painter’s perceptual and sensorial awareness as given to and affected 
by the painting medium. In Bergsonian terms, intuition is a type of vision 
                                                     
3 Howard Caygill, Hyperaesthesia and the Virtual, in Bergson and the Art of Immanence: 
Painting, Photography, Film. edited by John Mullarkey and Charlotte De Mille, Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013, p. 247 
4 H. Read, Education through art (Faber & Faber London, 1958). p. 9 
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from within things, given by the immediacy of one’s durational rhythm to the 
durations of things. However, in Kandinskian terms, it is the inner tensions of 
the painter in relation to the creative impulses of the world by which painting 
becomes a process of the mediation of expressions and the diversity of 
pictorial forms. However, to bridge a Bergsonian view with Kandinsky’s, we 
look to Henry’s  elaboration of Kandinsky’s theory of expression towards 
abstraction, specifically as he ascribes the evolution of painting, ‘By listening 
to the inner resonance dwelling in each particular object-from pure elements 
like the point or the line to colours...’.5 This is similar to Bergson’s account 
of intuition as an induction of understanding from an immediacy to 
perception, that is, towards a more approximate attention to the flow of 
reality.  In this regard we wish to extend a Bergsonian theory of intuition, with 
a Kandinskian view of expression and abstraction, towards a philosophy of 
painting which regards the changing definitions of visual experience 
according to the expressions in the process of painting generated by an 
attitude of attention in the dynamic of painter to painting medium. We will 
argue that within the process of painting, as a process of many durations of 
activity and images, the painter’s conscious expressions inheres within 
differing durations of images. By arguing that the intuitive experiences is 
fundamental to the process of painting, we mean to acknowledge a method by 
which the painting medium is the impetus for the painter’s sensation such that 
the painter’s direct and most immediate sensorial experience with the 
materiality is an experience of differing images. Moreover, this experience 
then generates differing expressions and creative visual forms through the 
process, such that the inner tension of the painter is affected by the immediate 
correspondences with the material and plastic experiences of the process.  The 
intuition in painting is a prompting of the painter’s activity, such that the 
painter’s expression proceeds from the insistence of the intuition as 
continuous explications through activities, movements, and the enlargement 
                                                     
5 Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky, Continuum Publishing, 2005, p. 134 
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of consciousness through visual forms.6 
 
 
Intuition and Perception 
 
The intuitive experience in the process of painting occurs as source of 
knowledge and as insight from within the materiality of the process. In this 
sense, the painter’s consciousness, having concentrated and exerted an 
attention towards the durations of things, consciousness becomes an 
immediate harmony of durational rhythm to the differing durations. However, 
as Bergson’s theory maintains, it is only by an effort of consciousness, itself 
a multiplicity of images that the painter’s perception converges with the 
multiplicity of images from the present as an extended continuity of images. 
This is then an attitude of consciousness to move beyond bodily habits and 
the habits of conscious articulation, and to touch the most immediate 
experience of its living centre. Applied to the process of painting, we argue 
then that the painter’s conscious perception is itself a tension of images, 
converges with the extended tension of the painting medium, and hence, the 
tensions between the differing durations of images both of memory-images 
and perception-images, is that of the object’s perception.7    Lawlor explains 
intuition inverts the customary direction of thinking towards actions so that 
the self coincides within the true perception of matter, that is, with the ever-
present and extended continuity of movement of the painting medium. 8In this 
case, as the painter is immediate to the change coordinated with and through 
the painting medium, this in itself situates the occurrence of intuition not with 
a process of thinking, or with any particular thought of the painter.  Rather, 
intuition is within the direct perceptual situation given to the painter’s 
experience and reciprocally affects the actualization of material contours and 
                                                     
6 L. Lawlor, The challenge of Bergsonism (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2003). pp. 64-65 
7 Mullarkey, John, and Charlotte De Mille, (eds.), ‘‘For We Will Have shown it nothing’: 
Bergson as non-philosopher (of) Art’, in Bergson and the Art of Immanence: Painting, 
Photography, Film, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), p. 207 
8 Leonard Lawlor, The Challenge of Bergsonism: Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics, 
(Continuum. London/New York, 2003), p. 65 
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forms as themselves, expressions originating from the intuition. Therefore, 
intuition in the process of painting may be considered in terms of the painter’s 
immediacy of attention, in terms of a contact within the durational rhythms of 
the materiality of the painting medium. 
 
However, this is then a question of intuition being different from intellection, 
and, then, particular to painting, a difference of direct presentations of 
expressions from representational articulations. We argue that this is 
considered by affirming Bergson’s conception of reality as a process of time. 
T. E. Hulme argues that Bergson did not establish a new theory of art, but 
rather, he enabled philosophers and theoreticians to make more clear and 
concise ‘the qualities which we feel in art’.9 He suggests that Bergson’s 
philosophy, by the meanings of its very conceptualization is able to guide the 
work of artists and to function in the advancement of artistic movements. In 
this regard, Hulme argues that there are two parts of Bergson’s philosophy 
that establish a theory of aesthetics. He suggests that from Bergson’s 
conception of reality as a flux of interpenetrated elements, as unseizable by 
the intellect, and the definition mind in terms of its orientation towards action, 
these theories indicate a notion of creative intuition as fundamental to 
Bergson’s philosophy of art. 
 
 
What Hulme indicates as being such influence is that from Bergson’s 
philosophy the theory of intuition has more to do with the theory of duration, 
in the sense that it insists upon an attempt to experience directly the flowing 
nature of the self as an interiority of life in the flux of time. For the painter to 
have intuition and to be immediate to the flow of reality, as Bergson suggests 
in terms of an immediate consciousness of duration, this means that intuition 
is an enlarging of the artist’s perception to include the whole of the totality of 
perception. As all things are in the continuous movement of time, for a painter 
                                                     
9 T. E. Hulme, Speculations: Essays on Humanism and the Philosophy of Art, 
[1924], Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1960, pp. 143-169.   
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to have an intuition is to experience the movement of time within the 
movements of materiality of the process. Bergson affirms this notion of an 
‘absolute’ movement, stating, 
 
But when I speak of an absolute movement, I am attributing to the moving object and interior 
and, so to speak, states of mind; I also imply that I am in sympathy with those states, and that 
I insert myself in them by an effort of imagination.10 
 
Bergson suggests that perceptions are relative in the sense that they may vary 
from the point of view of either things or movement itself. However, in the 
above passage he regards a type of perception that is an absolute movement 
as the flux of all things and the continuous movements of ‘states of mind’ as 
qualities of movement from the whole of duration. This is to say that our 
knowledge of things is relative to the movement of things, but alternatively, 
with intuition there are varying degrees of awareness. From this relative 
position our encounter with the present perceptual experience may be 
sympathetic and consistent with the movements of thing so that there occurs 
a mutual condition of the self and object. This is to consider the intuition as 
more than simply an empathy of things, and instead as direct awareness within 
things. Bergson suggests this view of a unity of self and world in his 
introduction to a theory of intuition, stating 
 
There is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple 
analysis.  It is our own personality in its flowing through time - our self which endures.11 
 
Bergson explains that intuition is not simply an inner feeling or an attitude of 
thinking, but instead, we are being directed to consider intuition as a 
combination of both intellectual and sympathetic qualities that emerge from 
a conscious exertion. Intuition is a relational condition of consciousness, such 
that in the painting process,     intuition is an awareness of the painter through 
                                                     
10 Henri Bergson, trans by T.E. Hulme, An Introduction to Metaphysics, ed. by John 
Mullarkey and Michael Kolkman, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
11 Henri Bergson, trans by T.E. Hulme, An Introduction to Metaphysics, ed. by John 
Mullarkey and Michael Kolkman, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 7 
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the becoming of experience, a heightened perception encountered at the point 
of contact of expressions and the mediums localization of the experiences of 
consciousness to its own expansion.12 From the centre of the multiple 
activities painting process progresses by an interpenetration of sensations and 
perceptions, so that painterly activities pass to sensible forms as external 
images in space. Here there is an agreement between consciousness as 
immediate to, and reflective within the activities of painting. Bergson’s theory 
of intuition maintains a dual nature of reality, in which we understand from 
within our personality, itself a flowing through time and as it endures, we may 
sympathize intellectually with our own selves.13
  
Moreover, in terms of the 
process of painting, the painter’s activities are relative to continuous views 
taken in perception. The variability of these activities reflects the variability 
of consciousness, so that the painter’s activity is variable in response to the 
material means of expression. However, for the painter, the reality confronted 
from within the process of painting is an indefinite flow of images. The 
material becoming of painted imagery as forms of expressions emerge from 
inner relations to external appearances. 
 
When I direct my attention inward to contemplate my own self (supposed for the moment to 
be inactive), I perceive at first, as a crust solidified on the surface, all the perceptions which 
come to it from the material world.14 
 
Here the term ‘image’ designates a bifurcated process occurring from among 
the differing modes of perceptual consciousness within the process of 
painting.   For Bergson intuition is a perception that is a direct and immediate 
experience of reality. In this sense, the intuitive experience is a simple sight, 
and therefore, superior to any abstracted reasoning or schematic 
                                                     
12 John Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy, Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 
158. Mullarkey’s summation affirms the connection of Bergson’s metaphysics with 
a philosophy of intuition, to suggest more clearly that intuition is not a mystical or 
ethereal condition, but rather, a radical empiricsim as it implyies the attenuation of 
philosophy to its experience and its experience grounded in the sense of an 
‘originality’ of reality.   
13 Ibid. p. 6-7 
14 Ibid. p. 7 
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demonstrations of a reality. In other words, intuition is the means by which 
one becomes most immediate to the force of change, and is thereby, inspired 
by a contact with this type of vision. From it the painter’s expression proceeds 
from things to the actualization of the expression in the living experiences of 
the body. This is not to suggest an intersubjective condition and to mean some 
form of ‘gaze’ of ourselves from a conscious perceptive of ‘other’. Rather, for 
Bergson, intuition is a duration of the self by which the self’s experience is 
grounded in the experience of other things.15
  
 According to Bergson, intuition 
has an intellectual character as well as it also being a type of sympathetic 
union within things. In this sense, intuition is a direct attention inwards from 
a contemplation of the self and concentration of consciousness to an 
experience from within an ever present and continuous flux of reality. 
However, having an intuition will then affect the continuity of perceptual 
formulations so that in the case of the painter, the inner life is then a type of 
generative force towards the conceptualization of what is given by being 
immediate to the continuity of reality. It is with this view that we regard the 
role of intuition in the process of painting, specific to the attention of the 
painter’s consciousness as a type of sounding from within the self, and 
reflected by an immersion into the flow of things. 
 
The inner life is all this at once: variety of qualities, continuity of progress, and unity of 
direction. It cannot be represented by images. But it is even less possible to represent it by 
concepts, that is, by abstract, general or simple ideas.16 
 
Bergson concedes that we should aim to promote the effort to get back to the 
original feeling of the duration of the flow of life. To do so, he admits, even 
though an image cannot replace or represent such an intuitive experience of 
duration by   ‘diverse   images’ and   consciousness coinciding   with differing   
                                                     
15 Leonard Lawlor. The Challenge of Bergsonism: Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics. 
(Continuum. London/New York. 2003). p. 67 
16 Henri Bergson, trans by T.E. Hulme, An Introduction to Metaphysics, ed. by John 
Mullarkey and Michael Kolkman, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 10 
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orders   of movements, this may allow for a convergence and seizing of a 
certain intuitive encounter.17
 
Intuition is a type of faculty of visualization, a 
process originating from an expansive ‘vision’ given by a direct experience 
with reality, but is an creative encounter continuing through a flow of 
differing images and thereby, generating a plurality of images, by efforts to 
return to the original experience. In the process of painting, the intuitive 
experience is conditioned by the materiality of the process, and in the same 
instant, becomes the capacity for the changing content of the activities within 
the process. In other words, the intuitive vision is to be had in the painting 
medium, as the medium is itself an indefinite material condition, but its 
experience as part of the process of painting generates further activities, and 
the compulsion to express different images.18 We see a striking similarity of 
this Bergsonian contextualization of painting with the Henrian view of 
Kandinsky’s abstraction painting in which Henry elaborates, ‘Nature could 
not provide either the content or the form of art.  The entire substance of the 
painted work came from life and it alone [...] and leads to more alive and 
intense experiences’.19  For Bergson and, as it would seem Henry, the ability 
to understand reality more acutely is the realization of reality through the 
intensity of the intuitive experience, which returns to furthering more 
accentuations of living. 
 
However, in terms of the Bergsonian ‘image’ in relation to the intuitive 
practice, it is a question of the images of experience, that is, conscious 
experience is an apprehension of reality by which the form of these 
experiences is given by the duration of images. Intuition gives us the 
experience of images becoming visible, and the visual object as a form of the 
experience of sensory phenomena. In this way, intuition is an interaction of 
                                                     
17 Ibid. p. 10 
18 John Mullarkey, Post-Continental Philosophy: An Outline, Continuum Publishing, 2006, 
p. 34.  From Mullarkey’s summation of the notion of ‘infinite’, we regard the on-going 
movements and ceaseless creation of reality, as also becoming in the modes of 
actualisations of visual experience and bodily expressions in the in the process of painting.   
19 Michel Henry, See the Invisible: On Kandinsky, trans. by Scott Davidson, Continuum 
Publishing, 2005, p. 135.   
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the images given in the field of perception, and, a relation of sensation to this 
experience conveyed through a diffusion of activities and expressions. In 
other words, intuition is a practice that occurs from a mass of images as an 
encountering from among the flow of images, and in turn, as an isolating 
activity of images, dissolving into a comprehensive image.20
  
Accordingly, 
the intuitive practice in the painting process allows for the unity of the 
intelligible, as the experience of images according to conscious reasoning and 
ideas, with the sensible, or the experience of images according to an 
immediacy of conscious experience. Similarly, Kandinsky indicates a similar 
notion of the role of intuition in painting in terms of differing ‘paths’, stating,  
How this takes place is a complicated question. I can say only one thing: To 
my mind this creative path must be a synthetic one. That is to say, feeling 
(‘intuition’) and thought (‘calculation’) work under mutual ‘supervision’.21 
 
Like Bergson’s description of intuition as an immediacy and feeling of 
consciousness with the flow of things, and, as an intellectual sympathy, this 
is paralleled by Kandinsky’s characterization of painting in terms of a dual 
action of observation and participation, that is, of both a sensation of 
expression and thinking through the expressions. This is most obvious in 
Kandinsky’s discussion of the possibilities of spontaneous and impulsive 
expressions in painting. Suggesting a foundation of spiritual evolution, he 
claims that the creation of expressions is from a ‘slowly formed inner feeling, 
tested and worked over repeatedly and almost pedantically.’22 Considering 
                                                     
20 Benedetto Croce. Trans. by Douglas Ainslie, The Essence of Aesthetic, (William 
Heinemann, London, 1978), p. 24. Cf. From the theoretical context of his query ‘What is 
Art?’, Croce argues that ‘the intuition is certainly the production of an image,[...]’, but only 
in so far as this sense of production means a ‘unity in variety’, which adds to our 
consideration of the intuitive practice in the process of painting as a force of production or 
as a condition of creation from among the images in duration. Furthermore, Croce’s 
deliberation on the nature of art leads to a final claim of the relation of intuition, and this 
compares closely to a Bergsonian position, stating, ‘and art is perfectly, defined when 
simply defined as intuition’. see pp. 33-34.   
21 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘Abstract or Concrete?’ [‘Abstract of Concreet?’], Tentoonstelling 
abstracte kunst (Amsterdam), (1938), in Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art, ed.by 
Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo (Da Capo Press. New York, 1994). p. 832 
22 Will Grohman, Wassily Kandinsky: Life and Work, Thames and Hudson, London, 1959, 
p.128 
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this claim, we can understand how his series of  ‘Improvisations’ painting 
were the result of an investigation of procedural intuitions and the intensive 
work resulting, according to his view, as ‘largely unconscious, spontaneous 
expression of inner character, non-material nature’.  The choice of idiomatic 
expressions in this statement aside, we can recognise the force of creative 
painterly expressions that resulted from Kandinsky’s own experience of the 
intuitive encounters in the process of painting.  From both Bergson and 
Kandinsky’s view, we can argue that having an intuitive experience effects 
the process of painting in such a way that an intrinsic experience of the flow 
of images sustains the activities of painting. Therefore, the intuition is also 
the impulse of the projection that emanate from its experience, and these 
coincide with the movements of the painter and the painting medium as 
explicit expressions of living images in duration. This is to say that, the 
intuition defines the intrinsic qualities of the painter in contact with the 
painting medium, and thereby, compels the expression towards the extrinsic 
qualities of painterly expressions. That is to say then, the immediacy of the 
painter’s perceptual experience effects the instantaneous discharge of activity 
in the form of material change.23 
 
 
Different Kinds of Images, Difference of Creative Intuition 
 
Bergson argues that our abstract ideas of reality ‘render service to analysis’, 
to mean that our study and examination of the world proceeds with the 
distinctions of objects and a view of relations from among these identities. In 
the sense, our thinking exists in ideas but not in the concrete existence of 
duration.24
 
This is because our thinking is a result of our adaptation to the 
world of continuous activity. Hence, the requirements of living demand a 
                                                     
23 R. Arnheim, Art and visual perception: A psychology of the creative eye (Univ of 
California Press, 1954). p. 412.  Cf. Arnheim’s description of a theory of ‘Dynamics’ in art, 
and here, he specifically cites Bergson’s theory as a grounding by which to argue for a 
dynamics of perception. 
24 Henri Bergson, trans by T.E. Hulme, An Introduction to Metaphysics, ed. by John 
Mullarkey and Michael Kolkman, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 12 
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fragmentation of an absolute knowledge, that is, for the facility of living, more 
and more complex divisions are required of what is otherwise a continuous 
and ever present plurality of activity in duration. These divisions as ideas and 
concepts, however, require the reflective nature of consciousness, and 
thereby, a turning away from the continuous and ever present immediacy of 
experience. However, with intuition, there is the ‘turning of experience’ to 
which the consciousness bends back on itself, as a retrograde effort against 
the pragmatic directions of thinking, and to the original source of experience 
and the essential and unique nature of reality.25
 
In this regard, Bergson 
explains that concepts only offer us a reconstruction of the objects, offering 
only general and impersonal aspects of reality, rather than a living experience 
present to the world. In addition, though the concept is general, from the 
concepts we abstract even further, so that reality becomes symbolized and 
distorted through the increased complexity of the conceptualizations. Bergson 
suggests that in this way, the concept becomes an extraction from the 
metaphysical objects of reality to the extent that even though the concept is 
moulded about the objects and adopts the contouring, the concepts grow 
beyond the object itself. Because the concepts are extracted from the objects 
of reality, there occur many different systems of thought to accommodate the 
many external points of view of reality. In this sense, Bergson points out that 
the ‘concrete unity’ of the object, itself as an aspect of a continuous material 
extensity of reality is divided according to symbolic expressions and by the 
furthering abstractions of concepts adding to the growth of systems of 
thought.26 
 
However, Bergson does not dismiss the operations of thinking and the 
expressibility of the concept, but rather, suggests that if we are to consider the 
metaphysical pursuits of reality we must go beyond the concept to attain the 
intuition of reality. But in the same token, for the expression of our 
                                                     
25 Leonard Lawlor, The Challenge of Bergsonism: Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics, 
(Continuum. London/New York. 2003), p. 68 
26 Henri Bergson, trans by T.E. Hulme, An Introduction to Metaphysics, ed. by John 
Mullarkey and Michael Kolkman, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 13   
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metaphysical occupations, and in particular, from our encounter of intuitive 
experiences, this means that we require a different type of concept. For 
Bergson, to express the intuitive experience we must create ‘supple, mobile 
and almost fluid representations’, by which our thinking becomes itself as an 
expressive movement, easily adapting and changing concepts on the ‘fleeting 
forms of intuition’. In other words, our duration can be presented directly 
within an intuition of reality, but, the expression of its experience can only be 
indirectly conveyed by ideas and conceptual representation. In this regard, 
Bergson claims that despite the increasing complexity and manipulation of 
concepts, we can never obtain the original intuitive experience. Rather the 
intuitive experience as a momentary vision of a changing reality, challenges 
thinking and reflection, requiring a transformation of thought to adjust to the 
alterity of the experience. Simply, the order of thinking and habits of thought 
are altered, shifted to approach the objective world again, with extension of 
the intuitive experience expressibly in the renewal of concepts and the 
invention of differing perspectives. Simply, by the order of thinking and 
habits of thought, we approach the objective world by concepts and ideas 
rather than consider the world from our direct and immediate duration among 
the duration of images then conveyed through concepts.27 
 
However, when we replace ourselves in duration by an effort of intuition we 
perceive the essential nature of things, and, by this turn of experience, we 
invert the customary course of thought and turn to a total vision from among 
the multiplicity of images in the unity of duration. This effort of 
                                                     
27 E. Panofsky, ‘Comparison to commentary’ in Idea: A Concept in Art Theory, trans. J.S.J. 
Peake, (Harper and Row, 1968) Panofsky offers an insight on the nature of the ‘Idea’ in 
Platonic thought,in terms of its relation to the notions of ‘icon’ or ‘image’. In regards to 
these terms, a comparison may be drawn which supports the distinction of the Bergsonian 
notion ‘image’ and its implication for a philosophy of art, from the ‘image’ in the Platonist 
sense, and the aesthetic theories that have followed from it. I take support from Panofsky’s 
thesis to assert that the Bergsonian notion of ‘image’, when considered in light of the 
rendering of artwork, is not secondary to the notion of Form, i.e. as an impoverished 
representation, or as an imitation. Rather, in regards to painting, the image is the continuity 
of the process of its presentation, and therefore, the image is of quantity and quality, of 
materiality and incorporeality, as a becoming in time.   
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consciousness to intuition is then a return to what is given by the intuitive 
experience, and thereby, a knowledge of the absolute duration in which 
experience of ‘the self by the self is possible’.28  Let us compare what we have 
considered so far from Bergson’s theory of intuition, with a view towards 
painting. Particularly with Kandinsky’s view of creative intuition, though not 
stated as a theory as such, is implied in his views of the creative process 
involved in painting. When questioned about the nature of the mental 
processes that give birth to the ‘idea’ and ‘conception’ of a painting, 
Kandinsky claims, 
 
My first idea is formed in various ways: sometimes it is an external impression (some natural 
occurrence, natural phenomenon, a street scene, a ‘chance’ effect of light, [...]), that gives the 
first impulse to some new idea [...]. These are all external impressions transmitted through 
the eye.29 
 
From this we can compare that similar to Bergson’s theory of intuition, 
particularly as Kandinsky suggests by the juxtaposed notion of ‘external 
impression’, there is implied relation of concepts and ideas to an original 
impulse. Moreover, this original impulse is itself given from the perceptual 
experience of the world. We find this to admit closely to a Bergson’s theory 
that intuition is to be had by a coinciding of the self within the duration of 
things, such that the creative impulse of the experience originates the diversity 
of concepts and, in the case of painting, painterly expressions and pictorial 
formulations. This is to say that, for both Bergson and Kandinsky, the 
intuitive experience is a duration of the self-immediate to the duration of 
things, and ‘external impressions’, expressing themselves through differing 
forms given by a direct relation of painter to the world. Kandinsky also 
suggests a similar notion of the relation of intuition to differing durations in 
                                                     
28 Henri Bergson, trans by T.E. Hulme, An Introduction to Metaphysics, ed. by John 
Mullarkey and Michael Kolkman, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 15 
29 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘Kandinsky’s response to ‘The Psychology of the Productive 
Personality’, by Paul Plaut, [Stuttgart] (1929) in Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art. ed. 
by Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo. (Da Capo Press. New York, 1994). pp. 737-738 
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terms of the impulse of painter and the external dimension of painting and as 
between an internal and external exchange,  suggesting, 
 
I wish to assert that there exist, apart from these external impulses, other internal ones, which 
have little or nothing to do with the external; [...], to put it in simple terms, being in a good 
or bad ‘mood’, a powerful inner tension whose origin I am unable to explain, which 
discharges itself in the different ways. [...] I only mean to say that one’s ‘conception’ is not 
just an external, ‘pictorial’ idea of beauty, but is bound up inextricably with these tensions 
within different elements.30 
 
Like Bergson, Kandinsky is describing a notion of intuition in terms of an 
interchange from internal and external domains of reality. However, 
Kandinsky’s view suggests a seemingly ambiguous origin of creative 
impulses, such that these are considered to arise within the tensions from 
among inner experiences and external impressions. His view also indicates 
that the ‘conception’ and forms of expressions are bound to these tensions. 
Hence, from among the inner and external tensions the creative impulse 
emerges, and from this the developments of conceptualization and forms of 
expression are given. This is to say that, similar to Bergson’s notion that 
intuition occurs as a coinciding affect from the differing tensions and rhythms 
of time, Kandinsky’s view suggests that for the painter, such a ‘vision’ 
encountered in the intuitive experience is an impulse that arises as the 
occurrence of correspondence among these tensions. This type of impulse and 
intuitive vision, explained by Lawlor, is likened to ‘a mystical rupture’ from 
the depths of duration.  Lawlor adds that this rupturing upsets conventions of 
thinking, creating a ‘disequilibrium’, which is then approached by the 
counterbalance of thinking, effectively prompting thinking to think 
otherwise.31  In other words, the intuitive vision is necessary for the transition 
of philosophical thinking, and in the case of painting, the creation of novel 
                                                     
30 Ibid. p. 739 
31 Leonard Lawlor, The Challenge of Bergsonism, Continuum Publishing, 2003, p. 79.  This 
is an important detail as it characterizes not only the force of Bergsonian intuition in the 
process of philosopfhy, but also regarded in Kandinsky’s radical departure from the 
historical conventions of painting, we see that intuitive experiences as ‘disruptions’ qua 
‘revolutions’ incite further activity and the evolution of experience and perception. 
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visual experience, to keep pace with the reality of duration.  Whether the 
‘vision’ is of a complete pictorial realization that the painter must work 
towards, or only a subtle impression or faint feeling that the painter pursues 
as a basic character of the process, it is nonetheless given by an original 
experience as being intrinsically bound up within the elements of the process.   
Kandinsky claims that this experience from the differing tensions (i.e. 
conscious perception from the materiality of painting), from which the 
original impulse arises, these discharge through differing forms. However, he 
explains that after the given impulse, if the artist proceeds with too much 
concentration towards its expression, then an ‘order’ of expression may occur 
in such a way that it leads the painter’s expression to something completely 
different. Whereas with the painter’s expression there may develop a ‘theme’ 
of feeling. In other words, from an imprecise sense of the ‘vision’, the 
painter’s inner tensions may become resolved in the articulation, in the sense 
that his feelings become agreeable with the expressions given.32
  
In both 
instances, we see comparatively, that   Bergson’s theory how the complexity 
of concepts adopting an ever-expanding ‘mould’ upon an object, may also 
become a distortion of the original view and expressibly something else. But 
also, with Kandinsky’s notion of the painter’s expression being led by a 
compulsion from the inner tension towards its being resolved, we see similar 
to Bergson’s view, that the intuition must be something that confers itself to 
expression. Nevertheless, with Kandinsky and Bergson, the intuitive 
experience as a persisting influence in the painter’s activity towards 
expression is only authentic to its origin by holding on to the vision or the 
unique image given. From the original intuition there occurs a potential for 
the diversity of expressions. And even through the process of expressing, 
there occurs constant shifting and changing of feelings that were once 
oriented towards some initial sense of expression. Hence, the intuitive 
experience is an encounter, but not a guarantee of its translation, and as such, 
the philosopher and painter are driven by the experience, compelled by the 
                                                     
32 Ibid. 739 
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experience immanent to the projections of the activities of its expression. 
 
In terms of the expression of an intuition in painting following as both concept 
and intuition, Kandinsky argues that the world may be encountered in diverse 
ways, given according to its inner or external domains, stating, 
 
Every phenomenon can be experienced in two ways. These two ways are not random, but 
bound up with the phenomena-they are derived from the nature of the phenomena, from the 
characteristics of the same: External-Internal.33 
 
 
What is significant here is that he is admitting to a world in which the inner 
and external domains are mutually bound and reciprocally derived from each 
other. By asserting this view, we understand his explanation of inner tensions 
originating by way of external impressions. More specifically, we see how a 
Kandinskian view of intuition would maintain that both the conceptual 
developments that follow an intuition and the immediacy of a diversity of 
feelings that continue along with the expressions of the intuition, these are 
given by a vision from within the painter as the painter is an occurrence of 
changing perceptual experience bound to a continuity of ever-changing 
perception. 
 
Henry explains that for Kandinsky, the notion of ‘forms of expression’ 
already assumes a prior existence, a type of abstract content of the tensions of 
experience, which affects the painter and   seeks through the painterly 
elements a means of external conveyance.34
 
Though Henry places more 
emphasis on his reading of Kandinsky in terms of the true perception, and that 
is, an abstract vision of life, we argue that Kandinsky may be read closer to a 
Bergsonian perspective to mean that the intuition is the nearest to a total vision 
                                                     
33 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘Abstract or Concrete?’ [‘Abstract of Concreet?’], Tentoonstelling 
abstrakte kunst [Amsterdam], (1938) in Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art.ed. by 
Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo.(Da Capo Press. New York, 1994). p. 832 
 
34 Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky. trans.by Scott Davidson. (London 
Continuum, 2009), p. 22 
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of reality that compels expression by its experience. This notion of the 
intuitive vision for both Kandinsky and Bergson, would mean a type of 
detachment of the painter’s reference to his own perception, and instead, to 
encounter a vision within the objects of reality. Applied to a theory of the 
philosophizing in the process of  painting, this implies that as the activities of 
the process of painting are durational the intuitive experience is an encounter 
situated by the painter and the painting medium as coinciding means to 
convey the very ‘mobility of durations’. Moreover, the resulting imagery and 
designated art-objects are the material conditions that have occurred by 
compulsion of the intuitive experience. In other words, within the process of 
painting, as the painter’s expressions proceed from an intuition, the intuitive 
experience influences the discharge of movement, and continues as an 
affective ‘inner pulse’, as a force of the becoming of images to express the 
force of their origin. Hence, as Kandinsky claims that phenomenon can be 
experienced in two ways, we admit that painting is a metaphysical 
undertaking in terms of the material conditions of its activity affective 
towards an intuitive vision, and the collective activity of painting as differing 
modes of experience given to the expressions of differing degrees of duration 
in process. Bergson’s theory of intuition implies  that  the  intuitive  
experience  is  an  unmediated  contraction  of  differing durations from among 
multiple perceptions. From this perspective we argue, that in the process of 
painting, the immediacy of the painter to the perceptions given by the painting 
medium allows for continual differences of seeing into reality, and thereby, 
from the unity of the duration of the process, the differing articulations of 
these visions are the many expressions proceeding from the multiple and 
successive states of consciousness through the activities of painting.35 The 
activities of painting are activities of consciousness itself, and thereby, 
consciousness attending to the expression from the experiences of 
perceptions. From within this dynamic, intuition is the affective vision 
                                                     
35 J. Mullarkey, Bergson and philosophy (Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh, 1999).. p. 
34 
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towards the expression and composition within the process, and a conscious 
realization through the activities actuated by the material form. Kandinsky 
suggests a notion of intuition in a similar sense, stating, 
 
This can happen in various ways. As for me, I prefer not to ‘think’ while working. It is not 
entirely unknown that I once did some work on the theory of art. But woe to the artist whose 
reason interferes with his ‘inner dictates’ while he is working.36 
 
In other words, for Kandinsky, the experience of conscious reflection in 
tandem with the feeling of an ‘inner dictate’ is considered conflictive. Though 
he does not deny the intellectual faculty in the expression, he warns against 
interfering with the inner compulsion. In this sense, intuition is the main 
operation that makes consciousness projective. However, if we consider the 
painter the centre of activity, the force of this centre, the affect of its activities 
extends through the painting medium. We compare this to Kandinsky’s 
theory, in which he suggested that the experiences of the painter are not 
random activities, but are bound up with the phenomena of the process of 
painting.   In other words, the painter and the painting medium are an 
amalgam of the process; they are ‘derived from the nature of the 
phenomena’.37 
However, by regarding such phenomena, in Bergsonian terms, as themselves 
a plurality of images in process, the process of painting involves the material 
unconscious of reality in which every image of matter is in contact with all 
the others, and consciousness, in which certain images are active towards the 
selection and reaction from among images. In this regard then, whether we 
consider the movement of images in terms of phenomena this consideration 
of intuition in the process of painting is the experience of life towards forms 
                                                     
36 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘Abstract or Concrete?’ [‘Abstract of Concreet?’], Tentoonstelling 
abstracte kunst (Amsterdam, 1938) in Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art.ed. by 
Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo.(Da Capo Press. New York, 1994). p. 832 
37 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘Point Line and Plane, [Punkt und Linie zur Flaeche] (Munich, 
1926) in Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art.ed. by Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter 
Vergo.(Da Capo Press. New York, 1994).pp. 524-700, p. 532 
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of life. Worms explains that Bergson’s theory maintained a view of the mutual 
condition of unity and divergence from among life and consciousness. Worms 
states that this ‘double unity’ is in consciousness, and therefore, it is the 
‘genesis of spatial consciousness from temporal consciousness’, so that 
intuition of consciousness is a spatial gaze in time.38 
 
In other words, Worms explains that the intuitive experience is understood as 
a unification of both temporal and spatial identities of consciousness. The 
experience of consciousness is of a two part mode: that of projection and of 
formation by an immediate spatial orientation. This suggests a deeper sense 
of experience of visualization, in that, the experience of consciousness in time 
is affective of the reflective consciousness which already assumes a spatial 
‘gaze’. Accordingly, we argue that intuition in the process of painting is the 
unification of the experience of the painter’s consciousness becoming through 
the activity of consciousness in the painting medium. From the intuitive 
experience, consciousness is creative from the immediacy with the givens of 
perception through the painting medium in time.  However, this complicates 
the relation of the intuitive experience within the dynamic of the process of 
painting.  Therefore, what we see lacking in Worm’s analysis, by way of the 
application of intuition to the practice of painting is the understanding of 
intuition as a creative faculty generated by the experiences specific to the 
painting medium.  By taking into account the immanence of living experience 
in the material forms of painting, we recognize multiple activities in of the 
flow of time, and thereby, bringing consciousness immediate to the becoming 
of material things without their distinction. 
 
In terms of duration, painting is both an experience of the undulations of 
becoming and the visual forms of the expressive conditions that actuate and 
concretize these lived experiences. Here again, we are maintaining from a 
Bergsonian theory of intuition, that painting is a mode of recasting the 
                                                     
38 M. R. Kelly, 'Bergson and Phenomenology'. p. 256 
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ceaselessly changing perceptions as given from the multiple movements and 
differing directions of activity in the flow of duration.  However, the painter’s 
intuition is conditioned by a direct attention and immediate experience of the 
continuous progress of consciousness to the processes of life.39 
Particular to the process of painting, intuition is then, a sympathetic 
engagement operating within the process of painting. Such ‘sympathy’ is the 
relation of consciousness and life. In the process of painting, we can say that 
there occur an indefinite duration of images (images as differing degrees of 
perceptions) from among the activities of sense, feeling, thinking, bodily 
movement, material movement, etc. There are durations of images immediate 
to consciousness. It is through the attention of consciousness and to the 
varying degrees of images, that the life of matter and the life of mind are held 
in a relation of differing degrees or of differing rhythms of duration itself. 
Accordingly, consciousness as a process of life, also durational with the 
process of painting, is made malleable by the changing images to which 
intuition attends. From among the differing domains of either the activity of 
painting, the perception of the painter, or the field of painted imagery, the 
intuitive encounter  in  the  process  of  painting  is  the  means  by  which  the  
painter,  as  the perceptual centre of the activity of painting, expands the 
perceptual experience in the encounter of the alterity of the painting 
medium.40
  
As a method, this would mean that the projection of intuitive 
vision in painting serves to directly apprehend the qualities of things, and 
reciprocally, affects the efforts of painterly experience towards conveyance 
of visual forms. Intuition is a type of effort or force in terms of the generative 
quality of development within painting’s activity, but also, the intuitive 
experience is a type of grasping or seizing in terms of the conceptualization 
                                                     
39 J.-P. Sartre and F. Williams, Imagination: A psychological critique (University of 
Michigan Press Ann Arbor, 1962).p. 146 
40 Rudolf Arnheim, ‘Abstract Language and The Metaphor’ in Toward a Psychology of Art: 
Collected Essays, (University of California Press. Berkeley. 1966), pp. 104-105. Arnheim’s 
essay begins with a reference to Bergson’s theory and offers a clear distinction of intuition 
as a direct ‘vision of the nature of the object’, from the experience of an object in which we 
‘turn about it’, and hence, reduce to an external reference or suitable representation.   
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of visual forms. In this regard, intuition is a methodological element of 
creativity and thereby as the dynamic capacity towards the becoming of 
perceptual development and the expansion of visual experience. In this 
regard, it is the intuitive ‘vision’ which  sustains the creative qualities of the 
activities  of  painting,  affects  the  opening  of  perception,  and  generates  
novel painted imagery.41 
 
This means that there is necessary tension between the intuitive experience 
within the painting activity as a counterpart to the process of actualization, 
and the intuitive experience realized through its becoming as a counterpart to 
the actualized painted imagery. This becomes a question of the variability of 
perceiving from the differing tensions of perception from among the subject 
and object relation in the process of painting. Intuition is then a concentration 
of temporal rhythms of perception, which are at once occurring as events in 
time and occupying space as activities of images. In  this  sense  intuition  is  
a  condition  of  the  unification  of  differing  temporal 
rhythms.42
   
And  though  intuition  is  an  inner  quality,  experience  is  given  
to  an external expression of the quality of perceptions. In either case, intuition 
is an influence and creative force among painterly activity and material 
formulations.43 
                                                     
41 Rob Pope, Creativity: Theory, History, Practice. (Routledge, New York. 2005). p. 43.  
Pope’s description of Bergson’s theory of creative evolution in terms of conceptualisation 
of life, is supportive of my claim of the intuition as the connection of life to matter, through 
the ‘self- 
generating’ activity of painting. 
 
42 Anton Ehrenzweig, The Hidden Order of Art: A Study in the Psychology of Artistic 
Imagination. (Granada Publishing. Paladin. London. 1967). p. 146.  Here Ehrenzweig is 
considering the ‘potency’ of abstraction in both scientific thinking and modern art, by way 
of its ‘full emptiness’, which he attributes to the ‘inner eye’. He explains that intuition as a 
mode of the relaxing of attention,  such that ‘several incompatible images‘ may occupy the 
same spot, to mean, no seperation of imagery, no distinction of time and space. 
43 Rudolf Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception: a Psychology of the Creative Eye, 
(Berkeley:University of California Press, 1966) . pp. 314-315. Arnheim explains that 
intuition is a feeling, and attributes it to a type of judgment in ‘what guides the artist’, but 
also it is in expression responding to the object of perception, the compositional process, or 
even the painted image. 
 
    
111  
 
 
Intuition 
 
According to the framing of Bergson’s theory of intuition, we have described 
the reality of painting as an oscillation between the qualitative plurality of 
painterly activities and the effect of temporality of this process towards a 
material translation and the structuring of material and pictorial forms. This 
oscillation involves modes of sensible apprehension. These modes are the 
occasion for intuition, which serves as the impetus of activity, and as 
intervening mode of variability affecting the actualization of painted imagery. 
That is when intuition is practiced in the process of painting the painter’s 
experience becomes an affective force within the process, a fathoming among 
the differing currents of duration as given by the painting medium, which in 
turn is articulated through the painterly exchange. In this way, intuition is not 
simply a passive condition of apprehension, but rather, a creative force, 
compelling movement towards its reification, and thereby, the enabling effect 
of a simple inner vision to vary the painter’s activities, in response to the 
events of the art-object. 
 
 
The Painter Intensity and Contact 
 
With this perspective, Bergson regards intuition as a type of contact. This of 
course, implies that through an intuitive experience there occur generative 
types of ‘movement’, such that the intuitive vision is as a central point of 
rhythm from among a confluence of sensorial and intellectual activity. For 
Bergson, an original intuition is an experience of ‘perception’ in which 
perception exceeds the patterns of its experience, and is thereby, the impetus 
of its transformation towards conceptualizations. Because consciousness is 
consciousness to something, perception issues from the world. Bergson’s 
notion of intuition regards the intuitive experience as a process of dilation, as 
an ever increasing awareness and opening to perception emanating from 
world. In line with this, Gooding describes Kandinsky’s painting as ‘a kind 
of intuitive metaphysics, intimating another dimension of reality, accessible 
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only to the imagination, made visible only by art’.44 
Referring to the course of his own development, Kandinsky suggested a 
similar notion of the creative force as the emergence of forms in painting, 
stating, 
 
One’s inner impulse, i.e. the creating spirit, will inexorably create at the right moment the 
form it finds necessary. One can philosophize about form; it can be analysed, even calculated. 
It must, however, enter into the work of art of its own accord, and moreover, at the level of 
completeness which corresponds to the development of the creative spirit.45 
 
Here we see that Kandinsky’s theory of the development of painterly forms 
and expressions are based on a principle of ‘natural growth’. This is similar 
to Bergson’s view, in which the forms of thought that proceed from a type of 
metaphysical disposition are then described as a ‘spontaneous aspect’ of 
thought.   Accordingly, these types of thought tend toward the simplification 
of metaphysics, since it will ‘draw closer to life’.46 Similarly, Kandinsky 
claims that conceptualization is part of the approach to painting, that 
exercising thought occurs during the process, but the content of painting is 
derived by experience, stating, 
 
I always emphasize with particular force that this theoretical path, this theoretical point of 
view is only a way of arriving at the ‘content’, which is why I place particular value upon the 
living experience of ‘tensions’. Theory is (especially today) indispensable and fruitful. But 
woe betide him who would create a ‘work’ in this way alone.47 
For Kandinsky, painting is not to proceed according to an order of 
conceptualization, but rather, by allowing theoretical and thoughtful exercise 
                                                     
44 MM. p. 17 
45 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘Cologne Lecture’, ‘Kandinsky uber seine Entwicklung’. 
(Munich,1957), Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art. ed. by Kenneth C. Lindsay and 
Peter Vergo. (Da Capo Press. New York, 1994), p. 396 
46 Henri Bergson, ‘Philosophical Intuition’ in The Creative Mind: An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, (1908), trans. Mabelle L. Andison, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), 
p. 107, henceforth CM. 
47 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘Kandinsky’s response to ‘The Psychology of the Productive 
Personality’, by Paul Plaut, (Stuttgart, 1929), Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art, ed.by 
Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo. (Da Capo Press. New York, 1994), p. 740   
    
113  
 
 
Intuition 
to progress with painting, it is the sensitivity of an ‘inner force’ that allows 
for the variations and development of the process. Likewise, Bergson suggests 
that the intuitive experience is a direct apprehension of reality without 
intellectual mediation. Accordingly, there are two directions of movement of 
thought in terms of the intuitive experience. He explains that these forms of 
consciousness, what he also terms as ‘visions’, are of differing 
kinds.48 
 
I mean a vision of reality ‘in itself’-that Plotinus had imagined, as those who have appealed 
to metaphysical intuition have imagined it. By that they all understood a faculty of knowing 
which would differ radically from consciousness as well as from the senses, which would 
even be orientated in the opposite direction. They have all believed that to break away from 
practical life was to turn one’s back upon it.49 
 
The one to which the type of thought as in ordinary knowledge or scientific 
knowledge belongs is of a direction that ‘takes things in a time broken up into 
an infinity of particles’.50 This would explain the exponential unfolding of 
ideas and concepts. The other form of consciousness or ‘vision’, the one to 
which intuition and in this case philosophical thought belong is of a direction 
in which we ‘perceive the continuous fluidity of real time which flows along, 
indivisible’.51 Let us consider some of the details of the above passage, as 
what they entail is yet again a subtle critique of the form of thought and the 
kind of ‘vision’ which does not admit of degrees of depth.52 Accordingly, the 
form of ordinary thought is of ‘surface states’ where everything is considered 
‘neutral’, immobile and divisible, and this contrasts with intuition, which is 
                                                     
48 CM ‘Philosophical Intuition’, p. 126, the use of the term ‘vision’ reinforces the 
perspectival nature of Bergson’s model of intuition, consciousness, and thought.  The 
‘image’, the concept that follows from it as a type of ‘captioning’, and the dual nature of the 
notion of perception as being both of the thought of becoming of ideas (divergence and 
multiplicity from abstraction) and of the sense of sight as a form of awareness, all coincide 
with Bergson’s theorization of mind in terms of the pictorial qualities of matter. 
49 Ibid. p. 140 
50 Ibid. p. 126 
51 Ibid. p. 127 
52 Ibid. p. 127, Bergson suggests that intuition ‘admits of degrees of intensity’ as well as 
‘degrees of depth’. As I have detailed, the increase of depth corresponds with the increase 
in tension. Here Bergson has termed this as a state of intensity, which is opposite of 
extensity, that is, the unfolding and spatialization of thoughts.   
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of a ‘vision’ that perceives through the depth of reality, which is a type of 
seeing into ‘all things sub specie durations’.53 However for Bergson, when 
practiced, the acuity that results from intuition, means that there is potential 
to grasp hold of reality, a mode of placing oneself ‘within an object’, and 
thereby, coinciding within the differing rhythms of duration. 
 
The notion of ‘effort’, albeit a specificity of attention as implicit in intuition, 
suggests that it is something universal, not exclusively a unilateral thinking 
of our consciousness, but rather a movement of consciousness to 
consciousness, since all occur within the unity of change. In this sense 
Mullarkey argues that the effort of intuition is essential to the creative force 
in the becoming of all things.  He explains 
that by ‘effort’, intuition is the effort of the ‘object’ and the ‘subject’, an effort 
to reintegrate each other through movement or differentiation.54
 
On the 
contrary, Bergson argues that the novelty of concepts is generated first, by a 
perception attained through the intuitive experience. He claims that a 
conception has a starting point in perception, so that the intellect only operates 
to arrange and disarrange, and even co-ordinate among concept, but these are 
originally given through intuition.55
 
 
From Sensation to Scheme 
 
However, first he begins by offering an inverse consideration of how the 
‘simpler idea which is able to develop into multiple images’.56 He admits that 
such meaning may not be distinct to a given series, and if detached from the 
                                                     
53 Ibid. p. 129 As this translates to ‘under the aspect of duration’ Bergson is associating this 
‘seeing’ with how the external world really is, that is, a mobility of life in which all things 
are becoming as reality is mobility. This contrasts with sub specie aeternitatis, ‘under the 
aspect of eternity’, which is to say a perception of things considered as and infinity of 
mental images, arranged on after another in a successive ordering, which presumes a 
stability of reality, and hence ‘covering successively some neutral stuff’.   
54 Henri Bergson trans by T.E. Hulme, ‘The Very Life of Things’ in An introduction to 
Metaphysics, ed. by John Mullarkey and Michael Kolkman, (Palgrave Macmillan 2007), 
pp. xx-xxi   
55 CM, p. 133   
56 ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’. p. 157   
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images ‘indicated’, may also be associated to a different series of images, and 
thus regarding idea as the meaning of images is inconsistent. Bergson 
suggests that this scheme is ‘something not easy to define’, and though we 
may not be able to easily articulate a definition of it, ‘each of us has the 
feeling’. 57 
 
Bergson offers the examples of ‘technical’ or ‘professional’ memories such 
as those employed in the game of chess to describe this notion the schematic 
idea (relation of image to idea). With the exercise of these memories coupled 
with a quantitative and geometric envisioning of the pieces of the game results 
as more of a hindrance than if the player were to allow a more automatic 
response. Bergson explains that such a response would be the result from a 
conditioning, like the memorization of poetry or the learning of a language. 
The player’s execution of learned moves becomes automatic, and issues more 
from the plane of sensation.    Rather than from the 
reflexion of consciousness and by an ‘external aspect’ the movements would 
be based on a ‘value’ or an ‘oblique force’.58 With this type of mental view 
the entire game is then a ‘composition of forces’. Bergson suggests that this 
is an ‘ideal scheme of the whole’, and this schematic idea is neither a summary 
or a meaning, or an extraction of a series of images. Rather the idea is a 
concise image, or a composition of images that are elements that may ‘evolve 
into parts external to one another’.59 
 
 
Thinking In Reverse 
 
Nonetheless, Bergson’s point is that intuitive knowledge is prior to this 
movement towards conceptualization, a movement to structuring and hence, 
exteriorization. Intuition  as  a  metaphysical  method  requires  a  type  of  
                                                     
57 Ibid. p. 158   
58 Ibid. p. 159   
59 Henri Bergson, ‘Philosophical Intuition’, in Henri Bergson: Key Writings, edited by 
Keith Ansell Pearson and John Mullarkey, Continuum Publishing, London, 2002, p. 
234 
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backwards  thinking,  an unthinking from our habits of thought. This means 
that intuitive experience in the development of philosophical systems, 
proceeds discrete ideas. The whole of a philosophical system should stem 
initially from what Bergson refers to as ‘a single point’, to the ‘simple, 
infinitely simple’ source of a thought.  And it is from this point that a 
philosopher is so moved that his efforts and formulations of thinking are 
generated by this encounter, and the inspiration compels him and directs his 
thinking through his living experiences effecting his entire philosophical 
outlook.60 
In the painting process, here the intuited image is a vital element of the 
interchange from painter to painting medium. It is itself a creative experience 
that endures as complexity of concepts, and a possible multiplicity of symbols 
to unfold. Bergson insists that the intuited image, ‘cannot be enclosed by 
representation’, that it is more than a representation, and not reducible to any 
conceptual scheme. As far as the image as an ‘indirect suggestion’ of the 
intuition, this would seem to suggest both characteristics of agency and 
mediation. It does not simply reflect or imitate what was presented in an 
intuition, but as it retains something of the intuition, it relays and even 
conducts according to what seems to be its own selection. 
 
The intuited image is a simple vision and an origin from what may become a 
complexity of concepts, and ever growing pursuit of expressions, and in the 
case of the painter, a sensitivity with the activities and gestures to resolve the 
force of the creative impulse. Bergson maintains that philosophy should strive 
for simplification, that it should avoid complication, by returning what was 
given by a simple intuition. 
If not the original and ‘simple vision’, he claims that philosophy should 
consider the most approximate image which translates it.61
 
Deleuze explains 
that Bergson often presents intuition as a simple act. However, Deleuze 
                                                     
60 CM p. 108-109   
61 Ibid. p. 110 
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indicates that Bergson’s view of the simplicity of intuition, ‘does not exclude 
a qualitative and virtual multiplicity’, but rather, as it is original and creative, 
it is a source of a variability of expressions.62
 
From the notions of depth and 
surface, Bergson’s theory of intuition suggests that reality is an evolution of 
images, a collective mass, as an image itself, in which the images have an 
affective relation upon one another, and ‘interpenetrate, as in a living being’.63 
The body is a coordination of sensation and movement according to the co-
relational affectivity of pure memory to matter. Therefore the body is a point 
of actualization of images, as it is situated between matter and memory, 
through which one meets the other.64
 
Bergson claims that the actualization of 
memory characterizes the mental effort by eliciting a difference in the 
functions of recalling memory.65
  
Interestingly, 
he terms this difference as that ‘between the spontaneous and the voluntary 
idea’.66 So, at this point Bergson’s concept of memory is analogous with idea. 
Since the notion of image is equivalent with distinct memories, then it follows 
from this development that on one hand memory is idea when actualized in 
the body, but on the other hand memory is indistinct image or an indistinct 
idea in the plane of pure memory. The plane of pure memory is the progenitor 
of images. Therefore, pure memory  is  the  source  of  affectivity  upon  
matter,  manifesting  sensation  and movement, whilst becoming ‘translated 
into distinct images’.67    
 
For Bergson intuitive thought is a type of penetrative thought that touches at 
the surface of the turbid mass of images, even though, what lies beneath 
remains inaccessible.68
 The ‘image’ is a point of confluence for the intuitive 
experience, as a type of connection from the immediacy of the sympathetic 
                                                     
62 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, (New York: Zone 
Books, 1991), p. 14 
63 CM ‘Philosophical Intuition’ p. 118 
64 Henri Berson, ‘Intellectual effort’ in Mind-Energy: Lectures and Essays, trans. H. Wildon 
Carr, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929), p. 151   
65 Ibid. p. 151 
66 Ibid. p. 151 
67 Ibid. p. 151 
68 Ibid. pp. 159-160 
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quality of consciousness with the formulation, and conceptualization of 
reflective consciousness. For the painter, the evolving and shifting image 
from the intuitive experience is the possibility for the multiplicity of activities 
towards its expression. In the process of painting the painter is the inner 
content of a philosophical schema, and thereby, the painter’s activities are 
inspired by the intuition and then proceed towards expression driven by the 
intuitive experience.  Bergson highlights this, suggesting the intuition is like, 
‘a point where the multiplicity of the images seems to be condensed into a 
single, simple and undivided idea’.69 
 
 
The Vertical and Horizontal: Movements of Intuition 
 
Bergson suggests that from the intuitive experience we have just two means 
of expression, that of the concept and the image. He explains that through 
concepts a system develops in which what was given by the intuitive 
experience is contracted. In this sense, by attempting to express the fullness 
of the experience of our elaboration, ‘necessarily falls back on concepts’. In 
other words, from the expression of concepts to concepts, what was given in 
the intuitive experience becomes more vague, and the expressions less 
approximate to the original vision given in intuition.’70 Bergson indicates that 
a philosopher’s original intuition is diminished and perhaps even lost in the 
efforts of consciousness. The modes of our expressions, therefore, have to be 
as immediate to the original experience a possible. There are expressions 
through the efforts of the formulations of abstract ideas, as expressions in 
concepts, and as there are expressions of percepts, that is, expressions ‘into 
an image’. 
 
In Bergsonian terms, let us then consider that this form of movement is that 
of process of expansion and contraction. From the impetus of the intuition, 
the philosopher attempts to express its fullness, postulates abstract ideas, 
                                                     
69 Ibid. p. 156 
70 CM. ‘Philosophical Intuition’. p. 119   
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notions, or concepts, which in a sense, may be regarded as types of captions. 
Bergson has indicated, such a systemization of ideas, all of its detail and even 
its extraneous components, are then condensed, compacted, as it ‘contracts’ 
into an image. Though the image may be characterized as a contracted system 
of concepts, i.e. ‘captions’, it 
may be just as well to consider these as ‘concept-images’ or ‘image-captions’, 
and by doing so we may clearly understand this particular model.71 
 
 
An impression or vague idea compelled the eventual articulation of a specific 
memory, but only through processes by which a ‘reciprocal implication’ was 
evident among the play of image. By this, the schematic idea is the distillation 
of image as an idea, whereby, the activity of recollection may invoke any one 
of the compositional elements or distinct images of such a series, which in 
turn may itself be a ‘simple idea’ in which an additional plethora or series of 
subordinate images may be condensed. Hence, recollection as characterized 
by the schematic idea is a reciprocal movement with no designation of the one 
in the many (image), to the many evoking the one (series of images or idea).  
According to Bergson, the ‘effort of memory appears to have, as its essence, 
the evolving pattern of the scheme’. 
72 
In contrast, with reduced effort of 
memory, relaxation, or operating according to basic sensory perceptions, the 
mind is situated among the lower planes of consciousness, and hence, 
associating images with images or moving horizontally. 73 
Through the horizontal movement the mind passes through successive image 
                                                     
71 Henri Bergson, trans. T. E. Hulme, An Introduction to Metaphysics, [1913], ed. 
byMullarkey, John, and Michael Kolkman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
Following Mullarkey’s commentary, I chose to use this term ‘caption’ in order identify with 
this ‘concept-percept’ nature of the image. In the sense of ‘seizing’ or capturing’ from the 
Latin capere, I think ‘caption’ is a relevant choice of term, since thus far, Bergson’s 
exposition on the nature of intuition has revealed that from the original intuitive perception, 
concepts are advanced and appended upon other concepts, in the struggle to return, and by 
that, to lay hold to a sensed-vision that is fleeting. Though to some this may not be accurate, 
but my intention is to adopt a term for the sake of clarity. 
72 Henri Berson, ‘Intellectual effort’ in Mind-Energy: Lectures and Essays, trans. H. Wildon 
Carr, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929), p. 162   
73 Ibid. p. 162   
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upon image. Though ‘the objects represented by the images are different’, and 
since this occurs within a ‘single plane’ they are ‘homogenous among 
themselves’.74 Through a vertical movement, the mind passes through 
‘heterogeneous intellectual states’ which represent just one object. This 
representation is in part the product of the condensed, distilled, ‘imaged 
idea’.75 Bergson suggests that ‘sometimes the schemes and sometimes the 
images, the scheme striving towards the image’. 76Accordingly, though 
intellectual effort is a vertical movement, eventually the operation of the mind 
is a ‘striving’ towards images, or a moving of the mind as an ‘extension’ 
among the successive, and penetrating images.77 
 
 
Intuition to Painting Medium 
 
This leads to a second point, one that is congruent with Bergson’s overall 
model of movement. In the above passage, he mentions a rising and 
descending of ideas from images and from this there seems to be an implicit 
notion of depth and surface. Of the latter, these will gain greater emphasis 
throughout the remainder his discussion. 
 
The more living was the reality touched, the more profound had been the sounding. But the 
sounding made on the sea floor brings up a fluid mass, which the sun very quickly dries into 
solid and discontinuous grains of sand. And the intuition of duration, when exposed to the 
rays of understanding, also quickly congeals into fixed, distinct, and immobile concepts.78 
 
By identifying intuition as ‘immediate’ and as the showing of motion within 
duration, implies that in the process of painting the intuitive experience is an 
                                                     
74 Ibid. p. 162   
75 Ibid. pp. 162-163   
76 Ibid. p. 162, Here Bergson uses the terms ‘extension’ in regards to what he entails as the 
horizontal movement, in contrast to the notion of ‘intensity’ and ‘in depth’ in regards to the 
vertical movement. See also, MM. p.181. However, I am highlighting this description as it 
not only implies Bergson’s theory of matter in terms of pure perception, and mind in terms 
of pure memory, but in this context, these expound the concept of intuition to the extent that 
it becomes descriptive of the literalisation of to the picture plane of painting and the 
material, physical surface as the situated site for the activity of painting. 
77 Ibid. p. 162   
78 Henri Berson, ‘Intellectual effort’ in Mind-Energy: Lectures and Essays, trans. H. Wildon 
Carr, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929), p. 193, henceforth ME 
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activity and material form. From Bergson’s description of the intuitive 
process, this suggests that intuition is a connection of a plurality of ideas, but 
ideas, ‘enclosed’ in an image. For Bergson, ideas or concepts are particulars 
from the reflective nature of consciousness, but from this notion of idea being 
‘enclosed’, and brought ‘into an image’, this suggests that the showing, and 
vision of intuition is a composite of captions, a condensed and unified stratum 
of images. Hence, it is in this reciprocation, the process of incorporeal 
becoming corporeal that intellectual effort may be felt.  Having presented the 
invention as a particular example in which intellectual effort is felt, Bergson 
describes the effort to move beyond the intuition as the movement of the 
mind.79 
 
Bergson’s description of the concept-images as expressions from an 
originating source, suggests that the intuitive experience is an unfolding of 
consciousness. However, he explains that there is another experience in which 
consciousness ‘turns back within itself’. This supports our understanding of 
painting as a process that unfolds visual forms. But also allowing for the 
simultaneous affect of creation and its presentation, painting is the 
interchange of the material images affecting the painter’s continued 
engagement with their rendering. Adding further emphasis to this, Bergson 
explains that this consciousness ‘takes possession of itself and develops in 
depth’. Consciousness is now something other than the subject, suggesting a 
strata of durations, ‘space in itself’ or ‘duration outside space’. Bergson 
asserts that this internal and infolding consciousness, is a ‘probing of its own 
depth’, and from this it penetrates ‘into the interior of matter’. According to 
Bergson’s cosmology, in which there are levels of reality, higher and lower 
degrees of mind and matter, such probing or penetrating involved in the 
stratified imagery requires effort and a specific concentrated attention. 
 
From the influence of the work of Ribot, Bergson claims that there are ‘two 
                                                     
79 CM p. 172 
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forms of creative imagination’.80 Accordingly, intuitive imagination 
‘proceeds from the unity to the details’, and reflective imagination is the 
return from the parts or details back to the whole of the abstract idea.81
 
By 
this consideration, the imagination is the operation of the scheme, which is 
‘elastic or mobile’ in that the affectivity of the idea upon the images is 
reciprocated by the images the idea has evoked.82 
That is, philosophy begins as a personal movement inward, ‘in the spirit of 
simplicity’, and consequently what results from this process of sounding is a 
type of contact, whereby a transition from the ‘impulsion’ of what is 
otherwise a depersonalized centre of force, results in a disbursement of 
thought and an array of images. According to this, the intuitive experience in 
the painting process is the impetus of images, images expressed through 
events of composition and formulation towards the material image. Thus, the 
painting as a material object, is an individuation of an immensity of images, 
images that are themselves indefinite flows from among the absolute 
movement of duration. However, through the intuitive experience, the 
material becoming of the painting is the bursting forth of actual forms from 
the depths of duration.  Bergson’s explanation of intuition as a type of 
sounding of the depth of the inner essence of reality means that for the painter, 
contact with the material of painting combined with the effort of imagination 
requires a balance of an inner impulsion and concentrated expression. 
 
From the intuitive experience, the painter explored a sense of his own 
interiority, beyond the concept of self through his own ideas, so that his 
thoughts contracted into a simple image. And the more approximate the 
painter is to his own inner experience, the more approximate to the experience 
of the life of things and the simpler the vision to coincide with the indefinite 
field of the total flow of images in duration. Contrary to the way some may 
regard intuition versus intellection in respect to a viable metaphysics, Bergson 
                                                     
80 ME. ‘Intellectual Effort’. p. 172   
81 Ibid. p. 172 
82 Ibid. p. 172 
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states, 
 
This composition takes effort. The ‘attention’ needed to discern and then compound (but not 
synthesize) such differences is exhausting. Whereas concepts ‘demands no effort’, no 
patience on our part, metaphysical attention is literally a ‘degree of tension’, an effort of 
grasping together, not under a higher conceptual category (by association), but as the 
affective re-creation of the movement of dissociation, the feeling-movement that dissociates 
itself into these very images.83 
 
The greater the depth, the greater the tension, and yet, the simpler the image, 
the more concentrated the point, the deeper the penetration into the centre of 
force and consequently the more forceful the reciprocal movement, i.e. the 
force to move back to the surface affecting the expression and development 
of thought. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have maintained that intuition in the process of painting, concerns the 
qualities of the painter’s contact and experience through the immediacy with 
the becoming of the painterly process. We considered that from the depth of 
this contact, from beyond the level of conscious perception and within the 
strata of durations of things, this characterization of the sounding of intuition 
suggests that the intuitive experience  is  as  itself  the  origination  of  the  
radical  forces  towards  physical projections of images, and the expressions 
of pictorial movements. According to the terms of this analysis, we have 
argued that the interchange of activity between the painter and the painting 
medium is the condition for the occurrence of an intuitive experience. We 
indicated that Kandinsky adopted a method of intuition in his practice of 
painting, and because of this, his paintings not only contributed to the 
historical paradigm of art, but opened the experience of painting and 
compelled the advocacy of our visual understanding in terms of the evolution 
                                                     
83 74 Henri Bergson, trans. by T.E. Hulmes, ‘The Very Life of Things’ in An Introduction 
to Metaphysics, [1913], ed. by Mullarkey, John, and Michael Kolkman, (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. xx 
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of expression and abstractions of life. From this, we considered Bergson’s 
theory of intuition with a view towards its application to the practice of 
painting, to indicate that that when informed by a willed empathy, the 
painter’s awareness is a diastolic experience from among the flow of 
durations, which in turn, becomes a systolic concentration of images, 
directing activity and expression towards pictorial depiction. By having an 
intuition, this means that the painter has a simple ‘vision’, but from this 
‘vision’ a novel paradigm of visual experience may occur. However, this 
vision becomes a type of inculturation by the direct coinciding of the painter’s 
inner duration with the durations of the material and extended continuity of 
the images of the process. Therefore, we argued that the intuition is a 
perception that occurs as a mode of the disinterest of life or the break of 
consciousness from pragmatic views towards living.  To this extent, the 
painter’s intuition is an immediacy with the painting medium, and in 
Kandinskian terms, as a result the inner ‘tension’ of the painter is itself a 
rhythmical alternation, from the seizing of ‘sound’, or, the grasping of a 
simple ‘vision’ then corresponding to the painting’s expression. From 
Bergson’s notion of the schema of intuition, we have argued that we must 
recognize a dual movement of intuition, as that of an initial empathy of the 
painter through the haptic encounter of the tonality of the painting medium 
reflecting the inner sounding of the self towards the enlargement of this 
experience by the elaboration of psychic activity in material expressions. As 
such the intuition is both contact and action, a dual movement mediated by 
reflective thinking and sensorial awareness through the interaction of the 
painter’s body and the painting medium, so that a sympathetic communication 
establishes an interchange from experience to expression. Cultivated in the 
process of painting, the intuitive experience is then an immersion into the 
interiority of its objects, and from the atmosphere of the interchange of the 
physical activity of the painter and material change, it is a resurfacing and 
force or exteriority towards the extension of activities and the creation of 
novel expressions in the formulations of the painting. In this sense, intuition 
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becomes the creative force towards material expression and visual expression. 
Accordingly, we have argued from Bergson’s theory of intuition, towards a 
contemporary application of Bergsonian philosophy, conveyed by a 
Kandinskian outlook in terms of the ‘inner necessity’, that intuitive thinking 
in painting is the active engagement with the course of expressions and the  
trajectory of thinking.  Therefore, the intuitive experience is the potential to 
intervene, to rearrange, to upset the order of experience in the process of 
painting, and allow for the standard of change to become encountered in the 
process. 
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Chapter 3 - Order of Movement 
 
Why resort to a metaphysical hypothesis, however ingenious, about the nature of space, time, 
and motion, when immediate intuition shows us motion within duration, and duration outside 
space?1 
 
There the blue wave rocks. The torn red cloth. Red rags. Blue waves.  The old book closed 
up. Gaze in silence at the distance. Wander blindly in the wood. The blue waves deeper grow.  
The red cloth soon sinks below.2 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The concept of movement is a principle theme of Bergsonian Philosophy. As 
such, this chapter takes as its point of development, a Bergsonian based 
conceptualization of movement to be applied to the theoretical development 
of the process of painting.  In the first chapter we were primarily concerned 
with Bergson’s ontology of images, as we are concerned with the 
understanding of a philosophy of painting, particularly in terms of the 
potentiality of images in duration.  From this following chapter, we 
considered the methodological attitude of intuition in the process of a 
painting.  In this regard, we are concerned with the creative engagement of 
perception within the reality of images, in terms of an attention of life and an 
immediacy of experience to perception. From this conceptuatlisation of 
intuition,  applied to the process of painting, we highlighted the movement of 
thinking, the movements of experience, and the movements towards creative 
expression as all contributing to the ‘decentering’ of thinking and the 
‘rupturing’ of  visual experience through the novelty of painterly expressions. 
This chapter is also a response to the post-structuralist adaptation of the 
                                                     
1 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, 
[1889], trans. F. L. Pogson, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1910), p. 114, henceforth 
TFW 
2 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘Hymn’, Sounds [Klänge], (Munich, 1912).in Kandinsky: Complete 
Writings on Art, ed.by Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo, (New York: Da Capo Press), 
pp. 323-331. 
    
127  
 
 
Movement 
Bergsonian view of creative movement with the notion of ‘decentering’.3  
Accordingly, the Bergsonian conviction of philosophy as process, and the 
difference of philosophy by the diffusion of thinking in the differing modes 
of philosophizing, leads us to consider the process of painting, as a philosophy 
of difference because of the movements immanent to its process and the 
change of its own identity.  In this sense we are interested in the creativity of 
movement in the process of painting, as a process of images.  However, our 
investigations in pervious chapters did not attend to the specifics of the 
indefinite nature of movement, that is, the duration of movements in the 
process of painting. Because there are innumerable ‘levels’ and differences of 
images in duration, so that it is the role of intuitive thinking, as an activity that 
is itself a mode of experience encountering multiple sensations, multiple 
durations, we are interested in the onotoligising of movement as it is the effect 
of becoming in the field of images. Here again, we see correlations with 
Henry’s philosophy of the ‘movement of the interior life’, in terms of the 
living movements  within the subjectivity of life, that is, the innumerable 
movements according to the affect of life moving within the individuated 
living experiences of life.  However, more specifically, Henry’s study of 
Kandinsky relates this theory of the interiors movements of life with the 
artist’s view of the proto-element in painting, the point.  For Kandinsky, the 
point is the prototype of pictorial expression, it is a ‘single sound’, and by its 
material application, ‘completely embodies the pictorial aim’.  4    
In this chapter, we will consider the conceptual concomitant of Bergson’s 
theory of reality as a duration of images, and the understanding of movement 
with the process of painting. In terms of the movement of painting, there will 
be a necessary engagement with the series of creative activities, and looking 
to Kandinsky’s example of the potency of movement from the movement of 
an individual application in the painting process, we will argue for creativity 
                                                     
3 Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglas, The crisis in modernism: Bergson and the vitalist 
controversy, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 11, 371    
4 Wassily Kandinsky, Point and Line to Plane, Dover Publications, London, 1979, p. 
37 
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possibility immediate to the real actions of the body. This to consider the 
immanent movements in the process of painting as full of ‘tones’ of 
movement, such that (in Kandinskian terms) the tonality of the process of 
painting is incipient to the modes of its experience . However, with this 
movement there are also the effects of its becoming, compelled by the 
affective qualities of perceptions from the material heterogeneity. Therefore, 
we are considering the double movement of the process of painting, first in 
terms of the painter’s body, as itself a series of temporalities, but then 
secondly, from the corresponding and coinciding with the exteriorized 
perception of the painting medium in its change of spatialized images and 
physical effect. In this regard, we are considering the movement of the body, 
the movement of the material image, and the reality of movements is in the 
totality of the processes in duration. In other words, by maintaining that the 
nature of reality is considered in terms of a plurality of images in ceaseless 
movement, the processual moments of change, so that our understanding of 
the occurrence of painted imagery as also the living creation of indefinite 
creation, will in turn follow from the conception of reality as an aggregate of 
images in process, i.e. as multiple multiplicities of movement.5 
 
 
Duration and the Movements of Painting 
 
It is from this relation that we will maintain that process of painting is a 
plurality of images. And as these images are themselves a multiplicity of 
movements, a theoretical application specific to the process of the movement 
of images in painting will unfold.6
 
By situating the concept of movement to a 
central position, this will emphasize the understanding for an ontology of 
actions and movements. This extends our previous argument from Bergson’s 
concept of image further, to mean suggest that fundamental to the process of 
                                                     
5 Marie-Luise Angerer, ‘Feeling the Image: Some Critical Notes on Affect’, Imagery in the 
21st Century, ed. by Oliver Grau, and Thomas Viegl (The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 2011), pp. 224-226.   
6 MM. p. 9 
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painting is an ontology of images, but with the added characterization of 
continuous change. In other words, fundamental to a Bergsonian philosophy 
of painting is a theory of an ontology of images, but, considered immanent to 
their process, the formation and creation of images implies an ontology of 
movement itself. From Mullarkey’s commentary we find added support to 
further our considerations of Bergson’s philosophy of duration, so that as a 
contextual background for a theory of painting, we understand ‘processes are 
the fundamental constituents of reality’. However, Mullarkey also claims that 
for Bergson ‘movement is different from space’. We ask the reader to take 
both these claims as mainstays by which this chapter will proceed. 
Specifically, we are interested considering movement, but maintaining the 
irreducibility of the multiplicity  of  movements  of  painting,  whereby  
painting  is  itself,  a  significant process.7 
 
However, for such a philosophical development, what is required is a 
typological account of movement that is not only relevant to painting, but also 
one that recognizes movement as the ‘intersection of mind and matter’.8 In 
this sense, we will progress with a view towards an analysis of the kinesis of 
the process of painting in which the movements of the painter and the painted 
medium are both, immediate and reflective, mental and physical. We will 
consider the difference of movements from that of the painter’s gestures and 
bodily articulations, in terms of the difference of the painter’s activities. These 
activities are themselves influenced by the painter’s conscious reflection. In 
this sense, the interchange of mental and sensorial experiences is mediated by 
the bodily movements towards a direct action with the painting medium, and 
manifesting instantaneous material change. In this way, to define the nature 
of the painting as an art-object, we must consider the intrinsic and extrinsic 
movements towards its expression as a unified process. In the process of 
painting, the multiple qualitative changes that occur from among its activities 
are the result of the temporal presence of the painter coinciding with the 
                                                     
7 John Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy, (Edinburgh Press, Edinburgh, 1999), p. 12. 
John Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy, (Edinburgh Press, Edinburgh, 1999), p. 12. 
8 MM. p. 13 
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undifferentiated continuity of the painting medium. Accordingly, the changes 
that occur then, condition its own variability in the indefinite unfolding of its 
movements towards distinct, discrete images and the existential experience of 
its becoming. 
 
We argue that movement, taken as a whole in terms of its metaphysical 
relation to the unity of time, is as a definitive principle of the nature of reality. 
Accordingly, duration is the collective flux of the universe, (i.e. a composite 
of innumerable heterogeneous elements and the coalescence of many 
different ‘rhythms’), in which what  may  be  regarded  as  ‘stable’  or  
‘objective’  of  reality  is  the  constancy of movement itself.9   Here we are 
reasserting Bergson’s main conceptualization of the ‘image’ in terms of the 
relation of matter and perception as the undifferentiated flow and aggregate 
of ‘images’. In this sense both perception and matter are different kinds of 
images, and collectively in the duration of all things, these elements of reality 
are in continuous states of multiple variations of change by combinations or 
‘intersections’ of these elements. We take as further support Bergson’s 
implied sense of movement as he describes thinking as that which unrolls 
itself in a chain of abstract reasoning. As we have considered already, thought 
is both an immediacy of conscious perception to the flow of reality and is 
accompanied by virtual images from the experiences, which already suggests 
movement of movements, i.e. a dynamic system of the movements of images. 
Bergson relates the passage of images as ‘divers tones of mental life’, or 
‘degrees of our attention to life’, to suggest that the changing states of mental 
and psychical movement occurs in terms of the progressions from intensive 
to extensive conditions of images, and hence, the continuity of change from 
the psychical to physical movements. Therefore, applied to the process of 
painting, our concern with the varieties of movement must aim to go beyond 
the general ideas and abstracted senses of the term.10
 
Of course, our penchant 
                                                     
9 MM. p. 207   
10 Henri Bergson. Mélanges ed. by André Robinet (Presses Universitaires de France. Paris. 
1972). p. 1058. 
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for the conceptual articulation of the real means that for both the thinker and 
the painter movement will be regarded through the lens of conceptualization 
and the re-presenting of the world. As with Kandinsky, the influence of the 
‘impulse to abstraction’ is difficult to assess without reducing it to 
formulations and stabilizations of our own schematic thinking. However, 
towards a consideration of movement in the process of painting, as with 
Kandinsky’s own sense of the ‘inner impulse’, we must reach for this by a 
sense of continual adjustment to the continuity of experience. Bergson 
anticipates the possibility of our faculties of thought to make the concept of 
movement redundant even in our most strident efforts to express the 
difference of movement from mobility, particularly with a theory of duration. 
He explains that we may objectify movement as a thing serving as support to 
movements and change, and consequently, not as something in itself to be 
regarded as changing. He concedes then that the movement of all things in 
terms of the unity of a plurality of movement may be simply ‘movement of 
movements’. 11 
 
In view of this perspective, by stressing ‘types’ of movement particular to 
painting, we mean a unity of a plurality of movements as a primary 
ontological reality for the process of painting.12
 
Here we are drawing the 
connection between Bergson’s sense of time as ‘Duration’ and the relation of 
multiplicity of movements in time. Bergson argues that we consider a non-
linear structure of time, and as applied to the arts, a 
non-linear mode of artistic practice and production. By this, I am adopting a 
Bergsonian sense of the modes of temporality, whereby the multiplicity of 
movement in the process of painting considers the material things of painting, 
the bodily activity, and the movement of thought of the painter, as involving 
a dynamism of images. In this sense, we are following Bergson’s 
development of a ‘method  of  multiplicity’,  so  as  to  consider  reality  as  
                                                     
11 CM. p. 72, see also ‘The Perception of Change’, p. 147. 
12 TFW. p. xxi. 
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processes  of  movements. 
 
However, rather than regard reality as a ‘One’ or ‘singularity’ of movement, 
in terms of difference of movement, we regard reality of painting as 
participating within a unity of a plurality of qualitative progresses.13
 
In this 
sense, we are claiming that the individuality of a painted image presupposes 
a process of a multiplicity of movements, albeit, an event of this multiplicity 
by which multiple movements become the conditions for the continuous 
unfolding of discrete painterly imagery.
 
The extended, material, and mattered image is not a thing, but rather, from 
among a flow of difference, it is the event and temporal register of a 
progression of movements. Therefore, from the process of painting, we mean 
in toto, the painter’s activities as experiences of multiple movements, and the 
force of movement through the painting medium, towards the event of the 
painted image. We take support from Bergson’s critique of Plotinus’ 
metaphysical formulation. In this sense, Bergson claims that ‘we must invert 
his point of view’. In this way, by paraphrasing Bergson, a theory of painting 
supported by such an inverted metaphysics, makes explicit that contemplation 
is less than action, movement is more than immobility that duration is 
heterogeneous and indivisible, and change and alteration of substances are 
within time. These ideas serve as the basis for this formulation of painting. In 
this respect, painting may then be regarded as a continuity of movement. But 
there is a twofold consideration from this. Firstly, the process of painting 
entails a complexity of movements continually converging towards the 
constitution of distinct images and discrete materializations. That is, the 
process of painting is a relation of these complexities by virtue of it being 
itself, a movement towards material creation. Kandinsky offers us an example 
for comparison. By referring to the internal necessity or inner compulsion of 
the painter, he suggests, 
 
At a particular time, necessities come to fruition. I.e., the creating spirit (which once can call 
                                                     
13 TFW. Pp. 10-14 
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the abstract spirit) finds access to the individuated soul, subsequently to [many] souls, and 
calls forth a longing, an inner compulsion. [...] then this longing, this inner compulsion is 
empowered to create a new value in the human mind, which consciously or unconsciously, 
begins to live in man.[...] Consciously or unconsciously, from the moment man seeks a 
material form for this new value that lives in spiritual form within him.14 
 
And though this comment places emphasis on the artist’s sensibilities, it is 
similar to Bergson’s conceptualization in that, from this notion ‘compulsion’ 
there is an implied reverberation of movements of the spiritual kind to the 
material kind, i.e. as movement towards movements.  Nonetheless, to our 
second point, we claim that although a painted image is itself a singularity 
from among a multiplicity of movements, (i.e. the effect of differential 
variations from multiple movements), painting is not determined by the 
immobilizations of its activity. Rather it is the continuity of continual creation 
of singularities, as well as the proliferation of changes through painting in 
terms of the difference from among the painted images. In the latter sense, 
painting is continuous change, and by the constant creation from the 
difference of its multiple movements, the continuity is itself the ‘permanence’ 
of painting, i.e. painting as process. In this way, painting as a process means 
the procession of movements in terms of the multiplicity of movement, and 
the collation of these movements and substantiality in terms of the unity of 
movements. Furthermore, painting is a ‘unity’ in the sense that painting is a 
continual activity of difference, i.e. painting differs from itself continually as 
it is the activity of multiple movements towards expressions. The painted 
images as extended materializations are the synthesis of differing movements 
in time. These art-objects are the concretized changes and transformations of 
movements made distinct by conditions from the multiplicity of these 
movements.  And moreover, the process of painting is a ‘multiplicity’ in the 
sense that, the continual activity of painting is a permeation of the continuity 
of its movements in time. In this sense, the distinct materializations in painting 
                                                     
14 ,Wassily Kandinsky ‘The Blaue Reiter Alamanac’ [Der Blaue Reiter] (Munich, 1912),in 
Kandinsky: 
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are subjects within the process of painting, (i.e. compositions of movements), 
and thereby, subjects of visual change and novel imagery expanding the 
creative process. 
 
A conceptualization of movement applied to the process of painting implies 
that change is an ontological quality of reality.15
 
In particular, based on 
Bergson’s notion of a ‘stratified series of temporalities’ we may consider the 
process of painting as a process of unfolding in time. Mullarkey explains that 
‘movement’ for Bergson ‘encompasses many other notions of change’ to 
which we find suited for the dynamics of the change involved in the process 
of painting.
 16 
According to the Bergsonian notion of the ‘becoming’ of movements, which 
considers change as fundamental to reality, in this context, the movements of 
the activity of painting, and movements attributed to the substance of painting 
are the cohering of a spirituality and materiality. So, we argue in terms of the 
difference of movements in the process of painting as a primary view of the 
duration of reality, as a becoming. In other words, from this context, we 
consider the process of painting as a complex of movements and a continuity 
of the change from their process, the process of formation and creation from 
the interaction of differing experiences by the composition movements in 
time. 
 
Perhaps the most immediate consequence of this doubling of the concept of 
movement is with the question of whether painting is to be regarded either as 
a process of multiple movements occurring in time, or painting as the 
collective establishment of a constellation of images occupying space. An 
alternative view, would have been held by Kandinsky’s contemporaries, 
particularly to the influence of Malevich, and Mondrian on the legacy of 
                                                     
15 John Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy, (Edinburgh Press, Edinburgh, 1999). p. 13. 
16 Ibid. p. 140 
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abstraction in painting.17  Accordingly, Kandinsky’s emphasis on tonality and 
the movement of expression imbued by psychical growth as the force of 
painting’s evolving elements, this was contrasted by Mondrian’s abstraction 
in painting as a spiritual purity, a transcendence from the material and 
expressive forms. Other alternatives would be the tradition of Cubism, 
assuming that the abstract form is itself a codification of conceptualisations 
of visuality. This this tradition was an initial force of modernist painting, its 
emphasis on the communications of movement through painting did not lend 
itself in the same as Kandinskian painting does on the ever-increasing and 
continuous growth of visual experience.  Art history often traces the lines of 
development of the conceptualisation of abstraction from these differing 
traditions of painting, but particular to our concern, the Kandinskian 
understanding of painting indicated a resonance with Bergsonian thinking of 
art, as evident in the painting, as expressing the evolution of the expression 
through creative movements of living, immanent to the world.  From this 
example, we see that concept of movement applied to painting requires the 
sum of the differing movements. To speak of painting as a meaningful 
activity, not as an indiscernible movement from among the total movement 
of reality, but rather, as a significant activity with its own implicit movements, 
this is to regard painting as the continuous occurrence of expression from the 
‘interior organization’ of its movements.18 And by this notion of organization 
we mean that from among the process the movements of the painter’s body, 
the movement particular to the painter’s application, and even, the movement 
of these as interactions with the movement of the painting medium, these  
movements  yielding  the  change  of  expressions  and  difference  among 
figurations, are an order of growth. Kandinsky held a similar view with his 
work, in which he considers music as itself something to model the aspirations 
of painting upon. In this way, he considered the painter as able to discover 
                                                     
17 See Paul Wood, ‘Cubism and Abstract Art Revisited’, in Art & Visual Culture, 
1850-2010: Modernity to Globalisation, edited by Steve Edwards and Paul Wood, 
pp. 91-113 
18 John Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy, (Edinburgh Press, Edinburgh, 1999). p. 195 
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similar means for his own art. In other words, like music, the painter searches 
through his own melodic being for the movements and tonality of painting, 
so that, in terms of the repetition of colour tones, and the motions of forms, 
these are collectively the expressive sounds of the painting’s composition.19 
Similarly, according to Bergson, we find aesthetic pleasure in the grace of 
movements, because like music and rhythm we consider movements to 
effortlessly flow one from the other. This flowing engages us to the extent 
that we respond to it with a felt sympathy by its eliciting our sense of 
anticipation and participation. For the painter, this also occurs with the 
painting medium, as the movement of the painter is not only in response to 
the movement of the medium, but also the continuous change of the painter’s 
experience, as a flow and variance of feelings. In this sense, the movement of 
the painter is also a qualitative progress from among the experiences of the 
painter’s sensation in the activity of painting and from the dynamic unfolding 
of differing visual forms. In other words, like the grace of music, the painter 
feels the rhythms of his own movement as entering into the rhythms of the 
painting medium. It is the qualities of the painting medium which elicits 
responses of movements from the painter whilst the painter participates by 
actualizing further movements towards the objective horizon of expression. 
 
In this sense, it is not a question of the objects in relation to the painter, or the 
painter’s movement towards the painting medium, but rather a question of the 
progress of the process.20
 
To consider the process of painting as more than a 
deliberate articulation of the painter, and the representational character of the 
painter’s intellect, we must consider intrinsic quality movement to all things, 
even to processes of movement. Like the continuity of music, Bergson held 
principle of growth to mean that there is a continuance of change of form, 
suggesting a process by different kinds in which there is a continual recording 
of duration. As we have asserted, the process of painting is also a continuity 
                                                     
19 Wassily Kandinsky, Wassily Kandinsky: A Colourful Life. Vivian Endicott Barnett. The 
Collection of the Lenbachhaus.. ed. by Helmut Friedel and Harry N. Abrams (Inc. New 
York. 1996), p. 17. 
20 TFW, pp. 110-111 
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of the organization of movements, from which further movements are 
effected, to mean a qualitative difference of movements from among 
movements. 
 
We have considered in Bergsonian terms, and from the insistence of 
Kandinsky’s view of painting that the process of painting is a rhythmical 
process of movement flowing in time, to suggest that the visual experience of 
painting is ongoing and immediate to the change of its expression. In its 
entirety, the process of painting is a sort of singular creation of forms of time. 
In other words, from the temporalization of the movements of process of 
painting, the qualitative passage of the process, as a kinesis in time, is creative 
towards the continuous aesthetic projections.  This is to situate the concept of 
movement, from within a broader context of a philosophy of duration 
(‘durée’) to imply that movements are of a relation of movements. Again, 
relating this to the process of painting, we must consider not only the activities 
of the painter in terms of gestural movement, but also the movement and 
change of the materiality of the process. Bergson claims that differing 
traditions of philosophy have considered the notions of movement and 
substance as incompatible. However, he argues that these notions are 
mutually inclusive. For Bergson, the difficulties raised by the ancients around 
the question of movement is comparable to the question of substance in the 
modern period, in that, both considered either movement and change as 
substantial, or  that  substance  is  movement  and  change.21
   Bergson’s 
analysis suggests the difference of movements is the results of the duration of 
a multiplicity of movements. However, specific to the process of painting, 
from this sense of reality as a ‘range of differentiation’, we can claim that the 
differing movements of expression are as a composite of differing processes 
of images in duration.22
 
So then, from  the  materiality  of  painting  to  the  
physical  activities  of  the  painter,  this reciprocal and necessary condition 
                                                     
21 CM. p. 156 
22 John Mullarkey. Bergson and Philosophy. (Edinburgh Press, Edinburgh 1999). pp. 182-
183 
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of movements entails differing movements that collectively endure through 
time. 
 
This is to say that the ontological conditions of the process of painting, 
whether it be in terms of painting as a process, or, painting as a material thing 
in duration, suggests differing kinds of movements.23
 
And since the material 
images are themselves compositions from the relation of the painter and the 
painting medium activities, we say that there is a multiplicity of movements 
which condition the process of painting. If we were to casually treat the 
images as themselves the repository of the painting process, this would be a 
return to the ‘problematic of representation’.24 More specifically, this would 
make the painted image a secondary effect, and temporally misaligned with 
the continual state of the presence of painting.
 
Instead we argue that as a 
metaphysical pursuit, the process of painting involves the intuitive 
experience, so that the image is part of a movement of images mutually 
reflecting upon the experience of its expressions, and relative to the 
immediate to its own becoming, progressing towards the novelty of its 
expressions.25 
                                                     
23 Ibid. p. 6. Here, by explaining the notion of change in Bergsonian Philosophy, Mullarkey 
comments on the process philosophy of Nicholas Rescher, indicating that a process 
philosophy by virtue of its principles, would not accept classifications of its ontological 
categories. Mullarkey’s response to this comparison is to suggest that for Bergson, ‘the 
notion of movement that lies at the heart of his metaphysic’, this is the nearest to a 
ontological basis that we may derive.   
24 Andrew Benjamin, Object Painting. (Academy Editions. London. 1994), p. 8. I am 
following Benjamin’s account of the ontological conditions of ‘questioning’ in painting and 
the art object. He suggests that it is the nature of painting as ‘insistently and effectively’ 
coming into being which makes the question of painting, and, the question of identification 
of the painted image insufficient. This is because of the continuity of becoming, implicit in 
art (i.e. the continuous as process with painting). However, it is what Benjamin terms as the 
‘becoming-object’, so as to move his development away from an ontology of substance, 
that I regard as comparable to the investigation of this chapter, and supportive as a 
contemporary theory. In particular, he suggests a ‘strategy of movement’ to explain that the 
categories of painting, (e.g. multiplicity of movements), these necessarily demand concepts 
that ‘affirm’ the present condition of painting as well as concepts that ‘differentiate’ with 
the continual becoming of painting, i.e. conceptual movement, perceptual movement to 
move with the multiple movements and multiple appearances of painting.   
25 Henri Bergson Creative Evolution, [1911], trans. Arthur Mitchell, Centennial Series ed. 
by Ansell Pearson, Keith, Michael Kolkman & Michael Vaughan, (Palgrave Macmillan, 
London, 2007), p. 14. Henceforth CE 
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Continuity and Succession 
 
However, as Mullarkey has indicated, we argue that the substantiality of the 
painted images is themselves the result of the continual dispersal of 
movements in time. A painted image may be regarded as the material result, 
and by this identified as a physical register of the kinetic becoming of 
painting. But we argue instead that the painted images are not necessarily 
anterior to the multiplicity of movements. Popper suggests that there has been 
an expression of the nature of movement through different traditions in 
development of art. He explains, for example, that the Impressionists aimed 
to express the movements particular to the innermost recesses of the human 
personality, and thereby, depict those movements that affected an 
unconscious.26
 
However, unlike this notion of stylization and hence a 
conceptualization of movement, we argue that the process of painting is a 
continuity of expression. Rather, instead of a view towards a pictorial content 
of painting, (i.e. what the painting is meant to represent), we argue that by the 
nature of movement inherent in the process, painting is itself a process that 
reveals the becoming of visual experience in time. Concerning the role of 
painting as a mode of philosophical thinking, painting is the potential for the 
continuous elaboration of visual knowledge, knowledge that is ever-
increasing by its practice.  Painting is a philosophical understanding as the 
expressions of its movements, go beyond the initial experiences of the 
process, and is thereby, a creative process by virtue of its expressive 
instability. The process of painting, is a dynamic reciprocity as it both depicts 
visual experience and the change of experience immanent to its expression.27
 
 
 
As Bergson considered the continuity of movements in terms of life being 
expressed outwardly by the intellect, and felt inwardly by our senses, and the 
                                                     
26 Frank Popper. Origins and development of Kinetic Art.. trans. by Stephen Bann. (Studio 
Vista. London. 1968). p. 17   
27 R. G. Collingwood, The principles of art (Oxford University Press, 1938). p. 134 
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body as a source of action in the flow of reality, this implies a dynamic of 
movements that exceeds the activity of conscious perception. As Bergson 
suggests, for the individual to act upon an object, the objects is perceived as 
‘divisible and discontinuous’. However, we understand that Bergson’s 
argument that the continuity of life cannot be thought by the intellect, and that 
the intellect carves life out from the reality of perception, according to the 
division of continuous and natural movement. Hence, the multiplicity of 
movements and the interpenetration of life from among the   movements of 
reality, means that   the conditions of consciousness can never fully express 
the movement of reality through the movements of activity deliberated by 
intellect alone.28 
 
And as with the continuity of reality, as the flowing, the passage of all things, 
so too with painting, there is continual change and novelty.29
 
In other words, 
by virtue of the elements of movement inherent in its process, painting is the 
activity of dynamic properties and the creation of physical images. In the 
widest sense, painting considered as creative activity would mean that the 
process of painting is an ensemble of movements. The movements are 
themselves of a multiplicity of movements, such that the movements are 
successions of different intensities of movement from within the whole of the 
process.30
 
In this sense, we consider the process of painting in view of the 
                                                     
28 CE. p. 105. 
29 Joseph Solomon. Bergson. (Constable & Company, Ltd. London. 1912). p. 9. Solomon 
opens his chapter on the topic of change in Bergsonian thought, describing the world as 
‘constant change’. In his description of Bergson’s concept, of how both living things and 
the inanimate elements of reality undergo continuous change, he connects the notion of 
change with movement, stating that all things of the world are, ‘constantly undergoing 
alteration or at least movement’. I wish to draw the reader’s attention to this association of 
change and alteration to movement and action, to not only indicate the synonymity of terms 
from among Bergsonian studies, but to also add support to a conceptualisation of movement 
in terms of ‘flux’ as a universal and ‘process’ as a constant of reality.   
30 Suzanne Guerlac. Thinking In Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson. (Cornell 
University Press. Ithaca. 2006). pp. 47-50. Following Guerlac’s analysis of Bergson’s TFW, 
(pp. 11-13), I find that her translation of the ‘qualitative intervention’ of different elements 
of movement, in the context of Bergson’s description of the movement of a dancer, as also 
supportive of the movement of painting. In painting, for instance, the intervening ‘things’ of 
painting, (i.e. applied to both the movement of its activity as well as the material effect of 
its physical basis), contributes further to the complexity of the becoming movements. In this 
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collective nature of the multiplicity of movements, the mutual 
interpenetrating elements of its progression, and through time, ‘obeying the 
laws of rhythm’.31 
 
 
Kandinsky’s Musical Rhythm and Bergson’s Rhythm of Change 
 
Kandinsky’s theory maintains a view of painting in terms of rhythmic 
development. Similarly, Bergson’s theory of movement argues that reality is 
a rhythm of durations.
  
 In Antliff’s study, the idiom of rhythm is reappraised 
from the early modernist period of art, particularly with the Cubists and 
Rhythmists.32 His commentary supports the notion that as the Bergsonian 
percept of rhythm influenced art developments during its contemporary 
reception, so to may we consider the notion of rhythm as a theoretical 
connection to contemporary Bergsonian philosophy of painting. By 
appropriating Bergsonian and Kandinskian views of the nature of reality in 
terms of rhythms, we are able to maintain that the process of painting is a 
rhythmical plurality of movements. In this sense, the movements of the 
process are also an assemblage of rhythmic movements, such that the 
painter’s movements and the movements of the painting medium coincide as 
total unity of movement.33
 
This  process is distinct in the flow of reality as it 
                                                     
way, the form of movement is not becoming according to a linear succession, but becoming 
to form in the sense of the growth of movements and images as a continuity of the synthesis 
of movements and images.   
31 TFW. p. 15. Here, is one of the few times Bergson offers direct comments on the nature 
of art. However, he is comparing the sense of rhythm that both poetry and the plastic arts 
effect in us.   
32 Mark Antliff. Inventing Bergson: Cultural Politics and The Parisian Avant-Garde. 
(Princeton University  Press. Princeton, New Jersey.1993).  
33 Albert C. Barnes and Violette De Mazia The Art of Henri-Matisse. (The Barnes 
Foundation Press. Merion, Pennsylvania. 1933). 2nd Printing 1959. p. 158. Barnes early 
recognition and admiration for the work of Matisse is notable, but more importantly is the 
author’s own theoretical interest implied in such chapters as ‘The psychology of Matisse’ 
and ‘Transferred Value’. Explaining the artist in such terms as, ‘a man who is fully alive 
finds himself in a state of constant change, in an environment also constantly changing’, 
Barnes’ conveyance of the ‘interrelationships’ of art extends throughout the work, 
suggestive and comparable to the broader theme of the the interrelation of music and art. 
See p. 24, ‘Here as everywhere the two general principles of design and rhythm contrast.’ 
See Also, pp. 19-20, 30-42, on the exposition of these principles in terms the variety of 
compositional unity. 
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is a source of the coming to presence of images, such that the accord of 
movements within the process is the tonality of the living experiences and the 
experiential compositions of matter.34
 
In other words, the process of painting 
is a continuity of the movements of the painter’s activities towards an 
expressive content, and the movements of the painting medium towards the 
event of a pictorial form, and thereby, a unity of diverse elements and form 
emerging from the movement of life. 
 
It is from the relational field of the categories of movements in painting, i.e. 
bodily movements (e.g. gestures of the painter, brush strokes, etc.), 
compositional movements, that the activities which manifest the emergence 
of visual imagery and the unfolding of painted images occurs.35
 
Regardless 
of the movements attributed to any given material image, it is the dynamic 
synthesis of multiple movements, merging and diverging, which allows for 
variations of imagery.    In other words, qualitative difference from within the 
continual change of the entire process of painting results in the creation of 
new image types. 
 
Our faculties of thought relate to time in terms of structure, (i.e. the temporal 
                                                     
34 Brian Massumi. Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts (The 
MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 2011). p. 1. Massumi opens with commentary on 
William James, to expand on the notion of activity. He argues that it is the experience of 
activity which is the immedicacy of ‘event or change’. Though base more strongly on 
Whiteheadian terminology, here I am taking from Massumi’s schema: activity to event and 
change, to potential and production, to process of becoming. I have approached this by 
suggesting that painting as process is immediate to its movements. 
35 Mark Antliff. ‘The Rhythms of Duration: Bergson and the Art of Matisse’. In The New 
Bergson. ed. by John Mullarkey. (Manchester University Press. Manchester, 1999). pp. 
184-208. I aim to draw from Antliffs analysis of the work of Henri Matisse in relation to 
Bergson’s thought, particularly, as he points out the influence of the Bergsonian concept of 
duration. More specifically, it is with the Matisse’s stylization of the frame, that the artist 
investigated the sense of ‘opening‘ or unfolding of the pictorial image. I think this bears 
strong similarities to Henry’s theorization of Kandinsky in terms of the artist’s process as a 
‘disclosure‘ of creative forms. See pp.35-39. hat is, for Henry the internal, the invisible, the 
profound nature of reality, so that as painting as its expression is the the process of the 
resonance of movements, transformative by an inner tonality towards the form and content 
of the external expression, i.e. the condition of ‘pictoriality’. Also, See. p. 43, Henry’s 
comment on a passage of Kandinsky’s theoretical writings, in which he suggests that the 
artists comments on the nature of painterly ‘movement‘, implies that the inner tonality, (i.e. 
the invisible), is ‘becoming conscious of itself’. In this latter sense, movement’s relation to 
time as a becoming, and relation to life as its becoming 
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as measurable, time held in terms of instants or isolable moments). Rather, 
Bergson argues that the reality of time is more closely understood in terms of 
duration: the succession of experiences as continuous, and the whole of 
reality as a coalescing, and continuously flowing movement. If the painter 
were to consider the continuity of his experience, and moreover, the 
experience of his inner temporal rhythm, as the whole of temporality over 
spatial identities and discrete parts, then the real would be 
painting as its expression is  the process of the resonance of movements, 
transformative by an inner tonality towards the form and content of the 
external expression, i.e. the condition of ‘pictoriality’ regarded in terms of a 
holistic account of temporal process and activity. And, as a result of this prioritization 
of time, duration would then become the ontological basis for the multiple and 
complex processes and the recognizable activities of reality. Painting must be 
regarded as one such multi-dimensional process, so that as a process, the multiple 
movements in painting are within the whole of a temporal continuity, that is, the 
durée of the painterly experience.36
  
To this end, our consideration of explicit 
properties of movement within the process of painting, in terms of the experiences 
of bodily activity and the changing qualities of the materiality, are underscored by 
Bergson’s ontology of a dynamic temporality. In this way, any particular movement 
or aggregate of movements, are themselves occurrences of movement, and as such, 
progressions of movement moving through the flow of time.37 
Progression and Succession 
 
For Bergson, the idea of mobility is distinct from the idea of the continuity 
and progression of reality. Although the concept of movement is connected 
to the idea of mobility, and, it may be taken to suggest the passage of reality, 
this does not mean that the idea of mobility can be transposed with the concept 
                                                     
36 TFW. p. 58   
37 Ibid. p. 58. Moore argues for the use of the english term ‘durance’, as opposed to the term 
‘duration’, since, he claims, the former term suggests the ‘property of going through time’, 
whereas the latter suggests a measurable time or fixed time of a particular occurrence. 
Noting the difference of meanings these English terms convey, despite the intention to 
translate from the French term ‘durée’, I will continue to use ‘duration’ particularly in this 
context of Bergson’s conceptualisation of movement, because of the sense of ‘continuity’ 
that the term expresses. 
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of movement. In terms of Bergson’s account of reality as change, 
understanding that movement inheres in the continuity of reality, the world is 
not itself a divisible whole, but a progression by difference. However, for 
Bergson, the continual passage of reality is an indefinite multiplicity of 
progressions expressing a heterogeneous quality of duration. Of course, as 
Bergson indicates, these require the presupposition of space as a homogenous 
milieu for experiences to be situated. In addition, such is the inclination of our 
thinking, i.e. towards the immobilization of reality by which things are fixed 
and placed. 
 
 
Might it not be said that, even if these notes succeed one another, yet we perceived them in 
one another, and that their totality may be compared to a living being whose parts, although 
distinct, permeate one another just because they are so closely connected? [...] We can thus 
conceive of succession without distinction, and think of it as a mutual penetration, an 
interconnexion and organization of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and 
cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought.38 
 
However, from a Bergsonian view, we must regard reality in terms of durée, 
that is to say, envisaging reality in terms of temporal flux and conceding that 
is change fundamental to reality. In this sense, Bergson argued that we could 
‘grasp the inner life beneath the juxtaposition of our states that we effect in a 
spatialized time’. This is to say that, in regards to painting, the activity and 
substantiality held in terms of duration, become more than the thing, (i.e. the 
painted image both regarded as subsumed within the whole of the process). 
Instead, painting is a process of multiple movements, originating differing 
rhythmic conditions of its elements, and as such, is continuously present to 
the content of its temporality. Similarly, Kandinsky argues 
that unlike music, which is itself a durational activity in time, painting 
presents to the whole content of its expression at one moment.39 
 
 
                                                     
38 TFW. p. 100 
39 Wassily Kandinsky Concerning The Spiritual In Art. Trans. by M.T.H. Sadler. (Dover 
Publications. New York. 1977). p. 20 
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Movement and Tonality 
 
 
In order to advance with the moving reality, you must replace yourself within it. Install 
yourself within change, and you will grasp at once both change itself and the successive states 
in which it might at any instant be immobilized [...]A perpetuity of mobility is possible only 
if it is backed by an eternity of immutability, which it unwinds in a chain without beginning 
or end.40 
 
Recognizing Bergson’s critique leads us to the second instance of our 
conceptualization of movement. That is, despite the actual and material 
structure produced by painting, this is not to confuse the process of painting 
according to a sequence of structural forms. Instead, painting as an artistic 
and aesthetic creation is to be understood as a process of the progression of 
the interpenetrating movements. 
 
Similarly, Kandinsky’s theory of painting considers the world in terms of 
visual tones from among visual forms, arguing that the painted image is 
constantly emerging from rhythmic tensions and is inherent to the painting 
process. What he termed as a rhythmic law in the painting process meant that 
both the continuity of visual expression and the multiplicity of expressions 
are original to the composition of the painted images.41
  
Taken further, this 
suggested a view of the world in terms of flux, hence, characterizing the 
process of painting as a tonality. However, in terms of the tonality of 
movements, the theory of the process of painting becomes more complex. 
From the sense of a sonorous materiality and tactile visual art forms the 
movements of painting in relation to sensation suggests a ‘structural’ 
aesthetic, i.e. plane, line, colour, material. In other words, from the basis of 
Bergson’s concept of durée, painting as continuous activity, as entailing 
multiple elements, and as a mode by which images emerge and change, 
arguably, suggests that painting is of a field of rhythms, rhythms of depth and 
                                                     
40 CE. pp. 308, 325 
41 Wassily Kandinsky. Point and Line to Plane. (Dover Publications. New York. 1979). p. 
83 
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of flux. Likewise, Kandinsky’s theoretical development proceeds from a 
recognition of an absolute temporal quality of reality, and consequently, his 
conceptualization of painting regards its activity and material forms according 
to vital and melodic attributes. 
 
The spatial elements in sculpture and architecture, the tonal elements in music, the elements 
of movement in the dance, and the word elements in poetry, all have need of a similar 
uncovering and a similar elementary comparison with respect to their external and their inner 
characteristic, which I call ‘sounds’.42 
 
Like Bergson’s theory, Kandinsky links aesthetic elements to movement. For 
him movements are inner ‘sounds’, as vibratory movements radiating 
externally. In this sense, the process of painting involves a feeling, and 
empathetic attunement to this movement, as a type of inner resonance from 
an inner sounding, as a descent from among movements towards the 
realization of the potential of movements. In either regard, the process of 
painting is an order of movements, in the sense that these movements are 
transformative within the continuity of the process, and the affects of their 
actualization in the painted object.43 
 
 
Painterly Experience: Consciousness and Movement 
 
With the view that considers reality as a unity of movements, and this view 
correlated with the concept of painting as an activity of movement, then 
requires a demarcation from among the movements. In other words, as 
movement in general implicates reality as duration this must be distinguished 
from painting as movements of specific kind. Because the concept of 
movement in relation to painting places painting in time, the concept of 
movement is most fundamentally a concept of qualitative difference. For 
                                                     
42 Ibid. pp. 8-9, reference to the Preface by Hilla Rebay, however, expounded upon by 
Kandinsky, p. 32 following the margin heading of ‘Tension’, and, pp. 34-35 in which 
Kandinsky addresses the relation of time and painting, suggesting that the visual forms 
themselves are ‘elements’ of time.   
43 CM. p. 147 
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Bergson, the question of the process of painting would be that of the 
‘substantiality of change’ becoming visible. He argues that change is most 
palpable from within the inner domain of life. This is to say that the painter is 
the immediate contact with the change of movements, by which the painter’s 
consciousness is itself a continuous melody of an internal rhythm. In this 
respect, Bergson is suggesting that life is the indivisible experience of the 
continuity of change, and in the process of painting, through the painter, this 
change constitutes the duration of the expressions.44
  
Bergson argues that 
movement is also the potential of continuous change. From the collective flow 
of the multiplicity of movements the qualitative change from multiple 
directions is preceded by the conditions for variations, and thereby, the 
predication of painting itself. In this sense, we are asserting that because of 
the alterity of movement, there are modes of movement: movement of activity 
and movement of substantiality. For on the one hand there is painting as itself 
a vital activity, through the living experience of the painter, but on the other 
hand, there is the activity of painting as expression through matter.45
 
However, these movements are not so clearly distinct. As we have maintained 
in terms of the notion of the theories of pure perception and a pure memory, 
the real is a continuity of its actual and virtual domains. Moreover, Bergson 
suggests that perception is both of a psychical domain and a material 
exteriority, stating, 
 
 
Let us no longer say, then, that our perceptions depend simply upon the molecular movements 
of the cerebral mass. We must say rather that they vary with them, but that these movements 
themselves remain inseparably bound up with the rest of the material world.46 
 
In this regard, the movements of the painter to painting medium, in terms of 
the movement of experience to expression, or from memory-images to ever 
present images of material extensity, movements of the process of painting, 
                                                     
44 Ibid. p. 149   
45 A.E. Pilkington. Bergson and His Influence: A Reassessment. (Cambridge University 
Press, 1976)   
46 MM. p. 25 
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are immanent to the continuity of change. We have argued that the movements 
of painting in time allow for the creation and emergence of visual form and 
imagery, and the content is furthered instantiated by the material extension of 
these elements of painting.47
  
To that end, painting is an activity, by which 
multiple movements in time are the source of visual form. In regards to the 
content of painting, content is the experience of the painter and the encounter 
with the painting medium, such the process of painting is the movement of 
the contents of the living experiences towards the application and enactment 
of visual imagery. Hence, the process involves the projection of movements 
of consciousness, consciousness presenting through physical extension and 
spatial materialization of its own visual imagery.  In terms of the process, that 
is, throughout the duration of the multiplicity of painterly movements towards 
the singularity of composition, multiple movements proceed towards the 
creation and proliferation of images.48 
                                                     
47 J. Bell, What is painting?: representation and modern art (Thames and Hudson, 1999). 
pp. 
112-113. From among Bell’s discussion of Modernity in the context of history, she explains 
the twofold shifts of both the content of modern painting and the ideas or attitudes of 
modernism in painting.  She notes that the historical age underlying the modernist 
movement was presented in terms of transience, so that the painting of that time was an 
engagement with themes of all things transitory. She identifies three ‘phases’ of 
development from this theme: Process impression and sequence.  I  find her analysis 
supportive, not only by its identification of theories of the relation of form and time 
throughout the historical survey of modernist painting and to which Kandinsky’s work was 
certainly contributory, but also, supportive of the idea that painting is itself an engagement 
with time, as a ‘fixing’ of change.  In this way, within the modernist period, ‘time’ is a new 
content of painting. Furthermore, as Bell indicates that by presenting the flow of change, 
and engaging with the process of reality, painting was regarded as also an activity towards 
the formatting of time.  Bell explains that an attitude of the modernist period was to allow 
the image to ‘emerge nakedly from visible brushwork’, and by this she is indicating the 
specific consideration of physical tracing, i.e. the marking of both bodily and material 
movements, as being valued in the sense that the movements were thought to be the 
creative energy of imagery.  
48 John Golding. Paths to the Absolute: Mondrian, Malevich, Kandinsky, Pollock, Newman, 
Rothko and Still. (Thames & Hudson. London. 2000). p. 83. In Goldings account of the 
early developments of Kandinsky’s work, after highlighting the influence of the Russian 
Vologda region and its folk art upon the artist, He offers a telling comparison of 
Kandinsky’s work in contrast to the works of Piet Mondrian and Kasimir Malevich. He 
claims that the modes of abstraction for both of latter artists was principled towards 
processes of distillation, towards the minimal, or with a view to express some essence of 
nature. However, Golding indicates that for Kandinsky, he ‘achieved abstraction through 
the proliferation of imagery, through the endowing his pictures with such a multiplicity of 
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The Life of Movement 
 
In other words, consciousness is creative, and by its continual movement in 
time, from either orientation of its interior or exterior sphere, there is 
invention, production, and variation of expressive forms. This is to first agree 
that states of consciousness are ever-changing, interposing, and hence, a 
multiplicity of interpenetrating relations. In this sense, consciousness is the 
movement of mediations between the vital perceiving and the process of 
becoming perceived. This indicates that the potential of movement is the 
central principle of these relations, and where we attempt to define the 
contours of those relations specific to painting we must rely on the sense of 
sight and its mediations with the relative constancy of the materiality of 
painting. Bergson explains that perception itself is not consistent, it is 
variable, and is relative to movement and change. He claims that perception 
                                                     
images...’. See p. 87 for another in text comparison, notably, of Kandinsky’s development 
from the early ‘Russian’ Period up to the time of his publication On The Spiritual In Art. 
From abstraction regarded as a ‘proliferation of imagery’, to abstraction understood as the 
attempts of the ‘musicalization’ of painting, I am taking Goldings commentary as a support 
for the notion that with either themes and theoretical developments of Kandinsky’s work, a 
conception of movement is implicit. In chapter eight I will consider the notion of 
abstraction in terms of Bergsonian conceptualisation. However, here I ask the reader to 
consider the relation between the process of abstraction, a painterly process, and the 
‘proliferation of imagery’. In so doing, I think there is reason to consider that a process of a 
multiplication of images indicates an equivalency of a multiplicity of movements. However, 
where Golding’s explains Kandinsky’s view of abstraction, suggesting that from among the 
multiple images within a picture, ‘eventually one image cancels out another and the canvas 
surface becomes a single, throbbing whole’, I cannot agree with this wording. Rather, in 
terms of duration, the process of painting is continuous, so that the multiplicity of 
movements are only dissociated by the substantiality of the painted image. In this sense, I 
am arguing against what I see here as a condition of negation, suggested to occur with the 
multiplicity of movements in painting. And Instead, I mean to suggest that from among the 
proliferation of movements, and therefore, from among the proliferation of images, there is 
progressive intervention of movement to movement, image to image, with the effect that 
there emerges painted imagery. By this, there is a rapid exchange, and dynamic tumult of 
painterly movements and painted imagery, which, is itself a condition of unity during these 
changes. In this sense, the process of painting is a course of events, movements, movements 
colliding, alterations of movement by other movement, eruptions of movement by effect of 
other movements. In other words, the process of paintings, overall, as a continuous process, 
is towards the shaping and shifting of images, connected by the advancement of the creative 
condition from the differential relations of movements. 
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given to thought and language, and more generally, given to the activities of 
mind, are as movements of the real. Furthermore, he explains that by the 
mind’s activity, the envisaging of movement and change may be expressed in 
the immediacy of reality to itself.49
 
Bergson explains that perception is then a 
relative condition by which the possibility of varying ‘images‘ results from 
the differing processes of movement within a unified reality of movement. 
Whether it is relative to the activity of visualization, to thinking, or to the flow 
of conscious events, the forces of perception within reality would mean that 
perception is relative among the continually diverging movements of 
perception. In other words, there is a multiplicity of processes of perception, 
such that, the living events of perception are not a singular, homogenous 
condition of being, but rather a plurality of movements effective towards 
continuous differentiation. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have considered Bergson’s theory of the conceptualisation of movement, 
as part of his metaphysical argument of the reality of duration.  We see that 
according to Bergson’s thought, movement is an independent reality, and in 
terms of the qualities of change immanent to reality, the material universe is 
considered more in terms of force and the ongoing process of difference. We 
see how Bergson’s view is concerned with the totality of movements, a view 
that contributes to his philosophy.  Prompted further by continuous flux of 
with time. From this context, we considered how Bergson regards 
consciousness, not as thing, but the movement of its experience. This offered 
us insight into the creative nature of the process of painting.  By considering   
perception as relative to movement, i.e. a carving out from the external 
viewing of things, we considered perception to be relational and even 
                                                     
49 Ibid. p. 70 
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formative to the expressions that follow from it. Bergson explains that 
perception is contiguous with the inner dimension of reality. In other words, 
there are perceptions that are of a harmonious relation as a constant succession 
from within all things and not simply the appearance of a constancy as the 
form of substantial thing. Again, this prioritizes a view of time as durational 
over the conception of time as successional. As for the interest of the 
conceptualization of movement as phenomenon within the process of 
painting, rather than regard these movements as finite steps connected 
together and relative, instead, movements are regarded as continuous and 
interpenetrating into one another. Hence, from this ontological determination 
of movement, whereby the conception of movement entails the activity of 
painting and is also attributed to the materiality of painting, a unity is 
maintained. We see how this onotologization of movement is implicit in 
Henry’s philosophy, expressed in relation to Kandinskian theory.  In 
particular the predicated ‘living’ of life, is what Henry considers as the 
pathological movement that compels the feeling and experience of life from 
itself.  Here, what he regards as the condition of life’s auto-affective drive, 
and its becoming through the soliciting of its encounter from among its bodily 
encounters, does not rely on an explicit concept of the kinesthetic relation of 
life to its living process. Regardless, we see the nuance of an ontology of 
movement, within his philosophical view of the reflexivity of consciousness 
and the moving of life towards its manifestation.  Here, for Henry, movement 
becomes an ontological basis, in terms of the life’s profound pathos, that is, 
through the ‘incarnation’ of life through its living. For our concerns toward 
the continuation of Bergsonian thinking, Henry’s implicit reliance upon 
movement as immanent to the immanence of life, draws a closer connection 
to the Kandinskian theory of the essence of life moving through the 
expressions of painterly forms.  Here, the concept of movement in the context 
of painting, means the continuity of change towards visual experience.  This 
brings Kandinskian theory back to an original Bergsonian view, by which we 
regarded the movement of all things, to include the entire process of painting 
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as the ongoing processes and, therefore, multiple tonalities of differing 
rhythms of time. 
 
We proceeded from our consideration of the movement of the process of 
painting in terms of rhythms of duration. Following this we considered an 
isolation of the properties of movement, so that, regarded in terms of life and 
consciousness, we argued that there are vital and ‘living’ movements essential 
to painterly activity. Finally, we will then be able to evaluate movement as an 
affect of time, and thereby, an element of the process of painting that by its 
force of creative expression it may be regarded as a vital and pictorial activity 
of formation. This is to highlight that, whether it be the relation of physical, 
psychological, or biological elements, (as these are also modes of multiple 
movements towards the particular movements of the activity of painting), 
those isolable movements of either the mental process of painting or the 
processes of the materiality of painting entail a plurality of movements toward 
the composition of multiple movements, and overall, towards the continual 
genesis of images. We argued that movement is the prevailing condition of 
even life itself, and therefore, is more than relations of succession in time. In 
terms of the process of painting, there are infinitely possible forms from 
among its totality, by which the human mind regards it.50 
 
We have considered that the concept of movement is a principle theme of 
Bergsonian Philosophy. Therefore, we proceeded with an analysis of the 
concept with a view towards a Bergsonian theory of painting. By maintaining 
Bergson’s theory of the duration of reality as a duration of images, we argued 
that this implies an absolute quality of movement of the real in which the 
process of painting is a further occurrence. So then, in terms of the process of 
painting as itself a unity of a plurality of movements, the change of the 
painter’s activities as an interaction with the painting medium, these are the 
changes of states of the activities and the qualitative effects of art-object. 
                                                     
50 CE. p. 58. 
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However, with this movement there is also the becoming effects from the 
affective qualities of perceptions from the material heterogeneity. Therefore 
we are considering the double movement of the process of painting first in 
terms of the painter’s body as itself a series of temporalities, but then 
secondly, from the corresponding and coinciding with the exteriorized 
perception of the painting medium in its change of spatialized images and 
physical effect. In this regard, we have argued from Bergson’s conception of 
movement, that in terms of the painting, the movement of the body, the 
movement of the material image, and the movement in between, comprise the 
passage of the process. Therefore, by maintaining that the nature of reality is 
considered in terms of a plurality of images in ceaseless movement and 
indefinite change, our understanding of the occurrence of painted imagery 
will in turn follow from the conception of reality as an aggregate of images in 
process, i.e. as multiple multiplicities of movement.51 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
51 Marie-Luise Angerer, ‘Feeling the Image: Some Critical Notes on Affect’, in Imagery in 
the 21st Century, ed. by Oliver Grau, and Thomas Viegl, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, The 
MIT Press, 2011), pp. 224-226.   
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Chapter 4 - Abstraction 
 
A mass of hills in every conceivable, imaginable colour. Of all different sizes, but always the 
same shape, i.e.: Broad at the bottom, with swollen sides and rounded tops. Simple, ordinary 
hills, of the kind one always imagines and never sees.1 
 
Let us try to see, no longer with the eyes of the intellect alone, which grasps only the already 
made and which looks from the outside, but with the spirit, I mean with that faculty of seeing 
which is immanent in the faculty of acting and which springs up, somehow, by the twisting 
of the will on itself, when action is turned into knowledge, like heat, so to say, into light. To 
movement, then, everything will be restored, and into movement everything will be resolved. 
Where the understanding, working on the image supposed to be fixed of the progressing 
action, shows us parts infinitely manifold and an order infinitely well contrived, we catch a 
glimpse of a simple process, an action which is making itself [...]2 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Abstraction may generally refer to any amalgam of conceptualizations and 
interposed theories applied broadly in the fields of philosophy and art.3
 
The 
Latin definition of abstraction, ‘abstractio’, means to lead or to draw away 
from some phenomenon. From its continual elaboration in differing fields of 
philosophy and in theories of art practices, this root definition of abstraction 
has been assumed through varying interpretations to the effect that to abstract 
has meant some process of separateness and independence from that of 
reality.4
 
In some instances it is considered as a process of ideas and as a 
                                                     
1 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘Hills’, Sounds [Klänge], Munich, [1912],  Kandinsky: Complete 
Writings on Art, ed. by Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo,  (Da Capo Press, New York 
1994), p. 295. 
2 CE. p. 264 
3 I. Chilvers, The Oxford dictionary of art (Oxford University Press, 2004). p. 3-4, Chilvers 
explains that throughout art history the emergence of differing stylizations and the 
theoretical courses of particular art groups and movements indicated a direction towards the 
formal sense of abstract art, culminating at the beginning of the 20th century. However, 
more specifically, with the second reference, Sandywell begins the statement by describing 
the Latin definition of abstraction, ‘abstractio: to lead or draw away from some 
phenomenon’. 
4 Barry Sandywell, ‘Abstraction’ in Dictionary of Visual Discourse, (Surrey: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2011), pp. 107-110. The definition that is given details the notion of abstract 
from the context of art history focusing on the changing meanings of the term from among 
the progress and developments of art. However, more specifically, by describing the Latin 
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condition being beyond the natural world. In this sense, the concept of 
abstraction has meant a renunciation of the material world, by the assumption 
of an essential and pure intellectualization, and therefore, a process that is 
necessarily divorced from the existential world of things.5
 
This has 
contributed to many views and contexts based on its usage, but in general, 
most concede to a condition of abstraction as being of some form of a 
schematization.6
 
However, in this chapter we wish to relate a 
conceptualisation of abstraction to the immanent nature of thinking in terms 
of a schema.  We will argue that by ‘abstraction’ we mean a quality of 
invention continuous with the becoming of images. We will consider 
Bergson’s concept of abstraction to mean that as perceiving occurs in things 
themselves, then the transitions of images from within the process of painting 
entail the dynamic selections and discernments of life from its experience in 
contact with matter. That is to say that thought as an abstractive quality of 
living, is both a distillation of images and an extraction of images from the 
flow of reality, and it is generated by the living experiences of perception.7  
However, in agreement with Bergson’s theory of abstraction, the order of our 
schemas, i.e. the attitude of our ideations, and the systematic developments of 
our concepts, these are all occurrences within the continuous change of 
perceptions. This is to say, that abstraction is immanent to the material world 
and the plane of pure perception. Furthermore, by considering abstraction in 
relation to the continuity of the flow images, and in particular, with the 
process of painting, we will argue that the emergence of novel forms in 
painting, are physical processes. Therefore, abstract thinking is physical in its 
origins.
 
For Bergson, abstraction occurs from the tendency of thought to 
isolate the movement of reality, so as to conceive of things, and quantify the 
states of things, as an ordering of reality in terms of formation.8
 
According to 
                                                     
definition of abstraction, ‘abstractio’, in terms of something being drawn away, we take this 
as a root definition to work from. 
5 J. Maritain, Creative intuition in art and poetry (Pantheon books, 1953). pp. 214-222 
6 J. Golding, 'Paths to the Absolute', Mondrian, Malevich, Kandinsky, Pollock, Newman, 
Rothko and Still, London.p. 7-8 
7 H. Bergson, 'The two sources of morality and religion'. p. 180, Henceforth TSMR 
8 J. Mullarkey, Bergson and philosophy (Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh, 1999).  
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this view we will argue that in the process of painting abstraction is a quality 
of movement of thinking as conditioned by the duration of the process itself.   
We will consider Kandinsky’s theory of ‘Abstract Painting’, to argue that it 
is only by physical effort directed through the painting medium, and, by the 
actualization of perceptions given in total to the process, that abstraction is 
from the living inclination of expression and the accumulation of images from 
the whole of reality.9
 Combined with a Bergson’s concept of abstraction, we 
will argue that with the process of painting, from the progressive and 
consolidated experiences of the real, the passage of its activities and events 
allow for changes in the direction of thinking. In other words, the painter’s 
thinking and perceptual awareness as a coinciding taking place within the 
movement of the painting medium becomes a refraction of perception towards 
the event of visual and conceptual images. Continuing from the previous 
chapter’s emphasis on the intuitive experience, and added by the ontology of 
movement implicit in the process of painting, we will now argue that the 
occurrence of creative thinking and the invention of visual forms and their 
expression  in painting, these are the variabilities of philosophical realisations 
as the abstractions of living from its efficacious becoming.  Here Bergson’s 
view of the work of philosophy in terms of philosophizing   as an activity 
continuing towards the investigation of the ‘concrete’ becoming of reality, 
resonates with consideration of the diffusion and plurality of the becoming of 
the real, as termed abstraction. This is seconded by Henry’s challenge to 
philosophy to consider the actual conditions by which reality proceeds. 
Henry’s philosophy based on his interpretation of Kandinsky, by which Henry 
implies through Kandinskian theory that the abstraction of life is through its 
self-realisation immanent to the revelation of living in the world. We wish to 
reconsider Kandinsky, through a direct comparison to Bergson, so as to 
further radicalize the notion of abstraction, and as a consequence, to expound 
the philosophical outlook of the process of painting.   
 
From the intuitive experience, the painter’s activity is inspired, and as his 
                                                     
9 W. Kandinsky, Kandinsky, complete writings on art (Da Capo Press, 1994). p. 789 
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movement is compelled by the articulation of this ‘vision’, the activities 
become inventive through the direction of thinking towards forms of 
expression. However, this is to claim that thinking in the process of painting 
opposes the tendency of the immediacy of action to the continuous activities 
of images, and fixes in visible form the expressions of experience, by which 
the experience of thinking develops formulation and selectively constructs, 
reifies and then inhabits its own abstraction. By ballasting this concept with a 
Bergsonian view, and more specifically, by relating it to the specific medium 
of painting, we will argue that abstraction is a condition that corresponds with 
the qualities of perception and direct (re)presentation, as creative movements 
within the field of painting as a process. This is to bring the concept of 
abstraction back to a process view of reality, and to regard abstraction from 
within the philosophical dialogues concerned with difference and the 
evolution of philosophizing immanent to the becoming of reality.  By arguing 
for an immanence philosophy of the condition of abstraction, we reaffirm the 
necessity of the process of painting, as a living encounter with itself, towards 
philosophies of difference.  Therefore, we are opposing the definition of 
abstraction as a transcendent ideation, and as a purity of thinking divorced 
from the experience of living.  Instead, we are reorienting the 
conceptualisation, to suggest that abstraction is the concretization of the 
novelty of change, and as a condition of the creative process in painting by 
the revelatory and differing durations of life by art.   
 
 
 
Time and Abstraction 
 
We argue that abstraction is a condition within the process of painting, such 
that in terms of the mediation of the painter and the instrumental function of 
the painter’s body, conscious perception involves a virtuality of nascent 
actions and the actualization of expressions as a realization of concrete 
perception. We regard abstraction as an effect of painting, original to the 
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temporality of the process. We consider abstraction, as a condition of time, as 
the creation of difference through the 
painter’s activity, the painting medium, and the presentation of the painted 
image. Abstraction relates to the field of perception, perceptions given to 
consciousness, but affected by the concentration of life in duration. In this 
sense, abstraction is the condition from the ‘double experience’ of life, life 
evolving from its content to its forms. The condition of abstraction within the 
process of painting, originates from movements of dissociation in the flow of 
duration. Hence, with abstraction there is a dynamic relations of movements, 
and by the change of these movements affected by the progression in time, 
the physicality of the activities and the visible expressions in the process of 
painting become something else. For Bergson, abstraction is regarded in terms 
of a broader metaphysical view, as part of the continuous ongoing change of 
a reality that is itself change. For Bergson, abstraction is related to the creative 
unfolding of the whole of reality. It is a dynamic condition within reality 
which Bergson   often   refers   to   with   such   terms   as   ‘delimitation,   
condensation, 
contraction’.10   These terms are derivations from a general meaning of 
abstraction, 
and conflate a notion of abstraction, in terms of conditions of inner life of 
consciousness, with a notion of abstraction in terms of the conditions of 
external forms. However, we argue in terms of Bergson’s view, that 
abstraction concerns the movements of consciousness, and this specifically 
applies to the experience towards expression dynamism of images in the 
process of painting. 
 
Individuation 
 
Our concern with the abstraction is then the relation of the inner and external 
domains of reality. However, as Kandinsky describes the ‘inner necessity’ of 
                                                     
10 CE. p. 6 
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the painter, the condition of abstraction is not a condition detached from the 
body, or exclusive of the external world, but as with the movement of thought 
being compelled by an intuition, it is the interchange of corporeal responses 
to thought, visual formulations responding to experience in the making. We 
have previously considered the role of intuition and its relation to the 
movements of thinking, and now extending from this context, we consider 
abstraction as a process of forming concepts on the basis of experience. In 
this sense, with abstraction in the process of painting, there are no clear 
divisions existing between the internal or the external domains, and the past 
or present. That is, the correspondence of the painter to the painting medium 
is the interactions oriented by a living centre of images and the multiplicity of 
images given by the painting medium, and from the manifold of this 
exchange, the condition of abstraction images is produced. From this view we 
maintain that the process of painting, from the initial stages of contact 
between painter and painting medium, the process lends itself to the activity 
of abstracting from itself. From the original conscious reflection, and from 
the immediacy of the painter’s sensorial and perceptual experience, this 
contact is the presence of a living experience with the potential to change 
environed by the fields of perception given by the painting medium. 
Mullarkey explains rather concisely that Bergson’s concept of abstraction 
suggests the occurrence of extraction.11
 
Accordingly, in the process of 
painting, abstraction is then not a stylization or a development from a 
particular method that seeks the rarefaction of visual elements towards an 
inner purity, but rather, it is itself a process of individuation from among the 
potential course of expressions in the process of painting. This is to say that 
in regards to the painter’s activity, images are individuated from the flow of 
psychical and material images, extracted from the exertion of intellectual 
effort through reflective consciousness, to the extent that the image is visual 
change from variable realisations of the composition of the painted image. If 
process of painting is to be regarded as a process of creation, then we argue 
                                                     
11 John Mullarkey. Bergson and Philosophy. (Edinburgh Press, Edinburgh. 1999). p. 6. 
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that abstraction is an intrinsic condition from the continuity of the painting 
process.  Abstraction is at once a condition of disruption and a dissociation of 
images, and is a quality of exchange and fragmentation from among the 
movements of perceptual visual content expressed in material forms.12
 
In 
other words, the process of painting is a twofold process, one of continuous 
activity of formulation and expression, and the other of the material and 
structural compositions.  In both definitions of the process, we see that these 
embodies the condition of abstraction in the activities of thought, the 
immediacy to the given perception, and in the movements of expression in 
the painting. 
 
 
In terms of the Bergsonian concept of abstraction defined in terms of 
extraction, this indicates a condition of the nascency of images, of the force 
particular to the becoming of visual forms. Abstraction does not only inhere 
within the field of painting, but more specifically, it is characteristic of the 
vital qualities of the activity particular to the event of painting.   Abstraction 
is a mode of difference occurring from among the process of painterly activity 
and the emerging of the material image. In a word, abstraction attributed to 
the force of the élan in time, as effecting the non- discursive transformation 
of painterly expressions. Similarly, Henry’s theory of abstraction via 
Kandinsky, was an attempt to redefine phenomenology by suggesting that 
abstract art was a way to be free from the appearance of the external world. 
From his formulation of the ‘materiality of life’, Henry suggests that 
abstraction is related to the embodiment of life in material, and the mutual 
and affective relation of life to material life.13 Though, Henry’s theory relates 
                                                     
12 A. Ehrenzweig, The hidden order of art: A study in the psychology of artistic imagination 
(Univ of California Press, 1967). pp. 70-71. I take Ehrenzweig’s point describing ‘Basic-
design’ methods of art, to include such exercises as ‘fragmentation’, as initially a means of 
organic and intuitive expressions lending to the ‘disruptive power’ of abstract art, so as to 
further my claims according to lexical similarities. 
13 Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky,  trans. by  Scott Davidson, 
Continuum Publishing, London, 2009, p. ix.  
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to Kandinsky’s theory of abstraction, to argue for the material embodiment of 
vital affects means that Henry is elaborating from a Bergsonian view of  life  
as  a  self-initiating  change  and  as  continuously  affective  to  its  own 
experiences.14 
 
 
The Foundations of Abstraction 
 
Henry claims that Kandinsky’s work corresponds with a particular 
philosophical conceptualization, and from the perspective of a 
phenomenological position, what he regards as the condition of the ‘invisible’ 
connected to the abstraction, is the emergence of life from the intertwining of 
the subject  and object.15
 Gombrich identifies Kandinsky’s work and the 
artist’s line of theory as part of a larger progression of art history.16 Gombrich 
remarks that from the first half of the twentieth century, the nature of ‘Modern 
Art’ was an attempt to break with the long held traditions of art but also with 
the conventions of expression and theories of design. He claims that the 
attempts of the art movements of this period were driven by efforts to develop 
new ways of seeing, new ways and means of aesthetic experience, and more 
significantly, towards the expansion of apprehension.17
 
However, for Henry, 
it was Kandinsky who demonstrated not only a proficiency in the 
development of painting within this movement, but who also provided the 
most clearly developed writings elaborating the principles of art towards a 
                                                     
14 J. Mullarkey and C. de Mille, Bergson and the art of immanence: painting, photography, 
film (Edinburgh University Press, 2013). See Brendan Prendeville’s essay, ‘Painting the 
Invisible: Time, Matter and the Image in Bergson and Michel Henry’. pp.247-266. I will 
cite this text often as Prendeville’s essay offers some preliminary analysis of Henry on 
Kandinsky adding comparisons to Bergson. Here, Prendeville highlights the distinction to 
be made between and Henrian reading of Kandinsky and Kandinskian theory as established 
by Kandinsky’s concepts and practice.   
15 M. Henry and S. Davidson, Seeing the invisible: on Kandinsky (Continuum Intl Pub 
Group, 2009). p. 3-7 
16 E. H. Gombrich, 'The story of art. Phaidon', Chapters 7. pp. 443-475   
17 Ibid. p. 446. Remarking on the interconnection of seeing and knowing, Gombrich 
explains that ‘what we call seeing is invariably coloured and shaped by our knowledge (or 
belief) of what we see’. According to the thesis of this chapter, here I read Gombrich as 
admission to a theory of abstraction, by which the exchange or interchange of sense and 
apprehension is condition for abstractive processes.   
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theory of abstraction. Kandinsky’s approach in theory and in painting was one 
of several artists and thinkers to move towards abstract art.     However, he 
considered abstraction in terms of a nonobjective or nonrepresentational 
mode of expression.18 
For Kandinsky, painting towards abstraction was compelled by a strong 
principle of a direct expression of inner necessity and only satisfied when 
corresponding with the reverberations of forms or de-materialized objects. In 
previous chapters we have indicated how this sense of ‘necessity’ corresponds 
to Bergson’s articulation of the creative compulsion from the intuitive vision, 
that is, the impetus of images emerging from a single intuitive experience. 
Similarly with a Kandinskian method, the freer the abstract form from a 
representation or depiction of a thing, the greater its appeal to the feeling of 
the painter through his activity. 
 
For Kandinsky this was the spiritual expression, as that of the movement of 
the paintings development expressibly through the inner tension involved 
with the corresponding reverbs of nonobjective forms.19
 
This amounts to a 
mode of expression in the painting process that originates from internal 
sensations, having a basis in the painter’s consciousness and psychological 
conditions, as affected by the painting medium, but not without a 
simultaneous crystallization of the images to be expressed with the animated 
physical occurrence of the forms of its content. It is the modification of 
images in which the condition of the expressions involves profound changes, 
that is, the becoming of a spiritual development, original to its resonance with 
the material correspondence. Within this interchange, there occurs 
abstraction. In comparison, Bergson relates the durational nature of psychical 
states, suggesting that from the continual becoming of the inner life an 
extraction is made of a certain quality by the localization of an image. This is 
similar to Kandinsky’s view of the notion of pure expression as that which 
                                                     
18 L. Dickerman and M. Affron, Inventing Abstraction, 1910-1925: How a Radical Idea 
Changed Modern Art (The Museum of Modern Art, 2012). 
19 W. Kandinsky, Concerning the spiritual in art (Courier Dover Publications, 2012). pp. 
20, 25, 35, 51-52 
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proceeds from an immediacy of sensorial experience with the evolution of the 
inner self. 
 
Stratum of Expression 
 
Henry claims that Kandinsky’s theory is fundamental to the ‘essence of 
painting’, and this supports his theoretical studies, particularly as the artist felt 
that the intellectual elaborations offer the means ‘to enter into the expanded 
life of aesthetic experience’.20 Henry explains that abstract painting is both a 
return to the motivational origin of painting, but also a return to the root of 
painting throughout history. The question of abstraction has led to broader 
questions of the nature of painting, considering the abstractive principle as the 
‘ever-present and active foundation’ of painting and original to the ‘source’ 
of painting, of image-rendering, and of art in general.21
 
According to 
Gooding’s assessment of the history of abstract art he claims that the notion 
of abstraction had no fixed starting point in time or place, but rather, its 
original sense emerged from different premises as its practice was made 
elaborate through varying directions of practice. In other words, the initial 
conceptualizations of abstraction in the practices of abstract art were 
expressibly diverging and converging, crossing and overlapping.
21 
Moreover, for many theorists, Kandinsky’s theory of abstraction offers a new 
picture type. His paintings disregard representational and referential forms of 
the world, and instead, present difference from within the world by a 
simultaneous expression of the inner tonal qualities of the world through the 
articulation of the material and visual forms. 
 
Henry argues that the condition of abstraction underlies ‘the rationality of all 
painting’, to the extent that all painting is abstract, and even the ‘possibility’ 
                                                     
20 Michel Henry. Seeing The Invisible: On Kandinsky(Voir L’Invisible), trans. by Scott 
Davidson, (London Continuum 2009), p. 2, By quoting these passages, I am highlighting 
what is to become more clear as definitive principles of Henry’s overall thesis, that is, a 
relation of a notion of the essence of things and the pathos of life towards a philosophy of 
life.   
21 Ibid. p. 3   
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of all art forms is abstract. By this, Henry means an interrelation of the notions 
of abstraction and possibility. For Henry, the ‘possibility’ of painting is 
related to the ‘potentiality’ of the artist. However, he argues that by 
abstraction in painting the potential of the nature of human being is due to the 
nature of ‘Being’ itself.22 In other words, according to Henry’s 
phenomenological account of the nature of ‘Being’, he relates the potential of 
Being to the possibility of ‘Being’, so that potential and possible are mutual 
coefficients of the abstraction of ‘Being’.23 Though Henry’s insistence is 
towards a phenomenological notion of ‘Being’ in relation to existence, 
Bergson’s philosophy maintains that consciousness is a rhythm among the 
unbroken melody of duration, which is to say, that life is endlessly continued 
change immanent to reality. For Bergson then, life is a radical process of 
change that characterizes its existence, and is a continual growth and 
development. Similar to Kandinsky’s view of the tonality of painting, we 
argue that it is life’s immediacy to its own experience, and that is, experience 
situated by the process of painting, as a stratum of images given by perception 
and exerting a direct influence through its modes of expression. 
 
For Gooding, since all art is abstract, as all art is an engagement with the 
world, in this engagement art abstracts aspects of the world, ‘in order to 
present us with an object or an event that enlivens or enlightens our 
apprehension of it.’24 Gooding’s explanation of our ‘apprehension’ with art, 
as a type of ‘understanding’, strikes closely to Henry’s theory, particularly in 
terms of the phenomena of the world as being experienced via the immediacy 
of the self internally. Henry claims that this internal immediacy is ‘pure 
subjectivity’, and the relation of the body is an external reality to itself. In 
                                                     
22 M. Gooding, Abstract Art (Movements in Modern Art Series) (Tate Publishing, 2001). p. 
3 
23 Ibid., p. 3, In this passage of the introduction, Henry does not directly state that within the 
work or theory of painting such knowledge is retained. Rather he puts this in the form of 
question, as expected in the context of an introduction, so as to entice the reader to follow 
his explication and thesis development. However, this is would seem to be a grounding of 
the notion of abstraction; a theory of painting doubling as a theory of knowledge. 
24 Mel Gooding, Abstract Art, (London: Tate Publishing, 2001) p. 6   
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other words, for Henry the body’s orientation to the world is not the 
immediacy of our apprehension of the world, but instead, the body is 
analogous to other objects.25 
Internal and External: The Invisible and the Body 
 
Similar to Kandinsky’s theory, Henry regards the body as being something 
external, and yet the situated centre of an internal and profound Being. In the 
same regards, the body is given externally as it is an object open to the 
possibility of phenomena. Gooding explains that the development of abstract 
art included a particular tone on a distinct intuitive research, one undertaken 
by artists to employ a respective abstract visual language to express the 
‘dynamic relations between objects’.26 Bergson theorized this clearly, 
maintaining that perception given by the material world is related to the 
representational images that are then reflected back to the world of images. 
From within this process, as the faculty of intellect is oriented to choice of 
actions, it enables a selectivity from among perceptions, a reflective analysis 
of perceptions, and thereby, the distilling of images from the perceptual field 
of images. For Bergson, abstraction occurs from the interchange of 
perceptions from the experience of consciousness with matter, whereby 
images, as cut out from the continuity of images by the process of articulation 
of consciousness, are then recomposed according to conscious reflection upon 
the real. Bergson explains that 
 
Then setting out from ideas, -that is to say, from abstract relations, -we materialize them 
imaginatively in hypothetical words which try whether they can cover exactly what we see 
and hear. Interpretation is therefore, in reality, reconstruction. A slight contact with images 
actually perceived throws abstract thinking into a definite direction. The abstract thought then 
develops into complete images, merely represented, which in their turn come and touch the 
perceived images, follow them as they go along, endeavor to coalesce with them. Where 
coincidence is perfect, the perception is perfectly interpreted.27 
                                                     
25 Michel Henry. Seeing The Invisible: On Kandinsky(Voir L’Invisible), trans. by Scott 
Davidson, (London Continuum 2009), p. 5 
26 Mel Gooding, Abstract Art, (London: Tate Publishing, 2001) p. 7 
27 ME. pp. 207-208. This offers a theoretical basis for comparison with the theoretical 
perspective adopted with Cubist painting.   
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Here, Bergson is relating abstract relations to processes of imagination. 
Similarly, both Kandinsky’s and Henry’s view of the internal/external 
dichotomy of experience, also parallels Bergson’s view of reality. However, 
Henry’s analysis suggests that Kandinsky’s meaning of the term ‘external’ is 
synonymous with the notion of how things appear or even ‘manifests itself to 
us’.  It is with an outlook of the immanence of life that Henry regards the 
predication of life in terms of manifesting itself.  By this Henry claims that 
the external experience of a thing is due to being exterior and positioned 
‘before our regard’.28  Gooding holds a similar view stating that, ‘Abstract art, 
even more than representational art, demands the actual encounter, the 
sensation of the thing itself.’29 
 
Bergson insists that the representational element of our engagement with the 
world may betray the immediacy and direct contact of the world as through 
the intuitive  
experience. This offers a conceptual view with linkage to Kandinsky’s sense 
of the non-representational in painting.  For both Bergson and Kandinsky, 
representation is a function of consciousness in the field of perception. For 
Bergson, representation is the work of the intellect, to carve out an image from 
among the indefinite and continuous images given in perception. It is the 
arrangement of an image to reflect the isolation of images from the continuous 
flow of images. In a word, for Bergson ideas and representation result from 
the selection of consciousness, and reflection of consciousness, from within 
the flow of reality. Thinking is an engagement with the flow of reality, it is 
the movement of reflective consciousness, so that, the representational and 
schematic quality of a thing is by the contraction of images, from the 
apprehension and distillation of reality. For Bergson, it is through a type of 
expulsion of thought that the intuitive experience can be actualised. 
                                                     
28 Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible, (London Continuum, 2009), p. 6, here Henry seems 
to be equating a type of knowing to visibility.   
29 Mel Gooding, Abstract Art, (London: Tate Publishing, 2001), p. 11 
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According to his theory, the effort of intellect can move a particular ordered 
system or arrangement of ideas through different planes of consciousness to 
a final image. In other words, through effort the intellect selects and extracts 
images from the flow of reality, and by the concentration of arrangement and 
formulation from different tensions of consciousness, the intellect abstracts 
from within the images of the reality.30 
 
 
 
 
Abstraction as Presentation 
 
Gooding explains that, in the practice of the early developments of abstract 
art, the work of abstraction was not based on what could be seen, but aimed 
at expressing the vibratory ‘energy’ within things. He suggests that this 
energy was considered as a higher order of connectivity between phenomena, 
and not explicitly invisible, it was regarded as an ever-present   spiritual 
energy,   which   ‘animates the universe 
Independent of the objects through which it moves.’31  Whether in terms of ‘a 
Spiritual energy’ or as ‘the invisible life’, both Gooding and Henry, highlight 
the theoretical developments of abstraction that suggest the interconnectivity 
of phenomena, and the immediate relation of subjects to objects. We take both 
perspectives to return to a Bergsonian view, that it is life that is compared to 
an impulsion or to the impetus of things.  He regarded life in itself to be an 
immensity of potentiality from which its own growth was to overcome 
repetition, to proceed from change to evolving change.  
In this sense, for Bergson, life is the progression of multiple tendencies, but 
only regarded by consciousness as outside of each other. In this sense, life is 
a creative force, such that the movements of this force are made distinct, 
articulated, and spatialized, by the contact with matter. However, as life is 
continuously creative and developing from itself in contact with matter, its 
                                                     
30 ME. pp. 210-214. 
31 Mel Gooding, Abstract Art, (London: Tate Publishing, 2001), p. 15 
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evolution proceeds through matter, but, its energy is expended on matter. For 
Bergson, matter determines the dissociation of life, and though it is that which 
makes evident the divisions and discrete expressions of the forces of life, its 
changing nature requires the change of matter. In other words, the potential 
of life is the individuation of perception by the encounter of activity with the 
material world. However, as consciousness is the content of life, affecting the 
expressions of its experiences, the division of life is also from its own 
inclination.32 
 
Furthermore, according to some of the earliest paintings and theories that 
followed from the abstract designation, painting is regarded as a ‘showing’, 
i.e. ‘showing’ that allows for us to see that which is ‘not seen and cannot be 
seen’. He suggests that if the ‘means’ of painting are ‘objective 
determinations’, and by this he means that since lines, colour, and planes are 
of ‘real being’ (external, visible reality), but as 
they are also referred to from the internal, invisible subjectivity, then ‘the 
ontological homogeneity’ of both ‘content’ and the ‘means’ of painting may 
be re-established.33
 Henry indicates that by the notion of ‘abstraction’ in 
Kandinsky’s work, the content of painting is thought to be derived from an 
internal domain. For Henry, as the dimension of interiority is equitable with 
life, this means that life, by its living, is itself ‘abstract’.34 
 
 
Abstraction as Representation 
 
For Henry, the ‘content’ and ‘means’ are the essence of painting, as these are 
from the ‘dimension of ‘Being’ itself’. The concept of ‘abstraction’ in 
painting has been equated to an activity of life.   Henry’s notion of ‘abstract’ 
has a broader meaning from which an application of the concept of abstraction 
                                                     
32 CE. p. 273 
33 Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible (London Contimuum, 2009) p. 11   
34 Ibid. p. 11, Henry presents this as a ‘Kandinskian equation’, that is 
‘Interior=Interiority=invisible=life=pathos=abstract. This is as much of conceptual equation 
as it is diagrammatic model, illustrative of Henry’s phenomenology. 
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is given to the process of painting. And though, recent developments of 
painting continue to presume abstraction as a conceptual reduction or as a 
departure from the physicality of the painting mediate, ‘abstract painting’ like 
other painting is based on the outlook of painting as a mode of presentation, 
i.e. as a means of offering a view of reality back to the world. This is the 
Henrian elucidation of what Kandinsky meant by abstraction.  However, 
Kandinsky’s view of the process of painting, suggests that it was the visual 
means of an elaboration of the non-representational. In this sense, Kandinsky 
considered painting as a mode of spiritual expansion through material means, 
a way of visual experience to be an encounter with the more profound depth 
of reality. 
 
From Kandinsky’s theory we may argue that through painting abstraction 
proceeds from the world. We maintain by this abstraction as a condition that 
emerges from the painter’s activity and the painting medium is a derivation 
from processes within the world. His theory of abstraction seeks to move 
against the view of painting as purely representational, and to coincide with a 
Bergsonian view, that by a condition of abstraction, the process of painting is 
at once the potential for a painter’s activity and the painting medium to occur 
uniquely, as simultaneous presenting of life’s experience to material change. 
Though, Henry argues that the emphasis has remained on external reality in 
painting, so that the ‘object dictates the rules of its deconstruction as well as 
its reconstruction’, in Bergsonian terms, we consider the living presence of 
the process to be an engagement of the experiences of sensation immediate 
the perceptions given by the medium. In other words, as abstractive qualities 
in painting have been regarded as a view of an object in terms of either 
increased or diminished perspective, we regard the condition of abstractions 
as offering the simultaneous experience of thinking differently, and the reality 
of life’s change through the encounter of the actuality in its expressions. We 
argue that modes of abstraction in painting allow for the unfolding of life 
through intellectual structuring articulated by the reflections of consciousness 
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in the painting medium. 
 
Kandinsky’s concept of abstraction was not based on the relation of the visible 
experiences, or the pursuits of an ‘object’s true nature’, or a sense of the 
essential, 
i.e. ‘true nature of visibility’. Henry explains that Kandinsky’s view of 
abstraction held that painting is the pursuit of a visible ‘objectivity’ of the 
world, and hence, ‘a return to pure perception’. Accordingly, for Kandinsky 
the problem of painting is pictorial representation, to the extent that his 
conception of abstraction begins not with the problems of objectivity, or with 
the world to be represented, but instead with the problem of the object in 
itself. Henry claims that the work of Kandinsky’s abstraction was of the 
‘abstract content’, that is, the ‘ceaseless’ invisible life and its continual 
emergence ‘into itself’ is the ‘living essence’ provided in the content of 
painting.35
   By this, Henry is suggesting that to be ‘abstract’, does not simply 
refer to a process of simplification, isolation, or complication, but instead, it 
refers to the expressing of the ‘pathetic profusion of ‘Being’.  Here again, 
Henry’s commitment to a Phenomenological view of the world means that his 
interpretation of Kandinsky is cast in terms of life as a subject to life as its 
own object.  In other words, Henry’s 
ontological approach to Kandinsky’s theory of abstraction already assumes a 
self- affective realisation of life through its experience towards its expression. 
 
However, this is not so different from Bergson’s view of the élan vital of life, 
that is, from the endlessly creative change that necessarily defines the 
passage, progression, and ultimately, the evolution of life. Nonetheless, for 
Bergson abstraction already assumes a complexity of life, that is, a dynamic 
development of consciousness from the degree of dilation of images or 
expansion of images, from the conscious orientation to a pure memory or pure 
perception. From the following passage, we can see Bergson’s articulation of 
                                                     
35 Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible (London Continuum, 2009). p. 16 
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the complexity of the intellect and representation with the function of 
memory, i.e. past experience, as a means of generating novel ideas, he 
explains, 
 
The scheme is tentatively what the image is decisively. It presents in terms of becoming, 
dynamically, what the images give us statically as already made. Present and acting in the 
work of calling up images, it draws back and disappears behind the images once evoked, its 
work being then accomplished. The image, with its fixed outline, pictures what has been. A 
mind working only with images could but recommence its past or arrange the congealed 
elements of the past, like pieces of mosaic, in another order. But for a flexible mind, capable 
of utilizing its past experience by bending it back along the lines of the present, there must, 
besides the image, be an idea of a different kind, always capable of being realized into images, 
but distinct from them.  The scheme is nothing else.36 
 
Here Bergson is elaborating on the becoming of images in terms of the modes 
of arrangements, the faculties of mental organisation, and the process of 
reflective consciousness towards conceptualization. He explains accordingly, 
that it is a type of ‘bending back’ of memory and the images of experience 
within the present situation of conscious perception, that a difference of 
images occurs within the real as a realisation of the ‘flexible mind’, so that a 
difference of images is brought into an immediacy of the present occurrence 
of the continuity of images. We regard this description of the schematic form 
of mind in relation to present images, in terms of Bergson’s theory of the 
abstraction of intellectual reflection, as a model for occurrences of abstraction 
in the process of painting. I see this similar to Henry’s claim, where he 
suggests that the greatest of painters and artists in general, have both lived 
and presented art to the extent that it conveyed a ‘mode of metaphysical 
knowledge’.37 In these instances art was regarded as a means to acquire 
knowledge by passing beyond or looking into the visible and the appearance 
of things and in doing so, ‘passing behind’ the material surface of reality. In 
this sense the individual discovers the ‘mystery of things, the secret of the 
                                                     
36 ME. pp. 227-228 
37 Ibid., p. 18   
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universe’.38 However, in the above passage, Bergson explains that intuition is 
a process of consciousness ‘bending back’ from its course of attention 
towards the immediacy of action, and thereby allowing for the reflection of 
experience, and the virtual image to be reinserted into the present, actualised 
as novel images made different and distinct from an initial representation. 
 
Explaining the difference of Kandinsky’s early abstract expressionist works 
to the different developments during his career at the Bauhaus, Gooding 
states, ‘A painting is more than a picture of those forces that shape external 
reality and that make the world and the universe what it is; it is, rather, an 
enactment of them’.39 According to this notion of ‘enactment’, Gooding 
suggests that Kandinsky thinks these ‘forces‘ should not only be identified by 
aesthetic value and aesthetic considerations, but more so, aesthetics and 
aesthetic production should be considered as the result from the affective 
process of these ‘forces’ becoming. Here again we may draw comparisons to 
Bergson’s notion of the abstraction of thought from the context of the 
progression and evolutionary passage of life. Where Kandinsky describes the 
‘inner necessity’ of the painter towards expression of painting, and this in 
relation to abstraction, he is not suggesting a transcendental and immaterial 
process detached from the body, but rather, the living emotions, the continuity 
of memory, and the bodily and sensorial responses immediate to the 
materiality of the world. As Henry regards ‘the essential truth’ to be that the 
true reality is the invisible, our ‘radical subjectivity is this reality’, and 
therefore, that this reality is the content of art from which art is the constant 
attempt to express the abstraction of life itself.40
 
Henry then restates that the 
means of representing the abstract content, as both external and visible, may 
be understood as an externalization, namely, a ‘materialization’ of the 
invisible.41
 This is similar to Bergson’s view of the movement and evolution 
of life as a gradual passage, proceeding from the actual and material to the 
                                                     
38 Mel Gooding, Abstract Art, (London: Tate Publishing, 2001), p. 26 
39 Ibid., p. 18   
40 Ibid., p. 21 
41 Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible, (London Continuum, 2009) p. 21   
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experience and states, 
 
This operation, which is the very operation of life, consists in the gradual passage from the 
less realized to the more realized, from the intensive to the extensive, from a reciprocal 
implication of parts to their juxtaposition. Intellectual effort is something of this kind. In 
analyzing it, I have pressed as far as I could, on the simplest and at the same time the most 
abstract example, the growing materialization of the immaterial which is characteristic of 
vital activity.42 
 
Here, Bergson’s explanation is clearly elaborating on the psychical growth of 
life in relation to the material universe. This description resounds with 
Kandinsky’s notion of the spiritual evolution through art. Henry explains that 
Kandinsky’s view of abstraction held that life is an increasing realisation of 
itself through material means, and hence, a spiritual development through the 
materialisation of painting. And this brings us back to Bergson, who suggests 
that the operation of life from the inner domain to the projection of its 
expression in the outer domain, is a process of the actualisation of its 
influence, and the continuous change of evolution. 
 
For Henry argues that the definition of a work of art is the externalization, the 
visible manifestation of the invisible, abstract content. Hence, the artwork is 
the confluence, and ‘the inseparable joining together’ of the first and second 
elements, the content and the means, the internal and the external. Henry 
suggests that this ‘fusion’ of the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ may be made 
clearer.43
 
Though this view privileges the external, material form of artwork, 
this is one way of understanding the fusion of the ‘content’ and the ‘means’.   
Henry explains that, in this regard, Kandinsky is in opposition.   Kandinsky 
does not regard the ‘radical interiority of subjectivity’ as a ‘virtuality’, 
‘abstract’ in the sense that it is devoid of reality, and therefore dependent upon 
external elements to become real. Rather, Henry explains that Kandinsky 
                                                     
42 ME. p. 230   
43 Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible (London Continuum 2009). p. 23, Note: This may be 
an place for the insertion of Brian Massumi’s analysis of virtuality, and pending further 
research, commentary on a Hegelian position in regards to interiority vs. exteriority, and the 
value of subjectivity.   
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would hold that ‘subjectivity defines this reality’, that is, there is a plenitude 
of being, through which the growth, and thereby expression of life is total. 
Still, Henry furthers the notion of the centrality of subjectivity, suggesting 
that the exteriority of the art work ‘borrows its content’ from the subjectivity 
of life, that is, the exteriority of the artwork is the concentration of the 
determinant interiority. Here, Henry has radicalised Kandinsky’s theories to 
mean that the inner tension as a spiritual reserve in the painter, as a means for 
perceiving and sensorial experience to be one in the same, is the occurrence 
of an individual manifestation of life.   
 
We do not follow Henry’s interpretation to its fullest extent, particularly as he 
admits that the subjective condition is an ‘interiority’.  Rather,  in  Bergsonian  
terms,  we understand that a particular sense of subjectivity may be attributed 
to the painter, but only in so far as the painter is a living centre of images, and 
thereby a ‘conditional’ subjectivity  by the actualisation of experience from 
the condition of images given by the  materiality  of  the  process.  In 
Bergsonian terms the totality of images in duration as an ever occurring 
present is anterior to the being of the subject?  In other words, Henry’s notion 
of subjectivity particular to the process of painting is resolutely a notion of 
life referring to its own self through the medium.  Whereas, from Bergson’s 
perspective, the consciousness of the painter is an individuated process of life, 
and as a living centre of images, is subjective, in so far as this subjectivity is 
subject to the conditions of the material images.44 
 
Intellectual Effort of Abstraction 
 
We now turn back to Bergson’s discussion of the effort of intellection. 
Though intellection is ‘the effort we have to put forward in order to 
comprehend and interpret’, it is also the continuous condition of the overall 
operations of mental life. Whether the degree of exertion of such effort is 
either that of the lower order, such as simple motor functions, or of the higher 
                                                     
44 J. Mullarkey, 'The psycho-physics of phenomenology: Bergson and Henry'. 
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order, such that the condition of mind is a concentration on the higher planes 
of consciousness as that in ‘imaged idea’, intellection is of both kinds.  Of the 
former of these, intellection is a basic form of Interpreting confronted 
perception, and is usually manifest in some automatic response.45
 
For 
example, an object perceived is immediately associated with its function or 
the custom of its use, and as this occurs with little or no delay, it would seem 
to be innate and therefore an automatic form of intellection. Language in 
conversation is another example by which the mind ‘remains on one and the 
same ‘plane of consciousness’, and this is demonstrated when we speak.  The 
word order and compatibility flow with ease as the intelligence is not 
concerned with the distinction and assemblage of each word to the letter, but 
is rather relaxed, and so speaking comes as a successive movement. 
 
However, what Bergson regards as ‘true intellection’, is the dual movement 
of the mind between images of perception and the meaning, or the association 
of idea.46 By this he means that the specific direction or even point of origin 
for this movement between image and meaning begins with the abstract 
idea.47
 
For example, by reading a text, we follow the parts of a sentence to 
obtain its expression. From a correlation of expressions we derive an abstract 
idea. The abstraction is of the collective parts in relation to the assemblage of 
expressions conveyed.48
 
In a similar sense, Bergson maintains that 
perceptions, such as hearing and seeing, are given form only through the 
preceding of ideas.49
 
Hence, pure memory as a higher plane of consciousness 
is not of distinct images but, through the vertical or descending movement of 
mind to the attention of perception, ‘slips into it and supplies most of its 
content’.50 In this sense, the effort of intellection is characterized as a type of 
interpretation, a process of understanding, and the dual or reciprocal 
movement between memory and concrete perceptions to abstract ideas. 
                                                     
45 Ibid. pp. 163-164 
46 Ibid. pp. 164-165 
47 Ibid. p. 165   
48 Ibid. p. 165   
49 Ibid. p. 165   
50 Ibid. p. 166   
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Furthermore, since the idea or the meaning is ‘before everything’, the 
operation of intellection is primarily the descending of mind as compelled by 
the force of pure memory. Hence, intellection is the engagement of abstract 
ideas, as a process of dissociation of images from the content of the continuity 
of images, to be reintegrated back to the immediacy of images. This suggests 
that image-ideas are extractions from the flow of reality, but by their very 
abstraction, they are formations of percept-image and concept images that 
enhance the mutual reverberation and reconstruction of images as a dynamic 
process of thinking and perceiving affected by the perceptual field and 
returning to the flow of perception-images. 
 
 
Image of an Image 
 
Bergson claims that the abstraction of thought is the result of pure memory, 
as this is represented or is ‘imaged idea’. In other words, intellection is a type 
of medium, by which we, ‘come and touch the perceived images’.51 
Accordingly, the mind is a dynamic component in the flux of images as it is 
a conduit, receptor, or agent for the direction of further contact of abstract 
thought (hypothetically disembodied) with the 
images of sensory perception. In short, Bergson maintains that intellection is 
interpretation, interpretation is reconstruction, and in the process of these, the 
mind within and of abstract ideas descends through planes of consciousness, 
and then makes contact with sensory perception. Hence the essence of 
Bergson’s broader thesis, that of the relation of mind to matter, is predicated 
on the presence of memory, as immanent to living. 
Voluntary attention or mental effort is accompanied by a type of ‘pre-
perception’, that is, an anticipated ‘image’ and the precedent of meaning prior 
to the perceived images to which such meaning would be ascribed. It is to say 
then, that attention in general is a result of the ‘projection of images’ 
emanating from a pre-image impulse. This impulse affectively coalesces with 
                                                     
51 Ibid. p. 167   
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images in such a manner that a descension through a strata of consciousness 
occurs towards perception.52
 
In other words, attention is effective insofar as 
it serves to ‘intensify the image’, or as it is an ‘enrichment of perception’.53 
Perception is then, not simply the process of receiving images in succession, 
but rather, the rapid oscillation of attention. From this movement of images 
there is the issuing of the schematic idea, wherein the relations of the images 
is designated a meaning. Hence, comprehension of what is perceived, or 
paying attention to what is perceived, is the development of the idea through 
the images.54
 
Bergson reaffirms this by explaining that towards schematic 
idea the feeling of intellectual effort comes from the concentration of 
consciousness and the process of the formulation from images as a 
‘continuous transformation of abstract relations’.55 
 
In order to verify this claim, Bergson maintains that invention is an example 
of the ‘highest forms of intellectual effort’.56 Influenced by Ribot’s theories, 
Bergson suggests that effort toward the invention of ideas and concepts may 
be characterized as a retrograde of mind. He describes this as the movement 
from an entire system of images, maintained over a ‘thread of means’ so as to 
discover the ‘composition of elements’, that is, the differing images that 
compose the whole. However, such a preconception is not entirely whole or 
complete without the parts or the individual images. Therefore the art of 
invention is the affirming of the function of abstract thinking, and hence, the 
effort of intellectual work, in terms of the struggle to convert the whole or the 
scheme, into the subordinate parts or the concrete images.  According to 
Bergson, invention is no less than a dynamic process whereby, the schematic 
idea becomes an imaged idea. In other words from the example of invention, 
the preconception of the inventor evokes in the mind, through trial and error, 
the discovery of those pieces that will ‘realize’ the whole, the resultant form 
                                                     
52 Ibid. p. 169   
53 Ibid. p. 169   
54 Ibid. p. 169   
55 Ibid. p. 169   
56 Ibid. p. 170   
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of what was initially abstract thinking.57
 
The same may be said about the 
compositional works of musicians or writers. In both cases the artists are 
compelled by an otherwise abstract idea or ‘impression’. However, Bergson 
claims that this initial impression does not remain unchanged. Through the 
schematic idea, the operation by which the incorporeal becomes materialized, 
the idea is ‘modified by the very images which it endeavors to be filled in’.58 
By this, Bergson maintains that a pure memory is the impetus of invention, 
creativity, inspiration, etc., and the artists or the agent of intellectual effort, is 
the vehicle through which scheme affects image and in turn the image 
reverberates and modifies the process of the vertical movement. 
 
 
Inner Necessity and Abstraction 
 
Though, Bergson’s view of abstraction is related to the development of mind 
through the efforts of the consciousness of the individual, this situationism of 
consciousness, is also important for Kandinsky’s claims of the role of the 
painter in the abstraction.  Kandinsky suggests a similar descriptor of the 
subjective condition in terms of the ‘unalterable law of art’.  Accordingly, by 
‘inner necessity’ means that it is the necessity of the living form to be 
determined by the invisible forces of its own becoming, so that internal 
conditions (i.e. conditions of life individuated), are relational to the totality of 
movements of life. In this way, it follows that the construction of the external 
world, the ‘material elements’, as these are dependent and subordinate in 
relation to the form, are located in a ‘spiritual reality, situated within our 
being’.59   In other words, the internal is the experience of art, returning to the 
continuum of life, and by the determinative and recognizant nature of the 
process of art, it is therefore, the sole principle of aesthetic creation. 
Furthermore, this ‘inner necessity’ is an ‘absolute necessity’ for the freedom 
of form in art. Kandinsky indicates this interrelation of an inner necessity with 
                                                     
57 Ibid. p. 170 -171 
58 Ibid. p. 171 
59 Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible, (London Continuum, 2009) p. 25   
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an outward manifestation of spiritual growth, stating, 
Consciously or unconsciously, artists turn gradually toward and emphasis on their materials, 
examining them spiritually, weighing in the balance the inner worth of those elements out of 
which their art is best suited to create.60 
 
Here Kandinsky expresses the notion of the creative drive of artists, and the 
spiritual view of the material means for the expression, and thereby, 
conflating the view of an inner domain to the spiritual elements in both the 
artist and the material, and thereby, a dual relation of interiorities affective to 
each other for spiritual growth. 
 
 
Abstraction and Progression 
 
This is consistent with Gooding’s overall analysis of the history of abstract 
art, suggesting that it is not only art moving from representation to abstraction 
so as to reveal aspects of reality that seems inaccessible to earlier forms. But 
instead, abstraction is the affective relation of life, by way of internal 
necessity and hence, the subjective condition to the appearance of things, the 
visible, and in relation to the external world. It is for this matter that 
abstraction may be regarded as a progression of art, in terms of the turn of 
experience, marked by its expressions that reveal   through the activities 
charged by the proximity to the source of experience.  The result is the 
creation of new forms, issuing from the deeper relations between the inner 
nature of the artist, and the material things of the painting process. This is 
closely related with Bergson, where difference in nature occur only on the 
side of duration, by which duration is itself is the process of continuous 
presence-ing in which all things vary qualitatively through time. However, 
Henry claims that Kandinsky’s theory of abstraction resolved the 
subordination of the object to subject, or of a subjective condition of the 
painter to his objective depiction of the world. Instead, he claims that 
                                                     
60 Wassily Kandinsky. Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art, ed. by Kenneth C. Lindsay 
and Peter Vergo, (Da Capo Press, New York: 1994), p. 153 
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Kandinsky not only resisted the measurement of art according to the visible 
world and its laws, but his inventions contradicted representation, such that 
the distinction of the painter to the materiality of painting began gradually to 
dissolve more and more.61
 
Simply put, the material becoming of painting is 
itself the immediate expression emerging first from the subjective condition, 
the inner necessity of abstraction, the movement of life. Here again, we argue 
that this is in accord with Bergson’s view of consciousness as its object 
immediate to the continuity of images in duration. 
Abstraction through Time 
 
Now we turn our attention to more recent theoretical considerations of 
abstraction so that we further our comparisons that indicate the importance of 
a Bergsonian philosophy of process that emphasizes the ‘turn of experience’ 
with Kandinskian theories of abstraction. It is to Greenberg’s theory of 
abstraction, that Benjamin asserts that abstraction is more philosophically 
privileged than other conceptualisations because of its link with the iteration 
of becoming.62  Although, abstraction is not a break with traditional 
representational painting, in that, the space of abstraction is irreducible to 
representational space, Benjamin claims that because painting and time  are  
of  a  complex  relationship,  questions  of  the  development  of  art,  are 
themselves of the process of abstraction, and reveal the nature of the present.63 
However, Benjamin also indicates that according to Greenberg’s general 
conception, contextualising abstraction in terms of modernism may be a 
limited interpretation of abstraction in art. For Greenberg, the development of 
theories of abstraction in terms of the non-representational, stemmed from the 
rejection of the modernist view of both the ‘aesthetic autonomy’ and the role 
of painting as a material analogue to visual change. His commentary places 
                                                     
61 Ibid., p. 31 
62 Andrew Benjamin, Art, Mimesis, and The Avant-Garde, Routledge, London and 
New York, 1991, pp. 1, 29, 32-38.   
63 Ibid., p. 8 More detail will be given particularly in terms of Benjamin’s theory of 
‘presence’ and ‘giveness’ 
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emphasis on the process of engagement with the material, and thereby, the 
turn of conceptual priorities to the process as itself the conditions of 
communication and exchange oriented to the medium specifity.64 Benjamin 
argues that contrary to Greenbergian analysis, we should extend abstraction 
beyond its contextualisation of conceptual change in modernism, and to 
consider the understanding of abstraction by to recognising its present 
interarticulation with claims about time. For our concern about the nature of 
abstraction related to the turn of painterly experience, Benjamin’s claims offer 
support, particularly as his analysis argues for the an ontologization of 
abstraction such that it is a primordial connection of painting with time.  This 
is not only a  supportive detail from a contemporary philosophical view that 
may be folded into a Bergsonian interpretation, but it also coincides with the 
Henrian view of the pathos life, as necessarily a condition of living 
experience, so that a condition of abstraction is the revealing of life to its own 
encounter. In other words, abstraction is a specific quality of experience, so 
that in a philosophy of painting we must continue  the question  of  abstraction  
in  terms  of  the  process  of  painting,  as an experiential process, continuous 
with the material actualisations the expressions of activities revealing 
difference to the present.65
 
In short, the developments of abstraction as a 
process within the development of art are situated in relation to an 
interrelation of processes of time, such that the process of painting, as itself a 
means for the difference of life through its expressions, is abstraction 
immanent to its becoming.66 
 
However, within Greenberg’s analysis, there is the connection made between 
                                                     
64 Z. Kocur and S. Leung, 'Theory in contemporary art since 1985'.pp. 279-280 
65 Wassily Kandinsky. Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art, ed. by Kenneth C. Lindsay 
and Peter Vergo, (Da Capo Press, New York: 1994), p. 153  ‘Temporality’ and ‘historical 
time’, are pivot concepts for Benjamin, in the sense that they situate abstraction in a 
material ontology of becoming. For our concerns, we compare evaluate this according to 
Bergson’s notion of abstraction, that is as the emergence of difference of images of thought, 
from the bending of mind back on itself, as an inflection of life towards its creative and 
endless change. 
66 Ibid., p. 9 More detail to come on this notion of an ‘economy of abstraction’ following 
Benjamin’s preliminary developments.   
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the sensuous and the ‘at-onceness’ of abstract art. The consequence of this is 
the claim that with the encounter with work of art the viewer is ‘summoned 
and gathered into one point in the continuum of duration. ‘In other words, for 
Benjamin, the art object maintains and contains a ‘singular temporality‘, one 
that is linked to the activity of viewing, so that it also satisfies the demand ‘to 
be given immediately.  However, for 
Greenberg, this means linking this identification of another source of 
signification to ‘the immediacy, or ‘at-onceness’, of the object’.67 Although, 
Greenberg’s view from this notion of the ‘co-presence’of the art work in time, 
his view is that the art work is ‘singular and thus received as a singularity at 
one and the same time’. For Benjamin, the work of art, that is, the ontic 
qualities of being and doing, allow the work of art to be subsumed in a 
temporal context, as an object of becoming, that is, as that which opens up 
‘the economy of abstraction’.68 
 
In view of this, Osbourne turns to the content of each perspective, asking of 
‘the relationship of abstraction to expression’.69 He explains that the early 
movement of abstraction was rooted on ‘Neo-Platonic metaphysical realism’, 
based on the search for spiritual values, and because of this, he claims that the 
‘act of painting’ was regarded as ‘the expression of spiritual values’.70 
Through this continual exploration, experimentation, and development of 
painting based on a ‘spiritual’ emphasis, the quality of the ‘spiritual’, as 
Osbourne suggests, progressively becomes weaker. Overall, Osbourne 
indicates that according to this multifaceted perspective with the early 
perspectives of abstract art, ‘Abstraction pre-figuratively expresses an ideal 
transcendence, through, but not, in the act of painting’. However this is a 
distinction between the abstraction of Mondrian and Malevich, and this 
differs from Kandinsky’s in the sense of the spiritual categorization of 
abstraction. 
                                                     
67 Ibid., p. 13. cf. Michel Henry’s theory of the ‘invisible’ as a condition of life.   
68 Ibid. p. 13 
69 Ibid., p. 63 
70 Ibid., p. 63 
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Concerning singularity, though it appears that ‘single texture’ and ‘at once-
ness’ are solely temporal terms, Benjamin explains that they are spatial 
designations with a temporal correlate. He suggests that the time in question 
is the instant; the time in which what there is ‘all there at once’. And still, 
what allows for giving and receiving to take place at this point in time is the 
interior of the frame containing a ‘single texture’. In short, singularity is the 
presence of a singular space, so that, singularity of space interplays with the 
singularity of time. A move against, what he regards as the conflation of space 
and time, Benjamin claims that the former is the precondition that governs the 
latter.71
  Furthermore, recalling Greenberg’s reference to an ontology of 
painting, according to his formulation of ‘being and doing’, Benjamin 
suggests that art works have a greater complexity than that which is given in 
the simultaneity of giving and receiving.   That is to say, the presence of this 
complexity means that the possibility of immediacy is an occurring secondary 
effect of a ‘more complex set-up’.72 
 
Beyond Reduction: Abstraction as Growth and Event 
 
The consequence that follows from this is the recasting of notions of ‘mind’ 
and the redefinition of the ‘eye’. In the first place, abstraction having been 
freed from the work of negation, but now we are presented with the necessity 
to hold to the presence of a complex ontology, as this is the basis for any 
description of the art work, and the singularity of the activity and work of art. 
Benjamin states, ‘Once the question of painting-here abstraction- is posed 
beyond the hold of simple reductions, then the inherent difficulty of the 
question ‘what is abstraction‘, must be allowed to endure’. What can be seen 
from this, as touched upon throughout the preceding development of his 
position, is that Benjamin must remain faithful to this ‘complex‘ material 
ontology, one that seems to engender a sense of the autonomy of abstraction, 
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72 Ibid. p. 27 
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a non-personal and subjectively devoid process of becoming. The resistance 
to any consideration of the subjective role of the artist, viewer, critic in the 
activity of art, the identifying as such as ‘simple reduction’ which close down 
the possibility of art, these seem to stem from a rather unorthodox view. 
Where he regards abstraction as a ‘staged encounter’, we understand this to 
mean that abstraction is itself a reflexive becoming in the process of painting. 
Here, we take the points of both Osbourne and Benjamin as not only 
paralleling Henry’s theory of material phenomenology, but more specifically, 
complementing his notion of ‘content’ and ‘forms’ of abstraction. 
 
However, for Benjamin ‘time’ is the lynchpin in the sense that it is involved 
in the movement of both elements, time at work in the work of interpretation 
of the painting, as well as time at work in immediate work of painting. In view 
of this, Benjamin’s theory of the work of art, suggests the painting process is 
a temporal context, from which forms of thinking emerge. According to 
Benjamin, abstraction is the activity of the process of painting, such that the 
‘art’s work’, is an impersonal, non-subjective, pluralistic movement of the 
process. Moreover, Benjamin’s most direct claim to his own question ‘what 
is abstraction?’ is that painting activities are continuously given in the 
process, and therefore, abstractions ‘have been given’, within its own 
becoming.73
  We take Benjamin’s analysis as support to further a Bergsonian 
theory of abstraction, by which we mean, a quality of the continuously 
becoming nature of painting, immanent to the turn of its experience, through 
its process in time. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Art history and the projections of contemporary art theory are testament to the 
conceptual developments in the Modernist period.  It is no less excessive, to 
highlight the importance of the theories and philosophical considerations of 
                                                     
73 Ibid., p. 27 Here Benjamin offers an endnote indicating that he has developed a theory of 
the event, but this is presented in another work, ‘The Plural Event’. 
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the concept of abstraction.  We have considered the concept from Bergson’s 
philosophy of the becoming of reality according to a plurality of levels of 
existence and the ontology of images to designate the existential significance 
of images in abstraction within the process of painting. We argued that what 
is most significant about the concept, is that it may be investigated in the 
philosophical attendance to the experiences most immediate to the expressive 
practices in painting, as well as being regarded in terms of the temporal 
rhythms of occasion the change of the visual and actual painted image.  Art 
theory records ‘abstract painting’ as a style of art that sees form and colour as 
full expressions, and regards the notion of abstraction as  an idiom and equally 
as an aesthetic value of a period in the history of painting in which painting 
becomes distinct form the naturalistic portrayal of the world. What history 
records supports our view, looking towards the identification of philosophies 
of becoming in the process of painting, that painting is the potential for the 
abstraction of life, and the capacity for differentiation of visual and painterly 
developments. From this context, in this chapter we advanced further from 
the underlying development of a process based image ontology to argue that 
abstraction is a progression of images, as equally a psychical evolution 
through conscious reflection and a material differentiation in the enactment 
of abstractive experience in the painting application. In this regard, we 
considered a Bergsonian theory of abstraction as an extension of Bergson’s 
ontology of images, describing abstraction as dynamic property of immediate 
to the expansion of experience, and particular to painting, immanent to the 
expressions of the process. By this we considered an extension of a 
Bergsonian theory of abstraction in connection with Kandinskian informed 
notion of abstraction, namely that by abstract, we are dealing with a ‘spiritual’ 
growth, as a development of the living and vital forces of reality’, such that 
these emerge from the actualisation of painterly experiences through the 
intertwining of the painter’s ‘inner tonality’ with the reverberations and 
harmonic effect of the materiality of painting.  In both instances of Bergsonian 
and Kandinskian approaches to abstraction, we see abstraction as the 
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atmosphere of change, immanent to the becoming of the life in the living 
visual forms of painting. 
 
In the previous chapter, we dealt with Bergson’s concept of movement, so 
that in this chapter the concept of abstraction is regarded as literally a natural 
progression, to that extent that Bergson describes both abstraction and the 
evolution of consciousness as a complex interchange of patterns of thought in 
terms of the divergence generated by the movement of thinking bending back 
to thoughts of experience.74 However, it is through a reading of Henry, and 
his consideration of the role of abstraction in Kandinsky’s painting, that we 
are able to bring the view of the ‘animation of painting’ in terms of the 
experience of life experiencing itself back towards a Bergsonian conception 
of change and evolving nature of life as  immanent to time.  In other words, 
through a mediation of Henry’s theory, a theory that rejects notions of 
‘intentionality’ and privileges the ‘object’, we regarded abstraction from both 
Bergson and Kandinsky as a principle of change, a radical shift of difference 
from the affective resonance of experience immediate to the living contact of 
expression. 75For Bergson, abstraction is a mode of extraction of images, and 
the impoverishment of perception, but only in so far as it is the potential of 
conscious reflection to bring the experience to bear on the immediacy of the 
material world, and thereby, the difference of expressions according to 
experience continuously adapting to flux of duration. Here movement is 
considered as a relation to the series of thoughts in the process of thinking, a 
process which ‘unrolls itself in a chain of abstract reasoning’. From the 
previous chapter’s discussion of the concept of movement, we see the 
kinesthetic quality of abstraction evident in painting, such that movement and 
thinking are necessary in the activity of rendering paintings.   
 
                                                     
74 John Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy, Edinburgh University Press, 1999, pp. 
181-183 
75 M. O'Sullivan, Michel Henry: Incarnation, Barbarism, and Belief: an Introduction 
to the Work of Michel Henry (Peter Lang, 2006). pp. 174-175 
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Here, the abstraction is at once an occurrence from among the development 
of thought and the coming into being of images. In this sense we are 
considering abstraction in terms of modes of differentiation among a process 
of images. This means that the condition of abstraction in painting is as much 
to do with the relation between the ‘unrolling’ of a painter’s thoughts as it is 
with the painting’s composition as ‘movements of locomotion’. Equally, and 
more specifically from a Bergsonian context the condition of abstraction is 
also with the relation between the painter’s acuity of perception in terms of 
difference of degrees of ‘attention to life’ , (as Bergson states), and taken to 
support the activity of pictorial formulation. Bergsonian theory of painting 
must insist that by abstraction, the activities of the painter and the event of the 
art-image are as a mutual affect of the dissociation of images from the total 
strata of the flow of images, and the immobilisation of thoughts and bound to 
a concept of that involves the becoming of conceptual and perceptual forms. 
We have considered the concept of abstraction from Bergson’s philosophy, to 
then compare this view with the concept of abstraction in Kandinsky’s theory, 
in order to argue that from the process of painting, abstraction is a condition 
of thinking as a difference of thought in the painting.  From Bergson’s view 
of the process of conceptualisation and percept-formulation emerging from 
the relation of movements of thinking in process, applied to the thinking in 
the context of painting, the correlation is the painter’s activity with the 
painting medium.   We see how this view resonates with Kandinsky’s 
understanding of the indefinable appearance of the elements of painting 
proceeding from expressions in the painting process that echo ‘inner sounds’. 
Having developed our argument from the basis of Bergson’s theory of image, 
we argued that abstraction related to Bergson’s philosophy of change, by 
which the abstractive nature of the process of painting is immanent to its 
continuously changing forms. In other words, from the endlessly changing 
content of life, the process of painting as a living process necessarily changes 
by difference of movements occurring within passage of movements. 
However, we also argued that in the process of painting, the painter’s 
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perceptual experience together with the immediacy of his activity is the 
subjectiviation of movement and the concomitant immobilisations of images 
as an interstitial condition within time. This implies that the physical 
composition and plastic processes of painting are the result of reciprocal 
affects: from the correlating modes of perception and activity to the 
expressive content of material objects and the painted visual experience.76
 
In 
this sense, we have argued that abstraction is a double movement of both the 
perception of consciousness and the material correspondence as mutually 
affective to each other. Specific to the activity of the process of painting, and 
that is from both psychical and material images becoming, the painted images, 
are as differing images persisting in a material expression. Here the double 
movements of perception related to painting are attributed to the immediate 
presence of perception, as the temporal quality of the activity, and the re-
presentation of the activity of the states of perception, as the spatial quality of 
the material objecthood of painting. With this double movement, in terms of 
painting as process continuously coming into being, as such the correlation of 
the perception in the activity and perception in the material image is an 
intersubjective state for abstraction. Furthermore, we indicated that the 
individuality of processes with the total reality of painting assumes 
abstraction, as the perception given to the activity is non- systematic growth 
of images from the activity of painting and paintings as material 
compositions.77
  
And  finally  we  argued  that  abstraction  is  then,  of  the  
creative occurrences within the process, resulting in the event of the painted 
image as a visual novelty.
 
Therefore, from a principle view of an ontology of 
images, abstraction is the time of variation in the process of painting.   
Painting as a process of living experiences encountering the difference and 
change among the material application and the medium’s actualisation of 
                                                     
76 MM. p. 147. I base this claim on Bergson’s explanation of the differing philosophical 
elaborations of existence in terms of a time, that is, reality as a self-sufficient flow or 
passage. In this way, all things are durations, coming-into-being, as opposed to the view of 
the continuity of qualities of mind and matter as a a heterogenous flowing time. 
77 MM. p. 5 
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images, becomes through the abstraction of its identity, by force of the change 
immanent to the experience of its activities and the movement of its 
expressions. 
 
 
    
190  
 
 
Frame 
Chapter 5 -Theory of Frame & Picture Plane 
 
When a ray of light passes from one medium into another, it usually traverses it with a change 
of direction. […] But, if we suppose centers of real, that is to say of spontaneous, activity, 
the rays which reach it, and which interest that activity, instead of passing through those 
centers, will appear to be reflected and thus indicate the outlines of the object which emits 
them. […] This is as much to say that there is for images merely a difference of degree, and 
not of kind, between being and being consciously perceived. 1 
 
A mass of hills in every conceivable, imaginable colour. Of all different sizes, but always the 
same shape, i.e.: Broad at the bottom, with swollen sides and rounded tops. Simple, ordinary 
hills, of the kind one always imagines and never sees. [...] I observed all this from above and 
request you likewise to look down on it from above.2 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the process of painting the frame establishes a distinction, functions as an 
analogic device, and in the most literal sense, is a material boundary of the 
applications of the activities.  The frame delimits a specific pictorial space 
which is otherwise environed by other non-specific material surfaces for the 
process of painting. The presence of the frame is itself a continual perspective, 
as it is an embodiment of an attitude of attention, directing experience towards 
the process of painting, and maintains a visual horizon for painterly activity 
and events. More often than not, the frame or the activity of fram-ing is 
regarded as a figurative or metaphorical expression of the direction of sight 
or see-ing. However idiomatic the notion of frame has become, we understand 
its specific definition as an actual, real thing, as the basis it’s becoming source 
of philosophical speculation.  The ‘frame’ is already the predication of the 
activities and the identities that we understand by it.  In this regard, the frame 
is indicates something, and by doing so, it is the signification of something 
                                                     
1 MM. p. 37   
2 Wassily Kandsinky, ‘Hills’, Sounds [Klänge]’, (Munich, 1912), Kandinsky: Complete 
Writings on Art. Ed. by Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo. (Da Capo Press. New York 
1994). pp. 295-296.. 
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other than itself.   In this chapter we will consider Bergson’s theory of 
perception as a basis for a theory of contemporary theory of frame and its 
relation to a philosophy of duration attended by the practice of painting.  
However, it is from Derrida’s theory of the frame that that we will ground our 
Bergsonian interpretation.  Our strategy is to  compare Bergson’s theory of 
perception in terms of framing, with Kandinsky’s view of the non-
representational quality of painting, so that by this comparison we see that the 
becoming of painterly experience and the creation of novel expressive forms 
as being independent acutalisations of becoming,  immanent to the orientation 
of process of painting.  Because Derrida’s philosophy was concerned with the 
iterability of being, that is, the capacity of modes of signification of meaning 
according to the syntactically linked groups of signs without a dependence 
upon any specific reference or link to a codifying context, we see comparisons 
of Derridian thinking with the Bergsonian view of the indeterminate nature of 
thinking in process.  More specifically, however, is that as Derrida regards 
the condition of iterability as the condition of any systematic activity that 
signifies, we consider the view of the difference of thinking, as already 
operating in our argument of the differing modes of philosophy (i.e. 
philosophy through painting). In painting, the process is and the reciprocity 
of its expressions are also a relation to the frame, such that the process is a 
proceeds according to the identity of the frame, an identification of painting 
which signifies its open and ever-evolving activity. In other words, the frame 
implies the becoming activity immanent to its own expression.   
 
In this chapter, we will we will be using the gerundive expression of the term 
‘frame’, to elaborate the consideration of  the physical frame as a material 
structure that distinguishes the material planar surface, but also as a perceptual 
selection that orients the visual and attentive centrality of the actualizations 
of activities. The question of becoming in painting, furthered by the admission 
of the different modes of philosophy, compels us to question the frame’s 
identity with the process of painting.  In this way, our theory of the frame 
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supports a processual view of the activity of framing, by which the planar 
surface of the painting is transfixed from the materiality of the real, 
pronouncing the movement of consciousness to the contact of concrete 
perceptions. The framing process is embodied in the event and the expressions 
of the art-object, and though the physical frame marks the culmination and 
completion of the process of painting, the planar surface itself is intrinsically 
imbued with the qualities of situatedness, that is to say, the planar surface is 
the embodiment of the enframing of perceptual experience and the movement 
of conscious expressions as an embedding of images.3
  
Here we will rely on our reading of Derrida’s study, The Truth in Painting, to 
understand the ‘inframing of a frame’, as this follows his elaboration of the 
logic of  ‘parergon’.  Accordinly, we will attempt to return to a Bergsonian 
view of the painting process, by consideration of Derrida’s insight of how the 
identity of the frame is related to both the activity of the contouring, selection, 
and delimiting of perception towards the painting, as well as the frame 
becoming part of the activity of the perception   towards the process of 
painting.4 Follow his line of thought we will argue that the frame indicates 
multiple views, the varying perceptual takes of the material world, and the 
concentration of process of the painter’s bodily activity in response to the 
conditions of perceptual selections. According to the view, we will regard the 
frame and its activity in terms of an ontological cut for the registering of the 
images projected by the painter’s bodily presence and affected by the painting 
medium.5
 
In this regard, we will argue that the frame is a condition of 
mediation from among the flow of perceptions. Either as a physical boundary 
or as a mode of the activity perception, and that is to say, perceiving as a 
continuous process of framing, we will consider this dual nature of the frame. 
So in terms of both its physical and perceptual qualities, we will suggest that 
the frame is a particular threshold. As an actual or virtual ‘windows’, the 
                                                     
3 M. B. Hansen, New philosophy for new media (MIT press, 2004). p. 11-13 
4 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington and Ian 
McLeod, University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed., 1987 
5 A. Friedberg, The virtual window: from Alberti to Microsoft (Taylor & Francis, 2008).p. 9 
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frame is the occurrence through which the possibility of a multiplicity of 
images are concentrated and presented. We recognize that the term frame 
operates in both literal and metaphoric registers. For on the one hand, a frame 
is the physical parameter of a pictorial image, regarded as a material 
boundary. On the other hand, the activity we associate with the frame, 
framing, is a discursive device, as a descriptor of our epistemic engagement 
with the visual field: as a caption, selection, and hence, directed attention. We 
will argue from Bergson’s theory of perception towards a theory of frame, so 
as to argue that the demarcation of a surface is an ontological condition of the 
perception to affectivity in the process of painting. This is then necessarily 
connected to the planar surface. The frame and surface of the art-object, 
parallels the shifting of movements and the difference of durations. The frame 
is a material boundary and typically an adornment to indicate and highlight 
the static surface. However the actual activity of perceptions, as themselves a 
continuous enframing of images from the painter’s activity, indicates the 
surface as already the site of affectivity and the occurrence of perceptions 
given by the painting medium. The aim of this conceptualisation is to connect 
Bergson’s ontology of images, with the process of painting, by which this 
quality of framing is already in the surface, and that this activity inversely 
conditions the subjectivity of the painter by way of the, embodiment of 
expressive and creative extensions as given by the process of its event. 
Therefore, we regard the frame as both liminal activity of perception and 
spatial orientations by its materiality, so that the frame and the activity of 
framing are differences of degree of the realization of perceptions between 
the tension of material and mental processes, to the extent that the becoming-
image is a corollary of the element of frame. Furthermore, the planar surface, 
the relation of the painter to the painting, is also the relation of a frame as an 
object, to the content of the framing image. 
 
By considering the frame in terms of process, this already means that the 
frame is not only regarded according to a discourse of two-dimensional 
representation. Rather, concerned with framing as an active property of 
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visuality (i.e. coming-to-see, as a type of seizing through perception and 
comprehension), it is more accurate to think of in terms of unique material 
and conceptual qualities. Unique in the sense that it’s material nature 
‘indicates’ or ‘marks the limits’, and by showing as such, it is also a 
conceptual device marking transition. The qualities in tandem, suggests that 
the frame is to be considered in terms of both mental and material realities. 
Because of its unique qualities, we also regard the possibilities of the frame. 
In other words, with the frame regarded as a process of denotation, (i.e. an 
object and activity of focus), this implies that the frame is part of process 
towards actualization. For example, in the process of painting, the material 
frame grasps and thereby allows the occurrence of an affective ‘open’ for 
expression and the continual activity in painting. 
 
The frame is regarded as both a characteristic of mind and material, and as a 
condition of images asserts an ontological identity. According to Bergson’s 
theory of image, we associate the frame with the localizing of movements of 
the painting image, as something more than a description of single-point 
perspective. Therefore, we maintain a theory of frame within this context, 
beyond characterizations such as ‘perspectival windows’, or as, ‘symbolic 
systems’, as these only suggest a secondary field, a place that is more or less 
than the whole and undivided immanent plane. 
 
 
An Active Boundary 
 
Therefore, ‘framing’, is a term referring to the activity of consciousness, and 
the contouring of the event of the painted image. This leads us to then consider 
the physical frame as a material boundary:  as a signifier of distinction, 
between that of perceptual attention, conceptual concentration, and the 
consequent condensing of images. The process of painting includes the 
activity of ‘framing‘, which is a mode of enclosing, and extraction, from 
among the field of perception.  However, because painting is creative, the 
activity of framing is also mode of revealing and disclosing. Minnisale argues 
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that the visual and pictorial quality of consciousness is intertwined with 
characteristics of direction and organization within visual conscious.  From 
Minnisale’s point, we argue that among the processes in painting the activity 
of framing is the evidence of the activity of consciousness. 
 
In this respect, according to a Bergsonian analysis, such a movement in terms 
of ‘frame to frame’, would involve a consideration of ‘shifts of attention’, that 
is, the merging of thinking and perceiving by varying degrees, the shifting of 
images from images.  From the ‘framed’ and immediate image, with the 
activity of consciousness, there is then indefinite potential of framing from 
the inherent oscillating movement. This movement is the movement of 
consciousness from the activity of the selection of images. It is a process of 
contraction and condensing, and ultimately, it is movement towards the 
singularizing of images that are themselves the events of a multiplicity of 
images.  Although, from within the frame visual consciousness is a series of 
selection (i.e. framing towards frames), this means that the initial delimited 
material surface is not reducible to other singular frames by a specific 
ordering.  In other words, the frame indicates to the painter’s conscious 
perception the direction of consciousness’ arrangements, which results in the 
compounding of views.  The frame indicates visual movement and correlates 
attention of consciousness. 
 
 
The Movement of Frame: Selection and Perception 
 
‘We maintain, as against materialism, that perception overflows infinitely the cerebral state; 
but we have endeavored to establish, as against idealism, that matter goes in every direction 
beyond our representation of it, a representation which the mind has gathered out of it, so to 
speak, by an intelligent choice.’6 
 
First, if we were to suggest that by mind in the sense of Bergson’s terms, we 
meant ‘perception’, then we would take this to also mean that mental or 
                                                     
6 MM. p. 187   
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cerebral activity does not originate from matter, but is active from within 
matter. In the same turn, we understand Bergson to mean that matter is not 
solely subsumed within an array of mental correspondences, but rather, matter 
is given to the dynamic characterization of mental and material processes. In 
either case, in Bergsonian terms, this is a necessary binary from which to 
characterize the conceptual quality of the frame and the activity of ‘framing’. 
In this sense framing is an active creation of perception. What is perceived by 
the painter is a choice, a selection, an extraction by a subjectively oriented 
activity of consciousness according to the affects given to its experience and 
the occurrence of actualization from the materiality of the process of painting. 
Bergson identifies this as ‘intelligent choice’, and this indicates that 
perception mutually coincides with the movement and variability of the 
materiality of the painting medium, there also occurs site-specific activities 
of mind, in which the states of perception vary according to coordinates of 
attention. In other words, Bergson indicates a particular process of perception 
that is at once a denotation of the material plane as well as an immediate limit 
of attention, i.e. the incisive, selective activity of thought. For that reason, 
such notions as selection, choice, and gathering, all indicate types of mental 
states. These states differ from the immediate, present oriented sensations, 
and Bergson explains, 
 
‘But we must not confound the data of the senses, which perceive the moment, with the 
artifice of the mind, which recomposes it. [...] The division is the work of our imagination, 
of which indeed the office is to fix the moving images of our ordinary experience, like the 
instantaneous flash which illuminates a stormy landscape by night.’7 
 
 
Here the perception of the senses differs from thought-perception. Sensing is 
continuous, and hence, indistinguishable from the activity and movement of 
the material plane, whereas thought (i.e. ‘the artifice of the mind’) is a 
reworking, a secondary ordering, and therefore a constitutive element 
                                                     
7 MM. p. 189   
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operating in terms of formations, structuring, composition, etc. Thought is 
regarded as a type of ordering, as an attitude to codify, it breaks from the flow 
of things, and as such, it is a division of the unified becoming-image. Bergson 
explains this as the imagination: the retrograde activity of thought, thinking 
as a condition that divides an otherwise continuous whole. Imagination, 
properly termed, is quality of imag-ing, which is a condition delimiting or 
fixing images from the mobile image spectrum. This is a condition in which 
the painter is engaged. As a creative process, painting is also a process that is 
reflective, thoughtful, accented by deliberate pause of bodily movement 
followed by its exertions of activity. In this atmosphere of differing activities 
and movements, varying choices and applications are made. It is the sense of 
varying choice coupled with thinking that we argue as being characteristic of 
framing activity, implicit in the process of painting. 
 
Thinking Frame and Giving Toward Space 
 
Minnisale also claims that painting is a philosophical engagement, a type of 
thinking which is manifest through the ‘marks’ of expression. Similarly, in 
Bergsonian terms, painting as a type of thinking is evident in the choice of 
movements and the projection of activities within the process.  That is, 
reflective consciousness affects the selecting and the ‘fixing’ of images from 
among the continuum of moving images. The result of the painters brush, the 
notational marking is itself a transfixing of an image. This is relevant to 
Bergson’s thesis of the ‘delimiting and selection of images’.8   However, 
though perception is continuous with the image-world, for Bergson, the 
process of visualizing, or the condition of visualization, imply extraction, (i.e. 
‘diminution’), and furthermore, the individuation of perception from ‘living 
centres of image’, and the condition of subjective selection from the total 
image spectrum.  In this respect, visual imagery is already a reduction and as 
such, it is the consequence of the representational attitude of the intellectual 
nature of consciousness.  In other words, unique movement of the intellect, 
                                                     
8 MM. pp. 179-190 
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characterized here as a type of demarcation, (i.e. the limiting and bounding of 
images), already assume an enframing movement of perception. Because all 
of reality is a relation in terms of the totality of duration, the articulating affect 
of reflective thought, as a continuous image parsing condition, is also a 
process of re-integration into the indefinite, unified, and yet heterogeneous 
whole of nature. What we want to argue by this, that framing is a mode of 
thinking, a continuous filtering of images that then relays the experience of 
images back towards spatial extension, such that the selection of images as 
the transposing of experience towards expression is spacing of images in 
coordination with a situated object. 
 
Visual Consciousness: Framing and Thinking 
 
From the contraction of images to the expansion into the image, for Bergson, 
there is an inherent tension between the interpenetration of material images 
and the continual juxtaposition of images of perception. Furthermore, this 
juxtaposing of perception (namely the quality of conscious reflection), differs 
from ordinary experience. 
Visual consciousness is a form of thinking that is active towards the 
sequencing of images, in the ordering of images, but, by which images are 
carved out from the flow of images and rendered immobile in thought.  This 
means that our apprehension is conditioned by a perspective of stability, such 
that, thinking entails immobilizing, and hence, visualization is a prolonging 
of a pattern of images particular to an attitude of consciousness. According to 
Bergson the field of perception is given from the material conditions of 
reality.  Hence, the material site of conscious reflection, the body, is a means 
of movement which facilitates the extraction of images, and in the case of the 
artist, the generating of specific material-images.  Bergson distils this notion 
further, considering the individuation of consciousness, he states, 
 
Already the power conferred on the individual consciousness of manifesting itself in acts 
requires the formation of distinct material zones, which correspond respectively to living 
bodies: in this sense, my own body and, by analogy with it, all other living bodies are those 
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which I have the most right to distinguish in the continuity of the universe. But this body 
itself, as soon as it is constituted and distinguished, is led by its various needs to distinguish 
a constitute other bodies.9 
 
We argue from Bergson’s theory of ‘distinct material zones’ that the planar 
structure, as indicated by the physical frame, is also delimited, rendered 
immobile by thought, and regarded as significant as it is conceptually isolated 
and situated as the site for continuity of the activity of conscious perception. 
However, what he has indicated here is that because of the active nature of 
consciousness, it is drawn by its own necessity, to the extent that the 
manifestation of consciousness, and ultimately its expression, necessitates the 
‘formation’ of regions with definite limits. In other words, consciousness, 
which goes beyond the body, requires the partition of the material continuum, 
so that the physical body, itself a material ‘zone’, is a ‘distinguished’ aspect 
of the world. Here Bergson’s statement, offers a descriptive basis for the 
delimiting quality of conscious reflection, and hence, a basis for the 
characterization of the process of the frame. 
 
 
 
Material Zones – Delimiting and Ordering 
 
We have argued that the ‘frame’ is the notation of the delimiting activity of 
consciousness. Though this is a figurative usage of the term, it is only so 
because it represents a material derived formation, constructed by 
consciousness. In this sense, the frame is also a form that is derived from 
consciousness itself. However, the frame is a physical, concrete constitution, 
in which the abstract activity of consciousness is made distinct.10
   
From this, 
we argue that framing is a quality of perception, such that framing is the 
medial interchange from the immediacy of conscious perception to the 
perception given by the painting media, allowing for the movement from the 
                                                     
9 MM. p. 198 
10 MM. p. 208 
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selection of images to be transformed into the physical and extended material 
images. As Bergson’s theory maintains that the body’s perception is a 
subtractive and delimiting activity of images from the field of perception, and 
that consciousness thought is a further ‘condensing’ of these selected images, 
here we assert that the bounding and limitations of conscious perception is 
necessarily the condition of framing intrinsic to the process of painting. 
However, by considering the frame in terms of the conscious reflection and 
the becoming of conscious expression, we are concerned with how the images 
of conscious perception are different from world of images.  To put this in 
Bergsonian terms, for our encounter with the frame, the images are of the 
frame, in the sense that by the attitude of conscious experience, the images 
are subordinated from the flow of totality of images of the real by the framing 
referent. In view of Bergson’s analysis of the image in terms of durations of 
time, it is interesting that where it is ostensibly a question of a Bergsonian 
philosophy of time in relation to the concerns of contemporary discourses of 
philosophy in painting, limited comparisons and connections have been made 
to Derrida’s work.  By considering how Derrida’s philosophy is similar to 
Bergson’s, as both share a fundamental concern with the relations of time to 
writing,  the visual arts, and the devices of potential for thinking and towards 
the expanding of possibilities of philosophy.11  In particular, Derrida’s 
analysis here, compared to Bergson’s helps us understand this confrontation 
of an ontology of images with the processes enacted by the frame, a device 
that for Bergsonian thinking is a relation of the contractions of perception, as 
engendered by the movements of the bodily activity,  towards the becoming 
of incipient action, and summarily in the Derridean sense, the significance of 
movement for movement to come.   As with the Bergsonian concern of the 
differing modes of philosophy to engage in the ever-changing flow reality, 
and thereby as continuous activity of exerting itself toward a perpetual 
                                                     
11 For a consideration  of Bergson’s analysis of writing in relation to the expressions 
of philosophical experience,  and with a view to Derrida’s commitment to a 
semiological formulation of the question of differance, see, The Creative Mind: An 
Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by M. L. Andison.   
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movement of the grounding of its experience, this philosophical outlook 
resonates with Derrida’s sense of the ever-changing elaboration of thinking 
and expression, by the demands of the difference of thinking that is mirrored 
in its activity.  According to Derrida’s view, the ‘deconstruction’ of 
philosophical’ thinking is a method immanent to its investigations and what 
it derives by the expressions of its realisations.  Though philosophical 
thinking does not wish to deny the potential of its expression, but rather, 
questions the modes of its reasoning.  Similarly with the process of painting, 
the frame and the picture plane, as seemingly encounters of the limitations of 
the process and devices by which the identity of the process must proceed 
from, these also indicate by the situated conditions of painterly expressions, 
that the ‘limits’ of painting are the origination of the potential to go beyond 
the certainty of visual experience.   
 
In The Truth in Painting, Derrida’s analysis of framing device in painting in 
terms of the ‘parergon’, indicates the infinite and potential nature of 
possibility, such that in the case of the frame as an ‘indicia’ of perception, the 
condition of the indefinite and continuous quality of perception in time 
exceeds the occasion of its actualisation.  Here, the frame is signify-ing, and 
thereby showing more than what is being shown. And rather than the frame 
encasing the picture plane, and the plane as itself, a bound-ing the limitation 
of painting, the frame’s activity is active towards the becoming of perception.  
The frame and the picture plane are themselves, active through the indicating 
of what has been actualised through the process of painting and in this 
doubling, reflect the depth of images beyond its appearance, the permeation 
of a plurality of images. In this regard, Derrida’s theory of the frame is a 
theory of the conveyance of the material devices in the visual arts, to be 
understood in terms of the movements immanent to them in time, and thereby 
to reconsider the happening or the becoming of existence beyond its own end. 
In the instance of painting, the process is prompted by its own encounter, an 
encounter with its becoming that is self-differentiating. It may be argued that 
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the frame indicates ‘what is’ and the picture plane reveals ‘what is’, by this 
inward referencing the visual experience is opening the possibility of what is 
different by engaging the encounter of experience with the alternative or 
counter experiential conditions. As with Bergson’s insistence of a 
philosophical outlook towards its identity in relation to the ever-present flow 
of reality, Derrida’s interest by the device of the frame is to assert a critique 
of our own habits of thinking, to challenge the static nature of conscious 
reflection. In other words, applied to a Bergsonian advancement of the 
philosophy of painting in process, Derrida’s connection of the frame as 
signifying the projections of change immanent to its own process, allows us 
to consider how the signifying conditions of the identity of painting are 
immediate to its temporality. The frame identified by its activity and its 
reference to the picture plane, are reflexive of the excess of time and the 
immanence of change in the processes of images.    
 
In The Truth in Painting, as he is driven by a concern for the visual arts, that 
we wish to couple his view with the challenge of a contemporary Bergsonian 
philosophy of painting.  In the manner of the Bergsonian outlook of 
philosophy through its process, the appropriation of Derrida’s insight helps 
us think the frame, and thereby, continuing through all the elements of the 
painting process, to think through the process of painting.  For example, 
Antliff’s study of Bergson’s thought and Matisse’s painting, pivots on the 
review of a Derridian critique of aesthetic autonomy, to advance the 
Bergsonian philosophical view the corporeal temporality, and by comparison, 
to reaffirm a metaphysics of a rhythmic duration.12 Here, Derrida’s analysis 
carries with it the elements of such metaphysical outlook.   More specifically, 
it is with the ‘significance of frame’, per Derridian theory, that the identity of 
painting as a temporal process may be fully understood.  In terms of the 
parergon, Derrida’s analysis question the nature of the boundaries or the limits 
                                                     
12 Mark Antliff, ‘The Rhythms of duration: Bergson and the art of Matisse’, in The 
New Bergson, edited by John Mullarkey, p. 12 
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that indicate aesthetic activity. Derrida’s question of the identification of the 
work of art, is poised as a question of whether the frame and the picture plane, 
are presented or presenting, as an ‘opening’ or a ‘closing’ of the frames 
content. He states, although apparently opposed - or because opposed - these 
two bordering determinations of what the parergon is working against (the 
operation of free energy and of pure produc-tivity or the operation of the 
essential lack) are the same (metaphysical).13  
 
According to this elaboration, we see how Derrida’s description of the frame, 
termed as a ‘parergon’, furthers its characterisation as a Mobius-like 
boundary, marking a content within, directing the visual experience to move 
inwards, and thereby, furthering the interiorization of conscious perception.   
Llewelyn’s commentary suggests that Derrida’s analysis is both an 
understanding and a questioning of our understanding of the logic of the 
signification of the parergon.14 From this view, we see from the above passage 
that the parergonal characterisation of the frame, and of our own 
understanding referenced by the frame, are amorphous and unqualified 
denotations of place, presence, and appearance. Derrida’s concern in his 
analysis is the broaching of the grounding identity of the frame, while also, 
opening the possibility of the frame, through the philosophy of frame to think 
beyond and through its identity.  In this regard, we can understand how 
Derrida’s philosophy of frame, was a thinking reframed by its own subject.  
Here the challenge to philosophical understanding is made clear, which is how 
to overcome the limitations of what it has established as the limitations of its 
meaning.  What are the borders of thinking through painting?   
 
This question is instigated by the Derridian theory and echoes the Bergsonian 
concern with the narrowing of thought by the limitations imposed according 
                                                     
13 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Ian 
McLeod, The University of Chicago Press, p. 81  
14 John LLewelyn, Derrida on the threshold of Sense, The Macmillan Press, 
London, 1986, p. 120 
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to the intellectual mirroring of the becoming of reality.  It is by our thinking 
of the world in terms of the experience we have of it that concerns Bergson, 
because we prioritize the reflection in reference to the experience rather than 
the approximation of attention, and a concentration of thinking in the 
immediacy of experience towards its own becoming. Similarly with Derrida’s 
challenge to the tradition of phenomenology, he questions not the interest of 
phenomenology to seek the presence of phenomena, or to venture the 
impossible investigation of the source of being, but rather, how to extend our 
experience towards its most full experience, and thereby continuing our 
opening towards the impossibility of experience.15 Here again we find the 
Derridian imperative towards experience integrated with the Bergsonian 
charge to do philosophy that overcomes its own identity, applicable to the 
process of painting as the potential for the ‘opening’ of experience by the 
reciprocity of expressions and the conditions of its difference through time. 
Echoing Bergson’s sense of the contingency of and ever-present totality of 
images in duration, Derrida’s expression of the possibility of framing to 
differentiate from the structures of thinking through the frame, he states,  
 
 So only a certain practice of theoretical fiction can work (against) the 
frame, (make or let it)  play (it) (against) itself. Don’t forget, 
nonetheless, that the content, the object of this  theoretical fiction (the 
free energy of the originary process, its pure productivity) is 
 metaphysics, onto-theology itself.16 
 
We see Derrida’s conviction towards the differentiation (differance) of 
thinking from itself,  expressed in the above passage, in terms of the ‘working’ 
of the content, and ‘playing’ of the object, as involving the process of being 
identified through its signification.  The frame is working, as it is both the 
                                                     
15 Gary Gutting, Thinking the Impossible, Oxford University Press, pp. 157-169 
16 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Ian 
McLeod, The University of Chicago Press, p. 81 
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identification of its work and the action of anticipating something more than 
what it marks.  Here it is the impetus of the differance of perception that the 
production of the painting extends to its ‘origin’, by the production that makes 
the productivity possible, i.e. the distinguishing marks of its identity heralding 
the becoming of its identity.  What Derrida regards as the ‘originary process’ 
is only understood by the thinking of the frame and its activity towards the 
picture plane. And by the ‘content’, the process of painting reveals the is 
immanent to it, that is, the multiplicity of visual experiences and the plurality 
of expressions of living forms. This view contextualized in a Bergsonian 
metaphysics of duration, would mean that Derrida’s critique of the 
ontologization of sense, according to the frame and picture plane as indicia of 
the stasis of thought, this is the projection of perceptual and contributes to 
habits thinking that we must overcome to express more, that is, to go beyond 
the limits of our expressions.   This reinforces the immanence view of the 
actual and creative process in painting.
 
But as the same instant, the frame as 
a demarcation of the content from the otherwise, external reality, excites the 
process of painting by directing the attention of expression to go beyond its 
own sense, and constitutes the expansion of perception that its content 
conveys.   
 
Here we argue from a Derridian informed perspective, that a Bergsonian 
theory of perception defines a theory of frame in the process of painting as 
the movements of conscious perception in relation to the framing movements 
of its selection, by which the activity of the process occurs. In other words, 
the frame is at once the demarcation of perception, and by its movement the 
inner transfer of painterly experiences given by the painting media as 
mutually situated by the site of occurrence. Therefore, the frame is both a 
literal device that indicates this site of exchange from the mutual 
correspondence of painter to painting media, but also, in Derridian terms, 
framing is a ‘discourse’ of perceptions and the interface of realised and 
experiential images with actual and expressive material images. This also 
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suggest the potential for shifts in the attitudes of attention in the activity of 
the painting process. Moreover, this constant framing, as an enframing of 
image through the actualisation of their expression in the physical painting 
media, is embodied as it is embedded in the process.  
 
In this sense, we concede to a Derridian ‘discourse of the frame’, to the extent 
that the perceptual and sensorial activities of the painter are themselves a 
framing and visual system. However a philosophy of painting that engages 
with the metaphysics of painting, demands that we recognise the duplicity of 
the frame and the picture plane so that at once the painter in the process 
understands the de-limitation of the devices of its materialisation, experiences 
the demarcation as the encounter with the realisation, so as to advance to the 
alterity of what is demarcated  and attune the attention of expression in 
accordance with the creative and novel emergence of painted imagery.  
Bergsonian philosophy requires that philosophising in the process of painting 
is to make our contact of perceptions most immediate to the experiential 
encounters of the process.  This requires an attentive recognition and must 
appeal to a sense of memory that is regulated according to various degrees of 
tensions of images, opening to the scope for choice and the indetermination 
of activities towards the incipiency of action.  In this sense, perception does 
not occur in the service of ‘knowledge’, but is relation to differentials of 
action. Because of this, philosophy is radically ‘empirical’ when philosophy 
is active in its efforts to align thinking through the approximations of its 
reflection, i.e. philosophizing as becoming most immediate to its experiential 
encounter. We see the lucidity of the Bergsonian challenge to philosophy, as 
philosophical thinking pertaining to its own process in time, with Derrida’s 
question in which he asks, ‘Is not the idea of knowledge and of the theory of 
knowledge, in itself metaphysical’.17 Here, we see that question challenges 
conscious perception, by considering the continuous presence of perception 
                                                     
17 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s 
Theory of Signs, Northwestern University Press, 1973,  p. 3 
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as a field of change in duration, the material universe is always in process, but 
regarded as presenting through modes of presence. Therefore, as with the 
Bergsonian outlook towards the creativity of thinking,  extended to the 
continuous origination of visual experience the expression of images 
becoming in painting, Derrida’s question also challenge our presupposition 
of fixed relations in modes of expressions and allows us to understand the  
determinate orientations of our thinking in terms of a constancy of being 
present.  Specific to the question of the frame and the picture plane, we 
assume the challenge of Bergson’s outlook of the becoming of thinking, 
coupled with Derrida’s elaborations of the deliberation of differance issuing 
from identities of fixity and constancy, to suggest the borders and surfaces of 
that identify painting are also enacting the possibilities of its process.   In this 
sense, the frame and picture plane may be regarded as the approximation of 
activity necessary for potential of creation immanent to their identities. 
Because the material continuum is an indefinite whole within duration, 
Bergson claims that by perceiving, conscious perception  is a  process  of  
fixing,  selecting,  and  ultimately,  immobilizing  images. The frame and the 
picture plane are those ‘placeholders’ and equally, by the dynamic’s of their 
materialisation they are the opening for expansions of expression to proceed. 
Relating consciousness specifically to visual perception, ‘framing’ is a 
condition of condensing the duration of perceptions. 
 
Conscious perception is necessarily an enclosing or a taking in of ‘long 
intervals’, that is, a discontinuous view (i.e. ‘quasi-instantaneous’), from the 
continual flow of the becoming image-world, for the purpose of continual 
movement and anticipated activity. By this notion of ‘long intervals’, 
Bergson is describing the vibrational character of reality. All images are 
of varying durational degrees, some of a more dense existence, and some 
of a lesser, dissolved, or ‘diluted’ existence. What is enclosed by the 
immediate viewing of perception, as Bergson claims, consists of an infinity 
of elements, an indefinite multitude of pictorial possibilities, all subject to a 
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condensing into single and successive, instantaneous images. In this respect, 
suggesting that the frame is itself a specific activity, uniquely material and 
mental, we can see that Bergson’s notion of the differentiated 
characterization of perception applies, so that to frame ‘means to immobilize’, 
but the degree of this immobilisation is dependent upon the duration of the 
consciousness, so that the process of framing is also a durational activity of 
perception in time. 
 
In the process of painting, the arrangement, compositions, and all degrees of 
material applications and productions through the painting media operate 
by way of the influence of perceptions given to conscious perception itself. 
Hence, the condition of framing is an affectivity of the materiality of 
painting, so that the enclosing of images is registered in the painter’s 
conscious perception according to the influence of the continuity of images 
of reality. However, Bergson elaborates further on the nature of our 
perception, indicating that our imagination, that is our faculty of forming 
images, operates in the same way. For our perception engages the world as 
immobile, rendering the world as a serial procession of views, and in a similar 
way, our faculty of imagination invents images as fixed, following one from 
another. He states, 
 
But our imagination, which is pre-occupied above all by the convenience of expression and 
the exigencies of material life, prefers to invent the natural order of the terms.  Accustomed 
to seek its fulcrum in a world of ready-made motionless images, of which the apparent fixity 
is hardly anything else but the outward reflection of the stability of our lower needs, it cannot 
help believing that rest is anterior to motion, cannot avoid taking rest as its point of reference 
and its abiding place.18 
 
Bergson continues to highlight this distinctive nature of our perception, and 
consequently of our imagination, both as tending to spatialize the material 
world, grasping the world as ‘ready-made’, and thereby, delimiting the 
material continuum according to successive ‘motionless images’. What this 
                                                     
18 MM. p. 217 
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means for the process of painting is that the delimited images, become 
the images in the painting process, expounding the imagination and its vital 
expression. In this respect, the physical art image is a specific surface where 
the material continuum and the activity of conscious perception merge.  
Minnisale speaks of art production in a similar sense, 
suggesting that the activity of art is an organizing process of consciousness 
that proceeds by ‘framed thoughts’.19 
 
Here Minnisale is initially describing the expositional nature of consciousness 
through the process of delimitation. Similar to what Bergson has 
indicated, that is, that with the ‘symbolic attitude’ and ‘expression’ typical of 
imagination, the c ontoured image, as a constructed image, exposes to 
attention, to the concentration of perception, a specific image, an isolable 
image, from the material continuum. 
According to Minnisale, art is not simply reproduction, rather it is the activity 
of consciousness, as he terms it an ‘unfolding’.  This parallels closely with a 
Bergsonian view in that the nature of the art image, is a becoming process, a 
process of ordering, for both incipient formulation of other images and the 
designation of spatial ‘zones’, and made distinct from the material continuum. 
 
For the viewer’s conscious perception this arrangement serves as guide as 
well as an established structure, such that framing is an ordering of perception, 
at once an embracing structure directing the focus of attention and a structure 
that also 
instigates further activity by compelling the viewer’s visual investigations 
towards continual framing.
14 
Here Minnisale offers the rather strong 
suggestion that the frame-in-the-frame is the initial scope of meaning and 
definition of the nature of consciousness. He indirectly points out that the 
‘form of points and lines’ are also instances of frames-in-the-frames.  The 
                                                     
19 Gregory Minnisale, Framing Consciousness in Art: Transcultural Perspectives, 
(Amsterdam and  
New York: Rodopi, 2009). p. 11 
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effect of frame-in-the-frame is a quality of visual perception, but it is also the 
occurrence of the materialization of consciousness, that is, the total process of 
painting, i.e. gestural marks, painted applications, plastic elements. 
 
 
Deleuze: Concept of Frame 
 
However, on this topic of the ‘form’ of the frame and the nature of its activity, 
it is to Deleuze that we should turn.  Deleuze offers us a specific analysis of 
the frame, one that elaborates more on the quality of its nature.  From a 
Bergsonian position, Deleuze comments on the attitude of the framed image, 
elaborating on the implicit dual quality, that is, the articulated and hence, 
immobilized image as well as the continuity and movement of the image. 
 
We will call the determination of a closed system a relatively closed system which includes 
everything which is present in the image- sets, characters and props- framing.20 
 
With this comment on the frame Deleuze conceptualises the frame beyond 
the ‘enclosing’ of images. For Deleuze the frame also forms a complex whole 
of active elements so that by the notion of ‘framing’ he regards an inherent 
activity that precedes the frame.   According to Deleuze’s theory, the frame is 
not a specific ordering or an embedded schema to be unfolded, rather, though 
he indicates there are ‘sets’, these are specified, yet indeterminate states of a 
plurality of images.21
 Deleuze is echoing Bergson’s insistence of the 
‘immense multiplicity’ of movements within the depths of the framed image, 
and therefore, the indefinite possibilities of arrangements and compositions 
of images-innumerable parts within a closed ‘system’. Deleuze indicates, that 
the ‘tendencies’ (i.e. activity) of the frame is to move from the whole to its 
parts, that is, the focus of conscious attention which is both a condensing of 
the material continuum and a differentiating of ‘moments of an intenser life’. 
                                                     
20 G. Deleuze, 'Cinema 1: the movement-image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam', Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Originally published as Cinéma 
1. p.12 
21 Ibid. p. 12 
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In other words, depending on the direction of the framing movement of 
consciousness, there is a qualitative distinction of the frame: either of a greater 
magnitude of the intensity of conscious perception (ie. towards saturation) or 
a lesser magnitude of intensity (towards rarefaction). Deleuze couples this 
dynamism, implicit in the nature of the frame, with its physicality. Although 
it is a material apparatus that is visually distinct and therefore marking a 
separate image from the visual field it also functions in a symbolic role and, 
hence, is of a signifying activity. Deleuze  claims  that  the  frame  as  a  ‘closed  
system’  is  conceived  as  ‘spatial compositions’, such that it serves as a 
receptacle. 22 
 
Though this comment entails the distinction of the material frame according 
to ‘geometrical or physical‘ dimensions, perhaps more significantly, what is 
also indicated is the qualitative nature of the frame in terms of spatialization. 
As with Bergson matter is defined in terms of extension, and, since the world 
is the unity of disparate images (i.e. a pluralistic whole), the image-world as 
also the material continuum, is referred to in terms of extension. Deleuze 
maintains that the frame is a ‘composition’, and by this, suggests that it is an 
activity of formation that is at once a selective process that ‘takes from’ as 
well as a formative process that unifies. This process results in a physical 
object, and thereby, a defined spatial distinction that also contains other 
images. This is supportive of a Bergsonian view, whereby the frame may be 
considered the designation of a particular surface, itself a singular image, by 
the thought of the surface immediate to conscious perception. In this sense we 
are arguing that the planar surface becomes both the idea of the experience of 
the process of painting, but also a site for the potential of expression as given 
by the multiplicity of images through the painting medium. However, aside 
from the active movement of consciousness in framing, Deleuze also 
indicates that it is a ‘limitation’.23 
                                                     
22 Ibid. p. 13 
23 Ibid. p. 13 
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From this comment there are two points to highlight.24
 
The first is that the 
action of framing, the selective activity of visual consciousness, is also a 
delimiting process. In this sense, though the framed image is also a 
multiplicity of images, it has a terminal point or a frontier beyond which the 
selective activity of consciousness is retained. However, the selective activity 
of consciousness is not altogether limited. Instead, as the ‘legible’ frame 
refers to conscious attention, framing as ‘limitation’ is a twofold meaning. 
Firstly, by limitation this means that the frame is the furthest boundary of the 
plurality of images. But secondly, it is a separation or division from the 
indefinite images of the material continuum. Deleuze explains that conscious 
framing, the selective nature of perceptual consciousness, is also affected by 
the image that is framed. From the framing of the image, the frame is either 
an abstract form which separates, or, rather in terms of the totality of the 
movement of images it distinguishes, these images as images becoming 
expanded.25
   
The frame is at once a specific form that functions to define and 
limit its subject, but equally, it also stages ‘zones’ or ‘bands‘ that are active 
with movement, movement continually towards successive changes (i.e. a 
plurality of images). Deleuze concedes that the movement from frame to 
frame is a constant qualitative shifting of properties, so that, by the inexorable 
activity of movement, frames are not a fixing design. Rather, frames are to be 
considered, in terms of positions, or attitudes of marking out and enclosures. 
In view of this, we argue that framing is a direction of activity and a 
movement that entails the becoming of qualitative differences, and therefore, 
in the process of painting, the frame is a non-specific isolation of an image, 
                                                     
24 Ibid. p. 13 Here Deleuze is referring to Kant’s philosophy of the sublime detailed in The 
Critique of Judgement. Kant’s claim of the subjective position in relation to the sublime, the 
faculty of reason in relation to that which surpasses its ability to measure or calculate, is 
correlated with the forms of the objects distinct from the formless quality of the sublime. 
Accordingly, beauty is in relation to the forms of objects, so that, it is contingent on the 
limitation of objects - the designation of boundaries to separate things. In short, this 
bounding orientation of the beautiful means that it is of a mathematical understanding, that 
to know beauty is to necessity ‘limitation’ as an element of aesthetic comprehension. 
Whereas, the Sublime is that which is boundless, a non-designated form, dynamic insofar as 
it is that which goes beyond reason. 
25 Ibid. p. 13 
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itself a collected whole of multiple elements. 
 
The Frame and Framing’s Affect: Differentiating Subjects 
 
The frame is more than a relational materiality.  Deleuze claims that the 
process of framing is a ‘relation to the data that it communicates to the 
spectators’.   In this sense,  the  frame  is,  ‘informatic’,  which  means  that  
is  its  as  process  in  itself, containing a multiplicity of images, but ‘rarefied’ 
from the flux of images.26
 According to Deleuze’s analysis, the frame entails 
a process of systematization of ‘parts’, an ordering of images from among a 
myriad of images. Hence, with the frame there is potential of a movement of 
images to become distinct images, to become actualized as a ‘closed system’. 
But, even though the framed image is a designated system, in the sense that it 
is ‘closed’, it remains in connection, and continuous with the total image 
spectrum. This is to say that, from the enclosure of frame, the image(s) is 
continuous as an affective relation among the properties of the parts. 
 
For Deleuze, the frame is both an originating system, ‘saturated’ with ‘sets’ 
and ‘parts’ relative and hence in potential affective relation to the viewer or 
other systems, as well as, a distinct and specific system relating to its own 
order, and of a ‘dynamic-physical’ quality. In both senses, it retains a force 
that stimulates change within its own system or process of becoming. 
According to Deleuze, the frame determines, the frame chooses, the frame 
selects, the frame affects, etc. and as such, we must consider the frame and 
framing activity in terms of consciousness, insofar as the material presence as 
well as the predicative attitude of the frame originates an order of images. 
 
For Minnisale, the frame is not solely consciousness, nor is the activity of 
framing exclusive of mental projection.27
 
Though he argues for the 
connection of the physical frame to consciousness, Minnisale’s theory like 
Deleuze’s notion of the frame’s, suggests that the frame is a ‘limitation’ but 
                                                     
26 Ibid. p. 18 
27 Gregory Minnisale. Framing Consciousness in Art (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 
2009). pp. 21-22 
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it is also a tendency. For Deleuze, as there is no separation of consciousness 
for the world, towards the world, from the world, etc. the frame is 
paradigmatic of the differentiating whole. Though it may be said that an 
immanent-ontological system is the context for Deleuze’s conception, 
Minnisale’s orientation with phenomenology, with a concentration on a 
specific study of consciousness offers a comparative theory of the frame. 
 
In this sense, we may be able to extend Minnisale’s notions of frame and 
framing as figuring in art works and with the experience of art, as a creative 
element and a conduit of novelty.  But even further, this conception of the 
frame conveys in ontological terms, the correlation of the dynamic-physical 
becoming of material and the sensual and perspectival becoming of ideas.   
The frame, as an activity has more to do with a process of movement in 
regards to the relation of materiality and perception, than with distinctions 
between materiality and perception. That is to say, framing is a specific 
activity within duration, whereby movement instigated by the frame (i.e. a 
material condition affecting consciousness) is an instance of the ‘transference 
of a state’.28   According to Bergson, we argue that the frame is an ontological 
condition.  The frame is the resultant activity from a source of ‘being’ that is 
‘able to fix’ 
 
 
From Frame to Plane 
 
Moreover, this state of ‘fixing’ can be further evaluated by its degree of 
tension registered according to an ‘intensity of life’.29 In the process of 
painting, this would mean that as the painter’s body and the substance of 
                                                     
28 MM. p. 202. This is phrase is the heading of section four in the third chapter of the text. It 
is in this section that I have garnered a Bergsonian perspective to not only clarify 
Minnisale’s position, but to insist on the resolution of the problematic binary, ‘sensations 
and movements’, or more specific to the ‘frame’ and consciousness, ‘unextended 
heterogeneity and extended homogeneity’.   
29 Ibid. pp. 17-19 Here I refer the reader back to chapter one in which I elaborate on 
Bergson’s theory of intuition in regards to his conception of the image-world. 
    
215  
 
 
Frame 
painting are in movement, perception and consciousness are of a process of 
division, by which the frame is a mode of condensing and delimiting a period 
of activity of consciousness and the event of its expression.30
   
And here, 
Kandinsky’s exuberant claim in defense of the work of painting immediate to 
surfaces, suggests that the active space for painting activity is not limited to a 
rigid conception of planar surface or of a specified framed medium for 
paintings expression, stating, 
 
He who is able to experience the bare wall is best prepared to experience a work of painting: 
the two-dimensional, immaculately smooth, vertical, well-proportioned, ‘reticent’, assertive, 
introspective wall, its limits externally determined, radiating outwards is virtually a primary 
‘element’.31 
 
Here Kandinsky’s praise is of the openness of painting, exclaiming that 
painting goes beyond the format of the easel, and for that matter,  extending 
the ‘framing’ of the process of painting beyond the idea of its presentation 
and the traditional thought of its modes of appearance.  We argue here that 
from our view of Bergson’s theory of perception, in which the frame is a 
characteristic of the perceptual contact and the transitional encounter of the 
painter’s activity with the perceptions given by the painting medium, it is the 
surficial physicality by which expressions are given force towards becoming. 
Kandinsky’s description suggests that the primary ‘element’ of painting is 
also a force of the experience of the work of painting.  By this we see how the 
spiritual element of Kandinsky’s theory has extended beyond the inner 
tonality of the painter, and rather suggests a mutual correspondence of tones, 
                                                     
30 Ibid. pp. 135, 200, and 202. cf. Bergson’s theory of ‘imagination’, chapter 1. Here I am 
drawing comparison with Minnisale’s word choice, ‘Embedding’, which means a selected 
object fixed deeply in a surrounding mass, to the activity of mind upon matter, that is the 
‘carving’ of images, the selection of a portion from a greater whole. With Bergson’s 
conception of the image, this notion of ‘embedding’ may be adopted to convey the idea that 
despite the body as predisposed to action, the potential of representations from the activity 
of imagination registers with the divisible multiplicity of the material world that ‘goes in 
every direction beyond our representation of it’. 
31 Wassily Kandinsky, ‘Bare Wall’ [‘Die kahle Wand], (Dessau, 1929) Kandinsky: 
Complete Writings on Art, ed. by Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo (Da Capo Press, 
New York 1994), p. 732 
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that is, rhythms of life radiating from the surface of paintings situated 
occurrence. 
 
 
 
 
Expression and Planar Tendency 
 
Here we transition to the consideration of both the material and the primary 
conceptual structures of painting, the most fundamental material facet of the 
event of the process of painting, the material surface. From the frame we move 
to the surface made distinct, a surface having existential qualities of both 
perception and conceptuality - the picture plane. By orienting a theoretical 
ontology from a Bergsonian perspective, I will consider the claims made by 
Kandinsky. We will consider the picture plane according to its materiality in 
relation to perception and its ‘pictorial form’ in relation to representation. This 
will come to bear on the affirmation of the existential nature of the picture 
plane and hence, its relevance to the condition of creative expression and 
image-becoming unique to painting. We will argue that the picture plane 
material presence of the process of painting, which inducts painterly activity, 
and is the extension of the event of the painted image. 
 
In the most literal sense, the picture plane is usually taken to be canvas, wood, 
stone, or any other ‘surface’. However, it corresponds with an imaginary 
plane, the abstracted perspective of images from the images of the field of 
perception. In this regard, material surface as the situated occurrence of the 
process of painting, whether it is a two dimensional planar object, a canvas, a 
piece of wood, etc., becomes a distinguished surface. The picture plane is 
actualised by the material surface, making the planar object a differentiated 
surface among all surfaces. Therefore, the picture plane is an ontologically 
distinct surface according to tendencies: tendencies towards organization, 
tendencies towards arrangement, and the tendency towards the situating of 
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expression. Either way, the picture plane may be regarded in terms that 
suggest a movement of repetition: for the expedience of nascent action and 
the prolongation of movement, but also, movement towards thought. In this 
sense, by way of its material and conceptual recurrence, there is the allowance 
for an inattentive quality of reflection, so that the picture plane becomes the 
content of life, a material surface that yields to the difference of vital 
expressions. The picture plane is both a material pattern and a vital activity. 
It is the location of consciousness, by way of conscious perception situating 
the activity of its expression towards an extended material location. In turn, 
this surface becomes a site of the progression of the painter’s activity. 
Bergson describes this type of transition of consciousness towards its 
externalisation, stating, 
 
Watching this progressive materialization, marking the steps by which consciousness 
externalizes itself, at least he would obtain a vague intuition of what the insertion of mind in 
matter, the relation of the body to soul, may be.32 
 
However, according to Bergson, such tendencies are not of a linear 
movement, but rather entail divergence, variance that arises from the effective 
tensions between that of the force of memory, (i.e. the prolongation of the 
past and the reinsertion of experience into the present), and the demands of 
life to react, to act, to move in coordination with the immediate present. 
However, creation and expression in this respect are derivatives of life’s 
content. The picture plane is an instance of the merging, and interdependent 
connection, that of a material ‘form’, (i.e. a perception engendered from the 
object), and necessarily linked to a vital ‘content’. In more general terms, the 
picture plane is an example of the interpenetration of material and mental 
properties. The picture plane is an instance of the very oscillation between 
these domains; it is a process of movement between the mental and material 
in duration. In a similar accord, Kandinsky’s concern with the 
‘dematerialization’ of art underpins to his theory of the picture plane, in which 
                                                     
32 ME ‘The Soul and The Body’, , pp. 35-36 
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the material plane is the site of painting, and hence, ‘receives the content of 
the work of art’.33     Kandinsky’s theory there develops from the principle of 
‘inner necessity’. Artistic creation, by virtue of its ‘spiritual’ qualities, 
inevitably exudes its expression transforming base matter. By identifying the 
‘Basic Plane’ with the ‘material plane’, Kandinsky’s view of the picture plane 
is that matter is subject to a process of ‘designation’. And, though the content 
of the planar object issues from the work of art, the work is itself an activity 
of life. In this respect, the ‘content’ is dependent upon the material plane, but 
the material plane (i.e. the picture plane) is specified or designated by the 
necessity of the content. Henry explains that for Kandinsky the inner or 
invisible nature of life is the source of the picture plane’s content. Compared 
to Bergson’s theory, this would mean that the picture plane is an object 
selected by consciousness for the activity of creative projections, and therein, 
part of the content of life. In other words, regardless of the material 
objecthood of the picture plane, it originates from a process of selection and 
arrangement. In this regard, the picture plane is an elementary ‘form’, because 
it is a catalyst for perception, a means of life towards its representations. 
 
In this respect, the picture plane is more than an artistic object, it is an 
origination of a derived attitude of life. As a pattern repeated for its efficacy 
towards anticipated action, we maintain that the picture plane, considered 
from the perspective of Bergson’s theory of memory-image, is the actualised 
occurrence for potential. That is, though the picture plane is a physical 
material thing to which perception readily experiences, it also incites 
intellectual reflection. In addition, from the scope of Bergsonian analysis, the 
picture plane is both spatial and temporal. Furthermore, the picture plane is 
fundamental to the intuitive experience. It is the material object itself by 
which the painter’s subjective involution is conditioned, resulting in an 
                                                     
33 Wassily Kandinsky, Point And Line to Plane, (New York: Guggenheim Foundation, 
1947) p. 115, here Kandinsky terms the ‘Basic Plane’, and later abbreviates as ‘B.P.’ to 
which Henry will abbreviate as P.P. However, for the purposes of this section, we will take 
‘B.P.’ to be equal with ‘P.P.’ as both indicate the concept of this present analysis, ‘picture 
plane‘. 
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externalisation of the perceptions given in relation to the painting medium 
active and situated by a distinct material reality. It is this special interface of 
the picture plane, its bounded surface, and its existential quality lying between 
matter and life that we must consider. To regard the picture plane as 
significant to life’s activity as well as being a material ‘pattern’ is to consider 
the picture plane in the context of a physical and object relation of 
perceptions. 
 
 
Material Schema 
 
For Bergson, perception is continuous with images in matter, and by 
considering the picture plane in terms of perception, it would have to be a 
particular image, a continual and recurring image, one that perception 
consistently isolates, identifies, and through repetition becomes an intelligible 
percept. Hence, perception ‘thinks’ the physical picture plane so that the 
incorporeal quality of perceiving and the material plane as object to be seen 
are one and the same. And, as such, the picture plane is immediately 
associated with ‘forms’ of seeing or thinking, i.e. a placeholder for 
expression.34 
Kandinsky describes the arrangement of the picture plane as formulaic in 
character. Recognizing its material configuration, he describes the picture 
plane as ‘set off as an individual thing in the realm of its surroundings’.35 
Following Kandinsky’s theoretical claims, Henry emphasizes the picture 
planes in terms of its material ‘selfhood’. Rather than a ‘thing’, the picture 
plane is described in terms of qualities that constitute an individual identity, 
an ‘autonomous reality’, and something that is more akin to a living being. In 
                                                     
34 Anne Friedberg. The Virtual Window: From Alberti to Microsoft, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2006) pp. 141-146. By this notion of ‘placeholder’, I mean 
to suggest to the ontological distinction between the duration of conscious and the duration 
of the actual physical world. I used the term ‘placeholder’ here, according to mean 
something that is expressively limited, symbolically neutral, but in itself, is required by the 
constraints of perception, and facilitates the purposes of creative activity. 
35 Wassily Kandinsky, Point And Line to Plane, (New York: Guggenheim Foundation, 
1947). p. 115 
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this regard, the picture plane is living material, as it is the situated contact of 
consciousness with the extensity of continuous images, as a confrontation of 
the living image with the images of perception. However, for both Henry and 
Kandinsky, the painter and the plane are ‘inhabited by secret forces’.36 
 
In so far as the picture plane is the result of perceptual selection, material 
composition, and processes of fabrication, it is a ‘marked’ material image, 
and therefore, an individual identity in time. In other words, as termed both 
perceptual and conceptual, the picture plane is an epistemically specified 
surface, an image for the equal contact of mental activity and material forces, 
but in terms of the continuity of activity, it is the occurrence of consciousness 
in contact with matter. However, it is not simply an object that consciousness 
comes in contact with, rather, it is in the surficial object and the planar surface 
that the experience to consciousness is given. So, considered in terms of a 
confluence of vital energy and material energy, the picture plane becomes 
more of a ‘continuity’ than an object or a ‘thing’. Here we want to argue that 
the picture plane is ontologically significant because it is at once the situation 
of the coinciding of images, and from this process, a tactile and embodied 
form of aesthetic projections. This means that the picture plane is a surface 
that responds to the movement of conscious perception, and is altogether 
immanent to the continuity of the processes of activities from among the 
painting medium. Because painting is a mode of action in response to 
perceptions, then picture plane is a situated experience of consciousness. In 
short, the picture plane is a remarkable ‘form’, i.e. an actual object that 
enables actualisation. From this it may be said that the picture plane is a 
dynamic image in itself retaining a degree of perception, but also considered 
as a conceptualisation, it retains a conceptual vitality. Henry suggests that in 
terms of a ‘living thing’ the picture plane engenders experience by its material 
composition, particular to the expression of painting that follows its 
                                                     
36 Michel Henry, Seeing The Invisible, (London Continuum. 2009) p. 58 
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arrangement, i.e. gesture, mark making. 37
    
From within the process of 
painting it is a material presence for representation, and enables the movement 
of life. This is to say that the picture plane is not simply a material device for 
the efforts of consciousness for production alone, rather, considering the 
picture plane on the basis of Bergson’s theory of ‘pure perception’, whereby 
the activity of life is said to be generally oriented towards action, the picture 
plane’s material arrangement is the result of the immediacy of conscious 
engagement to the field of perception and the concrete realisation of life. 
 
 
Sequence and Surface: Material Movement of Life 
 
Because matter is an aggregate of images, and the representations we have 
are always of the image virtually, the experience of the picture plane marks 
the significant transition of the intellectual ‘choice’ from material 
becoming(s). It may be said that the picture plane is a placeholder for the 
oscillation of material potential affecting intellectual schema. In other words, 
the picture plane is first a movement of life, a movement characterized by the 
activity of continual discernment (i.e. conscious arrangement or tendency) 
and, it is a repetitive appearance as a type of pattern in the deliberations of 
consciousness. 
 
In view of the history of painting, the planar image-surface appears to have 
become a pattern, a framed territory, a carved out ‘zone’ as a dynamic system, 
for the engagement of artistic practice, and the diversion of creative energy. 
According to Bergson, reality is the relation of the actual and material with 
the virtual and mental. In this sense, the picture plane’s material qualities as 
a relation to life, are such 
because it endures as it is connected with consciousness, it is living because 
it is the content of life.38
 
Bergson places emphasis on the enduring state of 
matter conditioned upon and correlative with the concentration of life. In a 
                                                     
37 Ibid. 51 
38 CE. p. 390   
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similar line of thought, Kandinsky emphasizes the affective quality of the 
picture plane’s material reality as important because it is an independent 
element, in which the power of the artist is dependent.39
 
In other words, by 
calling attention to the ‘nature of the BP itself’, Kandinsky is suggesting that 
there is a creative energy within the material conditions of the process of 
painting.40
 He elaborates further on this ‘autonomous quality of the picture 
plane’, suggesting that it is a ‘living being’. Aside from Kandinsky ascribing 
to the material surface ‘breath’ and even ‘life’, there is the connection he 
makes with the picture plane’s seemingly autonomous nature and the 
‘transference of one’s own observation’. It is here that Kandinskian theory 
closely parallels Bergson’s theory of perception, that ‘life’ of the picture plane 
is the possibility of its becoming, that is, through its vital characterisation, by 
its ‘breathing’, the virtual quality of the plane is to be realized through life, 
through conscious perception, and the action of the artist. 
 
Again, Kandinsky’s theory comparably follows Bergson’s. Here, he places 
specific emphasis on the picture plane as ‘fundamental’, but it is 
fundamentally simple in so far as it is diagrammatic, and representative.41
 
This is similar to Bergson’s theory of intuition. For Kandinsky, the picture 
plane is an intuitive composition (i.e. both actual and conceptual), and 
therefore it is simple.   And by its simplicity it directs consciousness towards 
the deeper durations of the materiality and within an immediate experience 
with reality. By redirecting thought which is generally attending towards 
action, the picture plane re-directs thought towards a surface, so as to open 
upon, to become reflective, and thereby, to move towards the inactive, the 
virtual. In a similar line of thought, Bergson explains that all of reality 
‘endures’, and the more immediate our conscious awareness comes to the 
duration of things, our own duration will involve ‘the creation of forms, the 
                                                     
39 Wassily Kandinsky, Point and Line to Plane, (New York: Guggenheim Foundation, 
1947) p. 116 
40 Ibid. p. 116-125., Kandinsky uses the acronym ‘BP’ to indicate the most ‘basic plane’, 
that is any surface to resonate with the spiritual experessions of the process of painting. 
41 Wassily Kandinsky, Point And Line to Plane, (New York: Guggenheim Foundation, 
1947), p. 143   
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continual elaboration of the absolutely new’.42 
 
Through the stages of the change in consciousness the movement from its 
contraction in the depths of life and equally in the concentration of the psychic 
self, there is the movement towards its surfacing and hence, extension in the 
expanse of spatial homogeneity, in which the attitude of consciousness is not 
only translated but affectively transforms its material localization. However, 
as with all of matter, more than simply a surface as a spatial origin, the picture 
plane is to also be considered in terms of depth surging fluctuation of 
movements. Kandinsky termed as the ‘inner tensions’ of reality, those 
experiences that are not given as immediately to consciousness, but rather are 
situated beneath, internally, beyond the limits of perceived objects. 
Paralleling Bergson’s theory of intuition, both thinkers are relating to an 
experience that is more than that which is generally given in perception.  
Bergson explains that with intuition the perception given is not limited to 
‘action on things’, or ‘on the surface of reality’, but below and within.43 This 
is closely parallels Bergson’s elaborations on the nature of intuition, in that 
the intuition is an exertion or effort to think beyond that of intellectual 
thought, to think in the things themselves, towards the possibilities of action. 
In relation to Kandinsky’s theory, in which Kandinsky attributes the surfacing 
of ‘inner tensions’, (i.e. those forces beneath the surface of reality becoming 
towards perceptual experience), to the composition and arrangement of the 
picture plane, he also suggests a ‘depth’ of the planar surface. 
 
 
Relations of the Surface 
 
We have maintained a notion of the picture plane as a movement, as a 
direction towards actualization originating from an intensive experience, (i.e. 
simply as a pictorial ‘form’). As the picture plane is a distinct surface in 
relation to other nondescript material surfaces, it is a perspectival relation, and 
                                                     
42 Ibid. p. 11 
43 Ibid. p. 49 
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in this sense, a ‘form’ of perceiving, a ‘form’ of knowing. Furthermore, the 
picture plane is more than a thing experienced in relation to other things, but 
perhaps it is a ‘habit we have contracted’, i.e. a slicing out of, or a delimitation 
from among the visual field. Grosz compares painting with architecture and 
suggests that what is similar to both forms of construction is the 
territorializing of reality in which reality is a plurality of ‘surfaces’.   These 
are of variable, and ‘bear upon them singularities, eruptions, or events’. For 
Grosz, the process of territorializing in reality is a mode towards the 
‘fabrication of space’, from which events ‘resonate for the sake of intensity 
alone’.44 This relates directly to our theory of the picture plane. Though not 
specifically in terms of territorialisation, Bergson suggests that the process of 
emerging ‘forms’ in reality, occurs through the distinction and outlining of 
objects from among the visual field of reality.  This comes from the influence 
of conscious perception, as the influence of the intellect towards the 
orientation of action to certain points of space’.45 
 
 
 
 
Thinking and Expressing Difference 
 
However, that is not to say that the picture plane is a completed reality, but 
rather, it is a process of repetition from the activity of perception. And as the 
entire ‘vital properties ‘of life are not actualized in full, the ‘form’ of picture 
plane is a significant juncture for the becoming of life’s expressions. 
Bergson’s explains, we may suggest that the picture plane is a ‘form’ by virtue 
of the exertion of perception to organize and to individualize, and as this 
material composition has been and continues to be repeated, it is both an 
inclination of perception and a material ‘tendency’ for life.  Again, in terms 
of the ‘individuality and therefore what we have attempted to recognize as 
                                                     
44 E. A. Grosz, Chaos, territory, art: Deleuze and the framing of the earth (Columbia 
University Press, 2008). p.10-12 
45 CE. p. 12 
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indicative of the ‘delimitation’ implicit in the picture plane.46 What is most 
significant is that  Bergson concedes that it is through the continual efforts of 
life tending towards ‘individuality’, that the resultant coming-to- be of life is 
from ‘constituted systems’. In a more specific example, we direct this theory 
to the picture plane, itself a design, an individuated surface anticipating 
creative movement, and repetitively perceived, as a  ‘tendency’ towards 
systems (i.e. ones that are ‘isolated, naturally closed’). From Bergson’s 
theory, the picture plane is then both a conscious selection of a physical 
surface and a conscious formation, and therefore, a particular material 
arrangement, and a particular form from the content of life’s efforts.47 
However, life itself is also part of the whole of reality, so that according to 
Bergson’s theory the ontological characterizations of the picture plane ought 
to follow from its existential qualities, that is, those qualities that are 
attributive to life and in total to expression of living through material reality. 
In a similar sense, Henry explains that the picture plane is animated, and is a 
living material presence to perception, and thereby, is ‘alive in an original 
metaphysical and ontological sense’.48 From a Bergsonian view, we argue that 
since perception is not of a different order than matter, the picture plane is 
then regarded as both form and content of concrete consciousness, and hence, 
as a medium for the means of life to experience its activity and the reflection 
of its change upon matter. However, we regard the picture plane first as a 
‘configuration’ resulting from the exertion of life. Secondly we regard affect 
of the picture plane as a material presentation of the activity and movement 
of conscious perception and sensation. Hence, we maintain a theory in which 
the picture plane is both a life ‘form’ and a materiality towards ‘life’.49 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued from the concept of the frame and its relation to the picture 
                                                     
46 Ibid. p. 15 
47 Ibid. p. 99 
48 Michel Henry, Seeing The Invisible, (London Continuum, 2009). pp. 58-59 
49 CE. p. 318   
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plane in the process of painting to suggest that both are psychical and 
material elements of the process. From the frame the process of painting is 
like a window and a threshold: a window through which a concentration of 
perceptions and the activities of many images are occurring, and a threshold, 
in which the painter’s duration merges with the differing durations of the 
painting medium, that is, by the encounters of the living centre of images, 
the transition of images from the conditions of experience and expression 
enframed by the ‘significance’ of the conscious transition of experience. 
This experience is itself a subjectivisation of the process of painting as its 
activity and the occurrences of its expression are conditioned by the given 
site of the process. The picture plane is a surface and at once, the site for the 
art-object’s becoming, the pre-qualification of the process as the gerundive 
form for the activity of the painter, and the making visual the material 
becoming of the images as the event of the painting process. In this sense, 
we have maintained a theory of the frame that suggest the frame as an 
activity of perception, as immanent function of the force of consciousness 
towards its expression, and thereby intrinsic to expressions becoming visible 
in the process of painting. However, as framing is an activity in the creation 
of painting, it necessarily inheres within the perceptions given by the picture 
plane, and bounds the planar surface as an ontological cut of the event of 
art-object from the continuity of other images. In this sense, we have argued 
that the frame, as also framing, is a double identity of a material and spatial 
extension as well as an embedded process within the transitions and 
interchanges of images from painter to painting medium.  
Through our appraisal and evaluation of Derrida’s notion of the ‘parergon’, 
we have extended a Bergsonian theory of frame to mean an expanding 
ontological identity grounded by its own process of creation via limitation, 
becoming via bordering. The reception of Derridian notion of the frame, 
allows us to further convey the challenge to the traditional thinking 
significant to the frames identity. This culminates further into the 
investigation of the picture plane, as an equally a limitation of potential and 
    
227  
 
 
Frame 
the isolation of the difference of experience beyond its encounter. Therefore, 
our theory of frame maintains that framing is itself the differential of the 
expressive and material process from the experiential encounter of 
perception. The frame coexists with the picture plane, as both are 
actualisations of the contractive qualities of perception, hence offering a 
representational quality of perceptual experience, immediate to the active 
actualisation of conscious perceptions expressing images.  
And finally we argued that the framed-image is always, virtually, in the 
material world, in so far as perception is an activity continuous with the 
indefinite and repetitive images of the material plane. In this respect, by the 
notion of frame or the activity of the frame as a process of framing, we have 
regarded it as an ontological condition, but more specifically, a creative affect 
of images towards material development and the manifestation of life. We 
then considered the planar surface more specifically as the situated site and 
occurrence of the actualization of the forms of perceptions, and as a spatial 
medium given to movements of thoughts, and affecting the expressions of 
conscious perception coinciding with its presence. Though this comparison 
may be taken to be more relevant to discussions of the ‘representational’ or 
‘pictorial’ form of the picture plane and the intuitive content inherent to its 
composition, what is most important is that either in terms of its position 
within the correlation of the ‘internal and external’, or its actualization as a 
process from sensation to perception, the ontological character of the picture 
plane is based on its embodiment of movements by its virtual capacity. 
According to Bergson’s theorization of the interpenetration of movements, 
the interchange of vital and material occur within the picture plane. We argued 
that although the material surface as the picture plane is occurrence for the 
manifestation of movement as a thing of its own differentiated duration, it is 
both the mediation of thought and the givenness of images as ‘embodiment’ 
of process of painting. However, according to the theoretical notion of the 
interrelation of mind and matter, referring to the picture plane as 
‘embodiment’ (i.e. the movement from the ‘intensive force’, the ‘intensive 
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origin’ from the depths of reality, to the surficial, material ‘individuality’) 
would be less accurate, than if the picture plane were conceived of and termed 
as an ontologically distinct process. We argued from Bergson’s elaboration 
of ‘living beings’ that, this description applied to the picture plane, mean that 
the picture plane is the ‘organization’ that occurs because of its mediation 
between activity and thinking. This means that the picture plane is a ‘content’ 
of material reality, but also as a ‘form’ given to vital activity. We compared 
our theory of frame and the relation to the picture plane to Kandinsky’s view 
of painting, and in particular his view of the rigour of painting in terms of the 
planarity of the material surface as issuing towards the experience of the 
painter. We see that with Kandinsky, the picture plane is metaphysical in the 
sense that it is a living element of expressing itself through the formative 
process of painting. Therefore, for Kandinsky, the element of planarity before 
the painter is the condition for spiritual growth, and is at once the physical 
and material possibility of painting, so that its content becomes the means for 
abstraction. In either case, from Bergson to a Kandinskian reading, we argue 
that the ontological significance of the picture plane as the surficial content 
for expression is based on its definition in terms of conceptual tendencies (i.e. 
towards life) and material processes (i.e. intuitive and creative movements). 
Therefore, by its ‘form’ given in perception, and its intrinsic content towards 
perception as it both affects, isolates, and is a reflection of the painter’s 
consciousness, the surface of painting is given to intensive attitude of thought, 
and gives rise to sensation. In this way, as much as the picture plane is a 
surface, it is a material process towards further movement, and thereby, 
surficial occurrence for the delving of intellectual attention, the emerging of 
intuitive experience, and the event for the process of painting. 
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Chapter 6 - Theory of Colour 
 
The wood grew denser and denser. The red trunks thicker and thicker. The green foliage 
heavier and heavier. The air darker and darker. The bushes more and more profuse. The 
toadstools more and more numerous. In the end one found oneself treading on nothing but 
toadstools. The man found it more and more difficult to walk, to push his way through without 
slipping. But he went on, repeating more and more quickly the same sentence: - Healing 
scars. Corresponding Colors.1 
 
For example, an obscure desire gradually becomes a deep passion. Now, you 
will see that the feeble intensity of this desire consisted at first in its appearing 
to be isolated and, as it were, foreign to the remainder of your inner life. But 
little by little, it permeates a larger number of psychic elements, tingeing 
them, so to speak, with its own colour.2 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter we consider the basic problem of colour to be that of the 
ontological nature of colour itself. The Bauhaus artist Josef Albers said, ‘colour 
deceives continuously’.  This may be the reason that discourses on the theory of 
colour in the visual arts and in philosophical circles have been irregular, 
inconsistent, and have not been maintained respective of the continuous 
experience and encounter of colour throughout the differing facets of life, 
fragmentary.3 Rather than attempt to overcome this with a Bergsonian reading 
towards an explicit identification of colour from the complexity of the modernist 
period of art, we will argue that from a Bergsonian perspective the philosophy 
of colour is to be encountered through the experience of its rhythmic 
duration, and this experience conditioned within the process of 
painting, allows thinking to be more immediate to the material and 
concrete reality of colour.  This is to serve the purpose of bringing Bergsonian 
                                                     
1 W. Kandinsky, Kandinsky, complete writings on art (Da Capo Press, 1994). p. 323 
2 TFW. p. 8 
3 David Batchelor, ed., Colour: Documents of Contemporary Art, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008, p.15 
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thinking into contact with the realisation of the terms of the philosophy of 
becoming, as a philosophy that regards the novelty of thought through its 
experience.  Based on Bergson’s claim of the difference from the rhythm of 
our own duration and the duration of matter, colour is the vibratory quality 
of matter that affects our sensation, and thereby altering the rhythmic pulse 
of consciousness. 
In this sense, we will aim to develop a theory of colour from the broader 
development of Bergson’s theory. In particular, from Bergson’s notion of the 
immediacy of conscious states in duration, we will suggest that colour is an 
independent ontological reality, to mean that colour is a fundamental medium 
of expression, by which its durational and qualitative status is an affective 
element in the process of a painting. We will consider colour first in terms of 
‘intensity’ and of qualitative sensations, and by following from Bergson’s 
conceptual negotiation of the difference of interior life and the purely 
qualitative states of consciousness, we will consider colour as material and 
creative extension of reality. We will maintain that in the process of painting, 
colour is the embodiment of rhythmic extensity towards the quantitative 
dimension of the material surface. However, it is also a psychical intensity 
permeating the expressions through the painter’s conscious experience as 
given by the dimension of colour from the materiality of the process of 
painting. From this context, we will consider colour from the context of 
Bergson’s theory of duration of reality, so that colour is itself a qualitative 
change in time, and as it is given through perceptions, as an unfolding of states 
of consciousness as temporal multiplicities. This is to argue that colour as a 
‘pure change’ is the underlying basis for an ontological theory of painting, 
such that colour is at once qualitative intensities of material reality, and in the 
process of painting, by its own rhythmic potential, colour is also an affective 
force of the becoming of discrete forms and quantitative magnitudes of its 
visual affect. We will then consider Kandinsky’s theory of colour to further 
Bergson’s view of colour beyond the description in terms of its duration and 
heterogeneous quality and emphasize its forceful presence in the change of 
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painterly experience and the spiritual progression resonating from its affect. 
From Bergson to Kandinsky, we will argue for a conception of colour to by 
which colour is regarded as the intermediary of the activities of experience 
towards expression. Primarily, we will argue from a Bergsonian perspective, 
as advanced by Kandinskian theory, that colour is an element of reality that 
is part of the field of visual experience, but as an affective force it is 
intrinsically spiritual. For Bergson colour is associated with music, and by 
this analogy Bergson’s view is that colour as with music are of differing 
durations, and are as flowing and distinct rhythms of time. Similarly for 
Kandinsky, colour is expression, proceeding from inward to outward 
manifestations, as a seamless continuity of organic passage and spiritual 
evolution. From our reading of Bergson and comparative considerations with 
Kandinskian theory, we will then argue that colour is feeling, or rather, an 
attitude that is a real succession, an element of real concrete duration. 
According to both lines of argument, we are considering colour as 
metaphysical property of reality, as a vital force, and hence, as a creative 
reality towards psychical and material phenomena. We will highlight how 
Kandinskian theory will further elaborate the dynamic and generative role of 
colour, as this will add support to a Bergsonian conceptual basis for a theory 
of colour. Kandinsky’s theory adds emphasis to the non-physical ‘life’ of 
colour, that is, as a force that persists, and as movements that endure. This 
complements a Bergsonian perspective that regards colour as sensation and 
experience, as a transformative and creative element of reality, and as itself 
an immediate and ever changing qualitative melody of time. 
 
A Goethean Approach 
 
From the early theoretical studies of colour, and particularly from the broad 
emphasis of its ‘subjective experience’, it was Goethe’s three part theory of 
colour, Farbenlehre, which influenced the studies of colour phenomenon. His 
account regarded colour according to the physical and psychological, and 
thereby, predominately influencing nineteenth and early twentieth century 
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advancements in these areas. There are many reasons for this, but perhaps the 
most important reason for the influence of Goethe’s theory was his insistence 
on the necessity of the eye in relation to colour. In other words, Goethean 
theory of colour emphasizes an understanding of the total experience of vision 
as a means for the study of colour- phenomena. Therefore, the Goethean 
account of colour is one of subjective considerations, such that, the eye is 
regarded as the receiver of light and the stimulated source of the immediate 
reception of colour. Whereas the Newtonian account suggests that through a 
process of divisibility, in accordance with the practices of the physics of 
optics, colour is a quantifiable and objective phenomenon not dependent on 
the basis of its physical perception. Of course, from these disparate views, 
that of qualia from that of an objectivity of colour, we may understand the 
inheritance of theories that continue to inform contemporary discourse on the 
nature of colour. Gage argues that since Goethe’s theory is primarily 
concerned with the physical and psychological effects, this in turn directs 
further analysis towards the immediate effects of colour within the individual. 
And, though the Farbenlehre was initially received and further expounded 
upon by other thinkers and scientific developments through the early 
nineteenth century, it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century, 
particularly through the work of the German Expressionist artists with 
emphasis on the psycho-physiological nature of colour, that the Goethean 
approach to colour had a resurgence of interest.4
  
Here we have the connection 
to 
Kandinsky, whose own theory emphasises the subjective experience of the 
synesthesia of colour, from the tone of colours towards new visual forms, as 
bridge towards spiritual evolution. Moreover, Gage suggests that through 
German expressionist paintings the traditional notion of colour identified with 
objects was jettisoned and instead the artists were interested in capturing the 
sole effects of colour without the conjunctive or associationist perspectives 
by which colour is linked to object relations. Here again, relating to the work 
                                                     
4 Ibid. p. 207 
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of Kandinsky, Gage suggests that though the artist offered perhaps the most 
‘thoroughgoing Expressionist theory’, as formulated in the manifesto, it was 
only after its publication that Kandinsky was introduced to Goethe’s Theory.5 
To that end, Gage explains that although Kandinsky’s theory emphasized 
colour and its effects according to spiritualist elements, it was from the artist 
description of the visible manifestations of such invisible elements, forces, 
rhythms, etc., by which the detailed and defined notion of abstraction was 
offered in terms of a non-associative psychological effects of colours.6
 
In this 
respect, as Gage has highlighted the connection from a Goethean theoretical 
basis towards its influence in the Kandinskian account of colour, there is an 
empirical and spiritual experience with colour. That is to say, colour is 
regarded as a binary movement, constantly subject to change as physical and 
material, but reciprocally effecting change from within the subject’s 
experience as an inner and psychological process. 
 
 
Colour and Materiality 
 
Bergson speaks of perception in terms of pre-reflective experiences, that is, 
movements affective and immediate to consciousness, so that sensations that 
are given are both the translations of these affective states and the conscious 
expressions from among the possible mental states. From this context, colour 
is both a physical property occupying space, as well as states of consciousness 
actualizing the perceptions of the given colour. . Because it is physical but 
also translates as psychical movements, we argue that colour is immanent 
                                                     
5 Ibid. p. 207   
6 Ibid. p. 207. Three points of clarification are to be made here. The first is that Gage 
suggests that it ‘seems’ as though Kandinsky’s reading of Goethe’s Fabenlehre occurred 
only after his writing of the manifesto. Secondly, Gage also explains that the Theosophist, 
Rudolph Steiner was instrumental in Kandinsky’s introduction to the Goethean theory, its 
analysis, and hence, as an influencing factor towards the occultist or spiritualist emphasis in 
his colour theory. And finally, though Kandinsky’s terminology and argument present the 
glazing of spiritualist elements, as Gage rightly explains, not only was Kandinsky’s 
theorization informed and perhaps indebted to the contemporary psychological debates of 
his time, but advanced these ideas in as much as it introduced them to art theory and 
practice. 
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to the experience of mind as it is a potential that issues from the field of matter.  
In other words, we are suggesting that colour is a rhythm of reality, as a 
synthesis of the temporal and spatial qualities of duration. In Time and 
Freewill, Bergson develops a thesis suggesting the unity of consciousness in 
duration, i.e. qualitative multiplicity misconstrued by the habitual thinking 
of spatialized time. Because of the developments of psychology and the 
contemporary experimentation under the auspices of psychophysics with 
particular emphasis on the theory of psychological parallelism, Bergson’s 
thesis was necessary.7
 
He explains that the experience of perceiving colour 
and the shifting of our impressions from the experience are generally regarded 
as reducible to the correlation of the differential of colours, that is, differing 
intensities of light with the change of states of consciousness. In other words, 
according to a physicalist view, colour is considered invariable and definite 
to objects and places, as a spatial and discrete property of things.  This means 
that the possibility of variation is dependent upon our sense of things, to 
include our sense of light. However, Bergson explains that there are differing 
sensations, differing intensities of our perceptual experience, and hence, 
continually changing states of consciousness. He argues that the total of 
reality is a continuous flow of duration, and as with light and colour, their 
experience is a continuous spectrum of change immanent to the flux of reality.  
This is the basis for a Bergsonian theory of colour. Hence, we maintain that 
the sensation of colour, by our sensorial perceptual encounters is also a type 
of absorption of the rhythmic qualities of colour, and thereby, a coinciding of 
our consciousness with the given durations of colour. Here, we want to argue 
that by applying this to the process of painting, it is the living sensation of the 
painter that is also the movement of colour as present to consciousness. In 
other words, the immediacy consciousness to colour is a change of relations 
between the potential of colour from the vibratory matter to affect sensations 
                                                     
7 J. Mullarkey, 'The psycho-physics of phenomenology: Bergson and Henry'. p. 201-220, 
for a specified analysis of Bergson compared to M. henry with Psycho-Physical and its 
subsequent theoretical influences as a backdrop. 
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and the perceptual experience, and therefore, a harmony of colour experience 
and the painterly expressions. 
By this we are arguing that colour is not a passive phenomenon of the material 
world, but rather a force of experience permeating the psychical and intensive 
qualities of the painter and the intrinsic potential of the materiality of the 
painting medium. We are admitting that colour is at once part of the psychical 
variations in the activities of the painter, and the non-measurable, ever-
changing quality of duration within the materiality of the painting medium. 
Bergson’s example of the sensation of light, develops from the broader 
context of his argument which distinguishes temporal intensive experiences 
as distinct from spatial and extensive experiences, and it is from this that we 
are attempting to navigate a theory of colour, as Bergson suggests that the 
intensive experiences of colour and its variations affect the unfolding 
multiplicity of states of consciousness. This draws further the lines of inquiry 
from the psychical or mental nature of colour to the material, physical, and 
actual qualities of colour.8
 
The notion of affect is a key term since it is used 
here to mean a quality of colour as well as the operative of change in the 
relation of colour to its own experience. Bergson challenges the notion that 
sensation, particularly that of the actual experience of light, is regarded 
primarily through a mediation of thought.9
 
However, Bergson questions the 
mode by which we evaluate the nature of our experience of light, that is, the 
‘intensity of light’, in terms of a quantitative measure of a qualitative value. 
This marks out direction for our theory of colour. By considering colour in 
terms of the intensity of experience, a Bergsonian conceptualisation of colour 
is based on questions of the psychogenic relations to material or external 
conditions. The sensation of light and the experience of colour in terms of the 
immateriality, movements, and force, means that our theory of colour is based 
on the living experiences of colour in time. That is to say, the sensations of 
light, the experiences of colour, are continuous and durational with conscious 
                                                     
8 TFW. pp. 50-61 
9 Ibid. p. 50  
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experience. 
 
 
Colour and Change 
 
Bergson’s conceptualization of light and sensation suggest that the continuing 
differentiation of psychical states proceeding from an experience cannot be 
solely interpreted in terms of degree, measure, or magnitude. We apply the 
habit of our intellectual calculus to reality, so that our experience is thought 
according to varying ‘amounts’, and in terms of summation.   This occurs 
even with our experience of 
light. Bergson explains that by considering luminous sources as either 
increasing or in terms of ‘reductions’ of measures of magnitudes of light, our 
sense of the definition of objects and the outlines of things, already presume 
that light is quantifiable. By thinking light, we consider our experience of it  
according  to distinct gradients, clear cut divisions of ‘tonal values’, to the 
extent that even though the colours of the environment and of the things 
themselves continuously change, we regard change as incremental.10
   
Here, 
Bergson is most critical of the assumption that the reduction of sensation is 
according to our habits of thinking and the analysis and numbering of reality 
from the reflective thought. In particular his concern with our experience of 
colour is that our notions of quantifiability are so aptly attributed to the 
experience of light, that the ‘measure’ of change, particularly, a measure of 
colour change is assumed in terms of static measurements. Though that this 
may be the case, he explains that the ‘changes’ of the hues of colour 
coinciding with ‘changes’ of luminosity are attentively perceived by the 
majority of people. The change of light as with colour is an indivisible 
movement, and as such, by the nature of their change, the isolation of their 
transition, or the ‘seizing’ of this change by perception is difficult to 
accomplish. However, when we attempt to isolate the shift and change, the 
analytic attitude of conscious reflection is focused upon incremental specifics 
                                                     
10 Ibid. pp. 50-51   
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of change. Bergson argues, as we ‘interpret changes of quality as changes of 
quantity’, this is from the attitude of intellect, by which we suppose that 
colours remain definite, invariable, particular to the surfaces of objects and 
fixed in the ambient environment. 
 
We assume that ‘change’ of colour is not change of the colour itself, but 
rather, we regard its ‘change’ to be the fluctuation with our own sensation of 
the changing light.11
 
Bergson indicates that instead of considering the 
qualitative change, in terms of our immediate nascent impressions of 
changing colour, instead we interpret ‘change of colour’ according to the 
quantitative and formulaic character of our understanding. In this latter 
instance, the consideration of the intensive sensation of colour is marginalized 
if not completely disregarded. We consider the intensive and affective 
experience of colour to consciousness to be reducible to an exteriority of 
reality. Bergson claims that when we consider the changes of light equal in 
measure to our sensation of that change, particularly our sensation of the 
colour of surrounding objects, then colour is only relative to the differing 
degrees of our sensation of luminosity. However, if we are to evaluate by 
quantity, by degree, how the variations of luminous intensity differ from one 
moment to the next based on the relative variations of colour hue, we find 
difficulty in reconciling a direct measurement of our sensations of luminosity 
with a definite succession of colour. Bergson is not directly questioning the 
accuracy of the photometric processes of his contemporaries in the early fields 
of psychology, namely, those from within the research and experimental work 
of psychophysics. Rather, he was questioning the means of interpretation. 
Bergson was concerned about the influence models of analysis, such as 
Weber’s Law and the work of ‘psychophysics’, as titled by Gustav Fechner. 
Bergson was concerned with the underlying epistemic view that the 
operations of the human mind are to be considered solely in terms of material 
agency. That the occurrences of thinking and sensation are regarded as 
commensurate to the spatialized character of reality, this reduces the 
                                                     
11 Ibid. p. 51   
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experiences of consciousness in terms of spatial modifications, and thereby, 
reinforces the prioritization of spatial dimensionality of reality over the 
duration of reality. 
 
Bergson asks us to consider the reality of colour as immediate to our 
consciousness. Directly put, colours are more than a phenomenal affect upon 
consciousness - colours are intrinsically different, not to be designated 
according to a view of a relationality of objects to subjects‘ perception 
existing within a general substrate, but rather, taken as immediate givens in a 
constantly changing and therefore, heterogeneous reality which is contingent 
upon a continuous temporality. 
 
 
Intensity and Colour 
 
In this respect, under the term ‘colours’ there are a multiplicity of unique and 
individual qualities of the experience of light. This means, that our sensations 
of colour are of the multiple experiences given by colour and the actualization 
of these experiences. Bergson explains that the brightness or intensities of 
colour are to be attributed to the qualitative changes of colour as the affect of 
change in duration.  In 
other words, the variations of a given colour are what is given immediately, a 
changing reality first affecting our impressions. By this, Bergson is critiquing 
the direction of our interpretation, upon the immediate effects of perception, 
and the immediacy of change to consciousness.  Bergson claims that it is with 
the immediate experience of colour that the changes in sensation are 
discontinuous.12
    
From one hue to another, attempting to establish a 
definitive point or a place of equal shade for one colour from among the 
indefinite and continual intermediate colour possibilities would require a 
calculus of ‘sudden leaps’. If we identified the transition of one colour to 
another, the question arises as to the notions of the intermediaries of colour, 
                                                     
12 Ibid. p. 57 
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the greater or lesser qualities of shades and hues, or total variations from 
among colours.13
  
Bergson argues that in the case of psychophysics, the 
measure of sensation results in more complex formulations because of the 
inaccuracy of the means of measure, but more so, by the modeling of the 
immediate experience on the basis of a spatial and quantifiable terms of 
thinking. 
 
Bergson discusses the indefinite, qualitative and variable psychological states 
given by our experiences of colour in terms of the notion of intensity. Whether 
by presentation to our perception, or, by the immediate impression given to 
our states of consciousness, according to Bergson there are two different 
approaches to a discussion of intensity.  ‘Intensity’ is regarded in terms of an 
external cause or means of the affective perceptual sensation, or we may 
consider intensity in terms of ‘simple psychic phenomena’ involved in 
psychological states.14
 
According to Bergson, our investigation of the notion 
of intensity presents us the idea ‘of extensive magnitude from without’, as 
well as compelling research into, ‘the very depths of consciousness, the image 
of an inner multiplicity’.15 
 
 
Colour and Images 
 
Bergson’s exposition coupled to that of his theory of image, gives us a 
clearer line of direction of the relation of colour to the image.16
 
Lawlor 
explains that the total of Bergson’s theoretical developments and the 
underpinning of his theses revolved around the use of the term ‘image’. He 
suggests that Bergson’s continual use of the term was because it suggested 
vision. Lawlor explains that as Bergson’s theories prioritize vision, the 
                                                     
13 Ibid. p. 59 
14 Ibid. p. 73 
15 Ibid. p. 73 
16 MM. p. 207, I am implying that from Bergson’s notion of the real movement contra ‘the 
transference of thing’, the difference of colour irreducible between the quality of rhythm 
and the quantity of colour in terms of common measure of consciousness. 
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theories concentrate on the nature of light itself. Lawlor adds that aside from 
the dependency of vision upon light, according to the Bergsonian notion, the 
image is likened to a ‘picture’ - a ‘picture’ that emits light.17 Bergson’s 
concept of ‘image’ privileges vision from among the nature of perception. 
Bergson argues that what is ‘given to see primarily’, and by the intrinsic light 
of the image to vision, is colour.18
 
Lawlor is suggesting that according to the 
terminology of modern philosophy, Bergson’s emphasis on light, colour, and 
vision as distinctive to the nature of the image, indicates his ranking 
‘secondary qualities’ as more definitive of reality than the geometric, spatial, 
extended, or ‘primary qualities’ of things. Because the ‘image’ is light, and 
illumination gives colour toward vision, colour is a particular and special 
characteristic of the image and hence, of reality in total. Lawlor explains that 
with this emphasis and even prioritization of colour in the definition of the 
image, in a manner similar to a definition of the nature of colour itself, this 
describes the image as, ‘at once simple or one, complex or different, and 
continuous or successive’.19 
 
However, the specific concentration of colour in the nature of the image 
means that within the unity of reality there is also a multiplicity of colours.  
Bergson’s theory, as a whole, maintains that reality is changing, it is 
continually differentiating, and, as a unity in movement, the element of colour 
is itself a multiplicity within the flow of reality, continually differing from 
among itself.20
 Lawlor explains that in Bergsonian terms, there are ‘natural 
articulations’ of colour, that is, absolute or non- relative distinctions from 
                                                     
17 L. Lawlor, The challenge of Bergsonism (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2003). p. 186 
18 Ibid. p. 5 
19 Ibid. p. 6. I think that Lawlor’s summary in this quoted passage, though brief, 
characterizes Bergson’s explication of the intensity of conscious states found in Time and 
Freewill, more specifically, Bergson’s analysis of the operation of quantitative judgments 
compared to qualitative impressions, as either discrete and measurable experiences or 
discontinuous and continually differentiating sensations. I say this because, in this quotation 
of Lawlors explanation, the dialectial terms he uses to describe Bergson’s theory of image 
may be traced full circle, to be also found in the conceptual operations of Bergson’s 
investigation into the experience and/or sensation of light and colour.   
20 MM. p. 197 
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among the compository and qualitative nature of the colours.  Considering an 
‘artistic picture’, (using Lawlor’s term) there is an implicit unity, a visual 
continuity of the painting itself. However, colours flow from one hue or shade 
to another, and in this sense, we cannot disregard the differing tones, distinct 
hues, and the separate timbre of colours. Bergson explains there are no 
intervals with vision. When the eyes are open, immediately light flows in, and 
we perceive a continuous and unified ‘picture’, albeit, one of a multiplicity of 
elements, as a constellation of elements undergoing constant change. 
 
 
Deleuzian theory of Colour and Sensation 
 
Deleuze’s philosophy of colour and the related theoretical corollary implicit 
in his theory of sensation are developed further and made more specific 
through the particular study and analysis of the work and thoughts of painters 
Francis Bacon and Paul Cezanne.   Describing the work of Cezanne, Deleuze 
claimed that the painter opted for a way of painting that moved ‘beyond both 
the illustrative and the figurative’.21 According to Deleuze sensation is as a 
totalizing domain of reality. The experience of colour is an experience by 
which the painter and the painting coalesce. The process of painting affects 
the visible rendering, and hence, the manifestation of the sensible experiences 
in ‘forms’ of the sensations. In other words, the experiences from among the 
process of painting conditioned the sensible experiences, and given to 
sensible forms, the experiences become sensations themselves. Deleuze 
explains that the painter, the painter’s sensation, the sensible world, and 
sensation in the world, are all things ‘indissolubly, it is Being-in-the- World’. 
By this he means that the subject ‘becomes’ in the sensation, and in to, 
sensations constitute fields or levels of reality in which the subject’s sensible 
experiences translate through objective reality.   By this, objective reality is 
also sensible ‘Being’, as object is through the subject. This means that sense 
                                                     
21 G. Deleuze and F. Bacon, Francis Bacon: The logic of sensation (U of Minnesota Press, 
2003). p. 25 
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and sensing are of a unity, as ‘Being’ is considered mutually inclusive of the 
subject and object.22
 
In this respect, Deleuze argues that Cezanne considered 
sensation to not be exclusive to the atmosphere, and ‘disembodied’ activity 
of light and colour. For Cezanne, sensation was to be located in the body, as 
well as in the material, static objects. 
 
In terms of ‘colour’ synonymous with ‘sensation’, Deleuze expresses that in 
the process of painting, to ‘become’ is a condition of the subject, as well as 
the material objects. This affirms the processual or event nature of painting, 
so that sensation ‘happens’ in paintings. To the latter point, Deleuze clearly 
states, ‘sensation is what is painted’, and this is not to be taken to mean as a 
form of representation of the objective, but rather, sensation is the object, 
colour is the immediate sensible form, from which their existence and 
experience persists. Deleuze suggests that Cezanne rendered the world in 
terms of Nature, i.e. landscapes and still lifes, whereas Bacon considered the 
world as artefact, i.e. being made and constantly unmade.23
 
Deleuze explains 
that this difference reinforces the conception that links the two painters, that 
is, that the sensation is the painting whereby, the sensation(s) sustained and 
affected by the sensible form are given through painting. However, both 
painters were interested in addressing the world in terms of sensation, and 
both considered sensible forms as a relation to the sensation in painting. In 
other words, the process of painting is a process of sensation, so that with 
both painter and painting object, the field of colour perception the field 
through which the mutual interchange of becoming occurs. In this, for 
                                                     
22 Ibid. p. 25. From the reading of this particular designation on the notion of sensation, I 
believe Deleuze offers a means of compatibility between the Bergsonian position and the 
phenomenological position on the nature of sensation, to include the theories of Merleau-
Ponty, and, to refer the reader to the later part of this text, also towards the specific theories 
of colour from Michel Henry. 
23 Ibid. p. 26. Here I further specified Deleuze use of the term ‘artifact’, so as to further his 
previous description of Bacon’s manner of painting as a type of recording, by way of 
considering the world as indisputable through observation and deservedly, to be 
investigated and surveyed as ‘facts’. In this sense, colour is ‘made’ in painting by its own 
means, as colour is the making of colour, as sensible form is given by sensation. 
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Deleuze, the sensation of colour is the force of its translation in the process 
of painting. In this sense, the nature of the process of painting, is also a 
continuous transmission of sensation affected by the material medium.
23
. 
 
Deleuze argues that within each painting, of all the possible figures, and of 
all the sensations, each and all ‘is itself a shifting sequence or series’.24 
Moreover, this reverses the fixity of these terms in the sense for each claim 
there is said to exist differing orders, differing series, or differing sequences. 
That is, with each process of painting, with each incipient figure towards the 
accumulation of sensible forms, rather than a relation of sensations of 
different degrees we have differing orders, different domains from ‘one and 
the same sensation’. 
 
 
For Deleuze asserts that with each sensation, with each figure, there is a 
plurality of constitutive values. From this unity and coexisting nature we are 
able to say that the sensation transmitted in the painting, the ‘affective 
material sensation’ of the painting - the sensation derived from the sensible 
forms, and the figure itself, are all of a synthetic character. Without 
reservation Deleuze rejects the view that the source of the ‘material synthetic 
unity’ can be found in the represented object or isolated to the ‘figured thing’. 
Because of this reversal of the primary figuration for the secondary, the 
‘sensational‘ nature of the painting ‘provokes‘ the nascency of sensation, that 
is, for what is given as actual, as perceived, or as ‘sensed’ in the painting is 
also the counterpoint for the force of becoming sensations.25
 
Instead, the 
possibilities of sensing, and thereby, the potential to experience differing 
levels of a sensation is more than what is given by or beyond any represented 
object.26 
 
                                                     
24 Ibid. p. 27 
25 C. Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze (Routledge, 2001). p. 59-61 
26 Ibid. p. 28   
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Deleuze identifies Bacon’s paintings according to three theoretical elements, 
i.e. structure, the figure, and the contour, of which he claims that ‘all three of 
these converge on colour, in colour’.27 Moreover, he adds, it is the modulation 
of colour - the variance and oscillation that constitute the relation among 
colours. But this modulation is also the reason for the convergence of these 
elements, the force of the movement from one to another, (i.e. what he 
suggests as their ‘distribution’) and more importantly, for ‘the unity of the 
whole’.28 
 
Colour Fields 
 
Deleuze suggests that by the ‘Figure’ element, there are forms or shapes that 
are dynamic, active within the painting, and, to the extent that they affect the 
viewer in such a way that the viewing is compelled to move from one to 
another, they are described in the manner of ‘a flow of broken tones’.29 
However, all of these elements operate within the entire painting, and though 
there is a background or general ‘field of colour’, the relation of all the 
elements on one and the same plane is based on the resonance and transitions 
of tones and figures, and fundamentally, to be found in the movement and 
exchange from among all the colours. This suggests a modulation of the 
painting, particularly to the ‘mode’ of variations in tone, and thereby the 
oscillating movement implicit in the self-differentiating field of colours. From 
this, Deleuze claims that the altering of tone and differentiating of value 
‘consists of internal variations of intensity or saturation’.30 
 
Deleuze explains that the relational aspect of colours in a painting and the 
                                                     
27 Ibid. p. 101. I intend to draw out the distinctions implicit in Deleuze’s word use here. 
Here he uses two prepositions to suggesting a mutual governance of the activity or 
movement among the elements of the painting, their ‘convergence’. That is, with ‘on 
colour, in colour’ we need to refer back to the analysis of his reference to a 
phenomenological position that offers a clearer position on the nature of sensation, 
whereby, insisting on the ‘unity of the senses’, he considers this to be relevant in claims of 
the relation of sensation and the vital rhythm.   
28 Ibid. p. 101   
29 Ibid. p. 102 
30 Ibid. p. 103 
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variability of their intensity is predicated by some quality of movement, such 
that, from lines and bands crossing over and through sections of colour, this 
alone generates differing fields of colour, as fields are made subordinate or 
‘accentuated’ by others.31 Referring to the work of abstract expressionist 
painter Barnett Newman, whose colour-field paintings juxtaposed a dominant 
colour field with narrow strips or marginal bands of contrasting colours, 
Deleuze asserts that the variations of the total colour field depend on the 
relations of the proximity from among the spatial and temporal values of 
differing colours. As the case with Newman’s work, Deleuze claims that what 
is produced is a perception of succession or perception of movement in time. 
He explains that with more or less contour and hence, variation among the 
differing colour values, the colour field becomes an object that is then 
regarded according to a ‘temporal perception’. In this way, the colour field 
itself becomes an unending moment, perceived as without difference, and as 
a, ‘form of time’.32 In other words, the uniform colour field perceived as a 
‘form of time’, is the means for structure, shapes, and movements to emerge, 
and hence, is an ‘active presence’ for the relations of zones and shifting colour 
values. The time of colour is the source of change, the means of variance, and 
difference of colour is from among the movement given by the entire painting. 
 
 
On Possibility and Forces of Colour 
 
Colebrook explains that for Deleuze the affect of colour is among the forces 
of becoming, so that the force of colour through the process of painting is 
demonstrably a creative force. She adds that according to Deleuze these forces 
and the potential for their becoming, is ‘the incorporeal world of sense’.33 In 
this respect, for Deleuze’s theory of colour, the notion of ‘colour-force’ means 
that our perception is not according to how any colour is actually, but instead, 
how colour is becoming to perception differently. Colour is a force as it is an 
                                                     
31 Ibid. p. 103 
32 Ibid. p. 104 
33 Claire Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze (Routledge Critical Thinkers, New York, 2002), pp. 59-
61   
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affect towards its own forms, it is the expression of the becoming of sensation, 
and hence, active towards its own distinction.  Colour is a disruption from its 
own flow, and yet, transformative from among its own relations. Colebrook 
explains that for Deleuze, the actual world as made aware by the senses is a 
‘composite of virtual tendencies’.34 The colour perceived is what the eye has 
actualized. Given to the eye, the flow of light is perceived as colours. Colour 
is then, an actualization of perception, a form of perceiving from the 
continuous flow of difference in time. Colebrook explains that there are 
indefinite possibilities for seeing, but these may not be actualized, that is, 
what is possible may not become actual by being perceived. In t h e  process 
of painting, though there are colours actual to our perception, what is 
given has the potential to be more than what may be seen. This is to say that 
there are possibilities for differing perceptions of colour.35
 
Colebrook 
suggests that for Deleuze, life is pure difference and the world is constantly 
becoming, so that the differences of painting are actualized by differing 
perceptions. She explains that every perception, as points of actualisation or 
contraction from the indefinite possibilities to perceive, have their own 
duration. She describes the Deleuzian notion of perception in terms of ‘a 
contraction of flows of becoming’. Accordingly, she explains that for seeing, 
it is necessary for a ‘virtual synthesis of time’. In the process of painting, what 
is said to be perceived is a unity of past perceptions, expectation of perception, 
and the connection to becoming perceptions. 36 
 
This three-fold temporal quality of perceptions means that the creative force 
of colour in painting is at once the present affect of colour upon perception 
and immediately the possible variations of colour to differ from themselves 
as perceived. In other words, the nature of perception is such that perceiving 
colour is a means towards the qualitative possibilities of vision, and hence, 
towards the virtual and potential of any colour. In a word, to perceive colours 
                                                     
34 Ibid. p. 126 
35 Ibid. p. 126 
36 Ibid. p. 127   
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is to go beyond its existential condition of experience (i.e. continual reference 
to past experience), and it is by this that colour may be said to be becoming 
sensible towards possibilities.   Deleuze refers to the process of these 
perceptions as ‘singularities’, to which Colebrook comments that ‘certain 
works of art can present this potential’.37 However, she adds that singularities 
are not to be thought of in terms of notable moments according to a sequential 
progression, or a coherent order following the developments or abilities to 
perceive. For singularities are not within time, (i.e. to have been experienced, 
or being experienced) but instead, they are ‘events’: turning points or 
movements of transition from as-yet-possible to becoming. In terms of colour, 
singularities may be regarded in terms of the ‘movement’ of shade or tonal 
difference, and thereby, the concentrations from among the relation of the 
actual colour shift the position of sections, or focus of forms. Deleuze’s 
specific explication of the ‘relation of proximity of colours’ follows his theory 
of the modulation of colours, in which the singularities are the exertion of 
colour affecting the becoming of another tone or value. 
In a similar line of thought to Colebrook’s theory, Megan Craig argues that 
Deleuze’s theory of colour is based on the theory that time is the innermost 
nature. This is a theoretical consequence that originates from Bergson’s 
theories and that challenges the dominant notions of the spatialization of 
sensation, as it situates sensation in time and experience in duration. She 
indicates that by theorizing about the ‘temporal dimension of colour in 
Bacon’s work’, Deleuze is highlighting the variable intensities and the 
differing movements that are possible within painting. In this sense, Craig 
claims that Deleuze’s theory of colour emphasizes the concept of a ‘living 
body’, wherein the difference of life from art, or even, bodies from colour, is 
made ambiguous.38
 She argues that Deleuze’s theory is a three part 
development: first, the meaning of the term ‘sensation’, second, this notion of 
sensation applied to painting (particularly to the work of Bacon), and finally, 
                                                     
37 Ibid. p. 127   
38 M. Craig, 'Deleuze and the Force of Color', Philosophy Today 54. p. 177 
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through painting the use of colour may evoke sensation and hence, precipitate 
the potential of painting towards difference. In view of this, Craig claims that 
Deleuze’s theory not only asserts a theory of colour but rather a colour within 
the context of a theory of the embodiment of difference.   This resounds with 
Colebrook’s description of the complexities of Deleuze’s theory of painting, 
and in doing so amplifies the more significant Bergsonian turn towards 
temporal dimension of experience and the vitality of becoming. Craig 
suggests that what is crucial for understanding Deleuze’s theories of painting, 
is the relationship between sensitive bodies and the forces of becoming, i.e. 
sensation subject to colour. To such notion of bodies she explains that unlike 
the emphasis of Merleau-Ponty or Levinas on the receptive possibilities of 
physical touch and hence, the visceral nature of touch, Deleuze considered 
them as ‘complex vitalities’. For him these bodies are not simply reducible to 
categories of outside or inside, but rather, they are places of events and things 
in time, which all undergo continuous change. In this way, Craig points out 
that Deleuze has taken the phenomenological theory of embodiment further.39
 
Craig suggests that similar to Bergson’s distinction of creative instinct or 
expression of immediacy versus static intellection, Deleuze also recognizes 
the differences in the transitions of sensation through their expression from 
the re-presentation and articulation as an ‘afterthought’ of sensation. 
 
 
 
 
Kandinsky on Colour 
 
Like Bacon’s work, Kandinsky argues for the expressive nature of painting, 
and rather than an objectivist’s view of reality, his is one that considers the 
nature of art in terms of inner life, the psychology of colour, and the language 
of forms and colour that flow from their source. Kandinsky explained that 
when our eyes move over a palette of colour we have ‘a purely physical 
                                                     
39 Ibid. p. 178 
    
249  
 
 
Colour 
impression’ in which one feels pleasure, happiness, and satisfaction as the eye 
is also ‘warmed, or else soothed and cooled’. His emphasis on these 
impressions is more to do with difference of feelings given by tangible 
presence of the activity of the eye and the colour palette, than having with the 
stimulus immediately translated as idea. Kandinsky’s theory argues that the 
painter expounds on such notions of impressions, physical sensations, and 
hence, the psychological workings of colour, and he does so by situating all 
of these in terms of the process of painting as being part of an indefinite 
temporal progression.40
 
He suggests that though the continuation of these 
impressions and their effect may be short lived, such that the ‘soul is 
unaffected’, the enduring affect from a glancing experience is to be found in 
the possibilities of painting - in the series of sensations and the emerging 
events in the work of painting to continue after.  For Kandinsky, there are 
many ‘purely superficial’ impressions that are experienced from among the 
more familiar and ordinary objects of the world, but he argues it is with ‘a 
first encounter with any new phenomenon’, which is the resounding affect 
upon the soul. The consequence of these first affects that are direct upon the 
soul, is a foundational movement in which what were once first, immediate 
impressions, become the compositional qualities of knowledge. In other 
words, the intensive experience is no longer identified with objects or 
phenomenon, but instead, what is lasting of the affective sensation becomes 
the meaning of the totalized and diluted composite from which traces of the 
enduring affects of the soul may be attributed.  
 
Kandinsky suggests that as an individual develops and comes to knowledge 
by the growth of experience, though impressions given are not likely to have 
as an intensive affect as was had by first encounters, the experiences of objects 
and phenomenon ‘acquire an inner meaning and eventually a spiritual 
                                                     
40 Wassily Kandinsky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art, trans. by M.T.H. Sadler, (Dover 
Publications, New York, 1977), p. 23.   
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harmony’.41 However, he claims that the impression of a colour may register 
differently with an individual who has developed a more ‘sensitive soul’, that 
is, one who is more aware of the potency and possible impressions of colour 
so as to be attuned to the impressionable variations of colours’ affect. He 
argues that for an individual whose senses are so directed by virtue of a trained 
disposition the effects of colours are to be considered in terms of ‘their 
psychic effect’.42  From a first encounter and then onto individual impression 
of colour over a period of time these gradually contribute towards the 
development of a conceptualization of colour. For the attentive individual, 
this process of the transition from the immediate intensive sensation to the 
extension of ideas in conscious reflection results in an interchange from the 
developed concepts returning to the immediacy of colour’s effect. However, 
this passage and direction of concepts towards impressions, suggest a 
direction of thinking colour towards the immediacy of colour.  In this 
transition, there occurs the culturing of colour’s inner meaning. For 
Kandinsky, by this process the individual is more inclined towards colour and 
therefore, tends to be more sensitive and moved by it. He explains that this 
process of development of sensitivity to a colour’s impression, a sensitivy that 
is prompted by experience, this leads to an widening of the sensitivity and an 
acute attunement in terms of an intensive receptivity. In this regard, learning 
to think the colour and feel the colour is to experience colour in terms of its 
‘corresponding spiritual vibration’. 
 
 
He explains that those first encounters or elementary physical impressions are 
only steps, steps towards a ‘meaning’ of colour through which one returns to 
colour. That is to say, that with colour there is type of communication in 
which the exchange is an interchangeable process of taking and giving, 
feeling and thought. Moreover, according to Kandinsky, what is most 
                                                     
41 Ibid. p. 24 
42 Ibid. p. 24 
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significant with this exchange is the psychic effects of colour over the purely 
psychical impressions from colour. Rather, colours effect the inner feeling in 
so far as those feelings coalesce towards primary meanings and thought, and 
as such, knowledge returns to impressions given by colour so as to further 
affect feelings. Kandinsky leaves open the question of whether it is possible 
for a ‘direct’ psychic effect of colour to produce an immediate intensive 
affect, or an attitude of knowing in the individual. Because of the overlap of 
physical, mental, and sensational properties belonging to both colour and the 
individual equally, Kandinsky regards the process of painting as the 
intertwining of the subjective condition of the painter and the objective 
manifestations of the painterly elements. He explains that because the 
individual’s psychical and intensive states are situated within the body, the 
physical impressions and sense experiences given by colour may be of such a 
kind or degree, that they also occur simultaneously as a ‘psychic shock’ and 
an intensive feeling. 
 
Kandinsky assumes a conceptually vague boundary, separating the physical 
domain and the psychical domain, by suggesting that colour has the 
potential to affect physical sensations to the extent that colour may ‘awaken’ 
other deep sensations. In other words, the psychic effect of colour becoming 
realised is a co-occurrence of inner ‘feeling’ and inner ‘meaning’. In terms 
of a psychology of colours then, Kandinsky explains that colour exercises 
influences on the body by affecting sensations and influencing expression. 
Colour acts as a type of medium by which external forces reverberate or 
‘echo’ with internal movements, such that the material elements of painting 
cause intensive sensations. Colour is not simply an external stimulus, but 
rather, in terms of Kandinsky’s non-objectivist account, it is a condition of 
the psychic effects emanating from the world, and in resonance with the 
painter’s inner tension, it is expressibly more than any register of vision or 
the senses. Instead Kandinsky directly relates this notion of the ‘necessity’ 
of the painter, with the inner and spiritual compulsion towards painterly 
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expression.  It is the impression of colour that requires the external 
orientation of its experience. This is similar to Bergson’s theory of the 
coinciding of colour perception with the extensity of colour in material 
things. For Kandinsky, colour is a compulsory and complementary inner 
movement that returns to the force of its experience through the expressions 
met by the painting media. This ‘inner need’ is not a particular condition 
that arises from the correspondence of sensations, but rather, it is towards an 
unequivocal core of vital expression. For Kandinsky, as with Bergson, 
colour is regarded in terms of its affective condition, and by its continual 
movement it is also understood as an experience of change.  Hence in the 
process of painting, the engagement with colour is integral to the harmony 
of expression in the painting. 
 
The Bauhaus Complement to a Kandinskian Theory of Colour 
 
During his time as teacher and organizer of the ‘Basic Course’ at the Bauhaus, 
Johannes Itten maintained a similar view with Kandinsky, theorizing that the 
understanding of the qualities of colour and the possibilities of the effects of 
colour are primarily questions of the psychological, of conditions of the 
individual, and foremost, concerning the subjective experience. Though he 
suggests that there is a need for ‘objective principles and rules‘, or simply a 
conceptual formulation of colour, for Itten, this is only to assist with the 
‘subjective predicament’, i.e. one’s own appreciation for any given colour that 
results from the expressive effects of colour.43
 
For Itten, colours are forces in 
the sense that they are ‘radiant energies that affect us positively and 
negatively’.44    According to Itten, the sum of these effects can be studied not 
by direct visual comprehension, but more broadly, by either consideration 
from psychological perspectives or according to symbolisms. Light in itself 
is not considered coloured, but rather, colour is attributed to its discrimination 
                                                     
43 J. Itten and F. Birren, The Elements of Color: A Treatise on the Color System of J. Itten, 
based on His Book the Art of Color. Edited and with a Foreword and Evaluation by F. 
Birren. Transl. by Ernst Van Hagen (Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970). p. 7 
44 Ibid. p. 12 
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from its arising from the visual and mental processes. Itten explains that 
colour taken as a secondary or emergent property from the reception of light, 
helps us understand how recognition colour and apprehension arises. But 
what we understand is that ‘several colours arise from qualitative differences 
in photosensitivity’.45 From the analysis of colour in substances, Itten explains 
that our understanding accords with the form of a chemical variant or agent 
that colour is considered. Hence, colour is seen as definable as much as the 
analysable pigment or colourant, or simply, material of which it is a property.  
In this respect, Itten explains that colour is given meaning and takes on a 
content by way of its optical register, as well as its ‘cerebral perception’.46 
For Itten, the eye and the mind come to different perceptions of colour. In 
respect to optical perception, and certainly in the interests of both the chemical 
and physiological analysis of colour, colour perception is more in terms of a 
‘physiochemical reality’. By this, colour is recognized only according to its 
physically and/or chemically definable agency.  Whereas, with cerebral 
perception, this would be the focus of a psychological theorization of colour, 
and Itten terms this as ‘the psycho-physiological reality’of colour. In this 
sense, Itten claims that when the agency of colour and the physical medium 
for colour encounter the mental or cerebral nature of colour, and these do not 
coincide as a co-occurrence of one to the other, then there is the opportunity 
for novelty in expression. For Itten, this is not a matter of how, but rather, a 
question of when such discordance occurs between physical and psychical 
properties of colour. The artist, when driven by aesthetic pursuits, is 
concerned when the physical and the mental nature of colour are discordant.  
Itten explains that for the artist, when this occurs, there is the possibility of 
‘discordant, dynamic, unreal, and fugitive expression’.47 In other words, 
whether by approach of colour based on its physicality or in terms of its 
effective or mental register, by the merging of its concrete nature and its 
mental nature, colour as a phenomena generates ‘unreal vibrations’. 
                                                     
45 Ibid. p. 16 
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In this sense, by studying the differing perspectives of theories of colour 
perception, from the position of the artist, Itten suggests that it is with contrast 
effects that we may more fully approach the ‘problems of colour’ (i.e. the 
‘subjectively conditioned colour perception’), and hence, further the study of 
colour aesthetics. Indeed, further study lending to further practice, eventually 
leads to possibilities ‘that affords the artist his opportunity to express the 
ineffable’ For Itten, with any other mixture in which the combination is 
considered discordant, non-harmonious, or one-sided, as such, this proceeds 
from the application of subjective combinations and, therefore, 
‘its expression has an exciting and provocative effect’.48  Furthermore, 
towards this 
subjective colouring, Itten claims that not only the subjective combinations 
of hues but also the subject’s orientation of the colour applied and the size 
of its application 
suggests modes of thought or feeling. 
The ‘subjective timbre’ is the subjective quality and characteristics of the 
individual that are the possibilities of expressions through colour. But, by 
considering the ‘individual temperament and disposition’ , and hence, the 
potential of the subject’s mode of thought, feelings, and actions, the 
‘subjective timbre’ is then expressed through the subject’s choice of 
combinations and overall use of colour. In this respect, Itten claims that colour 
serves as a medium for the inner being of the individual. By which he means 
that the ‘intrinsic constitution and structures’ emerge from and are unique to 
the psychophysical state of the individual. For Itten, the objective principles 
of colour are to be recognized, understood, and practiced. However, this does 
not mean to disregard the subjective timbre which precedes the subjective use 
of colour. Instead, like Kandinsky, Itten argues that the principles of colour 
may be empirically derived, but from the impressions of colour, the painter’s 
intensive and felt experience precedes any plan, design, or any calculated 
composition. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have argued for attempted a continuation of a philosophy 
of colour, by thinking colour in terms of its relation to a Bergsonian 
philosophical view of the process of painting. We evaluated Bergson’s 
thinking that colour is part of the real movement and continuously changing 
nature of reality, so that  by thinking through the encounter with colour, the 
experience is an encounter with the indivisible rhythms occurring within 
duration. From this view we argued that the nature of the colour experience 
is variable according to the occurrences of colour coinciding with the 
continuity of our own consciousness. In this sense, we continued a Bergsonian 
interpretation of colour to argue that colour is a heterogeneous and qualitative 
movement in time. However, by the contracting of the rhythms of colour into 
the durations lived by our consciousness, we are affected by what is given 
through the experience of colour. Therefore colour is a continuous possibility 
for the experiences of conscious perception, as a continuity of difference 
with the movement of the living and sensing body, and thereby, the potential 
for differing levels of sensation.49
 
This is to say that for the painter, the 
experience of colour as an experience through sensorial and perceptual 
contact with the painting media is an affective force because of its real 
duration. Furthermore, we argued against the Fechnerian principle of colour 
that extends to contemporary psychological,  and continues to uphold the view 
that colour is a deterministic force registered by the psyche as  independent 
and distinct encounters.  Rather we regarded colour, not according to the 
rhetoric of the causal relations, but in terms of the immediate experience of 
colour, an approximation of temporal conditions as occurrences of qualitative 
change. And therefore, colour as an indivisible, multifarious, and 
heterogeneous quality of real duration, coincides with the pure duration of the 
inner states of consciousness. We conceded that colour is a force towards 
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expressions and is immanent to the process of painting. Therefore, we argued 
that colour is given to the painter, through the painting media, such that the 
qualitative range of the differences of light also correspond with the feelings 
of the painter, affecting his activity, and influencing the continuous 
experience of the painterly activities towards the expression of living visual 
forms. From this context we argued that colour is affective towards conscious 
perception to the extent that its variability, occurring through the mediation 
of conscious perception is then the subjective mode of its experience. Colour 
is immanent to the change in the world. Hence, we argued that the sensations 
given by colour are the qualitative manifestation of its rhythmic passage. 
In this sense, the expression of colour proceeds from the harmony of the 
painter’s intensive experience with the rhythmic extensity of colour in the 
world, and in particular with the forms of colour. Therefore, we have 
considered colour as the perceptual experience of the painter and as an 
intrinsic property of the materiality of the painting media. In this way, colour 
is a type of medium by which the differing durational rhythms of material 
reality reverberate or ‘echo’ with internal rhythms of consciousness. From 
this perspective, we at tempted to  ex tend a Bergsonian theoretical 
orientation of colour to Kandinsky’s theory o f  colour by comparing 
Bergson’s descriptions of the melodic and qualitative nature of colour to 
Kandinsky’s view of colour in terms of the impulse for spiritual expression 
by way of the harmony of colour.  In Bergsonian terms, colour not reducible 
to codifications of degrees of external stimuli, but rather, in terms of 
Kandinsky’s non-objectivist account, it is a condition of the psychic effects 
emanating from the world. Though Kandinsky’s theory considers a  
rationalisation of the psychological effects of colour, he understands that 
the investigations towards a logic of colour, a re  immanent to the relation of its 
resonances with the painter’s, as inner tensions, and the reciprocity to the 
tones and rhythms of colour in the world.  Moreover, the double 
movements of colour, from the sensorial encounter and experience towards 
the influence of colour in the expression of its experience, this is the 
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exacting of the spiritual experience through process of painting. In this 
sense, similar to Bergson’s theory of the coinciding of colour perception 
with the extensity of colour in material things, the peculiar differentiation of 
colour from its internal experience towards its externalizations is an 
interpenetration of subjective states that are at once conditioned by the 
material and extensive quality of colour. In the process of painting,  t h e  
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  colour is the most fundamental element of its expression, 
such that the painter’s experience of colour is part of the living activity of 
its expression, as a rhythm of difference then projected into the material 
becoming of the painting media towards the event of the art-object. 
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Chapter 7 - Line and Divergence 
 
There is, in Leonardo da Vinci’s Treatise on Painting, a page that Ravaisson loved to quote. 
It is the one where the author says that the living being is characterized by the undulous or 
serpentine line, that each being has its own way of undulating, and that the object of art is to 
render this undulation distinctive.1 
 
Now vanishing slowly in the green grass.  Now sticking in the gray mud.  Now vanishing 
slowly in the white snow.  Now sticking in the gray mud. Lay long: thick long black reeds. 
Lay long. Long reeds. Reeds. Reeds.2 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The line is a trace of movement, but perhaps, even more so, the line is 
movement itself. Rather than consider the line in terms of a ‘thing’, as a visual 
apparatus, as geometrical schema, as a plastic element, or even as a distinct 
material orientation, in this chapter, we will argue that the line is the most 
stable translation of the experience of life in the process of painting. In this 
regard, we will consider the line according to its ontological nature. We will 
argue that the line is an affectively present form of coalescence of contacts of 
the painter’s rhythm with the rhythms of the painting medium, occurring as 
visible formulations of a contouring process in time. By considering the ontic 
qualities of linearity, we will argue that the lines are tangible ‘possibilities’, 
through which occurrences of expression and experience are embodied in its 
true movement. We will maintain that there is a linear aspect to 
consciousness. And since the continual experience of consciousness is 
particular to its linear expression, we will argue that by movement of lines, 
lines are not reducible to their apprehended figures. Instead, we will argue 
that lines are vital processes in themselves, as immediate expressions from 
the force of duration divulging life’s movements. In this way, we will claim 
that in the process of painting, linearity is the progression of living expression 
                                                     
1 CM. p. 229 
2 W. Kandinsky, Kandinsky, complete writings on art (Da Capo Press, 1994).p. 301 
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immediate to its unfolding, so that lines are the marking out of forms of 
expression before it is a figure or a graphic form.  However, by the diversity 
of linear movements in the process of painting, we will argue that lines are 
affective actions, by which creative movements are implicit in the extension 
of lines, but they are also genetic movements becoming visual and reflective 
to the immediacy of conscious perception. The tangible and visual forms of 
line as a continuity of becoming through living linearity implies the 
embodiment of images, and the durational qualities of living experience. In 
this sense, we will then argue beyond the line, to suggest that linearity is 
immanent within the process of painting, so that the corporeal and expressive 
materiality of painting are productive movements generated by the affective 
and intensive qualities of life. Painting is a material process, a material form 
of living, and a spiritual process, a unique manner of sensation and thinking 
affecting visual and pictorial projections. Therefore, we will attempt to argue 
that as the process of painting embodies both material and mental activities, 
as with the line itself, the qualitative change of painting is one of processes of 
continual movement, differing degrees of tensions of consciousness, and the 
durational rhythms of visual expression. In this sense, the line in painting 
signifies the ‘living’ process most immediate to the activities in painting, as 
not merely mind intending towards and uniting with material, but moving 
from its own embodiment and continuously opening towards its endless 
creation. 
 
 
The Vitality of Line 
 
Lines are simultaneously affective, by which their quality of continuity is 
immediate to the sensations arising from their markings so that the forms that 
extend from the contouring, become part of the visual intuitions. However, 
what is at stake here is the equivalence of thought and visual object, that is, 
similar value given to painting as physical process as well as a psychological 
process. In other words, for painting to be both, the continual process of 
rendering thought and the continual thing-ness of thought constantly in 
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movement, proceeding towards its own realization, this implies that painting 
is solely reducible to processes of becoming.3
 
Here we recall the notion of 
becoming with Bergson’s theory intuition, so that there is an indissoluble 
relation of thing and thought, as both domains are themselves differing 
movements of images, and changing within the continuity of duration.   From 
this motion of a multiplicity of movements, as a principal quality of reality, 
we argued that the condition of constant change in the process of painting, in 
terms of the material and mental variability, implies movements of thinking 
things towards things thinking. In other words, painting is a process in which 
the movement of its expression is towards its material becoming. 
 
We see this duration of becoming signified in the visual and progressive 
existence of the line, such that its qualitative linearity exhibits a process of 
self-creation, both, developing from the force of its movement and the force 
of the linear movement continuing from itself. In other words, the line is 
movement, and because movement is fundamental to any mark making in the 
process of painting, whether we regard the movement as original to the 
painter’s body or the physical manifestation of the object in motion, this 
means that lines are both actual and potential. Continuing with his exposition 
of Ravaisson, Bergson quotes da Vinci, affirming that art offers unique 
visions of reality, and this in connection with his view of life’s potentials 
through its passage as in terms of continuous movements of dissociation  and 
division, stating, 
 
The secret of the art of drawing is to discover in each object the particular way in which a 
certain flexuous line which is, so to speak, its generating axis, is directed through its whole 
extent, like one main wave which spreads out in little surface waves.’ It is  possible, 
moreover, that this line is not any one the visible lines of the figure. It is not in one place any 
more than in another, but it gives the key to the whole. It is less perceived through the eye 
than thought by mind.4 
 
                                                     
3 Ibid. xii 
4 Ibid., p. 229 
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Here Bergson elaborates on the notion of lines as particular modes of life and 
thereby, linear processes immediate to sensorial experience and then apparent 
and open to conscious reflection. In this sense, linearity is analogous to the 
renderings of vital forces, particular to their movement, as a continuity of their 
opening and growing. Lines are creative experiences, wherein, their markings 
concretize and affirm their movements, and from the necessity of their 
generating movement, they move beyond their actual designation. There is a 
schematic workings of lines in which lines are the precondition for the 
continuity of thought original to their own generation. According to Bergson, 
this sense of a ‘generating’ or originative nature of line suggests a similarity 
with the course and progression of life, by which linearity is also a 
characteristic of living movements that proceed from conscious deliberation. 
In other words, the line is invisible as a continuous quality of realization to 
mind, as it is the continuous activity of consciousness, before, it is the visible 
articulation taken up by perception. 
 
Painting,’ said Leonardo da Vinci, ‘is a mental thing’. And he added that it is the soul which 
creates the body in its image. [...] That is where the painter has placed himself. It is in 
developing a mental vision, simple and    direct, concentrated on this point, that he found, 
trait for trait, the model he had before his eyes, reproducing in his own way the generating 
effort of nature.5 
 
By this account, Bergson again, elucidates the connection of the ‘generating’ 
activity of material reality, to the perception of consciousness apprehending 
it. To this we might add, that in the process of painting then, the linear 
movements of the painter’s gesture and the applied line are physical 
applications and contact to the planar surface through the painting medium, 
but the indefinite qualities of lines and the activity of linear movements are 
originating within the objects themselves. We argue from this point that, the 
conscious activity of drawing out lines in the process of painting is the 
development from a non-particular influence of the generative forces of the 
                                                     
5 Ibid., pp. 229-230   
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objects of perception. In both cases, the activities of painting and drawing are 
processes of forceful seizure in which, the generation of the movement of a 
particular painterly gesture or linear expression is also the force originating in 
its material relation. Bergson emphasizes the movement of art and the 
perceptions in the activities of its rendering as already present to the painting 
medium, the forms emerge from the materiality, stating, 
 
True art aims at portraying the individuality of the model and to that end it will seek behind 
the lines one sees the movement the eye does not see, behind the movement itself something 
even more secret, the original intention, the fundamental aspiration of the person: a simple 
thought equivalent to all the indefinite richness of form and colour.6 
 
 
What we want to argue here is that the line becomes a contouring of other 
content from the exertion of life in response to its contact with the material 
world.  The line is then, among the conscious activities in the process of 
painting, activities that are given by perception. Hence, towards the 
advancement of a Bergsonian theory of line, we argue that the line in the 
process of painting emphasizes the ontological quality of the gesture, of the 
mark making of the painter as both, an immediate and aesthetic experience, 
originating from the reception of consciousness to the affects of materiality.  
Other contemporary philosophies offer theories of the line, establishing a 
conception of line in terms of movement, thinking, and altogether, as an 
expressive and hence, creative force. In Bergsonian terms however, we argue 
that the movements of life in the process of painting, are expressibly the 
condition of linearity, as the mutual affect of the materiality and the effect of 
a ‘reintegration’ of thought and the images of reflective consciousness into 
the material world.7
   
So far, with our present consideration of the concept of 
line, we argue that linear processes and the characteristic operations of 
linearity are the movements of consciousness towards the images given by 
perception. For Bergson the line and the condition of linearity in the process 
                                                     
6 Ibid., pp. 230   
7 Ibid. p. 238 
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of painting, is a dual movement of the immediacy of consciousness to the field 
of perception, and the turn to intellectual reflection, which projects the force 
of line. In this sense, the total linear expression is also a means of 
consciousness, and is the content of life.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contour and Expression 
 
From the individuality of the lines both, life’s expressions and life’s 
experience of its own creativity are attained. This is not to say that the line 
derives a creative effect from a representative attitude towards nature, but 
rather, the line as a movement of the activity of presenting consciousness 
through linear expression is continuous to the field of perception. According 
to Ravaisson’s method of drawing and its relation to his philosophical views, 
Bergson argues the distinction of the mechanical or imitative processes of 
‘guide marks’, from the spiritual or originating and creative processes, 
explaining, 
 
What counts above all in these circumstances is, in fact, the ‘good judgement of the eye.‘ The 
student who begins by providing himself with guide marks, who then links them together by 
means of a continuous line, drawing his inspiration as far as possible from geometric curves, 
can only learn to see falsely.  He never grasps the characteristic movement of the form to be 
drawn. ‘The spirit of the form’ always eludes him. The result is entirely different when one 
begins with the characteristic curves of life.9 
 
From the above, the obvious distinction made is between the mechanical and 
geometric linear processes from the ‘characteristic movement’ and 
continuous changing contour of life. By ‘curves of life’, Bergson is appealing 
to notion of the direct and immediate influence of nature upon the artist’s 
                                                     
8 Ibid. p. 238 
9 Ibid. p. 241 
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perception and the perception of the life shifting in relation to its attended 
object. It is the influence of our intelligence which produces lines, but, 
according to an analysis of the visible and in the direction of geometric 
composition.  To that extent, Bergson suggests that, 
 
By starting from geometry one can go as far as one wishes in the direction of complication 
without ever drawing any closer to the curves by which life expresses itself.10 
 
The ‘curves’ of the line is synonymous with the deviating qualities and the 
continuous movement of life. Bergson’s claim is directed to life’s linear 
expression as a means of revealing the origin of perception within things. In 
this sense, the work of life is true to itself, when it moves towards the 
continuous revealing of nature. Again, Bergson intimates the creative and 
vital movement of the line resulting in beauty to life’s efforts and effect from 
nature, stating, 
 
Perhaps-that is, if we consider that beauty itself is only an effect, and if we go back to the 
cause. Beauty belongs to form, and all form has its origin in a movement which outlines it: 
form is only recorded movement.11 
 
This is not to speak of life’s expression through drawing as equivalent to the 
compositional forms, but instead, it is from the movement of life’s continuous 
effort that forms are continually expressed. For Bergson, the line is a 
movement of consciousness, but this movement is from the actualization of 
life’s effort.  Through 
linearity, we argue, life is expressing the effort to express from a vision 
‘beneath the sensible intuition’. To do this, the line is the individual and 
concrete effort of consciousness to enclose, and to embrace the experiences 
immediate to the materiality that ‘unrolls and manifests ‘from life’s 
expression.12
 
From this view of line and linearity as a contouring which 
embodies the confluence of living experience and the affect of materiality, we 
                                                     
10 Ibid. p. 241 
11 Ibid. p. 243 
12 CM, pp. 223-224 
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now shift to a Kandinskian perspective to understand further this notion of 
line as a force of moving expression. 
 
 
Kandinsky’s Potential of ‘Point’ and Bergson’s Force of ‘Line’ 
 
We have demonstrated in many instances that Kandinskian theorization 
corresponds or at least, parallels with Bergson’s theory of consciousness and 
life, expression and matter. Henry’s analysis has given us a bridge from 
Kandinsky, by the recasting of Bergsonian theory, namely in terms of the 
affective exchanges of life as it is both continuous with its experience, and 
expressive from this encounter, and becoming difference in duration. 
Nonetheless, we see that Kandinskian theory is able to stand on its own with 
the interjection of a phenomenological perspective. Such that we can see with 
Kandinsky’s theory of line, a notion of linear expression develops from within 
a broader exposition of material and elemental forces corresponding to 
spiritual growth. Most importantly for our concerns in this chapter, he claims 
that the work of art follows from the potential of its contents, and in terms of 
life as the dynamic of artistic expression, the force for the originating of 
painting is from an inner source. From this view, we argue that Kandinsky’s 
theory of non-objective painting is most aptly to his theory of line, in that he 
regards the line as not being a pictorial or referential element, but rather, it is 
of the dual nature of force and activity, a becoming and expressive opening. 
 
Kandinsky claims that the two basic elements of painting are the point and 
the line. The point has dual properties that of a non-corporeal thing and, as a 
material form. He explains that the point is a ‘proto-element’ that serves as a 
bridging of both the inner and outer dimensions of reality. In terms of being 
both invisible and visible, the point is at once, within the depth of 
consciousness, as an affective feeling, as well as occurring on the material 
surface, as an external gesturing of conscious perception. Where, Bergson 
considers the problem of metaphysical speculation, by first suggesting that it 
is an attempt to understand life’s origins, we compare this to Kandinsky’s 
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theory of point, here, specifically to connect Bergson’s notion of the ‘origin’ 
of metaphysics with the Kandinskian theory of the ‘point’. In terms of 
Bergson and Kandinsky, these realities correlate according to the nature of 
systematic approaches of our thinking, and the methods that develop in both 
painting and philosophy. Bergson encourages continual philosophical 
reflection, but is critical of the ‘mechanism of thinking’. Our epistemological 
nature attempts to analyse its own means of analysis before expanding 
thought to the whole of the experience of reality. For Bergson this indicates a 
‘premature reflection of the mind on itself‘, which does not allow for the 
expansion of knowledge. Bergson’s tacit use of a notion of linearity, 
figuratively expresses the difference of conditions for abstracted thinking. 
 
That is, the nature of reflective speculation, that of an immediacy of thinking 
that is mobile in terms of moving along with experience, continually 
expanding, and hence, as a continually expanding reasoning. However, 
Bergson argues that such knowledge does not follow ‘the sinuous and mobile 
contours of reality’.13 By suggesting that the mind’s abstraction from 
experience in attempts to articulate the essence of experience results in the 
illusion of a metaphysical order, he describes such forms of thinking in terms 
of a representation of reality as being formulaic, and therefore, they do not 
apprehend the dynamic qualities of reality. Similarly, Kandinsky explains that 
the ‘most basic graphic elements’ in painting such as the point and the line 
are abstracted, when thought of as being isolated from ‘the real of the material 
surface’, whereas, ‘upon the material’ surface, the effects of lines and points, 
the overall expressions of the painter’s activity become characteristics of the 
materiality of the painting medium itself. In other words, though relatively 
fleeting, the application of the point and line is an original expression most 
approximate to the experience and perceptions given by the materiality. 
 
In this context, the line is a figure of composition, a definite graphic form that 
contributes to the sense of the fixity of reality, and all the while, betraying this 
                                                     
13 ME, pg. 3 
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sense by the very movement and intrinsic change of its trace. Moreover, when 
applied to a schematic for metaphysical thinking, what is already presumed is 
whole of reality is certain and fixed. However, in linear terms Bergson 
suggests that the metaphysician’s ideas may be schematic, simplified and 
formulaic, but these are not sufficient to evaluate reality in terms of its 
‘sinuous and mobile contours’. In terms commensurate with qualities of lines, 
Bergson describes the nature of reality, in which its essence is thought of as 
continually bending and continually shaping flow. We argue that this offers a 
basis for a concept of the line in the process of painting. Linearity in the 
process of painting is the effort to conceptualize towards rigid forms of 
thinking, but also, actualizes the continuity of expression as a mode of life 
towards an openness of reality, and the continuity of change from the 
immediacy of its experience. Conditions of linearity are ascribed to distinct 
forms of reasoning and to qualities of reality. However, I am not attempting 
to decontextualize what may be regarded as only a metaphorical usage of the 
notion of line. Rather, considering Bergson’s own admission of the difficulty 
to articulate a philosophy of time, his argument for a type of thinking that is 
immediate to existence, we maintain that Bergson’s theory analogous to 
notions of linearity is the basis for a concept of line. In his attempts to 
elucidate a radically empirical metaphysics, Bergson’s theory of the 
‘linearity’ of thinking suggests that the line in the process of painting is a 
means of conveyance of the durational nature of reality. In other words, the 
line is a material activity, and by experience of its expression, the event of a 
conceptual becoming is made apparent. Hence the condition of linearity in 
painting, as a term for a broader process of life, means that the line is a process 
present to its living experience. 
 
 
The Thinking Line 
 
Bergson’s philosophy introduced a ‘reversal’ of philosophy, a transformative 
approach to metaphysics in which, not only the origin but the orientation of 
    
268  
 
 
Line 
thinking changes.    From this, thinking is not according to a referential 
direction ‘from concepts to things’, but that processes of mind belongs to 
things themselves.14
 
In this respect, we maintain that painting is thinking. The 
material painting is a painted thing, and as painting is also a process towards 
rendering, the objects of these process become yet other variants of becoming 
things, other changes in the lived experiences of painting. Moreover, the 
thing-ness of the process of painting are the possibilities for multiple 
directions of thinking further affecting its continual becoming. This is not to 
say that the thinking in painting is to consider paintings as thinking things. 
This is to say that thinking is a mode of life that inheres within the multiple 
processes unique to painting, preceding the material conditions of painting, 
the thing-ness of painting. Though modes of thinking are continuous towards 
objects, and in the reflection of perceptions back upon the process, the modes 
of thought unique to painting indicate the multiple processes of becoming 
thought, the ongoing realizations of thought, through the actualizations of the 
process.15
  
In other words, thinking is simultaneously the materiality of 
painting, i.e. the painted thing itself, as well as the process of its becoming. In 
this regard we maintain that as painting is a continuous process, thinking is 
also an innate variability in modes of painting. Regardless of the metaphoric 
or analogistic notions of linearity occurring in Bergson’s work, we extended 
a notion of linearity from the context of his theory to mean that aside from the 
linearity of thinking and the linear development of schemas, the actual 
concrete line also expresses conceptual development as a form of thinking in 
progress. However as we have articulated above, the line is more than its 
actualization. Rather, by its movement it is at once a virtual concept as the 
condition of linearity is continuity of movement from the potential of 
                                                     
14 H. Bergson, An introduction to metaphysics (Hackett Publishing, 1949). p. x 
15 Ibid. xi, Here I am not considering the ‘object as non-reducible to thinking, but instead, 
commensurate with objects. In this sense, there is not a relation to something that gives rise 
to the action of thinking or a constitutive orientation for the directions of thought such as a 
thinking subject. Rather, thinking is a set of processes, occurrences from the movement of 
continual movement of reality. This is to say that, things are the potential for variances of 
mind.   
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movement continuously actualizing by its experience. That is to say that 
linearity is significant, not solely in terms of a pictorial identity, but by the 
movement of its traces the movement of the line is already becoming 
represented. Equally, it is a conceptual state in which a quality of expression 
is nearest the qualities of material reality. This may be furthered by 
considering that the qualities of linearity then convey the interposing of 
somatic qualities and intellectual qualities of reality. Bergson suggests a view 
supportive of this, stating, 
 
But it seems to me that in different groups of facts, each of which, without giving us the 
desired knowledge, points out to us the direction in which we may find it.  Now to have only 
a direction is something. And it is still more to have several, for these directions will naturally 
converge towards one and the same point, and it is that point we are seeking.16 
 
Moreover, it is the convergence of linear qualities of mind, (i.e. as either 
symbolic in linguistic operations or in conceptual expression), and linear 
qualities of material realities (i.e. contouring, bending, movement, 
directional, etc.) that a ‘line of thought’, that is, a linear model of thinking, 
may be considered equal to lines as sensuous qualities of reality. For Bergson, 
there are ‘different regions of experience’, by which our knowledge is not 
given inclusively in full, but instead, relative to the distinct facts that 
correspond to these regions accordingly. There is an implicit sense of 
movement, as Bergson suggests, in which they are given as courses of action, 
as ‘directions’ given toward knowledge. Hence, there are indefinite 
multiplicities of movements, pluralities of action and variable correlations of 
experience as differing ‘directions’ of fact. Bergson’s use of the term 
‘direction’ suggests the multiple possibilities of experience, and thereby, (in 
a linear sense), implies that experience is a multiplicity of directions of 
experiences along which the duration of becoming prolonged. By our 
attempts toward a comprehensive understanding, we reflect on these 
                                                     
16 Ibid. p. 4   
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experiences and from the ‘facts’ gathered, we have ‘a certain number of lines 
of facts’.17  In other words, experience is itself a linear progression and facts 
are then the ‘directional’ nature of experience. For Bergson, despite all the 
variable directions and different facts of individual ‘directions’ of experience, 
when all of these progressions are considered as constituting a whole, as a 
‘convergence’ of lines, then there occurs a ‘accumulation of  possibilities’.18  
The possibilities of philosophy are increased, as ‘lines’ of experientially 
derived facts are brought into a process of collation. These differing and yet, 
continuing ‘directions’ of experience, are collectively likened to the efforts of 
philosophical speculation. Our metaphysics, and hence the practice of our 
speculations through the process of painting are not only formations of 
abstracted ideas, but instead, like the course of the line, they are an unceasing 
progression, a growth of experiences, varying contours as they endure in time. 
 
In this way, Lines of fact, lines of experience, and hence, lines of thinking are 
implicitly unfolding forces in immediate relation to time. Bergson suggests 
that these tend to meet towards a point. This is not in the sense of a fixed, 
static position, or in terms of a spatial dimension. Rather, as a change of the 
movement from the processes  particular  to  their  course,  their  convergence  
is  the  result  of  an  ever 
Increasing approximation, and therefore, an eventual accumulation by 
necessity of their mutual and gradual growth.19
 
Bergson explains that the 
convergence is the natural outcome of continually growing experiences, so 
                                                     
17 Ibid. p 4, this is Bergson use of Italics, in which we may assume that by emphasizing the 
words themselves, he is indicating the distinction of experiences as linear occurrences not 
as a following after of experience but of the continual progression of immediacy of 
knowledge within its own temporal event, and hence, a ‘fact’ as unabated duration of 
thinking, living, feeling, etc.   
18 Ibid. p. 4, I wish to evaluate this passage very carefully as I see Bergson articulating the 
notion of mind as immediate to itself in reality, as then also durational, this is synonymous 
to the meaning that we give to lines. That our thinking is linear, that our speech and 
expression is linear based, are all indicated by the metaphor of linearity in Bergson’s 
writings, but, a concept of line is as an abstracted form of thinking is unique to these 
descriptions as also recognizably derived from life. 
19 Ibid. p. 4 
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that the point to which the lines converge, may also be said to be a growth of 
change, i.e. a concentration of experiences, a collection of differing directions 
of lines of thinking, and hence, a moment  of creative  inertia.    From the 
durative    nature of experiences, and the 
Variability of thinking, Bergson attributes characteristics of linearity to the 
progression of mind.20 
 
 
Force of Line 
 
Here we return to a Kandinskian view, comparative to Bergson, by the 
assertion that the point in the visual application of movements is to be 
regarded in terms of a silence and speech. For Kandinsky, this implies that 
the first mark, the inertial beginnings of the linear gesture is both inactive, 
according to its concrete application, but active in terms of its communication 
and affect from among the other forms of expression. However, having 
established the most primary of the basic elements, Kandinsky claims that 
from the point as an inactive, self-contained, and ‘stationary’ state of being, 
the line is then activated, develops, and hence, is a necessary force that 
proceeds from ‘without’. Here he explains that the physical and geometric 
line is an invisible thing, as it is a tracing made by the moving point. This is 
to suggest that the point is itself an initial and inertial movement of 
expression, so that the most primary of the basic elements as a force in itself, 
develops from its own energy, resulting in the line.  Kandinsky attributes the 
affect of the one to the other as a reciprocal exchange of force, claiming that 
greatest anti-thesis to the point is the line. In so far as the line originates from 
external forces, it is the activity that proceeds from a static point. The point is 
the origin of the line as motion, and through the line’s movement becomes a 
continual and dynamic movement itself. For Kandinsky the line occurs from 
the application of force upon the point or the application of multiple forces. 
In other words, he is careful to describe the line primarily in terms of force 
                                                     
20 Ibid. p. 4 
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and motion. In this sense, line is not only regarded as a transformative 
movement from static to dynamic states, but also, a motion that undergoes 
transformation from forces that are affective towards multiple and diverse 
kinesis.  For Kandinsky, the movement of lines and the diversification of lines 
is the result of the forces applied.21
  
He specifies that there are two instances 
of forms of lines. There is the line as a continual movement, affected by a 
force ‘from without’, and ‘straight’ in the sense that it remains in a singular 
and continuous succession. Then there is the line that is initially a single 
direction of movement but, affected by an alternating pattern of force, or 
affected by the ‘simultaneous action’ of more than one force, it changes 
direction in repetitive turn.22 
 
Kandinsky uses ‘tension’ as a substitute for the term ‘movement’. He reasons 
that ‘movement’ is ‘inexact’ and leads to misconceptions in which the term 
may suggest the act or process of force. Instead, the notion of ‘tension’ 
expresses the vital, ‘living’ element within the line. He suggests that because 
of the inherent ‘tension’ of the straight line, there is the implicit quality of life, 
‘the most concise form of the potentiality for endless movement’.23 He points 
towards an impetus of the line, that is, an essential energy that precedes the 
course and continuity of the line.  We argue that such energy from this tension 
of line is already a momentum itself, so that the line is a capacity for limitless 
continuity and progression. Kandinsky further qualifies his description by 
suggesting that the ‘tension’ of the line is only one aspect of its creative 
capacity. The Kandinskian theory of line is more broadly positioned in the 
context of a theory of the elements of painting, and is fundamentally defined 
in terms of movement. Although the element of line is regarded as a material 
thing, its physicality proceeds firstly from particular forms of ‘tension’ and 
                                                     
21 W. Kandinsky, Point and line to plane (Courier Dover Publications, 1947). 
22 Ibid. p. 55 
23 Ibid. p. 57, I will continue further with comparisons to Bergson’s theory of life, but for 
here the most significant point is that Kandinsky is attributing to a fundamental element of 
art, properties of potentiality, continuity, temporality and existence. That is to say, the line 
as a form, arguably a kind of life-form, is latent with energy. 
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‘direction’. 
 
Kandinsky suggests that unlike the point, the various differences for a line is 
to be attributed to the ‘three typical straight lines’: the horizontal, vertical, and 
diagonal.24
 
He explains that these lines are themselves phenomena, but, 
phenomena of experience. In other words, in terms of ‘The Outer and the 
Inner’ designations of phenomena, Kandinsky argues that the external and 
internal development of phenomena are similar to our experience of pictorial 
elements.    Therefore, the development of points and lines are essential to the 
nature of the pictorial elements in themselves. For instance, the straight line, 
‘corresponds to the line or the plane upon which the human being stands or 
moves’.25 The line expresses the qualities of our sense of spatial orientation, 
and for that matter, the existential sense of our being, of being somewhere, 
and relative to a temporal or physical direction. By claiming that the 
horizontal line ‘corresponds’ in such a way to the ‘human imagination’, 
Kandinsky argues that it is related to the senses. For example, he explains that 
the straight, horizontal line has the tonal attributes of coldness and flatness, 
and argues that it is then the expression of the possibility of ‘endless cold 
movement. In other words, Kandinsky regards the potential of the line as a 
plastic element in painting, in terms of its differing grades as then differing 
modes of the ‘elements’, and differing inner-pulsations extending to external 
activity and experience. From the designation of three types of lines, 
Kandinsky is suggesting an ontological identification of lines, by which the 
senses of the pictorial elements expresses as senses of material tonality. 
 
 
The Divergent Line 
 
For Kandinsky the movement of lines, regarded as a ‘potential’ of lines, 
generate sensuous and tonal identifications, towards a specific creative 
outcome. He argues that the line has the creative quality of being able to 
                                                     
24 Ibid. p. 58 
25 Ibid. p. 58 
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generate a plane. As a continuity of movement, the line is a creative force that 
affects the generation of other forms of movement. The line is a living form, 
a force itself, that resounds through its inertial nature, affects change through 
its temporal and spatial identities. Kandinsky claims that the lines expression, 
auto-affective, such that ‘this power expresses itself’.26 However, he does not 
give preference to the direction of either the material opening into the internal 
(i.e. invisible) or, the inner, vital force rupturing upon the physical and 
external. Instead Kandinsky maintains a view of the immanence of art with 
life, so that the inherent movements in pictorial elements of point  and  lines  
suggest  the  constantly  changing  grades  of  reality.    Where the difference 
of external or inward properties of lines may suggest the spatial operations of 
enclosing, disclosing, outlining, etc., these instead, should be regarded in 
terms of the continuous enveloping from the different durational grades from 
the potential of these elements regarded as various tones of life. Kandinsky 
claims the ‘life’ within the ‘sound’ of line, ‘seeks the appropriate external 
means to enable it to attain the shape necessary’.27 
 
The forms of line as outward aspects of inward conditions are underscored by 
totalizing and interpenetrating courses of change. The line considered in terms 
of force, and more specifically, as a ‘tension’ of energy, is attributed to 
qualities of the movements of life. In this sense, the line is not simply a ‘linear’ 
progression that is a becoming trajectory, or a movement according to pre-
established conditions for a set of possibilities, but rather, because of the 
‘internal’ and immanent force to become, with the movement of line there is 
also the continual expansion of the lines possibilities. Hence, the line is not 
‘linear’, it is divergent. Therefore, we argue that the line is not ‘linear’, to 
affirm the Kandinskian concept of line, and to argue a Bergsonian view, we 
assert that the line is a striving form. In terms of both Kandinskian and 
Bergsonian readings, we maintain that the linearity as a condition of the 
                                                     
26 Ibid. p. 60 
27 Ibid. p. 109 
    
275  
 
 
Line 
process of painting, occurs as a creative activity, continuous and changing in 
time, and thereby, the possibility for divergence and the actualizations of 
divergent experiences to life. 
 
In this sense, painting is not to be regarded as a process about a given subject 
or experience, but rather, as a ‘reversal of the work of Metaphysics’. The 
process of painting is a process in time before it is a discrete, painted object. 
It is an activity relative to the expression of vital movements and the impetus 
towards pictorial projections. By this we may say then that painting is 
mutually, a process of life, through its activities of thinking and feeling, 
affecting its realization in the concrete actualizing of the painted image. From 
the process of painting we see that life is not simply active in the enterprise 
of gesture and mark making, but, it is radically opened by perceptions taken 
from paintings’ material basis. 
 
 
Painting ‘Image’ and Living ‘Being’ 
 
From this consideration of the graphic and material nature of line, we extend 
this further to consider the living processes affecting the physical and plastic 
renderings in the process of painting. In this regard it is from life that we 
consider the movements of expression specific to the process of painting. In 
particular, it is the set of movements that are provoked from the interchange 
of conscious perceptions experiencing what is given by the materiality of the 
painting medium and continuous affect from the actualisation of its 
experience in the activity. In other words, by its expression, the experiences 
of consciousness are further articulated. The process of painting is then a 
continuous dilation and expansion of images, between the immediacy of 
feeling and sensation to the real duration of matter, and the contraction and 
intensive isolation of images, from the reflective nature of consciousness and 
thinking. Between mind and matter and then, the opening of perception as a 
reciprocal process of conscious acts provoked by the material basis means 
that the process of painting is a particular attention of life. It is a mode of 
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living creativity by which a material basis imposes on its own effects towards 
its continued activity, toward its own variability, and thereby working through 
differing movement, towards a unity of endless material and visual registers 
of change. In other words, the processes in painting are the enacting of both 
materiality and thought towards creation. With this view, the metaphysical 
consideration of painting begins with the physicality of the painter and the 
medium of painting, with the dynamic formulation of painting with the ‘thing-
ness’ and expression of painting, all in terms of processes of change. 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Living’ Painting & The Perception of Life 
 
In comparison to Kandinsky’s view of the expressivity of painting, linear 
expression in particular proceeds from a situated subject, from an inner self 
relative to external phenomena. In this sense expression is both inherent in 
the force of the line, and in the movements. Therefore, initially lines are not 
representational, but are immediate conveyances of the impulses and desires 
self-affecting their visual becoming. Lines are then, the linear tracings of the 
content of life emerging as forms continuous with the movement of life. This 
compares to a Bergsonian account, by which we argue that the line is a 
creative movement, an expression of the progression and development of 
living. Henry elaborates this more fully, considering lines as ontological 
demarcations, and thereby, attributing to line both the ‘linear content’ of life 
particular to subjective realities, as well as, the consummate emergences of 
these differing linear forms with the infinite linear varieties of the whole of 
life. In other words, the identity of lines as subjective movements is the result 
of the individuation of the expressions they embody. In this sense, linear 
forms are living movements, proceeding from the infinite varieties of life’s 
becomings. 
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However for Bergson, it is from the ‘inner life’ that sensation is also a 
qualitative change, and from this change, the individual is ‘willed’ to action 
or conscious reflection and the deliberation of thought. The novelty of 
consciousness, whether willed in anticipation of a prefigurement, engaged in 
a mode of thought, or caught up in a direct activity, occurs from its continuous 
change and the continuity of its becoming in duration. In this way, as 
perception is to be found in things themselves the ‘direction’ of thinking is 
from things to their conceptualization, so that from the directions  of  
expression  such  as  the  multiple  and  variable  directions  of  the movement, 
the concepts are of these movements.28 However, in keeping with the notion 
that in the flux of consciousness, consciousness is neither a thing nor a 
substance, then with painting regarded in terms of an event of consciousness, 
means that it is a mode qualitative change - a mode of psychological 
existence. As such, through painting, life is a presenting of itself, a synthesis 
of consciousness as an interpenetrative multiplicity of material and 
psychological elements that endure. By this I mean to suggest that painting is 
the relation of temporal processes, and thereby, the merging of particular 
movements, the encounters of these movements from the crystallization of 
images of both mental and material motions towards the continuity of 
painterly creation. In other words it is the vicissitudes of the materiality of 
painting, by which the psychical nature of reality coincides with this change. 
From this Bergsonian aspect, we may consider a notion of the tendency of 
painting, that is, the activity and imagery as modes of perceiving and thinking, 
collective movements as altogether, attributes of life. In other words, life is a 
multiplicity of continuous transformation, such that in the process of painting, 
the expressions of line and other material expressions are in themselves the 
progression of life, experience of its own becoming as a living form, and as 
an evolution of continual development. 
 
Time is the creative potential unique to painting, as images of becoming 
                                                     
28 H. Bergson, An introduction to metaphysics (Hackett Publishing, 1949). pp. xi-xii. 
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perceptual, as becoming conceptual, painting is thereby, a means for the 
divergence of life affecting the whole of life’s experience through its 
process.29
 
This highlights an ontology of painting. In terms of the abstraction 
and divergence of image from among a flow of images, life is the quality of 
change affecting differences from matter. It is from among the actualisations 
of perceptions in painting that difference opens further the possibilities of 
conscious experiences and the continued growth of life’s expressions. 
Bergson attributes existential qualities of change and continuity as themselves 
properties of life. In this sense, life is durational, and as such, the element of 
linearity is a dual conversion of durations of thought and durations of 
substance in the process of painting, such that lines originate from activities 
of the experiences and events of expression, through the coefficient of a living 
duration. Like the line then, the living body rendering the line is a continuity 
of existence, and in the process of painting, mutually occur as an expression 
of the continuance of life. This is to say that, the process of painting is a 
vitality situated by their temporality, retains the force of inventiveness and is 
the origin novelty towards perception. Moreover, painting is a particular 
movement of life in duration, and its material basis, that ‘of the inorganic 
world’, is immediate to the rhythm of its flow. This correlation allows for the 
engendering of the continuity of the visible and perceptible. According to 
Bergson the ‘living being’ has duration, and its duration is evident because it 
is continuously elaborating what is new. For Bergson the process of living is 
a process of elaboration, and this process entails a complexity of thought and 
feeling, as described in terms of a ‘searching’ and’ groping’.30 In other words, 
as 
Bergson describes the continuous unfolding of life, the unbroken ‘unwinding’ 
of things, and as such, the development of life as intervals of continuity, he 
then adds to this that this process is not without uncertainty. Rather, 
reaffirming what Bergson articulates above, the processes of painting 
considered in terms of developments of life, are likened to processes of 
                                                     
29 Ibid., pp. 92-93   
30 Ibid. p. 39 
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discovery, not in the sense of directed intention, or as a type of linear progress 
respectively, but as results of indefinite deviation associated with continual 
movement. These processes as an unfolding of experience are essentially 
dynamic. 
We regard painting as a particular process from among the progressions of 
life, to say that the possibilities of perception are unique to painting. As a 
means of life, painting ‘renders visible’, as an autonomous process in itself. 
It is an ever-changing agency of perceiving, self-creating and conceiving its 
identity from among its own expressions. The movements unique to 
painting’s existence and experience are the active adaptations constituted 
from its own ontological differences and situated in a process of becoming. 
Therefore, the ontological, and thereby, philosophical considerations of 
painting extend beyond assessments of material origins, and beyond notions 
of development and historical placements. Rather, in terms of a process 
ontology, painting is a metaphysical activity and a creative force enacting 
modes of life and the unity of consciousness in the experiences of the painted 
object. 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued that the line is a creative movement, before it is a 
representation, to mean that the condition of linearity in the process of 
painting is the immediacy of expressions through which the actualisations is 
the form of its becoming. By this we argued that the process of painting is a 
living process. It is the continual relation of activities of consciousness from 
the perceptions given by the materiality of the painting medium, towards the 
actualisation of expressions as a continuity of change from the intrinsic 
change of the modes of experience. However, the process of painting is not 
only a sense of the exploration and crystallization of sensation, nor, as only 
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the articulation of feeling or thinking. Rather, painting is a process of growth 
from among the turbulence of the continuous reabsorbing of perceptions and 
the persistent reasserting of perceptions. We argued this implies that the line 
is a materiality and the condition of linearity is the movement of its expression 
immanent to the process of painting. Therefore, the line is the becoming 
generated by the creative temporalizing movement of life. Linearity is then 
the variability of living expression through the different kinds of movement 
of life. We argued that variability of expressions intrinsic to the form of the 
movement, is the difference from the tendency of the living expression. 
Hence, by considering the line as a condition of expression, and linearity as 
mode of living movements, we argued that the materiality of the painting 
medium is a tendency towards expression, an inclination to become different 
from its movement. In terms of the activities of the painter, we argued that the 
movement of the medium, the substantive change of materials in the 
presenting of a pictorial projection, and the event of the painted object are all 
immanent to the living elaboration and divergence of life. However, 
becoming as a condition of the process of painting, is only so, because of the 
creative movements and the continuous force towards projection by the living 
temporality. In this sense, painting must be regarded as a series of creative 
movements, as continual divergence from these movements by virtue of the 
continual opening of perception, and the affects of the durations of 
consciousness.31
 
From this perspective we furthered our view according to 
Kandinsky’s principle of inner necessity.  We attempted to bridge a 
Kandinskian theory of line to Bergson’s theory of the extended existence of 
the passage of life, so as to argue for a process of painting in which the linear 
qualities of the painter’s expression are the means for vital forces immanent 
to the interchange of the living experience and the given perceptions of the 
materiality. Accordingly, we argued that in terms of the line and the visual 
and graphical elements of expression, the painter is at once the means towards 
                                                     
31 Ibid. p. 92 
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expression and subject to the experiences of these expressions.32
 
In this way, 
the line and the linearity of expression condition the subjective modes of 
conveyance, affecting their experience, and thereby, are the unfolding and 
continuously creative modes of life. By encountering the immediacy of his 
expression, the painter becomes a potent content of life’s expressivity, so that 
the first mark of the point, the initial gesture of the line, is already the presence 
of the experience of life’s creative power. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
32 Ibid. p. 54   
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Conclusion 
 
Towards a Bergsonian Philosophy of Painting 
 
This study was set out from a double perspective of a contemporary 
Bergsonian philosophy - to investigate the extension of Bergsonian 
conceptualizations from the context of the themes of time-duration, image-
memory, perception-action, as subjects of Bergson’s original philosophy, and 
to then exercise these concepts in there interaction with other currents of 
thinking to contribute to the continuation of Bergson’s philosophical outlook 
in the context of the present Bergsonian thinking. By considering the 
background of our research in terms of the recent scholarship of continental 
philosophy, and the movements of its thought towards attitudes of increasing 
complexities of thinking from motivations of thinking towards its own self-
appraisal within the divergences of its traditions, this prompted our 
questioning of the recent return to Bergson. By considering this pattern of 
development in terms of return resulting in archeologic orientations of the 
questions of contemporary continental philosophy, we regarded this as having 
contributed to the increasing momentum and furthering assertions of 
philosophy to go ‘beyond’ itself.  In this sense, the turn of thinking towards 
the question of the possibilities of thought and the renewal of considerations 
of how we must think, we have added focus to the research of philosophy 
regarding its process and prompted a return to the new philosophies of 
immanence.  By orienting our questions of philosophy to the key ideas of 
Bergsonian philosophy, and applying these concepts as they also imply the 
continuation of metaphysical thinking through the activities of philosophy via 
movements of thinking,  our questions have been aimed towards the 
elucidation of a Bergsonian immanence philosophy and the possibility of its 
thinking through the process of painting.  We have heeded the investigations 
of more recent Bergsonian scholarship, acknowledging the insight of figures 
such as Lawlor, Mullarkey, Ansell-Pearson, and more specific, to the 
interaction of Bergsonian thinking on art, Antliff and Alliez.  Though we have 
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seen that these figures have contributed to the contextual framing of the 
questions of our investigation, as they have been prompted to extend 
Bergsonian thinking and have offered lines from this continuation, we have 
been challenged by the limited scholarship directing Bergsonian thinking to 
the practice of painting and the exploration of its process as a way of doing 
philosophy. Because Bergson’s philosophy, as a philosophy of images in 
process, and as a philosophy that anticipates its difference according to the 
statutes of the becoming of all images in time, our research objective worked 
with the question and the philosophical operative of  what is at stake with 
thinking in painting, how is it most significant to a philosophy immanent to 
art.  According to this line of thought, we acknowledged that Bergson made 
limited references to art, even though the influence of his original thinking 
had profound impacts in the theoretical and visual developments in the arts 
and effectively resounded in the cultural mileu of the modernist period and 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century.  Through this frame of 
history we see how the reception of Bergson’s initial philosophy waned, but 
it was not solely because of the eclipsing of trends of thinking and currents of 
culture.  Rather by the impetus of the thinking, it became diffuse, being 
absorbed in the tumult of transitions of philosophical perspectives, and no less 
excessive than inspirational in the developments and expansions in the lines 
of philosophies of time, perception, and art.  From our view, what was most 
significant in Bergson’s thinking, was the force and vision of his ontology of 
images, itself generating the lines of Jean-Paul Satre’s thinking of 
Imagination, and being poised as a counter-position, from which Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty would make advancements towards a phenomenology of the 
materialisation of perception as the basis for the establishment of thinking 
towards the possibilities of philosophy in painting. We mentioned this tracing 
of the historical lineage of Bergsonian thinking to reaffirm our investigation 
as being at once the relation of Bergson’s conceptualisations coming to bear 
on the efforts of a philosophy of metaphysics towards the thinking of time, 
and graduating to the differing fields of as a philosophical conviction and as 
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an attitude of difference in philosophical inquiry, now evident with its present 
return as Bergsonian thinking in time.  In both senses, it has been the 
conceptualisation of philosophy as process that has been a resolutely 
multidirectional impetus towards philosophies identifications in all potential 
modes of its process.  From this context we understood Bergson’s philosophy 
to be an invention of philosophical thinking to overturn the mistakes of 
philosophy according to traditional conceptions of method and philosophical 
identity.  It is from here that we looked for other shifts of thinking 
philosophical or otherwise, which were contemporaneous with Bergson’s 
original philosophy, and regarded the work of Wassily Kandinsky. It is not 
only because of his own theories being in proximity to Bergson’s but, as with 
the effects of Bergson’s theoretical influence throughout the post-modernism 
directions of continental philosophy, so to with the effects of Kandinsky’s 
theory exercising itself through the difference of painting in terms of 
‘abstraction’, and the change of its methodology, but also in the identity of 
the visual experience of painting to exceed its own modality, to enact the 
expression that invokes creative thinking, occasioned by its process.  In view 
of the post-developments of these mirroring philosophies, we were guided by 
the initial question of Bergson’s concept of image, through our attempts to 
elaborate a theory of the ontological nature of painting. Our consideration of 
principle concept and theories gave us conceptual forms, material structures, 
and the dynamic elements of the processes and forces originating in the 
painted image, we concluded that the process of painting, as a process of 
images is conditioned by for the further elaboration of life. In this sense, 
painting is regarded as a mode of life’s expressions, the becoming of 
difference in the world. It is a practical activity of externalisation, compelled 
by the force of expression by the vitality of its own process. The process of 
painting involves the forces of life, so that painting is the activities of 
consciousness through the living events of the rhythmic extensity of art- 
objects. We concluded that the process of painting is continual and effects its 
own experience in the growing and diverging qualities immanent to its 
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expression. 
 
Our initial consideration of Bergson’s concept of image, provided a theory of 
an ontology of images to serve as a formulation and theoretical application to 
other elements of the process of painting, and a grounding for the comparison 
and mining of Kandinsky’s  didactic conceptualisations.  According to our 
view of a process ontology of images, applied to the process of painting, the 
implication is that of continual unfolding of time as a process of durations. 
From the nature of painting in these terms of images, we see the impersonal 
force of time, the impersonal force of its expression as a pure becoming, and 
becoming, regarded in its substantive and resonating basis. Reality is then 
considered as continual change and flux of images, and as continuity of 
occurrences of activity and the events of divergent change. Here we relied on 
our concurrent analysis with Kandinsky’s theory to establish further 
resonance of his sense of abstract painting with a Bergsonian reflection of 
painting towards the practice of philosophy immanent to painting. For this 
regarded the identity of philosophy’s translation according to the essential 
differences of durations within the process of painting, encompassing the 
objective forms and materiality of the painting media, which conditions the 
subjective experiences of painter and the individuation of his expressions. It 
follows that the process of painting, as a process of images, is a possibility to 
experience and express time because of its originating activities. From the 
Kandinskian orientation of our analysis we understood Henry’s challenge of 
the immanence of painting, as echoing the Bergsonian turn of thinking, 
according to  theories of embodiment and affectivity Henry interpreted and 
distinguished in the Kandinsky’s work. From this we considered Mullarkey’s 
call for immanence philosophy to continue in new directions by orientation 
of dialogues of thinking from Henry’s, with the consideration of the currents 
of contemporary research towards Bergsonian thinking.  Because of this we 
regarded the complexity of a triune return of Bergsonian thinking, through the 
thinking of Kandinsky, for the thinking of Henry’s thinking counter to the 
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directions of thought established in the course of phenomenology. The 
dialogue of Bergsonian philosophy is opened and active here with Henry, but 
independent of the Henrian adoption of Kandinsky, the emergence of the 
dialogue of Bergsonian philosophy towards philosophies of painting may be 
encouraged by approximations of Kandinsky’s.   By this we recognised the 
potential of Bergsonian thinking towards other modes of thinking, as 
witnessed in the recent turn of thinking of Henrian perspectives, but obvious 
in the historical developments of painting preceding Henry, the turn of 
Kandinsky’s work as defining a new era in the domain of philosophical  
possibilities in painting, towards an abstraction of art.  From this we argued 
that by continuing practice of philosophy in painting, we must  insist on the 
continuing practice of painting with the anticipation for the further 
understanding of images. However, we also concluded that by broadening the 
scope of philosophies of images, and by the concern that also drives the 
exploration of different modes of image making, the discourse of philosophies 
of change and the process will continue, but from our view of Kandinsky on 
painting via Henry, we recognise the turn of thinking that is most notably and 
significant towards Bergsonian philosophy.  In this sense the immanence of 
the process of painting means that the process is transformational and never 
permanent. 
 
Nonetheless, we oriented the process of thinking to the complexity of the 
process of images, in the Bergsonian context of differing durations in the 
unfolding in time. Because of this, we considered Bergson’s theory of 
intuition, so as to offer a method of philosophy in the practice of painting. 
More specifically, we considered the intuitive experience as provoked by the 
process of painting. In this regard, we claimed that by a painterly intuition, it 
is the processes of the painting media that evokes the vision in things. We 
considered Bergson’s theory of intuition, applied to painting, to underscore 
our claim of the creative and affective order of immediate reflection. To this 
end, and from the basis of Bergson’s theory of intuition, we considered 
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painting as an activity of sensible apprehension. This was found to be equal 
with Kandinsky’s , by ascribing this notion of intuition to process of painting 
we understood this to mean the role of intuitive experience within the 
activities of painting as an intervening mode of conscious reflection affecting 
the whole of the painting process. In this sense, intuition is staged as a medium 
for processes of origination in painting, and a means of difference towards 
visual forms. For intuition to be utilised as a practice, its method in the process 
of painting, we argued, is also a metaphysics, signaling a Kandinskian turn in 
the identity of the painting, and that this requires a level of immediate 
attention as configured by painter’s bodily movement and gestural activity in 
continual response to the affective qualities of the painting media, further 
signals the Bergsonian turn to thinking through difference. In other words, the 
synthesis of Kandinskian and Bergsonian views on intuitive experience, 
allows us to consider the Henrian operative of the ‘manifestation’ of images, 
from a correlation of the painter’s activity in response to the painting medium. 
We considered that the painter’s perceptual situation is present to the state of 
the durational presence of the painting medium, to mean that the intuitive 
experience is engendered by the materiality of the process. The implications 
of this are a renewal of philosophical discourse on the role of painting towards 
its own ‘revealing’ potential. Here is the situation of thinking, towards the 
further investigations of the philosophy of painting, as the working towards 
the difference of philosophical thinking inscribed in painting medium, but 
extending to the expressions furthering the motives of the philosophizing 
process. Again, the question remains present towards the thinking encounter 
of its process, so that the identity of painting, is the duplicitous creativity 
source, towards its philosophy through image and its becoming through 
images.    
 
We considered the process of painting, specific to the emphasis of painting as 
events of experiences attentive to the becoming of images, and through the 
encounter of these images, difference of the realizations of life through the 
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force of material forms.  By encountering Kandinsky, again, by return of 
Bergsonian thinking to the question of thinking, we argued that the painter is 
the contact of activities which assume the germinal affect of perception 
towards difference of thinking from an ontological condition of images in 
process. By thinking Bergsonian, the transverse of Kandinskian theorisation 
with Bergsonian was elaborated, so that the renewal of painting as thinking, 
and the investigation of thinking through painting may be reconsidered. From 
these spatialized views of experience, our intellect affirms a sense of 
permanence and substantiality equally effecting a division of continual 
processes of being. This assumes a plurality of images, images differentiating 
from among a totality of images in movement. The theoretical implications 
of this is that movement  is directly related to the development of 
consciousness, and the investigations of the experience of movement in 
process of painting may offer philosophical expressions immediate to the 
novel changes of conscious perception. We considered that painting as 
multiple events of movements and must now admit that the different images 
created from within the continuity of a multiplicity of movements within the 
process of painting are limited by the capacity of the painting media. 
Therefore, we wish to consider other painterly means that may challenge the 
modes of expression in the process of painting, and perhaps even, discover 
modes of expressions through novel experiences of movement. This concern 
will always remain where a philosophy of duration and philosophies of 
process continue. For us, this question of movement and change may be 
continuously approached in the process of painting. Its resolve, however, is 
open by the processes of its investigation. 
 
We then considered a concept of abstraction, to regard the unique property of 
difference from among the change and movements of images in process. We 
considered abstraction in terms of a disruptive force, with qualities of 
fragmentation and derived from intuitive and organic experiences of 
creativity. Towards a Bergsonian theory of painting, we insisted that by 
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abstraction the activities of the painter and the event of the art-image are a 
mutual affect of the dissociation of images from the total strata of the flow of 
images. It is to this end that we considered abstraction to be the condition of 
an interruption of images, from the immobilisation of thinking and thought 
then binding concepts to images, involving the becoming of conceptual and 
perceptual forms. We have considered the concept of abstraction from 
Bergson’s philosophy, and then compared this with the concept of abstraction 
in Kandinsky’s theory, to argue that from the process of painting, abstraction 
is a condition of thinking in the painting. We argued that the process of 
conceptualization and percept formulation emerges from the relation of 
movements of the painter’s activity with the painting media. Having 
developed our argument from the basis of Bergson’s theory of image, we 
argued that abstraction related to Bergson’s philosophy of change, by which 
the abstractive nature of the process of painting is immanent to its 
continuously changing forms. In other words, from the endlessly changing 
content of life, the process of painting as a living process necessarily changes 
by difference of movements occurring within the passage of movements. This 
implies that the physical composition and plastic processes of painting are the 
result of reciprocal. The reciprocal affects from the correlating modes of 
perception and activity to the expressive content of material objects and the 
painted visual experience. In this sense, we have argued that abstraction is the 
occurrence of both the perception of consciousness and the material 
correspondence as mutually affecting each other. The implications of this are 
that the concept of abstraction is necessarily encountered in the process of 
painting. Therefore, the discourses of philosophy and painting, continuing 
with the process, are abstractive. We insist then, that a continuing philosophy 
of art considers its unfolding as a simultaneous experience of abstraction, and 
thereby immediate to its understanding. 
 
We considered frame in a broader ontological view, one that suggests a 
distinct material boundary, as well as a unique process of conceptualizing the 
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world, processes of contouring and outline, affecting visualization. We argued 
that the present challenge for the development of a Bergsonian theory of the 
frame in the process of painting is to consider the first described frame or the 
activity of framing as being systemic with the force of motion that precedes 
space, and therefore, consider framing according to the processes of conscious 
selection and the delimiting nature of imagination. We argued that ‘frame’ is 
an ontological condition of the expression of life and material becoming of 
the affective transition from perception to becoming-perceived. We 
considered the frame in connection with the surface of paintings activity to 
argue that the picture plane is an identity from a process of framing. We 
argued that in Bergsonian terms, it can be said that the picture plane is both a 
recurring pattern of material arrangement marking the creative ‘ascension’ of 
life. But also, it is a spontaneous reproduction, the memory-image of a pattern 
of experience, and thereby, a literal surface-image by its natural delimitation 
from the material world. Framing is intrinsic to the surface of the picture 
plane, as reasserted through the experience of concentration, reflection, and 
thinking that orients conscious perception. We argued from Bergson’s 
concept of movement, to suggest that the picture plane is the situated 
interpenetration of movements, the interchange of vital and material occur 
within the picture plane. We compared our theory of frame and the relation to 
the picture plane to Kandinsky’s view of painting, and in particular his view 
of the rigors of painting in terms of the planarity of the material surface and 
its intrinsic force of movement issuing towards the experience of the painter. 
It is by Kandinsky’s theory that we see a turn in the identity of painting, by 
rejecting figuration and the privileging of the object of painting, his view and 
the outlook incorporated in his paintings align a conceptualisation of process 
with the immanence of the creative force intrinsic to its identity. We see how 
this brings Kandinskian theory in close proximity to Bergsonian, and by this 
orientation in the uptake of Henry’s aesthetic theories, challenges the 
institution of phenomenology by the replacement of  ‘concsiousness of form’  
with ‘every form is in reality a force’.  Furthermore, we discovered that with 
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Kandinsky, the picture plane is metaphysical in the sense that it is a living 
element of expressing itself through the formative process of painting. 
Therefore, for Kandinsky, the element of planarity before the painter is the 
condition for spiritual growth, and is at once the physical and material 
possibility of painting, so that its content becomes the means for abstraction. 
The consequence of this is that the picture plane is to become itself a topic for 
further philosophical discourse. By approaching the surface, as a designation 
for the originating of activity, we consider this as the beginning of method of 
philosophy. 
 
We considered colour as a material force from the notion that its material 
movement is also the probability for its own difference. From this, we were 
interested in the external application of colour and its intermediation for the 
possibilities of difference in colour expression in the process of painting. We 
considered Bergson’s view that colour is part of the real movement and 
continuously changing nature of reality, so that concerning the nature of 
colour in itself, we understood colour to be an indivisible rhythm occurring 
within duration. From this view we argued that the nature of the colour 
experience is variable according to the occurrences of colour coinciding with 
the continuity of our own consciousness. In this sense, we continued a 
Bergsonian interpretation of colour to argue that colour is a heterogeneous 
and qualitative movement in time. However, we then considered that through 
the contracting of the rhythms of colour into the durations lived by our 
consciousness, we are affected by what is given through the experience of 
colour. Therefore with our view towards the expression of colour in the 
process of painting, we argued that colour is a continuous possibility for the 
experiences of conscious perception as a continuity of difference within the 
movements of the painter’ body, and thereby, the potential for differing levels 
of sensation in its expression. Compared to Kandinsky’s account in either 
terms of the impressionable or affective nature of colour upon the body and 
the mind, we discovered that colour is yet one of many indicia of the multiple 
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and dynamic impulses of life.  What this meant to us is that the use of colour 
in the process of painting is an immediate engagement with the flux of reality, 
and therefore, a means for philosophical introspection and metaphysical 
expression. In other words, because life is considered in terms of force and 
movement, colour as a force and movement is a means to understand the 
variabilities of experience in the passage of time. Philosophical discussions 
of colour take many forms, generally elaborating on either notions of a 
subjective experience as relational properties, or as objective and a ‘thing’ of 
objects. From the implications of our view of the process of colour we 
concede that all of these options adhere in some degree. Therefore, the 
conclusion we draw from this towards a continuing philosophy is that the 
direct contact with colour in the modes of art media may allow for those 
experiences of colour to expand our philosophies of colour. A consensus of 
the experience and expression of colour is open towards art’s investigations 
and philosophical understanding. Through a view of colour in terms of both 
Bergson and Kandinsky, we now see that what is at stake for a philosophy of 
colour applied to the broader outlook of the philosophy through painting, is 
the ideogrammatic identification of colour according to the its infusion  into 
the variational definitions of the whole of painting.  The challenge remains, 
to encounter colour without the terms of painting, without the identification 
preceding its experience, without its understanding based on a pictorial 
language.  How to overcome the referential obligations of colour in the 
broader project of the philosophy of painting remains as a testament to the 
longstanding problem of how to think colour without inaugurating its 
reference.  This marks a challenge for Bergsonian theory towards painting, 
and prompts further reading of Kandinsky to investigate the ‘rhythm’ of 
colour before its inevitable deferment to the semiotic element of the picture.   
 
From our considerations of affect of colour from within the living experience 
of the painter, we then argued that the line as a materiality and, condition of 
linearity as the movement, are processes of expression. The line as a mark and 
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as a movement of marking is a movement that translates the experience of 
other movements but it expresses movements beyond itself. We considered 
the concept of line and its derivation of linearity, as immanent to the process 
of painting. Therefore, we understood the line as a quality of becoming, 
generated by the creative temporalizing movement of life. Linearity is then 
the variability of living expression through the different kinds of movement 
of life. We argued that the variability of expressions intrinsic to the form of 
linear movement is also potential towards difference as a tendency of living 
expressions. We considered the Kandinskian theory that suggested the line in 
terms of continuous motion and as energetic rhythms. By its gestured material 
manifestation it is a form of movement that is immediate to its own 
actualisation. Compared to a Bergsonian view we considered the line in terms 
of a vitality, so that, as a form given by its own movement, it is also the tracing 
of living experience. From a philosophy of immanence, I think that the 
linearity of the line is evidence of the possible affects and the actual material 
modulations of forces of life. We attempted to bridge a Kandinskian theory 
of line to Bergson’s theory of the extended existence of the passage of life, so 
as to argue towards and ontology of 
linearity. Accordingly, we argued that in terms of the line and the visual and 
graphical elements of expression, the painter is at once the means towards 
expression and subject to the experiences of these expressions. In this way, 
the line and the linearity of expression condition the subjective modes of its 
conveyance, affecting its experience, and thereby, is an unfolding of 
expression but also a continuous possibility and a creative mode of life. 
 
From Bergson’s view of the endless and ever changing activity of time, we 
have maintained that painting is a process immanent to time and is therefore, 
an elaboration of activity through movement, imagination, and projection. 
Because of the temporality of painting, the total process of reality may be 
encountered, and experienced through the indeterminate nature of its 
continuous presentations. Time is a creative force unceasing its elaboration 
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through divergences of perspective as indeterminate movements resulting in 
unforeseen expressions. From Bergson’s notion that time is something that 
acts, that time itself is elaborative, by this we maintain that the painterly 
qualities of the process are creative because of the indefinite variability of the 
painter or the painting medium. Therefore, painting is the process in which 
philosophy may experience the inexhaustible possibilities of thinking and the 
continuous change of time in things. From our evaluations of those aspects of 
Bergson’s philosophy which may be regarded as each a philosophical system, 
but collectively, they offer a simple vision by which the continual 
appropriation and continuing philosophical discourses in the living and 
experientially based practices of painting may proceed. To this end we admit 
to the inexhaustible process of images, through which the becoming of 
painterly experience and its thinking continues. 
 
 
    
295  
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
M. Antliff, Inventing Bergson: Cultural politics and the Parisian avant-garde 
(Princeton University Press Princeton, 1993). 
J. Mullarkey, The New Bergson (Manchester University Press, 1999). 
N. de Warren, 'Tamino’s Eyes, Pamina’s Gaze: Husserl’s phenomenology of 
image-consciousness refashioned', Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences,  
(Springer, 2010). 
M. Merleau-Ponty, 'Eye and mind (C. Dallery, Trans.)', The primacy of 
perception. 
G. Gutting, French philosophy in the twentieth century (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
J. Mullarkey and C. de Mille, Bergson and the art of immanence: painting, 
photography, film (Edinburgh University Press, 2013). 
W. Kandinsky, Kandinsky, complete writings on art (Da Capo Press, 1994). 
P. Crowther, The language of twentieth-century art: a conceptual history 
(Yale University Press New Haven, CT, 1997). 
S. Guerlac, Thinking in time: an introduction to Henri Bergson (Cornell 
University Press, 2006). 
J. Mullarkey, Post-continental philosophy: An outline (Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2006). 
D. Ihde, Postphenomenology: Essays in the postmodern context 
(Northwestern University Press, 1995). 
H. Bergson, Matter and memory (New York: Zone books, 1999). 
J. Golding, 'Paths to the Absolute', Mondrian, Malevich, Kandinsky, Pollock, 
Newman, Rothko and Still, London. 
M. Fernández, ‘Life-like’: Historicizing Process and Responsiveness in 
Digital Art (na, 2006). 
L. Lawlor, The challenge of Bergsonism (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2003). 
N. Wolterstorff, 'Works and worlds of art'. 
H. Focillon, C. B. Hogan and G. Kubler, The life of forms in art (Zone Books 
New York, 1989). 
W. Grohmann and W. Kandinsky, 'Life and Work', New York. 
W. Kandinsky, Concerning the spiritual in art (Courier Dover Publications, 
2012). 
H. Bergson, Henri Bergson: key writings (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2002). 
J. Mullarkey, Bergson and philosophy (Edinburgh University Press 
Edinburgh, 1999). 
B. Sandywell, Dictionary of Visual Discourse: A Dialectical Lexicon of 
Terms (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2012). 
J. Hornsby, Concise Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy (Psychology 
Press, 2000). 
I. W. Alexander, 'Bergson, philosopher of reflection'. 
F. C. T. Moore, Bergson: thinking backwards (Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
    
296  
 
 
 
H. Michel, 'La barbarie', Grasset, Paris. 
K. Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual (Routledge, 
2002). 
W. Kandinsky, Point and line to plane (Courier Dover Publications, 1947). 
H. Bergson, 'Duration and Simultaneity, with Reference to Einstein’s Theory, 
trans', Leon Jacobson (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) 44. 
H. Read, Education through art (Faber & Faber London, 1958). 
B. Croce and D. Ainslie, The essence of aesthetic (Heinemann London, 1921). 
R. Arnheim, Art and visual perception: A psychology of the creative eye (Univ 
of California Press, 1954). 
M. R. Kelly, 'Bergson and Phenomenology'. 
J.-P. Sartre and F. Williams, Imagination: A psychological critique 
(University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor, 1962). 
R. Pope, Creativity: theory, history, practice (Psychology Press, 2005). 
A. Ehrenzweig, The hidden order of art: A study in the psychology of artistic 
imagination (Univ of California Press, 1967). 
G. Deleuze, 'Bergsonism, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam', New York: 
Zone. 
H. Bergson, Mind-energy: lectures and essays (H. Holt, 1920). 
F. Burwick and P. Douglass, 'The crisis in modernism: Bergson and the 
vitalist controversy'. 
O. Grau and T. Veigl, Imagery in the 21st Century (Mit Press, 2011). 
S. Edwards and P. Woods, Art & Visual Culture 1850-2010: Modernity to 
Globalisation (Tate Enterprises Ltd, 2013). 
F. Popper and S. Bann, Origins and development of kinetic art (Studio Vista, 
1968). 
R. G. Collingwood, The principles of art (Oxford University Press, 1938). 
J. Solomon, 'Bergson'. 
A. C. Barnes and V. De Mazia, The Art of Henri-Matisse (C. Scribner's sons, 
1933). 
B. Massumi, Semblance and event: Activist philosophy and the occurrent arts 
(MIT press, 2011). 
A. E. Pilkington, Bergson and his Influence: a Reassessment (Cambridge 
University Press, 1976). 
J. Bell, What is painting?: representation and modern art (Thames and 
Hudson, 1999). 
I. Chilvers, The Oxford dictionary of art (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
J. Maritain, Creative intuition in art and poetry (Pantheon books, 1953). 
H. Bergson, 'The two sources of morality and religion'. 
M. Henry and S. Davidson, Seeing the invisible: on Kandinsky (Continuum 
Intl Pub Group, 2009). 
E. H. Gombrich, 'The story of art. Phaidon', Chapters 7. 
L. Dickerman and M. Affron, Inventing Abstraction, 1910-1925: How a 
Radical Idea Changed Modern Art (The Museum of Modern Art, 2012). 
M. Gooding, Abstract Art (Movements in Modern Art Series) (Tate 
Publishing, 2001). 
    
297  
 
 
 
J. Mullarkey, 'The psycho-physics of phenomenology: Bergson and Henry'. 
Z. Kocur and S. Leung, 'Theory in contemporary art since 1985'. 
M. O'Sullivan, Michel Henry: Incarnation, Barbarism, and Belief: an 
Introduction to the Work of Michel Henry (Peter Lang, 2006). 
M. B. Hansen, New philosophy for new media (MIT press, 2004). 
J. Derrida, 'The truth in painting'. 
A. Friedberg, The virtual window: from Alberti to Microsoft (Taylor & 
Francis, 2008). 
J. Llewelyn, Derrida on the Threshold of Sense (Macmillan London, 1986). 
J. Derrida, Speech and phenomena, and other essays on Husserl's theory of 
signs (Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
G. Deleuze, 'Cinema 1: the movement-image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Barbara Habberjam', Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Originally 
published as Cinéma 1. 
E. A. Grosz, Chaos, territory, art: Deleuze and the framing of the earth 
(Columbia University Press, 2008). 
G. Deleuze and F. Bacon, Francis Bacon: The logic of sensation (U of 
Minnesota Press, 2003). 
C. Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze (Routledge, 2001). 
M. Craig, 'Deleuze and the Force of Color', Philosophy Today 54. 
J. Itten and F. Birren, The Elements of Color: A Treatise on the Color System 
of J. Itten, based on His Book the Art of Color. Edited and with a Foreword 
and Evaluation by F. Birren. Transl. by Ernst Van Hagen (Van Nostrand 
Reinhold, 1970). 
H. Bergson, An introduction to metaphysics (Hackett Publishing, 1949). 
 
